Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 55; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 462
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar
- Decided
- 9 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 161/2025
- Sections
- 125(4), 125, 9, 498A, 125(1), 488, 488(4), 2, 41, 8, 42, 24
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 462 : 2025 INSC 55 Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another (Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 2025)
10 January 2025 [Sanjiv Khanna, CJI and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, stand absolved of paying maintenance to his wife by virtue of Section 125(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if his wife refuses to abide by the said decree and return to the matrimonial home.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125(4) – Disqualification under, when not attracted – Wife’s right to maintenance u/s.125, CrPC – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – s.9 – Decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by respondent No.1-husband – Non-compliance therewith by the appellant-wife – If would be sufficient to attract the disqualification u/s.125(4):
Held: No – Mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification u/s.125(4) or be determinative straightaway of her right to maintenance – It would depend on the facts of each case to be decided, on the evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree – Restitution decree was passed on 23.04.2022 – Admittedly, there was no attempt made at reconciliation after 2017 – However, having secured the restitution decree, respondent No.1 did nothing – He neither sought execution of the decree or a decree of divorce – The stalemate created by Respondent No.1 reflects his lack of bonafides and demonstrates his attempt to disown all responsibility towards his wife – His conduct in completely ignoring the appellant after she suffered the miscarriage of their child added to her suffering due to the ill-treatment in her matrimonial home – Respondent No.1’s admission that he did not bear the expenditure * Author [2025] 1 S.C.R. 463Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.
for her treatment and her unrebutted assertion that he did not take her to the hospital or even come from Ranchi to see her were clear indicia of the pain and mental cruelty meted out to her – Therefore, she had just cause to not return to her matrimonial home, despite the restitution decree – Appellant had more than sufficient reason to stay away from the society of Respondent No.1 – Hence, her refusal to live with him, notwithstanding the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be held against her – The disqualification u/s.125(4), CrPC was thus, not attracted – High Court erred in applying the same holding that the appellant was not entitled to the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court – Impugned judgment set aside – Order of the Family Court restored. [Paras 29, 35, 37-39] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maintenance proceedings – Nature:
Held: Even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, like other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings – Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature of such proceedings. [Para 30] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maintenance – Statutory scheme – Discussed. [Paras 8, 9] Words and Phrases – Mental cruelty; “Judgments in rem”; “Judgments in personam” – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.40-43 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – ss.34-37 – Discussed. [Paras 32, 33, 36] Case Law Cited Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, 2007 INSC 1190 : [2007] 12 SCR 577 : (2008) 2 SCC 316; Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Others, 2014 INSC 490 : [2014] 8 SCR 858 : (2015) 6 SCC 353; Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Another, 2013 INSC 703 : [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another 2020 INSC 631 : [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324; Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, 2015 INSC 283 : [2015] 4 SCR 137 : (2015) 5 SCC 705; Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat and Another [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 45 : (1996) 4 SCC 479; Amrita 464 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Singh v. Ratan Singh and Another (2018) 17 SCC 737; Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, 2003 INSC 596 : [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 98 : (2004) 1 SCC 438; Mst. Jagir Kaur and Another v. Jaswant Singh [1964] 2 SCR 73 : AIR 1963 SC 1521; Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another v. Meenakshi Marwah and Another [2005] 2 SCR 708 : (2005) 4 SCC 370; K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police and Another [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 350 : (2002) 8 SCC 87; Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and Others [1978] 3 SCR 782 : (1978) 4 SCC 70; Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706; Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt.) and Others, 2000 INSC 115 : [2000] 2 SCR 58 : (2000) 3 SCC 180 – referred to.
K. Narayana Rao v. Bhagyalakshmi, 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 190 : (1984) 1 Kant LJ 451 : 1984 Cri LJ 276 (Kant); Fakruddin Shamsuddin Saiyed v. Bai Jenab, AIR 1944 Bom 11; Sampuran Singh v. Gurdev Kaur and Another, 1985 Cri LJ 1072 (P&H); Amina Mohammedali Khoja v. Mohammedali Ramjanali Khoja and Another, 1985 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : 1985 Cri LJ 1909; Kavungal Kooppakkattu Zeenath v. Mundakkattu Sulfiker Ali, 2008 SCC OnLine Ker 78 : (2008) 3 KLJ 331; Subal Das v. Mousumi Saha (Das) and Another, 2017 SCC OnLine Tri 175; Babita v. Munna Lal, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4933; Shri Mudassir v. Shirin and Others Criminal Revision Application No. 268 of 2022, decided on 09.02.2023; Smt. S.R. Ashwini v. G. Harish, NC: 2024: KHC: 14466 : RPFC No.104 of 2018; Girishbhai Babubhai Raja v. Smt. Hansaben Girishchandra and Another, 1985 SCC OnLine Guj 161 : (1986) GLH 778; Hem Raj v. Urmila Devi and Others, 1996 SCC OnLine HP 116 : (1997) 1 HLR 702; Ravi Kumar v. Santosh Kumari, 1997 SCC OnLine P&H 529 : (1997) 3 RCR (Cri) 3 (DB) – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Evidence Act, 1872; Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
List of Keywords Decree for restitution of conjugal rights; Non-compliance; Maintenance; Absolved; Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Wife’s right to maintenance; Disqualification [2025] 1 S.C.R. 465Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.
