M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 273; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2035
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 27 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3266/2025
- Sections
- 17, 49, 17(1), 202, 201, 40, 54, 133, 22A, 1, 2, 92
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2035 : 2025 INSC 273 M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr.
v.
J. Manjula (Civil Appeal No(s). 3266-3267 of 2025)
27 February 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether an agent by virtue of being a holder of the General Power of Attorney (‘GPA’) along with Agreement to Sell had any right, title or interest in the subject-matter of the agency, to execute a registered sale deed after the death of the principal; Whether it was obligatory for the Respondent to challenge the execution and validity of the GPA and the Agreement to Sell and seek a declaration that the registered sale deed invalid, non-est or illegal.
Headnotes† Facts in brief: It is a dispute concerning title to immovable property, both appellants and respondents traced ownership through separate transactional chains — The appellants asserted that the original owner, executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) and an Agreement to Sell in favour of his agent, who subsequently, as attorney-holder, sold the Suit Property via registered sale deed – Conversely, the respondents claimed that following the original owners’ death, his heirs rightfully sold the Suit Property. Indian Contract Act 1872 – ss.201 and 202 – Whether mere use of word ‘irrevocable’ in Power of Attorney (‘POA’) will make the said POA an irrevocable POA — The Supreme Court held that a document has to be construed as a whole to conclude that the said POA is irrevocable POA — Mere mentioning of the word ‘irrevocable’ does not make the instrument irrevocable, moreover mere entitlement to remuneration or authority to sell does not by itself confer such vested interest — The agency must be expressly created to secure the agent’s proprietary interest, which was not done in the present case:
* Author 2036 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: Contract of agency gets automatically terminated by death of either of the parties — As soon as the executant of POA dies, the right given to the agent comes to an end. Once the agency is terminated, the agent cannot act on the basis of the power granted to him under the GPA — When a Principal-Agent relationship coupled with an interest in the subject matter of the agency, it metamorphosizes to an irrevocable agency unless expressly stated otherwise — It is not disputed that there is principal-agent relationship in the present case — But mere mentioning of word ‘irrevocable’ and right to authority to sell in the said POA does not make the POA irrevocable — A stray sentence here and there cannot be picked out to construe a document — To understand the tenor of the document and the intention of the parties, it has to be read as a whole — It is a settled principle that the agency has to be specifically meant to secure the agent’s benefit or interest, in order to make the POA irrevocable, interest of the agent can be inferred from the language of the document or from the course of business between the principal and agent — The real intention of the parties has to be construed by examining the totality of the recitals in the document — If the POA is not coupled with interest, no extraneous expression can make it irrevocable — In the present case, it is evident from the tenor of POA that is not irrevocable as it was not executed to effectuate security or to secure interest of the agent, mere entitlement to remuneration or authority to sell does not by itself confer such vested interest — The agency must be expressly created to secure the agent’s proprietary interest thus, in the case, the holder of POA could not be said to have an interest in the subject-matter of the agency. [Paras 45, 46] Registration Act – s.17 and s.49 – Compulsory registration of instrument which transfers any interest:
Held: The combined reading of the POA and the agreement to sell — Would mean that by executing the POA along with agreement to sell, the holder had an interest in the immovable property — If interest had been transferred by way of a written document, it had to be compulsorily registered as per Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act — In the instant case, the POA was not registered thus, it would not be open for the POA holder to content that they had a valid right, title and interest in the immovable property to execute the registered sale deed in favour of another person. [Paras 53-55] [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2037M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula Whether it was obligatory for a party to challenge the execution and validity of the General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell and to further pray that the registered sale deed is invalid — Where title is foundational to possession, courts are competent to determine ownership without necessitating a separate declaratory action:
Held: Where a finding on title is necessary for granting an injunction and has been substantially dealt with by the Trial Court in a suit for injunction, a direct and specific prayer for a declaration of title is not a necessity — Where a finding on an issue of title is not necessary for deciding the question of possession and the grant of an injunction, or where no issue on title has been framed to decide a suit for injunction, any observation or decision on title would be incidental and collateral and will not operate as res judicata — Thus, it is not correct that the absence of a separate suit for declaration or even a specific prayer to that effect will alter the legal position of either party in the case. [Paras 58, 59] Case Law Cited Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors. [1979] 2 SCR 424 : (1979) 2 SCC 601; State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : (2005) 12 SCC 77; Timblo Irmaos Ltd., Margo v. Jorge Anibal Matos Sequeira [1977] 2 SCR 451 : (1977) 3 SCC 474; Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & Ors. [2018] 5 SCR 36 : (2018) 7 SCC 646; Sajjadanashin Sayed MD. B.E. EDR. (Dead) by LRs. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer [2000] 1 SCR 1095 : (2000) 3 SCC 350; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. [2008] 5 SCR 331 : (2008) 4 SCC 594; Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2011] 11 SCR 848 : (2012) 1 SCC 656 — relied on.
