Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 124; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1782
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Sarasa Venkatanarayana Bhatti
- Decided
- 29 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6071/2023
- Sections
- 31(4), 30(4), 31, 31(1), 31(2), 30, 30(2), 29, 29(1), 62, 53T, 7
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1782 : 2025 INSC 124 Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd.
v.
Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6071 of 2023)
29 January 2025 [Hrishikesh Roy,* Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the approval of a proposed combination by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) must mandatorily precede the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), as stipulated under the proviso to Section 31(4) of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Headnotes† Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.31(4) proviso – If mandatory or directory – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of ‘HNGIL’, the Corporate Debtor/Target Company with a 60% market share of the glass packaging industry in India – Proposed combination between ‘HNGIL’ and ‘AGI Greenpac’, the Successful Resolution Applicant and second largest company in the field of glass packaging and manufacturing in India, after HNGIL – Entire process from submission of AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan to its approval by the CoC challenged to be riddled with irregularities – Whether approval of a proposed combination by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) must mandatorily precede the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) – Competition Act, 2002 – Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to Transaction of Business relating to Combination) Regulations, 2011:
Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] 1. Proviso to Section 31(4) IBC was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2018 – * Author Ed. Note: One judgment was pronounced by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy on behalf of himself and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia. Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti pronounced two separate judgments – one for each of the two sets of appeals. An order was also passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy on behalf of the Bench.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1783Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Introduction of a proviso, specifically addressing those Resolution Plans with provisions for combination, and the use of the term ‘prior’ therein, makes it starkly clear that the intent of the legislature was to create an exception – This ensures that in cases containing combination proposals, the approval of the CCI i.e., the regulatory body designated to ensure fair competition in markets and preventing anti-competitive practices, should first be obtained before the same is approved by the CoC – Legislative intent behind inserting the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC would suggest that prior approval of the CCI was specifically mandated and it should not be seen as a flexible provision to be ignored in certain exigencies – Use of the word ‘prior’ at the appropriate place in the proviso besides being direct, clear and unambiguous also does not lead to any absurd consequences – Proviso to Section 31(4) IBC mentions that the approval to the Resolution Plan from CCI shall be obtained ‘prior’ to its approval by the CoC – Therefore, to interpret the specific word to mean that such an approval can be obtained even ‘after’ and not necessarily ‘prior’ to the approval by the CoC would amount to reconstructing a statutory provision, which is not permissible – ‘Commercial wisdom’ accorded to the CoC being paramount, the legislature intentionally provided for a prior approval of the CCI with respect to Resolution Plans, containing combination proposals – Otherwise, an illogical situation may arise since any modifications so directed by the CCI, would be kept out of the scrutiny of the CoC and the CoC would be forced to exercise its commercial wisdom without complete information – When a Resolution Plan containing a provision for a combination that leads to an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) is placed before the CoC for approval before securing prior approval from the CCI, the Plan is incapable of being enforced or implemented – Specific consequences in law are provided under the IBC and the Competition Act for the same – Such a major omission cannot be cured at a later stage – Therefore, approval by CoC to such a deficient Resolution Plan can have no legal implications – In the present case, the CCIunapproved Resolution Plan does not pass the muster – The same cannot be approved as it is in violation of Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3), 30(4) and 34(4)(a) of the IBC – It does ‘contravene provisions of the law for the time being in force’ – On the aspect of a possible disharmony between the stipulated timeline to be followed under the IBC and the Competition Act, the NCLAT in the impugned order has held the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC, to be directory in nature since mandatory prior approval of the CoC, would lead 1784 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to disruption in the CIRP timeline, as stipulated under the IBC – However, the model timelines prescribed under any regulations, i.e., in the current case, Regulation 40A of CIRP Regulations, cannot by any stretch, supersede a statutory provision i.e., the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC – In fact, the subordinate legislation must be interpreted in a manner that conforms to the statute, and not the other way around, as was unacceptably rationalised by the NCLAT – As far as the two timelines stipulated under the IBC and the Competition Act are concerned, the same do not usually cause any disharmony or conflict – The only exception could be in the extremely rare circumstances, influenced by external factors – But such extreme and unlikely situations cannot and should not be allowed to influence interpretative exercise on the functioning of the legislative framework which will fit in with most cases. [Paras 32, 34, 53, 65, 79, 80, 86-89].
