Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 85; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 15 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2052/2014
- Sections
- 468, 120, 271, 465, 420, 13(1), 13(2), 13, 374, 304, 2
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85 Biswajit Das v.
Central Bureau of Investigation (Criminal Appeal No. 2052 of 2014)
16 January 2025 [Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Conviction for offences under section 468 r/w section 120(B), section 271 and section 465 r/w 120(B) and section 420 r/w section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) as well as section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a year for offences under ss.271 and 465 r/w section 120(B) and two years rigorous imprisonment for all other IPC offences. For offences under PC Act, he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 3 years. The appeal against the conviction was dismissed by the High Court of Assam at Gauhati. Hence the SLP was filed. While issuing notice in the matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court confined it to question as to whether the petitioner could have been convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and on the quantum of sentence for the other offences.
The question that arose for consideration in the captioned case was as to whether the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has the power to expand the scope of the appeal, hear on all the points and record an order acquitting the appellant, if satisfied. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Articles 136 and 142 – Expansion of scope of appeal in light of decision in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat (2011) 6 SCC 312; Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar (2017) 16 SCC 418 and Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd. (2008) 12 SCC 541 – Considered and relied on:
Held: This Hon’ble Court while acquitting the accused in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat (2011) 6 SCC 312, a case where limited notice was issued while granting leave and at the [2025] 2 S.C.R. 111Biswajit D as v. Central Bureau of Investigation stage of hearing the expansion of the scope was sought for, held that: (a) by exercising Article 142 of the Constitution this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decrees and may make such orders as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matters pending before it; (b) No fetter is imposed on the Court’s jurisdiction except of course any express provision of the law to the contrary and normally this Court cannot ignore the same while exercising its power under Article 142; (c) An order passed by the Court at the time of admitting a petition does not have the status of an express provision of law and the observations in it are tentative observations which cannot limit this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 – While deciding Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar (2017) 16 SCC 418 reliance was placed on Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd. (2008) 12 SCC 541 and it was held that Article 142 embodies the fundamental principle that the jurisdiction of the Court is to render complete justice – When the Court initially issues a limited notice but subsequently grants leave, the scope of the appeal does not raise a matter of jurisdiction but of judicial discretion and the guiding principle has to be the advancement of substantial justice. [Paras 10,11,13-14] Art. 136 of Constitution of India – Expansion of scope of appeal – Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 and Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia (1998) 4 SCC 39 – Distinguished:
Held: The question involved in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 was not with regard to the scope of expansion of notice in an SLP but with regard to the continued discretionary power vested in the Court at the stage when the appeal comes up for hearing after admission of SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution – In Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia (1998) 4 SCC 39 this Court displayed guarded approach regarding expansion of scope of appeal – But it was a decision rendered in a statutory appeal under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and not in an appeal after granting leave under Article 136. [Paras 8-9,12-14] Recent development of jurisprudence in criminal matters – Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023) 9 SCC 164 – Referred to:
Held: In Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023) 9 SCC 164, this Court had taken a pro-liberal and justice-oriented 112 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports approach to secure the liberty of citizens – Even after a convict’s challenge to his conviction and sentence failed, his case was still reopened upon a co-convict’s appeal, directed against the same judgment when the latter succeeded – A similar relief granted to the co-convict was extended to the convict by even recording an order of acquittal [Para 15] Article 136 and Article 142 r/w Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Expansion of scope of appeal – Whether discretion was exercised by this Court:
Held: When a party demonstrates patent infirmity in the findings recorded in the impugned judgment, or a glaring error in the procedure followed having the effect of vitiating the proceedings is shown to exist, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, which might have been overlooked by the Bench when it issued limited notice Justice becomes a real casualty if the same or the subsequent Bench is held to be denuded of its jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the contentions relatable to points not referred to in the notice issuing order – Since exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 is discretionary, the jurisdiction to decide all legal and valid points, as raised, does always exist and would not get diminished or curtailed by a limited notice issuing order – If this position is not accepted, Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 read with Article 142 of the Constitution will lose much of its significance – Discretion was exercised by this Court and the scope of appeal was enlarged. [Para 16] Section 468 r/w section 120(B), section 271 and section 465 r/w 120(B) and section 420 r/w section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Whether the charges are proved against the appellant and quantum of sentence is sufficient:
Held: The appellant was a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India and was found guilty of being instrumental, together with a co-convict in obtaining settlement of two insurance claims by projecting the insured as dead although he was, in fact, alive – In evidence it was brought out that the appellant who was friends with insured along with the co-convict took the policies from insured on the assurance that the same will be upgraded and also the appellant could not satisfactorily [2025] 2 S.C.R. 113Biswajit D as v. Central Bureau of Investigation explain why he filled up the six blank cheques (Exhibits 4-9) for different amounts totaling to Rs. 1,67,583, i.e., the amount for satisfaction of the insurance claim – The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court holding the appellant guilty under the aforementioned sections is upheld – The decision in State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi (1972) 2 SCC 392 has no application herein and was distinguished – The order of limited notice dated January 3, 2014 had also called upon the respondents to show cause on the question of sentence imposed upon the appellant, meaning thereby that prima facie a case for alteration/modification of the sentence had been set up – Since the date of the incident relates back to 2004 and the appellant has spent a little less than 2/3rd of the prison term of 36 (thirty-six) months in custody, in interest of justice the term of imprisonment is modified to the period of sentence already undergone. [Paras 18-21, 25] Case Law Cited Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [2011] 6 SCR 958 : (2011) 6 SCC 312; Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar [2017] 9 SCR 766 : (2017) 16 SCC 418; Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd. [2008] 9 SCR 450 : (2008) 12 SCC 541 – relied on.
Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat [2023] 12 SCR 220 : (2023) 9 SCC 164 – referred to.
Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad [1999] 1 SCR 901 : (1999) 2 SCC 635; Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia [1998] 2 SCR 428 : (1998) 4 SCC 39; State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi [1973] 1 SCR 313 : (1972) 2 SCC 392 – distinguished.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Limited scope of the notice issued in Special Leave to Appeal; Expansion of scope of appeal; Article 142 of Constitution of India. 114 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2052 of 2014 From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2013 of the High Court of Gauhati, Assam in CRLA No. 133 of 2009 Appearances for Parties Hrishikesh Baruah, Anurag Mishra, Utkarsh Dwivedi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Adit Khorana, Sridhar Potaraju, Shantnu Sharma, P V Yogeswaran, Mrs. Ranjana Narayan, Kartik Dey, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment
1. The appellant was convicted for commission of offences punishable under Section 468 r/w Section 120(B), Section 271 and 465 r/w Section 120(B) and Section 420 r/w Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as well as Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19882 .
2. For all but one of the offences punishable under the IPC, sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment3 was imposed on the appellant. For the offence under Section 271 and 465 r/w Section 120(B), sentence of R.I. for a year was imposed. Insofar as the offence punishable under sub-section (1)(d) read with sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the PC Act is concerned, the appellant was sentenced to three years’ R.I.
3. The conviction and sentence dated 31st July, 2009 having been carried by the appellant to the High Court of Gauhati in an appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the impugned judgment and order dated 27 th September, 2013 of a learned single Judge affirmed the same.
1 IPC
2 PC Act 3 RI [2025] 2 S.C.R. 115Biswajit D as v. Central Bureau of Investigation
4. The appellant thereafter approached this Court with a special leave petition out of which this criminal appeal, by special leave, arises.
5. On 3 rd January, 2014, a coordinate Bench of this Court passed the following order:
“Issue notice confined to the question as to whether the petitioner could have been convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and on the quantum of sentence for the other offences.”
6. Service effected, this Court heard the parties and granted leave on 12th September, 2014 whereafter the appellant was enlarged on bail on 12th October, 2015.
7. Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, having commenced his argument assailing the findings returned by the trial court in respect of the offences under the IPC, which were found to be proved, Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent, invited our attention to the order issuing limited notice.
8. We then called upon Mr. Baruah to overcome the objection raised that having regard to the limited scope of the notice to show cause, it is not open to us to expand the scope of the appeal, hear him on all the points and record an order acquitting the appellant, if satisfied. He referred to the decisions of this Court in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad4 to support his contention that this Court having granted leave without any restriction, it is a fit and proper case where we ought to hear him on the merits of all the points that are available to be taken on behalf of the appellant for obtaining a clear acquittal.
9. In Taherakhatoon (supra), this Court held that:
“15. It is now well settled that though special leave is granted, the discretionary power which vested in the Court at the stage of the special leave petition continues to remain with the Court even at the stage when the appeal comes up for hearing and when both sides are heard on merits in the appeal. This principle is applicable to all 4 [1999] 1 SCR 901 : (1999) 2 SCC 635 116 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports kinds of appeals admitted by special leave under Article 136, irrespective of the nature of the subject-matter. ...” x x x “20. In view of the above decisions, even though we are now dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so and declare the law or point out the error — still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded in a different fashion. ...”
10. Next, Mr. Baruah placed the decision of this Court in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat5 in support of his contention that notwithstanding limited notice having been issued, the scope of the appeal could be expanded by this Court. The opinion of the coordinate Bench expressed in the said decision reads thus: “4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that though at the time of issuing notice, this Court limited its rights to raise points only within the confines of Section 304 of the Penal Code, the Court is not bound at the time of final hearing with that direction given while issuing notice and the appellant is entitled to urge all the questions including his right to urge that he should have been acquitted in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
x x x
8. The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution have been construed by this Court in several judgments.
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