Dalchand v. Seth Hazarimal & Ors., 1931 SCC OnLine MP 57; Palani Vannan v. Krishnaswami Konar, 1945 SCC OnLine Mad 119; Shri Harbans Singh v. Smt. Shanti Devi, 1977 SCC OnLine Del 102; Manubhai Prabhudas Patel v. Jayantilal Vadilal Shah, 2011 SCC OnLine Guj 7028; Channegowda & Anr. v. N.S. Vishwanath & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 153 — relied on.
List of Acts Contract Act, 1872; Registration Act, 1908.
2038 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Registration of instrument when interest transferred; Deed of conveyance; Claim for possession is dependent on issue of Title; Agent’s interest in power of attorney; Irrevocable Power of Attorney. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 3266-3267 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.2019 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA Nos. 1317 and 1318 of 2014 Appearances for Parties Adv. for the Appellants:
Ms. Farhat Jahan Rehmani.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Mahesh Thakur, Ranvijay Singh Chandel, Mrs. Geetanjali Bedi. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:- INDEX* A. FACTUAL MATRIX .................................................................... 3 B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT .......................................................... 15
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S) .......... 21
D. SUBMISSIONS OF BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT(S) ...... 24
E. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION .............................................. 26 F. ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 27 i. Relationship between the Executant and Holder of General Power of Attorney ............................................. 28 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2039M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula ii. Independent Reading of the General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell .............................................. 32 a. ‘Interest’ in Power of Attorney .................................. 32 b. Nature of Power of Attorney ..................................... 40 iii. Combined Reading of the General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell .............................................. 46 iv. Effect of Suit for Injunction simpliciter ........................ 54 G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 60
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are the same, the parties are also same and the challenge is also the self-same, hence those were taken up analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. These appeals have been filed before this Court from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru dated 16.10.2019 in R.F.A. No. 1318/2014 c/w R.F.A. No. 1317/2014 (“impugned judgment”) whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the common judgment and decree dated 21.06.2014 passed in O.S. No. 133/2007 and O.S. No. 4045/2008 by the Court of VIII Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge at Bengaluru City.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The description of the parties before this Court, the High Court and before the Trial Court is tabulated as follows:- Before This Court Before the High Court Before the Trial Court Remarks Muniyappa - - Original Owner A. Saraswathi - - Holder of POA Appellants Petitioners Plaintiff in O.S. No.
4045/2008 Defendant in suit instituted by the respondent no. 9 Respondent Nos.
1-6 Respondent Nos.
1-6 Defendant Nos. 1-6 Legal heirs of original owner 2040 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Respondent No.
Respondent No. 7 Defendant No. 7 Purchaser Respondent No.
Respondent Nos.
8-10 Defendant No. 8 Purchaser Respondent No.
9/Answering Respondent Respondent No.
Plaintiff in O.S. No.
133/2007 Defendant no. 9 in suit instituted by the appellants/Gift Deed Holder Appellant no. 2 was represented by his general power of attorney holder i.e., appellant no. 1, for the purposes of the appeal before the High Court and this Court.
5. The dispute arises from a common claim put forward by the appellants and the answering respondent on property bearing Site No. 10, out of Sy. No. 55/1, situated at Chunchaghatta Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk (hereinafter referred to as “Suit Property”). The Suit Property originally formed part of 1 acre 8 guntas of land situated in Chunchaghatta Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluka within the revenue limits of Konanakunte Gram Panchayat owned by late Muniyappa @ Ruttappa (hereinafter referred to as “original owner”). The original owner developed the said land in the form of individual plots and sold those plots for consideration to various person. The Suit Property is one of those plots.
6. It is the case of the appellants that on 04.04.1986, the Suit Property was sold by the original owner one A. Saraswathi (hereinafter referred to as “holder”) for total sale consideration of Rs.10, 250/by executing an irrevocable power of attorney (hereinafter referred to as “POA”) and an unregistered agreement to sell. The contents of the said POA and agreement to sell are extracted hereinbelow:- “GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT, I,
Muniyappa urf Ruttappa Son of Ragallappa, Major, residing at Vajarahalli village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk do hereby appoint, nominate and constitute Smt.