2. To ensure that entities operate with utmost confidence in the sanctity and fairness of India’s legal and regulatory system, the objectives of the IBC and the Competition Act must also necessarily be in harmony with one another. Within that context, while the IBC’s primary objective is the timely resolution of stressed assets with maximised value realisation for the stakeholders, the significant delay seen in the present case is both unfortunate and regrettable – Nevertheless, expeditious resolution cannot come at the cost of disregarding statutory provisions – Providing relief for stressed assets must necessarily align with the statutory framework, as adherence to legal principles is fundamental to a fair and just resolution process – In the present case, the statutory provision and legislative intent unequivocally affirm the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC – For a Resolution Plan containing a combination, the CCI’s approval to the Resolution Plan must be obtained before and consequently, the CoC’s examination and approval should be only after the CCI’s decision – This interpretation respects the original legislative intent, and deviation from the same would not only undermine the statute but would also erode the faith posed by the stakeholders in the integrity of our legal and regulatory framework – Where the provisions allow for dilution or departure from the intended scheme of the IBC or the Competition Act, it is the responsibility of the legislature to rectify such inconsistencies through appropriate legislative measures and the judiciary should not normally venture into the legislative domain – Further, indispensability of procedural safeguards as an integral component [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1785Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. of a just legal order must be given its due weight, especially as procedural requirements are not mere formalities to be circumvented for expediency but substantive protections designed to ensure fairness and transparency – In that light, the procedural lapses with respect to objections to the proposed combination and the consequent divestiture modification proposed within the framework of the Competition Act, 2002, seriously vitiated the integrity of the process – Adherence to procedural propriety is non-negotiable and the ends cannot justify the means – By upholding the mandatory nature of the statutory provision and emphasising upon the critical importance of procedural safeguards, the principle of rule of law is upheld in alignment with global best practices which underscore fairness, predictability and transparency – Such an approach not only reinforces the integrity and credibility of the legal framework but also highlights India’s commitment to fostering a regulatory environment, which is conducive to both business and innovation – Additionally, it also ensures the protection and enforcement of rights in an equitable manner, free from bias or favouritism – Therefore, a balance between the need for expeditious relief and adherence to the statutory framework must necessarily be maintained, in order to ensure that the objectives of both, the IBC and the Competition Act are met in a manner that supports India’s long-term economic aspirations – The AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan is unsustainable as it failed to secure prior approval from the CCI, as mandated under the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC – Consequently, the approval granted by the CoC to the Resolution Plan dated 28.10.2022 without the requisite CCI approval, cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside and quashed – Any action taken pursuant to the Resolution Plan shall stand nullified, and the rights of all stakeholders shall be restored as per status quo ante, prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan by the CoC on 28.10.2022 – Consequently, the CoC shall reconsider the Appellant’s Resolution Plan and any other Resolution Plans which possessed the requisite CCI approval as on 28.10.2022 i.e., the date on which the CoC voted upon the submitted Resolution Plans. [Paras 148-154, 155.1, 155.2, 155.3]. Held: (per S.V.N. Bhatti, J.) The question as to whether a requirement under the statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed – Use of the word ‘shall’ raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative – However, the prima facie inference about the provision being imperative 1786 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports may be rebutted by other considerations, such as:– The object, scope of the enactment, and the consequences flowing from such construction – Interpretation of the word ‘shall’ as directory has been a purposive effort of the court – In determining whether the word ‘shall’ is mandatory or directory, the court examines noscitur a sociis, the operation, functions, duties, and consequences for nonperformance – The