under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Family Court; Suit for restitution; Refusal to live with husband; Refusal/desertion; Reconciliation; Lack of bonafides; Matrimonial home; Mental cruelty; Responsibility towards his wife; Miscarriage; Ill-treatment; Just cause; More than sufficient reason; Stay away from the society of husband; Maintenance proceedings; Nomenclature; Criminal proceedings; Mental cruelty; “Judgments in rem”; “Judgments in personam”.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
161 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 04.08.2023 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in CRR No. 440 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Sayesha Gambhir, Advs. for the Appellant. Anup Kumar, Ms. Pragya Choudhary, Mrs. Neha Jaiswal, Shivam Kumar, Ms. Shruti Singh, Vaibhav Prasad Deo, Vishnu Sharma, Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Shiv Ram Sharma, Pawan Kishore Singh, Dipankar Singh, Mrs. Anupama Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Kumar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, stand absolved of paying maintenance to his wife by virtue of Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if his wife refuses to abide by the said decree and return to the matrimonial home?
3. This intriguing question was answered in the affirmative by a learned Judge of the Jharkhand High Court, vide order dated 04.08.2023 in Criminal Revision No. 440 of 2022. Aggrieved, Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena, the wife, is in appeal.
466 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
4. The appellant, Reena, and respondent No. 1, Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, were married on 01.05.2014. They parted ways in August, 2015, and Reena started living at her parental home. Original (MTS) Suit No. 495 of 2018 was instituted by Dinesh on 20.07.2018 before the Family Court, Ranchi, under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for restitution of conjugal rights. Reena contested the suit by filing her written statement on 25.04.2019. Dinesh claimed that Reena left the matrimonial home on 21.08.2015 and did not return thereafter. According to him, attempts were made during August and October, 2017, to bring her back but she refused to come. He stated that his parents were very old and needed to be taken care of but Reena was not there to do so. On the contrary, Reena asserted that she was subjected to torture and mental agony by Dinesh, who demanded ₹5 lakh to purchase a fourwheeler. She alleged that he had extramarital relations. Further, she stated that she suffered a miscarriage on 28.01.2015 but Dinesh did not even come to see her from his workplace at Ranchi and it was her brother who took her to Dhanbad for medical care. She claimed that it was Dinesh who persuaded her to go to her parental home in August, 2015, on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan and he never truly tried to bring her back thereafter. She claimed that it was she who had gone to her matrimonial home in the year 2017 along with her relations but they were forced to return as Dinesh and his family members treated them badly. She stated that she was ready to return to her matrimonial home if Dinesh did not demand money to purchase a car and if she was not ill-treated by him and his family members. Her further conditions were that she should be allowed to use the washroom/toilet in the house, as she was not allowed to do so earlier, and she should also be allowed to use an LPG stove to prepare food, as she had to do so by using wood and coal hitherto. She concluded her written statement by asserting that the suit for restitution filed by Dinesh was nothing but a tool to save himself from the effect of laws which were put in place for women’s safety and prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. Reena, despite filing the above written statement, failed to appear thereafter before the Family Court.
5. By judgment dated 23.04.2022, the learned Additional Principal Judge-II, Additional Family Court, Ranchi, decreed Dinesh’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Therein, it was noted that Dinesh [2025] 1 S.C.R. 467Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
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had attempted to bring his wife back only once but, relying on the evidence of his witnesses, the Family Court concluded that he wanted to live with her as husband and wife. As no evidence was adduced by Reena, the Family Court held against her as regards her allegation that Dinesh demanded ₹5 lakh to purchase a car and her allegation of ill treatment and torture by him and his family members. As to her two conditions, the Family Court noted that Dinesh was a Junior Lineman in Jharkhand State Electricity Board and observed that he would be expected to provide an LPG stove to his wife to prepare food. Opining that there must be something more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of married life for a wife to withdraw from the society of her husband, the Family Court held in Dinesh’s favour. He was, however, directed to ensure the respect and dignity of his wife and to see that her conditions with regard to cooking and toilet facilities were complied with. Reena was directed to resume conjugal life with Dinesh within two months. Admittedly, Reena did not abide by this decree.