A. Saraswathi W/O M. S. Anantha Murthy, residing at No. 155, 5th Cross, Wilsongarden, Bangalore - 560 027 as [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2041M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula my General Power of Attorney holder to do the following acts, deeds and things on my behalf that is to say:
1) To look after, maintain, manage the Schedule Property in the best manner as my attorney deems fit.
2) To enter into any type of agreements in respect of the Schedule property with any person for any amount, receive advance amount, issue proper receipts, apply to the competent authority seeking permission to execute any type of deeds, in favour of any persons, and to execute such deeds in favour of such persons, receive full consideration amount, issue proper discharge thereof, sign all deeds, forms etc., etc., 3) To apply for transfer of Khata and to pay all future taxes and to receive proper receipts.
4) To apply for sanctioned plan for construction of any type of building on the property and to construct such building, utilise the same as my attorney deems fit and to get all profits therefrom.
5) To represent me in respect of the Schedule property in all Government offices, BDA, BWSSB, KEB, Corporation etc., etc., apply for any type of documents, receive the same, and approach BDA for reconvey of Schedule property, to pay all betterment charges and to do all connected things. 6) In case of complications to sue such matters in proper courts, of law by engaging the service of advocates or advocate, sign all forms, vakalath, suits, petitions, etc, produce any documents in court, take any documents from the court, give evidence, obtain decree, execute the sale or enter into compromise.
7) The Schedule property is in my peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof as absolute owner thereof.
8) My Attorney is ge11erally entitled to do all such acts, deeds and things, in respect of the Schedule property, which are not specifically written hereunder and I do hereby agree to ratify confirm all such acts, deeds and things done by my attorney as the acts, deeds and things done by me in person and this G.P.A. is irrevocable in nature. 2042 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
SCHEDULE
Site No. 10, out of Sy. No. 55/1, situated at Chunchaghatta Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, measuring East to West 30 feet and North to South (40-6” + 42-3”)/2 feet and bounded as follows:- East by: Property No. 11 West by: Property No. 9 North by: Road & South by: Private Property In witnesses whereof I the executant above named signed this General Power of Attorney on this 4th day of April 1986 at Bangalore.
Identified by me Executant Execution admitted before me S.B. Chandrasekhar Bangalore Metropolitan Area Notary Bangalore Date: 4-4-1986
SALE AGREEMENT
This Deed of Sale Agreement is made on this 4th day of April, 1986 at Bangalore and executed by Sri. Muniyappa urf Ruttappa, Son of Ragallappa, residing at Chunchaghatta village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk hereinafter called the “VENDOR” (which term shall mean and include all his heirs, executors, administrators and assignees) of the one part and in favour of Srimathi. A. Saraswathi W/O, Ananthamurthy, residing at No. 155, 5th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore-560 027 hereinafter called the “PURCHASER” (which term shall mean and include all heirs, executors, administrators and assignees) of the other part witnesseth as follows:~ [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2043M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula WHEREAS the Vendor is the absolute owner in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule Property more fully described in the Schedule hereunder.
And whereas the Vendor is in need of funds for the maintenance of his family and other legal necessities he desired to sell the Schedule Property in favour of the purchaser for a sum of Rs 10,250/-(Rs. Ten thousand two hundred fifty only) to which the Purchaser duly agreed to purchase the same for the said sum of Rs. 10,250/- only. In pursuance of this Sale agreement the purchaser paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- on 20-5-1985 through a Cheque No. 0861556 of Syndicate Bank, Wilsongarden Branch, Bangalore and a sum of Rs. 5,250/- only Cheque No.
039 529/243 dated 3.4.86 of Syndicate Bank Wilson Garden, Bangalore total the Vendor received the full sale consideration of Rs.10,250/- only. This day the Vendor handed over the vacant possession of the Schedule property to the purchaser to have and to hold the same as absolute owner. As there is a prohibition of selling the revenue sites by the Government of Karnataka the Vendor could not execute the sale deed. As and when the Government of Karnataka revokes the fragmentation act the Vendor execute the sale deed.
This day the Vendor handed over the vacant possession of the Schedule property to the purchaser, the Vendor have no objection to construct a dwelling house on the Schedule property the Vendor have no objection to transfer the Khata of the Schedule Property to the name of the purchaser. The Vendor assures the purchaser that the schedule property is free from all kinds of encumbrances and it is free from all taxes.