rule of literal interpretation with its exceptions is noted, and the grammatical interpretation of sections 30 and 31 of IBC sets the stages of consideration of twin approvals, one by the CoC, and the other by the Adjudicating Authority, while approval or rejection is granted to the resolution plan – The combination approval as an enclosure to an applicable resolution plan at the stage of section 30(4) IBC is a form or procedure that does not have consequences – When adopting a consequentialist approach, it becomes clear that the insistence upon a combination approval at the stage of Section 30(4) does not place the stakeholders at an advantageous position – Proviso to sub-section (4) of section 31 is directory and would be compliant with IBC and the Competition Act – Hence, the combination approval of CCI at the stage of consideration of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority under section 31(1) would be proper and legal – Such interpretation keeps the operations of the successful resolution applicant as a going concern, without deviating from the rigour of 63 the Competition Act, and simultaneously, a one-year window is granted to obtain licenses, permissions, consents and other regulatory approvals envisaged by a host of laws – Therefore, the proviso is to be interpreted purposively and it is held that approval of a combination of CCI at the stage of consideration by CoC is directory and not mandatory – By operation of section 31(2) of the IBC, to avoid rejection of a fully compliant and voted resolution plan, the Adjudicating Authority confirms that the approval of the combination is available before implementing the resolution plan – At best, the use of the words “prior to” is a temporal expression whose mandatory or directory nature is to be determined from the context surrounding section 31 – IBC and the Competition Act have timelines for the discharge of a duty and function – It is impermissible to interpret the provisions in one enactment by keeping in perspective the starting point of a timeline and the termination of a timeline in the other enactment – The enactments are allowed to work parallelly and without pressure for performance from the other in line with the duties and obligations cast through the enactments – NCLAT in ArcelorMittal, Vishal Vijay Kalantari [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1787Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. and Makalu Trading Limited held that the requirement under proviso to sub-section (4) of section 31 is directory at the stage of CoC approval – View of NCLAT was confirmed by this Court while referring to the NCLAT judgment in ArcelorMittal - Argument against the view taken by this Court in Vishal Vijay Kalantari and Makalu Trading Limited is rejected – Idea of IBC is to let the financial markets work – Adjudicating Authority to dispose of the Application filed by the Resolution Professional. [Paras 75-82, 82.1 and 85 of first judgment] Rules of interpretation – Literal or Purposive – Whether rule of purposive interpretation should be adopted in order to interpret the proviso to s.31(4) of IBC and not the principles of literal interpretation – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] To understand the legislative intent, the Rule of Plain Reading or literal interpretation should find favour rather than the rule of purposive interpretation – When the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, literal interpretation is the best way to understand the legislative intention behind enacting the particular provision – Statutory enactments like the IBC demand strict adherence to legislative intent, guarding against procedural overreach that may upset the framework envisioned by the Parliament – Where the language is clear, plain and unambiguous, the courts are duty-bound to give effect to the meaning that can be inferred from a statute, irrespective of the consequences – Mere inconvenience being caused to a party, by virtue of the plain and literal interpretation accorded to a statute, cannot be reason enough to forego such interpretation – When the language is unambiguous, as in the present matter, the courts must respect its ordinary and natural meaning instead of wandering into the realm of speculation and unintended overreach invoking the so-called ‘spirit of the law’ – Language of the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC appears to be clear with no ambiguity and in those situations, all words finding place in the provision must be given their due meaning – Efforts must be to construe any text, phrase and/or proviso in a reasonable manner without going beyond the limited range of permissibility within which the legislative meaning can be captured – Use of the word ‘prior’ in the proviso, must be given some meaning as by virtue of the same, the statute requires that the act of obtaining CoC approval for the Resolution Plan must 1788 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports be done in a particular manner i.e., the necessary CCI approval for Resolution Plans containing combination proposals must be obtained prior to such Plan, being granted the CoC’s approval. [Paras 35, 36, 38, 42, 45, 55, 56] Held: (per S.V.N. Bhatti, J.) To arrive at which one of the interpretations is applicable, the summary of the idea, roadmap, implementation, and conclusion of the IBC, as well as the extent needed, is considered – Literal interpretation satisfies the application of exact meaning to the words used in the proviso, but whether such application is consistent with other provisions in section 31 is to be determined – If literal interpretation leads to inconsistency with the text and tense used in section 31, then the Court attempts to resolve it to make the section consistent in text and tense – The IBC was enacted with the intention of improving the ease of doing business in India – In line with this thinking, one of the legislative measures is the amendment to the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 31 of the IBC – The Parliament has not incorporated the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 31 in the text of section 30 of the IBC – Section 30(2) of the IBC, read with Regulation 39(4) of CIRP Regulations, 2016, has provided for what is to be reported to the CoC by RP through Form H – The rules of grammar are to be applied unless those rules contradict the legislative intent or purpose – This statement is more so if it refers to legislative intent or purpose manifested in the only manner in which a legislature can authoritatively do so in the text of the enactment – Though not to find out violability in the text of the enactment, but to keep the content consistent throughout the enactment – The court gathers the meaning of all the expressions used in the same section – In this manner, the courts have applied grammatical construction to provisions of law – In sub-section (2) of section 31, the words “does not confirm to the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 31” grammatically interpreted throw light on the stage of satisfactory compliance of all the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 30 – The Parliament, in its wisdom, would have employed the expression “did not” in place of “does not” if the requirement is that the resolution plan is fully compliant at a stage before consideration of the resolution plans by the CoC – As part of the interpretative process, the Court ought not to lose sight of expressions which are in the present tense, such as “meets”, “does not”, and “satisfies” in section 31 of the IBC – To keep section 31 uniform in all perspectives, in the place of literal interpretation, purposive [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1789Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. interpretation is apt; therefore, the word ‘shall’ in the proviso to section 31(4) of the IBC is interpreted and held as directory. [Paras 46, 52, 59, 67, 68, 78 of the first judgment].
Competition Act, 2002 – s.29 – Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to Transaction of Business relating to Combination) Regulations, 2011 – Regulation 2(f) – Show cause notice to the Parties to combination – Term ‘Parties’ – Meaning of:
Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] Section 29(1) of the Competition Act and Regulation 2(f) of the Competition Regulations, 2011 mandate the issuance of a Show Cause Notice [‘SCN’] to the ‘parties to the combination’ if and when the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that a combination is likely to cause or has caused Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC), within the relevant market – The term ‘parties to the combination’ as explicitly defined under Regulation 2(f) includes both entities entering into the combination and the combined entity, if the combination has come into effect – The term ‘to the parties to the combination’ cannot be restricted to the proposed acquirer alone – The term ‘parties’ may appear broad and/or encompassing all related entities associated with the combination, such an interpretation cannot dilute the inherent plurality attached to the word ‘parties – The use of the plural form signifies a clear legislative intent to address not just one entity but multiple parties directly involved in the combination process, including but not limited to the acquirer, the target, and, where applicable, the combined entity, if the combination has come into effect – The term ‘parties’ must be understood to cover both entities participating in and directly affected by the combination, ensuring the integrity of competition assessment and compliance with statutory provisions under Sections 29(1) and 29(2) – To argue otherwise would not only mutilate the term ‘parties’ but would also result in procedural lapses and incomplete analysis, defeating the very purpose of the regulatory oversight. [Paras 124, 126, 133, 134].