6. Significantly, in the meanwhile, on 10.08.2018, Reena lodged a complaint under Section 498A IPC against Dinesh, in C.P. Case No. 3270 of 2018. As a result of this, he was sent to prison and was consequently suspended from service for some time. The case is stated to be pending. Thereafter, on 03.08.2019, Reena instituted Original Maintenance Case No. 454 of 2019 against Dinesh seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’). This case was allowed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad, vide order dated 15.02.2022, i.e., before the decretal of Dinesh’s suit for restitution. Therein, the Family Court noted Dinesh’s stand that he was ready and willing to keep Reena with full dignity but held, on the evidence adduced, that she was entitled to maintenance. Dinesh’s pay-slip (Ex-3) revealed that he was working as a Junior Engineer in the Electricity Board and his net salary, after deductions from the gross salary of ₹62,000/-, was ₹43,211/-. The Family Court held that Dinesh, despite having sufficient means, had neglected to maintain his wife, who was unable make ends meet on her own. The petition was accordingly allowed and Dinesh was directed to pay ₹10,000/- per month to Reena towards maintenance. Such maintenance was held payable from the date of the application, i.e., 03.08.2019, and the arrears were directed to be paid within two months.
468 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7. Challenging this order, Dinesh filed Criminal Revision No. 440 of 2022 before the Jharkhand High Court. A learned Judge allowed the revision by the impugned judgment dated 04.08.2023. Therein, the learned Judge noted that Reena, who deposed as PW-1, was not even cross-examined by Dinesh. Similarly, the other two witnesses who appeared on her behalf were also not subjected to cross-examination. In her deposition, Reena asserted that she was not working and this was confirmed by her brother, Dilip Kumar Mahato (PW-3), who stated that she was completely dependent upon him. Dinesh, in his own cross-examination, denied that it was due to his assault that his wife suffered a miscarriage. He also denied that he had demanded ₹5 lakh in dowry. He, however, admitted that Reena suffered an abortion and that he did not bear any expense in that regard. It was submitted on behalf of Dinesh, that he was ready to pay ₹5,000/- per month to Reena, but not from the date of filing of the maintenance petition, as he was suspended from service during that period owing to his being in judicial custody in relation to the Section 498A IPC case instituted by her. The learned Judge, however, noted that there was a specific finding in the judgment dated 23.04.2022 in Original (MTS) Suit No. 495 of 2018 that Reena had withdrawn from her husband’s society without reasonable excuse and that she had not returned to the matrimonial home despite the said decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which she had not even chosen to challenge by way of appeal. The learned Judge, therefore, reasoned that Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. would come to Dinesh’s aid and, in consequence, Reena would not be entitled to maintenance. Hence, the learned Judge allowed the revision.
8. Before proceeding to consider the matter on merits, it would be apposite to take note of the statutory scheme. Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is titled ‘Order for Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents’ and comprises Sections 125 to
128. Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. provides to the effect that, if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate children, falling in the prescribed categories, or his parents, who are all unable to maintain themselves, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to pay a monthly allowance, as thought fit, for their maintenance. Notably, Section 125 Cr.P.C. is not of recent origin. It [2025] 1 S.C.R. 469Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
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is analogous to and in continuance of Section 488 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
9. In its 41 st Report submitted on 24 th September, 1969, the Law Commission of India, while adverting to Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, observed that the primary justification for placing provisions relating to maintenance of wives and children, which is a civil matter, in the Criminal Procedure Code was that a remedy, speedier and more economical than that available in the Civil Courts, is provided to them. The Law Commission noted that the provision was aimed at preventing starvation and vagrancy, leading to commission of crime.
10. On the same lines, in Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai,1 this Court observed that the object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his neglect but to prevent the vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife, by providing her food, clothing and shelter by a speedy remedy. It was held that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice, especially enacted to protect women and children, falling within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution. Thus, the objective of the provision, then and now, is to alleviate the financial plight of destitute wives, children and now, parents, who are left to fend for themselves.