SCHEDULE:- Site No. 10, out of Sy. No. 55/1, situated at Chunchaghatta Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, measuring East to West 30 feet and North to South (40-6” + 42-3”)/2 feet and bounded as follows:- East by: Property No. 11 West by: Property No. 9 2044 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports North by: Road & South by: Private Property In witnesses whereof both the parties have affixed their signatures to this sale agreement on the day, month and the year above first written.
WITNESSES:
1.
2.
3.
VENDOR
PURCHASER”
7. On the same day, the said POA was duly notarized. On 30.01.1997, the original owner, executant of the POA died. On 01.04.1998, the holder of POA executed a registered sale deed with respect to the Suit Property in favour of her son, i.e., the appellant no. 2, in exchange of sale consideration of Rs. 84,000/-.
8. On the other hand, several years after the death of the original owner, his legal heirs through a registered sale deed dated 21.03.2003 sold the same Suit Property to the respondent no. 7 for total sale consideration of Rs. 76,000/-. Subsequently, respondent no. 7 sold the Suit Property to the respondent no. 8 vide another registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 for total sale consideration of Rs. 90,000/-. Then, on 06.12.2004, the respondent no. 8 executed a registered gift deed in favour of her daughter, i.e., the answering respondent.
9. It is the case of the appellants that after a long period of time, the father of appellant no. 2, i.e., the appellant no. 1 herein, visited the Suit Property on 02.01.2007. To his shock and surprise, he found strangers in possession of the Suit Property. He, accordingly, lodged a police complaint with the concerned police station. The occupants as well as the answering respondent were called by the police to the police station. However, the police closed the matter saying that the dispute was civil in nature.
10. Later, the answering respondent filed O.S. No. 133/2007 for permanent injunction against the appellant no. 2 or anyone else [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2045M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula acting under him from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Suit Property. Following this, the appellant no. 2 also filed O.S. No. 4045/2008 against the legal heirs of the original owner, the subsequent purchasers and the answering respondent respectively for declaration of sale deeds executed on 21.03.2003 and 29.09.2003 respectively, and the gift deed executed on 06.12.2004 as null and void. He sought further declaration of absolute ownership and direction to handover vacant physical possession of the Suit Property. Both the suits were consolidated and tried together by way of recording common evidence.
11. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court vide its common judgment and order dated 21.06.2014 decreed the O.S. No. 133/2007 filed by the answering respondent by granting a decree of permanent injunction in her favour and dismissed the O.S. No. 4045/2008 filed by the appellant no. 2 herein.
12. The findings recorded by the Trial Court in its judgment and order can be better understood in four parts:-
(i) First, on the issue of possession the Trial Court recorded that it was an admitted position that the answering respondent was in possession of the Suit Property. Further, the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 reflected that the respondent no. 8 had purchased the Suit Property from the respondent no. 7 for total sale consideration of Rs. 90,000/- and then respondent no. 8 gifted the property to the answering respondent vide the registered gift deed dated 06.12.2004. While, evaluating the evidence adduced by the appellants (defendants therein) the Trial Court from the cross-examination of appellant no. 1 recorded that two days prior to 01.04.1998, he had visited the Office of Sub-Registrar and found that the revenue site was being registered. Further, it was an admitted position that, though allegedly, a general power of attorney (“GPA”) and agreement to sell were executed by the original owner in favour of the holder in the year 1986, yet the appellant no. 2 was not in possession of the Suit Property as on the date of the institution of the suit. The Trial Court held that the answering respondent is the donee of the Suit Property and is in lawful possession and that the appellant no. 2 is not entitled to seek recovery of possession. 2046 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(ii) Secondly, on the issue of legality of registered sale deed dated 21.03.2003 that was executed by the respondent nos. 1-6 in favour of the respondent no. 7, the Trial Court proceeded with the premise that it was an admitted position that as on the date of institution of suit, the appellants were not in possession of the Suit Property. It held that though, the original owner had executed the GPA and the agreement to sell, yet the holder of POA failed to get it registered in time. The contention of the appellants that the GPA and the agreement to sell respectively were not registered in 1986 due to a prohibition on the registration of revenue lands was rejected. It was held by the Trial Court that for transfer of ownership in immovable property, whose value is more than Rs. 100/-, the conveyance has to be mandatorily registered as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short, “Registration Act”) and sale by GPA is not recognized by law. By placing reliance on Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 656, the Trial Court held that the sale deed dated 01.04.1998 executed by the holder of POA in favour of the appellant no. 2 was invalid along with the admitted position that it was executed after the death of the original owner. Thus, it was held that the registered sale deed dated 21.03.2003 executed in favour of the respondent no. 7 was legal.