Held: (per S.V.N. Bhatti, J.) The CCI must issue notice to the acquirer and also the target, i.e., the corporate debtor subjected to the resolution process represented by an RP – Irrespective of different statutory schemes in the sections relied on by CCI, it can be said that the words “it shall issue notice to the parties to 1790 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports show cause” cannot be restricted only to the proposed acquirer – If the plural expression on a case-to-case basis is understood as singular, then it would restrict the meaning of the language. [Para 33 of the second judgment] Words and Phrases – Term ‘any person aggrieved’ appearing in s.62 of IBC and s.53T of the Competition Act – Meaning of – Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] Term ‘any person aggrieved’ appearing in s.62 of IBC and s.53T of the Competition Act must be understood widely and not in a restricted fashion – Appellant as an unsuccessful resolution applicant whose Resolution Plan could have otherwise been approved by the CoC, satisfies the requirement of being aggrieved. [Paras 26, 27] Interpretation of Statutes – Proviso – Purpose of – Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] A proviso in a given statute may be introduced to serve various purposes, like qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment or insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable or as an optional addenda to explain the real intendment of the statutory provision – Ordinarily, however, the function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein. [Para 33] Rules of interpretation – Whether permits courts to read a certain word, term or phrase in the statute differently from its plain meaning:
Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] Rules of interpretation permit courts to read a certain word, term or phrase in the statute differently from its plain meaning if it leads to absurdity but the courts must always remain conscious of the fine dividing line, separating adjudication and legislation, which must not be crossed. [Para 64] Rules of interpretation – Literal interpretation vis-a-vis legislative debates, committee reports and/or historical contexts – Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J.) (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] While literal interpretation must remain the judiciary’s guiding light, insights gained from legislative debates, committee reports and/or historical contexts may be looked at with a degree of caution. [Para 67] [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1791Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Rules of interpretation – Notes on Clauses vis-à-vis Memorandum explaining particular clauses – Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] Memorandum explaining a particular proviso stands at a lower footing when compared with Notes on Clauses, explaining the entire amendment, especially in cases where the language in the statute is definite and straightforward. [Para 76] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Locus standi of unsuccessful resolution applicant – Term ‘any person aggrieved’ appearing in Section 62 of the IBC and Section 53T of the Competition Act – Meaning of:
Held: [per Hrishikesh Roy, J. (for himself and for Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)] Once the CIRP is initiated, the nature of proceedings are no longer in personam but rather become in rem – Term ‘any person aggrieved’ appearing in Section 62 of the IBC and Section 53T of the Competition Act must be understood widely and not in a restricted fashion – Appellant as an unsuccessful resolution applicant whose Resolution Plan could have otherwise been approved by the CoC, satisfies the requirement of being aggrieved – Preliminary locus standi objection vis-à-vis the Appellant, therefore, does not merit acceptance. [Paras 26, 27] Case Law Cited In the judgement of Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Committee of Creditors of Essar v. Satish Kumar Gupta [2019] 16 SCR 275 : (2020) 8 SCC 531; CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [2010] 11 SCR 112 : (2010) 10 SCC 744; Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. CoC of Educomp Solutions Ltd. [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401; GLAS Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. [2024] 10 SCR 1802 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3032; Samir Agrawal v. CCI & Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 1044 : (2021) 3 SCC 136; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand Maharaj [1963] 1 SCR 1 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 12; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta [1982] 3 SCR 491 : (1982) 2 SCC 61; Nelson Motis v. UOI [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 325 : (1992) 4 SCC 711; Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan [1958] 1 SCR 360 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [2007] 5 SCR 416 : (2007) 7 SCC 636; 1792 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Mahalaxmi Mills Ltd., Bhaunagar v. CIT, Bombay [1964] 5 SCR 216 : 1963 SCC OnLine SC 190; Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [1976] 1 SCR 505 : (1975) 2 SCC 671; Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Premdeva [1983] 1 SCR 498 : (1982) 3 SCC 270; Tata Consultancy Services v. Andhra Pradesh [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 1040 : (2005) 1 SCC 308; CIT, Agri. v. Keshab Chandra Mandal (1950) SCC 205; Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [1955] 1 SCR 671: (1954) 2 SCC 314; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Private Limited [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 517 : (2003) 2 SCC 111; A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 500; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore [1958] 1 SCR 895 : 1954 SCC OnLine SC 25; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3 SCC 92; Visitor, Aligarh Muslim University v. K.S. Misra [2007] 9 SCR 763 : (2007) 8 SCC 593; ESI Corpn. v. KEY DEE Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. [2022] 3 SCR 842 : (2022) 17 SCC 379; UOI v. Hansoli Devi [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 324 : (2010) 15 SCC 483; JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1961] 3 SCR 185 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [2002] 1 SCR 75 : (2002) 2 SCC 135; Ramphal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma (2004) 9 SCC 278; Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. [2012] 12 SCR 327 : (2012) 9 SCC 552; Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [2006] 2 SCR 190 : (2006) 2 SCC 670; Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India [1990] 3 SCR 441 : (1990) 4 SCC 366; ACG Associated Capsules v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 3 SCC 32; Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone [1980] 1 SCR 1177 : (1980) 1 SCC 403; Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [2022] 11 SCR 808 : (2022) 10 SCC 1; Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union [2015] 4 SCR 45 : (2015) 4 SCC 544; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya [1961] 2 SCR 679 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5 – relied on.
Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Abhijit Guhathakurta, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 920; Makalu Trading Ltd. v. Rajiv Chakraborty, 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 643; Vishal Vijay Kalantri v. Shailen Shah, 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1013 – distinguished.
Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [1985] 2 SCR 643 : (1985) 1 SCC 591; Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India [1989] 3 SCR 488 : (1989) 4 SCC 187; State of [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1793Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das [2019] 7 SCR 197 : (2019) 6 SCC 270; Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17 – referred to.
Hutton v. Phillips (1949) 45 Delh 156, 70A 2d 15; Corp. of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, 1921 SCC OnLine PC 75; Wilma E. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US 607; 2 Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Vandry, SCC OnLine PC 10 – referred to.
In the judgments of S.V.N. Bhatti, J.
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others [2019] 16 SCR 275 : (2020) 8 SCC 531; New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 459 : AIR (1963) SC 1207; Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh [1955] 2 SCR 457 : AIR (1955) SC 830; Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan [1962] 1 SCR 517 : AIR (1961) SC 1480; State of UP v. Babu Ram Upadhya [1961] 2 SCR 679 : AIR (1961) SC 751; State of MP v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. [1966] Supp. 1 SCR 473 : AIR (1967) SC 276; State Bank of India & Ors. v. The Consortium of Murari Jalan and Florian Fritsch & Anr. [2024] 1 SCR 1045 : Civil Appeal No. 5023-5024 of 2024; Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 9 : AIR (1971) SC 530; Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. NC Budhraja and Co. [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 185 : AIR (1993) SC 2529; Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra [2001] 2 SCR 654 : (2001) 4 SCC 534; Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [2002] 2 SCR 369 : (2002) 3 SCC 722; Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur [2008] 2 SCR 424 : (2008) 12 SCC 372; Samir Agarwal v. CCI [2020] 13 SCR 1044 : (2021) 3 SCC 136; Union of India v. Cipla Ltd [2016] 7 SCR 523 : (2017) 5 SCC 262; Brahm Dutt v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 431 – referred to.
Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Abhijit Guhathakurta, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 920; Makalu Trading Ltd. v. Rajiv Chakraborty, 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 643; Vishal Vijay Kalantri v. Shailen Shah, 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1013; Bank of Maharashtra v. Videocon Industries Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 6 – referred to. Corp of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island (1921) AC 2 384; Shannon Realities Ltd. v. St. Michel (Ville De) (1924) AC 185 – referred to.
1794 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Books and Periodicals Cited In the judgment of Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., Francis Bennion; Appraisal of the Principle of Plain Meaning, Chapter 1 – Basic Principles, Justice G.P. Singh’s Principle of Statutory Interpretation (15th Edition), 2016; Ried Macdonald and Fordham, Cases and other Materials on Legislation, 2nd Edn; Ryan Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 110 (2016); Justice Antonion Scalia, Common Law Courts in Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, 3 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997) – referred to. In the judgments of S.V.N. Bhatti, J.
Earl T. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes (Thomas Law Book Company, 1940), p. 516 – referred to.
List of Acts Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ; Competition Act, 2002; Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to Transaction of Business relating to Combination) Regulations, 2011; CIRP Regulations, 2016.