11. In Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena and others, 2 this Court observed that Section 125 Cr.P.C. was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial suffering of a woman, who left her matrimonial home for the reasons provided in the provision, so that some suitable arrangement can be made by the Court and she can sustain herself and also her children, if they are with her. It was held that the concept of sustenance did not necessarily mean ‘to lead the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else’ and the wife would be entitled in law to lead a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. This Court further cautioned that, in a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot be permitted to take subterfuge to deprive the wife of the 1 [2007] 12 SCR 577 : (2008) 2 SCC 316 2 [2014] 8 SCR 858 : (2015) 6 SCC 353 470 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports benefits of living with dignity and there could be no escape route, unless there is an order from the Court that the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from the husband on legally permissible grounds.
12. Earlier, in Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and another, 3 this Court held that the provision of maintenance aims at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of the individual and while dealing with cases thereunder, the drift in the approach from adversarial litigation to social context adjudication is the need of the hour. More recently, in Rajnesh vs. Neha and another,4 this Court emphasized that maintenance laws were enacted as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependent wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy.
13. In Shamima Farooqui vs. Shahid Khan, 5 this Court noted that the inherent and fundamental principle behind Section 125 Cr.P.C. is the amelioration of the financial state of affairs as well as the mental agony and anguish that a woman suffers when she is compelled to leave her matrimonial home. It was further observed that, as per law, she is entitled to lead life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband and as long as she is held entitled to grant of maintenance within the parameters of Section 125 Cr.P.C., it has to be adequate so that she can live with dignity. Lastly, it was noted that, a plea is sometimes advanced by the husband that he does not have the means to pay as he does not have a job or his business is not doing well, but these are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in law as a husband, who is healthy, able-bodied and in a position to support himself is under a legal obligation to support his wife and her right to receive maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless disqualified, is an absolute right.
14. Such disqualification, by way of an exception, was envisaged under Section 488(4) of the old Code, which is replicated, almost verbatim, in Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It reads thus:
3 [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188 4 [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324 5 [2015] 4 SCR 137 : (2015) 5 SCC 705 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 471Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.
“Section 125
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an [allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be,] [Substituted by Act 50 of 2001, Section 2 for “allowance” (w.e.f. 24-9-2001)] from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.”
15. The issue, presently, turns upon the applicability of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. to the case on hand. The question as to whether noncompliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by a wife would be sufficient in itself to deny her maintenance, owing to Section 125(4) Cr.P.C, has been addressed by several High Courts but no consistent view is forthcoming, as their opinions were varied and conflicting.
16. In K. Narayana Rao vs. Bhagyalakshmi, 6 the Karnataka High Court observed that the Court dealing with a maintenance claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C. has to carefully examine and take into consideration the decree for restitution of conjugal rights which has not been complied with by the wife but it would not be bound by all the findings therein, including findings on questions, such as, whether the wife withdrew from the society of the husband; desertion on her part; or her leading an adulterous life. Reference was made to Fakruddin Shamsuddin Saiyed vs. Bai Jenab, 7 wherein the Bombay High Court had held that the Magistrate should not ‘surrender his own discretion’ simply because the husband was armed with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
17. In Sampuran Singh vs. Gurdev Kaur and another,8 the Punjab & Haryana High Court observed that a wife can still claim maintenance in the presence of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights if the conduct of the husband is such that it obstructs her from obeying the decree.
6 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 190 = (1984) 1 Kant LJ 451 : 1984 Cri LJ 276 (Kant) 7 AIR 1944 Bom 11 8 Criminal Revision No. 1562 of 1983, decided on 17.01.1985 : 1985 Cri LJ 1072 (P&H) 472 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
18. In Amina Mohammedali Khoja vs. Mohammedali Ramjanali Khoja and another,9 the Bombay High Court noted that an order of maintenance can always be passed in favour of a wife even if her husband obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, unless it is established that she willfully deserted her husband and was not willing to stay with him without reasonable cause or sufficient reason. On facts, it was found that the record did not show that the wife had deserted the husband and was unwilling to stay with him without reasonable cause or sufficient reasons. It was further noted that, after obtaining the decree, the husband had not taken any effective steps to get the decree satisfied as he had made no genuine, honest and sincere efforts to see that his wife comes back to him. It was, therefore, held that he was only interested in a paper decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which he had gotten ex parte.
19. In Kavungal Kooppakkattu Zeenath vs. Mundakkattu Sulfiker Ali,10 the Kerala High Court noted that the expression used in Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. is ‘refusal’ and not ‘failure’ to live with the husband and that there is evidently some difference between the two. It was held that ‘failure’ would mean not doing something that one is expected to do but ‘refusal’ would mean saying or showing that one would not do or accept something which is offered. In effect, if a husband says he is willing to do something for the wife but she states or shows that she does not want or accept that something which is offered to her, then only there is refusal.
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