(iii) Thirdly, on the issue of legality of registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 which was executed by the respondent no. 7 in favour of the respondent no. 8, and the registered gift deed dated 06.12.2004 which was executed by the respondent no. 8 in favour of the answering respondent, the Trial Court held that the appellants failed to prove that the above-mentioned sale deed and gift deed were illegal, null and void. At the same time, it held that the respondent no. 8 had a valid title over the Suit Property so as to execute the gift deed in favour of the answering respondent.
(iv) Lastly, on the issue of maintainability of the suit instituted by the appellants, the Trial Court held that the suit instituted by the appellants was barred by limitation. It held that as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “Act of 1963”), for the purpose of challenging the sale deeds dated 21.03.2003 and 29.09.2003 respectively and the gift deed dated 06.12.2004, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2047M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula he should have presented the suit within three years from the date of the alleged sale deed or agreement to sell as he had come to know about the sale transactions in the year 2003 itself.
B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
13. Being aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, the appellants/ judgment debtor, preferred First Appeal. The High Court framed the following points for determination:- “14. In the light of the above, the points that arise U for my consideration in this appeal are:- 1 ] W h e t h e r t h e a p p e l l a n t h e r e i n ( p l a i n t i f f i n O.S.No.4045/2008) proves that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property?
2] Whether the registered Sale Deed dated 01-04-1998 in favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.4045/2008 executed by Smt. A. Saraswathi as a General Power of Attorney holder would convey a valid title in favour of the plaintiff? 3) Whether the plaintiff in O.S.No.133/2007 would prove that she is in lawful possession of the property as on the date of the institution of the suit?
4] Whether the plaintiff ln O.S.No.133/2007 has proved that there was an interference in her lawful possession of the suit schedule property by the defendants?
5) Whether the common judgment and the decrees under appeals deserve interference at the hands of this Court?”
14. The High Court dismissed both the appeals and thereby affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The High Court dismissed the appeals on four grounds:-
(i) First, the High Court held that the appellants had not denied or disputed the existence of the two registered sale deeds dated 21.03.2003 and 29.09.2003 respectively and the gift deed dated 06.12.2004 in the suit preferred by the answering respondent. The said documents made it amply clear that the Suit Property was sold by the legal representatives of the original owner in favour of the respondent no. 7, who in turn vide a registered sale deed then sold the same Suit Property to the respondent 2048 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports no. 8. The respondent no. 8 thereafter gifted the Suit Property to her daughter, i.e., the answering respondent by way of a registered gift deed dated 06.12.2004. Accordingly, answering respondent is the lawful owner in possession of the Suit Property. The relevant observations read as under:- “22. As already observed above, the plaintiff in O.S.No. 4045/2008 has not denied or disputed the documents at Exs. P-1, P-2, P-3 which are two registered Sale Deeds and a Gift deed respectively. By virtue of the said documents, it goes to show that the suit schedule property was sold by the legal representatives of the deceased Muniyappa @ Ruttappa in favour of one Sri.
S. Sreenivasulu on 21-03-2003 which Sreenivasulu in turn sold the very same suit scheduled property to one Smt. C. Roopavathi (the mother of the plaintiff in O.S.No.133/2007) under a registered Sale Deed dated 29-09-2003. The said Smt. C. Roopavathi, in turn, has gifted the said property to her daughter – Smt.J. Manjula (plaintiff in O.S.NO.133/2007) under a registered Gift Deed dated 06-12-2004. It is based upon these documents and the subsequent documents like tax paid receipts, self-declaration of property tax and the water bill and water tax receipt which have all been produced as exhibits in ‘P’ series as observed above, the learned counsel for the plaintiff in O.S.No.133/2007 (Respondent in R.F.A.No.1318/2014) contends that, it is Smt. J.
Manjula - the plaintiff in O.S.No.133/2007 has been in lawful possession of the suit schedule property in her capacity as the owner of the suit schedule property.”