List of Keywords Corporate-debtor; Resolution Professional; Resolution Applicant; Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition; Resolution Plan; CIRP; Committee of Creditors; Approval of resolution plan; Prior approval; Directory or mandatory; Rules of interpretation; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Competition Commission of India; Literal interpretation; Purposive interpretation; Interplay between the IBC and the Competition Act.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6071 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2023 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in CAAT (I) Nos. 735, 807, 607 and 724 of 2023 With Civil Appeal No(s). 4954, 4924, 4937, 5018, 5401, 6847, 6055, 6123, 6177, 7037, 7038, 6771 and 7428 of 2023 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1795Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Dhruv Mehta, Rajshekhar Rao, Abhijeet Sinha, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mahesh Jethmalani, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Dushyant Dave, Mukul Rohatgi, Parag Tripathi, Rana Mukherjee, Amit Sibal, Ms. Liz Mathew, Balbir Singh, Sr. Advs., Indranil Ghosh, Debabrata Das, Palzer Moktan, Ms. Aanchal Tikmani, Aditya Shukla, Saptarshi Mukherjee, Ms. Mehrunissa Anand Jaitley, Harshil Wason, Ms. Mrinal Choudhary, Ms. Mehr Bedi, Advait Ghosh, Utsav Trivedi, Avishkar Singhvi, Ms. Unnati Agrawal, Ms. Manini Roy, Piyush Tiwari, Ms. Nandini Acharya, Siddharth Seem, Ms. Mugdha Pande, Ajay Awasthi, Swapnil Singh, Ms. Dhanakshi Gandhi, Ms. Rooh-E-Hina Dua, Buddy Ranganadhan, Samar Bansal, Pawas Kulshrestha, Parv Garg, K.S.Rekhi, Ms. Nandini Tomar, Ms. Shefali Tripathi, Ms. Divya Jain, Nikhil Jain, Yadunath Bhargavan, Neeraj Chaudhari, Raghav Agrawal, Udit Sidhra, Dhanya Krishnan, Akshay Chandra, Mohit D. Ram, Anubhav Sharma, Chirag Shah, Sanjeev Sharma, Vaibhav Gaggar, Akshay Nanda, Ms. Sanya Sud, Ms. Vaishali Goyal, Ms. Praniti Ganjoo, Aditye Arora, Keshav Sehgal, Ms. Monika Lakhanpal Gaggar, Ms. Kokila Kumar, Anirudh Krishan Gandhi, Debargha Roy, Mohit Rai, Ms. Divya Joshi, Ms. Somya Chaturvedi, Dhruv Mehta, Utkarsh Tiwari, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Ms. Oindrila Sen, Ms. Sneha Ahmed, Samarth Mohanty, Ms. Pratiksha Sharma, Ankit Acharya, Aditya Shukla, Darpan Sachdeva, Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Vinamra Koparhia, Saksham Dhingra, Ms. Bagavathy Vennimalai, Ms. Ritu Chaudhary, Rajnish Prasad, Udayan Jain, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Raj Surana, Ranjan Mishra, Ms. Ananya Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Balbir Singh, Rana Mukherjee, Rajshekhar Rao, Mukul Rohatgi, Parag Tripathi, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mahesh Jethmalani, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs., Rajnish Prasad, Udayan Jain, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Raj Surana, Ranjan Mishra, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Ms. Oindrila Sen, Ms. Sneha Ahmed, Samarth Mohanty, Indranil Ghosh, Debabrata Das, Palzer Moktan, Ms. Aanchal Tikmani, Ms. Misha, Soummo Biswas, Siddhant Kant, Ms. Moulshree Shukla, Ms. Gayathri Balasubramanian, Yugal Jain, S. S. Shroff, Indranil Ghosh, Debabrata Das, Palzer Moktan, Ms. Aanchal Tikmani, Sanjeev Sharma, Vaibhav Gaggar, Akshay Nanda, Ms. Sanya Sud, Ms. Vaishali Goyal, Ms. Praniti Ganjoo, Aditye Arora, Keshav 1796 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Sehgal, Ms. Monika Lakhanpal Gaggar, Ms. Kokila Kumar, Anirudh Krishan Gandhi, Debargha Roy, Mohit Rai, Ms. Divya Joshi, Ms. Somya Chaturvedi, Dhruv Mehta, Utkarsh Tiwari, Samar Bansal, Pawas Kulshrestha, Parv Garg, K. S. Rekhi, Ms. Divya Jain, Nikhil Jain, Utsav Trivedi, Avishkar Singhvi, Ms. Unnati Agrawal, Ms. Manini Roy, Piyush Tiwari, Ms. Nandini Acharya, Siddharth Seem, Ms. Mugdha Pande, Ajay Awasthi, Swapnil Singh, Ms. Dhanakshi Gandhi, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Vikram Wadhera, Ms. Smriti Churiwal, Jaiveer Kant, Ms. Meher Thapar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Table of Contents* Factual Matrix ........................................................................... 2 SubMiSSionS................................................................................. 9 DiScuSSion & analySiS.................................................................. 16 Objections on Locus Standi.............................................. 