(ii) Secondly, the High Court observed that the appellant no. 1 in his cross-examination had admitted that the original ownerexecutant of POA, died on 30.01.1997. It is further an admitted position that the registered sale deed in favour of the appellant no. 2 was executed on 01.04.1998 i.e., after the death of the executant. The said sale deed was executed by the holder of POA in her capacity as a GPA holder of the original owner. Therefore, the execution of sale deed dated 01.04.1998 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2049M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula was after the death of the executant of GPA. The appellants submitted that since the holder had an interest in the POA, it should be read along with the agreement to sell which was executed pursuant to sale consideration. The High Court while addressing the aforesaid submissions of the appellants held that though the GPA and the agreement to sell were executed by the same executant on the same day in favour of the same holder yet they cannot be treated as a single transaction. The detailed and comprehensive reading of the GPA and the agreement to sell would indicate that the contents of the GPA do not mention anything about the execution or purpose of executing the agreement to sell or vice versa. The relevant observations read as under:- “…Even though it is observed that Exs.D-4 and D-5 were contemporaneous documents executed by Sri. Muniyappa @ Ruttappa in favour of Smt. A.
Saraswathi, by that itself, it cannot be concluded that, the said Smt. A. Saraswathi had any interest in the Power of Attorney at Ex.D-4. It is for the reason that the said document at Ex.D-4 nowhere expressly mentions as to for what reason the executant was made to execute the said document and more particularly, the executant has nowhere whispered in it that the attorney has acquired any interest in the property mentioned in the said Power of Attorney.
However, the said Power of Attorney – Smt. A.
Saraswathi whether is having any interest under the said irrevocable Power of Attorney has to be gathered from the circumstance of the case and the position of law. If it can be concluded that she had acquired interest by virtue of Exs.D-4 and D-5, then probably, Section 202 of the Contract Act may come into picture. Otherwise, it would be Section 201 of the Contract Act that may come into operation.”
(iii) Thirdly, the principal contention of the appellants was that since the holder of POA had an interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the POA, the POA would not come to an end on the death of the executant by virtue of Section 202 of the 2050 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short, “the Contract Act”). The High Court held that executing a POA, including an irrevocable one or an agreement to sell for immovable property, does not automatically transfer any right or interest to the beneficiary, such as the attorney or agreement holder. By referring to the decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan in Prahlad & Ors. v. Laddevi & Ors., reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Raj 19 and the High Court of Karnataka in Wajid Pasha v. The Chairman, Bangalore Development Authority, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10135, the High Court held that the purpose for which the GPA was executed had not been stated either in the GPA or the agreement to sell. It was observed that indisputably, the holder of POA did not enforce the agreement to sell against the legal representatives of the executant of the POA. After the death of the executant, the holder of POA transferred the Suit Property to her son i.e., the appellant no. 2, for a sale consideration of Rs. 84,000/- which was considerably higher than the amount she paid for the Suit Property to the original owner. Thus, the High Court held that the case of the appellants would not be covered by Section 202 of the Contract Act and that the POA did not create any right or interest in the favour of the holder of the POA. The relevant observations read as under:- “38. Illustration (a) to Section 202 of the Contract Act is clear and applicable to those cases where the very purpose or execution of the Power of Attorney is to enable the Power of Attorney to get his/her entitlement paid to him/her. It is in that case, the attorney holder can be called as having interest in the General Power of Attorney executed in his/her favour, whereas, in the case on hand, as already observed above, the purpose for which the General Power of Attorney was executed by Sri. Muniyappa @ Ruttappa is nowhere made clear either in Ex.D-4 or Ex.D-5. Merely because they are contemporaneous documents, it cannot be inferred that the holder of the said agreement would get an interest under the General Power of Attorney so as to over come Section 201 of the Contract Act and fall within the scope of Section 202 of the same Act. This is clear in all the [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2051M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula three judgments referred above which were relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents.
Rather in those situations, where the sale agreement holder though was put in possession and had already parted with some consideration, the remedy available to such agreement holder would be for enforcing the contract, specifically either as against the executant or his/her legal representatives.”
(iv) Fourthly, the High Court noted that the answering respondent not only established her lawful possession over the Suit Property as on the date of the institution of the suit but was also able to establish that there was interference with her peaceful possession by the appellants herein. The High Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation. It held that the Trial Court erred in holding so, as the suit was one for declaration and possession of the property. Therefore, as per Article 65 of the Act of 1963, the period of limitation would be twelve years.
15. In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellants are here before this Court with the present appeals.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S)
16. Ms. Farhat Jahan Rehmani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the present case relates to the scope, interpretation and construction of the POA and the agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 executed by the original owner in favour of holder. Hence, the limited question for our determination is whether the POA, which was coupled with interest is irrevocable as per Section 202 of the Contract Act or it stood terminated upon the death of the original owner as per Section 201 of the Contract Act?
17. Ms. Rehmani submitted that the fact of execution of the POA and the agreement to sell in favour of the holder by the original owner in exchange of sale consideration is not disputed. Since both the POA and the agreement to sell are in favour of the same person, they should be read together and construed harmoniously. The holder of POA executed the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 in favour of the appellant no. 2. Further, there is no challenge to the validity of the GPA and agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 and the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998. The GPA specifies 2052 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports that it had been executed for the purpose of the Suit Property. It specifically mentions that it is ‘irrevocable’ and the schedule to the GPA references the particulars of the Suit Property. The GPA read with the agreement to sell would indicate that it had been executed for a valid sale consideration, and possession of the Suit Property was also delivered to the holder of POA. Thus, she had an interest in the subject-matter of the agency being irrevocable. By placing reliance on Section 202 of the Contract Act, he submitted that where the agent himself has interest in the property which forms a subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot be terminated to the prejudice of such interest of the agent. In the facts of the case, Section 202 of the Contract Act is applicable and not Section 201.
18. It was further submitted that the High Court erred in holding that the purpose for which the GPA and the agreement to sell was executed was not mentioned in either of the documents and therefore, even though the two documents are contemporaneous yet it cannot be inferred that the holder of the two documents would derive an interest in the subject-matter of the GPA. Ms. Rehmani asserted that it has to be inferred that the original owner executed the agreement to sell as a consequence of executing the GPA in favour of the holder, hence, the said POA is not irrevocable merely for the reason that in the said documents the purpose for executing the GPA and agreement to sell has not been mentioned.
19. While drawing the Court’s attention to para 26 of Suraj Lamp (supra), she submitted that the case of Suraj Lamp (supra) will not be applicable to the facts of the present case as in the present case the holder of GPA executed the registered sale deed on 01.04.1988 which was much prior in time. She further distinguished the decision in Prahlad (supra) and Wajid Pasha (supra) referred to and relied upon by the High Court on facts. Ms. Rehmani submitted that the High Court failed to consider that there was no challenge to the validity of the GPA, and the registered sale deed executed in favour of appellant no. 2. In such circumstances, a suit for injunction simpliciter filed by the answering respondent would not be maintainable. Further, the respondent no. 7 had no title in the Suit Property as the title had already been conveyed under the registered sale deed and there was no challenge to the same. The suit O.S. No. 4045/2008 filed by the appellants for declaration and possession ought to have been decreed.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2053M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula
20. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the counsel prayed that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court be set aside and appellants be declared to be the true owner of the Suit Property and grant possession thereof.
D. SUBMISSIONS OF BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT(S)
21. Mr. Mahesh Thakur, the learned counsel appearing for the answering respondent submitted that an agreement of sale creates an interest against the vendor or his legal representatives and to enforce that interest the intended buyer is required to file a suit for specific performance by virtue of Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, “the TPA”). In view of Section 17 of the Registration Act, a property worth Rs. 100 or more cannot be transferred without registration. In the present case, the value of property is more than Rs. 100, therefore, the original owner could not have transferred the property merely by an agreement to sell or GPA or by executing both.
22. To buttress his aforesaid submission that such documents cannot pass on title, Mr. Thakur relied on the decision in Suraj Lamp (supra) to submit that by virtue of Section 54 of the TPA, an agreement to sell does not create any interest in or charge on such property. Further, a POA is not an instrument of transfer qua any right, title or interest in any immovable property. A sale by an agreement to sell or GPA will neither convey any title nor create any interest in an immoveable property. He relied on Wajid Pasha (supra) to submit that the contract of agency gets automatically terminated by death of either of the parties. As soon as the executant of POA dies, the right given to the agent comes to an end. Once the agency is terminated, the agent cannot act on the basis of the power granted to him under the GPA. He also placed reliance on Prahlad (supra) to submit that a POA granted by the donor to the donee is operative and effective only during the lifetime of the donor. Since the donor and done are in a relationship of master-agent a POA cannot stand after the death of the donor. He asserted that the principle of nemo dat quod non habet would apply meaning thereby that the holder of POA could not have passed a title that she did not possess.
23. Mr. Thakur further submitted that even if for the sake of argument, it is presumed that the GPA was coupled with interest and Section 202 of the Contract Act comes into operation, still it can apply only 2054 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to an extent that the buyer can enforce the agreement against the vendor or his legal representatives for specific performance or for return of the sale consideration paid. Lastly, he submitted that it is not the case of the appellants that legal representatives of the original owner were aware about the transaction between their father and the holder of POA. Answering respondent now holds the position of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration.
24. In such circumstances referred to above, the counsel prayed that there being no merit in the present appeals, those may be dismissed.
E. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
25. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration:
a. Whether the agent, A. Saraswathi, by virtue of being a holder of the General Power of Attorney along with Agreement to Sell had any right, title or interest in the subject-matter of the agency, to execute the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 in favour of her son i.e., the appellant no. 2, after the death of the principal, on 30.01.1997?
b. Whether it was obligatory for the answering respondent to challenge the execution and validity of the General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell dated 04.04.1986 and a further prayer to declare that the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 is invalid, non-est or illegal in O.S. 133/2007?
F. ANALYSIS
26. At the cost of repetition, we deem it necessary to state how the property exchanged hands on both sides. It is the case of the appellants that the original owner executed a GPA and agreement to sell in favour of the holder. Thereafter, the holder in her capacity as a holder of POA vide a registered sale deed sold the Suit Property to her son, appellant no. 2. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondents that after the death of the original owner, his heirs (respondent no. 1-6) sold the Suit Property to S. Sreenivasullu (respondent no. 7) vide a registered sale deed, thereafter, S. Sreenivasullu sold the Suit Property to C. Roopavathi (respondent [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2055M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula no. 8) vide another registered sale deed. Lastly, C. Roopavathi vide a registered gift deed gifted the Suit Property to her daughter, J. Manjula (answering respondent).
Appellant’s Version Respondent’s Version Muniyappa @Ruttapa (Owner)
↓ After Muniyappa’s death Heirs of the Owner ↓ Saraswathi (GPA holder)
↓ S. Sreenivasullu ↓ A. Manohar (appellant no. 2) C. Roopavathi ↓ J. Manjula (answering respondent)
i. Relationship between the Executant and Holder of General Power of Attorney
27. A power of attorney derives its basic principles from Chapter X of the Contract Act which provides for “Agency” along with Sections 1A and 2 respectively of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882. Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two persons, where one explicitly or implicitly agrees that the other will act on their behalf to influence their legal relations with third parties, and the other similarly agrees to act in this capacity or does so based on an agreement. The relationship between the executant of a general power of attorney and the holder of the power is one of principal and agent. A principal is bound by the acts done by an agent or the contracts made by him on behalf of the principal. Likewise, power of attorney in the nature of contract of agency authorizes the holder to do acts specified by the executant, or represent the executant in dealings with third persons.
28. In the case of Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 601, this Court held that the relation between the donor of the power and the donee of the power is one of the principal and agent having its genesis in a contract. It further observed that the term “agency” refers to the relationship in which one person has the authority or ability to establish legal relations between a principal and third parties. This relationship arises when a person, known as the agent, has the authority to act on behalf of another, 2056 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports called the principal, and agrees to do so. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:- “10. The first contention of the appellant is that it was impermissible in law for three persons to jointly grant a power of attorney in favour of Defendant 34. Barring the ipse dixit of the learned counsel nothing was shown to us to make such a joint power impermissible in law. The relation between the donor of the power and the donee of the power is one of the principal and agent and the expression “agency” is used to connote the relation which exists where one person has an authority or capacity to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties. The relation of agency arises whenever one person called the agent has authority to act on behalf of another called the principal and consents so to act. The relationship has its genesis in a contract. If agency is the outcome of a contract between the principal and the agent, in order to show that three principals jointly constituting an agent by a deed called “Power of Attorney” was impermissible, provisions of Contract Act or the general law of contract should have been shown as having been violated by such a contract. Nothing of the kind was pointed out to us. On the contrary, in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. I, 4th Edn., para 726, the following proposition has been stated:
“Co-principals may jointly appoint an agent to act for them and in such case become jointly liable to him and may jointly issue him.”
We are in agreement with this view and, therefore, three principals could jointly appoint an agent.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, reported in (2005) 12 SCC 77, while dealing with the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 22A of the Registration Act, it was held that a deed of power of attorney is a document of convenience empowering the agent to act for the principal or manage the affairs of the principal. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2057M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula “Power of attorney
13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
14. Besides the Contract Act, the Powers-of-Attorney Act, 1882 deals with the subject. Section 1-A of the Powersof-Attorney Act defines power of attorney to include any instruments empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. Section 2 of the said Act reads, thus:
“2. Execution under power of attorney.—The donee of a power of attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof.
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