16 Proviso to Section 31(4) IBC.............................................. 17 Undertaking Interpretation: Why Literal and not Purposive? 21 Principle of Plain Meaning..................................................... 24 Different Threshold for Combinations.................................. 33 Notes on Clauses, Memorandum & Scrivener’s Error.......... 35 (Dis?) Harmony between Stipulated Timelines...................... 43 Distinguishing cases relied upon by the NCLAT................. 49 Relevance of CCI & its scrutiny.......................................... 53 Procedural Lapses under the Competition Act ................. 58 Discrepancies in Data........................................................... 67 Practical Challenges with Conditional Approvals................ 69 concluSion.................................................................................. 71 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1797Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Judgment# Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Factual M atrix
1. These are statutory appeals under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC’] against the judgement dated 18.09.2023 (impugned order) passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as ‘NCLAT’] in appeals, pertaining to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as ‘HNGIL’]. Additionally, there is a set of appeals arising out of the NCLAT Order dated 28.07.2023, pertaining to the approval accorded to the combination between HNGIL and AGI Greenpac. In this common judgment, the parties are identified from Civil Appeal No. 6071 of 2023.
2. One key party in this matter is HNGIL i.e., the Corporate Debtor/Target Company with a 60% market share of the glass packaging industry in India. The Resolution Professional represents them. Incorporated in 1946, HNGIL has manufacturing plants located in Bahadurgarh (Haryana), Rishra (West Bengal), Neemrana (Rajasthan), Naidupeta (Andhra Pradesh), Sinnar (Maharashtra), Puducherry and Rishikesh (Uttarakhand), catering to a wide range of industries, including pharmaceutical and wellness, cosmetics, food & beverage, and alco-beverages, etc.
3. Combining with HNGIL is AGI Greenpac Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as ‘AGI Greenpac’] i.e., the Successful Resolution Applicant, which is the second largest company in the field of glass packaging and manufacturing in India, after HNGIL. With two manufacturing plants in Telangana, AGI Greenpac is the leading manufacturer of container glass. The combination between AGI Greenpac and HNGIL, with potential market share of 80-85% in F&B segment and 45-50% in alco-beverage segment, is generating a key issue for adjudication since the combination of the two major players in this sector is likely to result in an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition [hereinafter # Ed. Note: Judgment pronounced by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy on behalf of himself and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia.
1798 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports referred to as ‘AAEC’] in the glass packaging industry generally and in particular, within the sub-segments of F&B and alco-beverages.
4. The main contesting party to the aforementioned proposed combination is the Bermuda-registered Appellant – Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as ‘INSCO’], incorporated in 1984, which also submitted their Resolution Plan for HNGIL – the Corporate Debtor/Target Company in India.
5. After the CIRP was initiated against HNGIL by DBS Bank [hereinafter referred to as ‘Financial Creditor’] under Section 7 of the IBC, the Adjudicating Authority i.e., National Company Law Tribunal (Kolkata Bench), admitted the matter on 21.10.2021. An Expression of Interest [hereinafter referred to as ‘EOI’] was floated on 25.03.2022, by the Resolution Professional as per Form G under Regulation 36(A)
(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. Within the EOI, Clauses 3.3 & 4.1.1(k) prescribed a mandatory requirement of approval from the Competition Commission of India [hereinafter referred to as ‘CCI’] prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the Committee of Creditors [hereinafter referred to as CoC’].
6. In response to the above, both INSCO (Appellant) and AGI Greenpac submitted their respective Resolution Plans in April 2022, for consideration. On 19.05.2022, a provisional list of eligible Resolution Applicants was published with both the Resolution Applicants placed at Sl. No. 6 (INSCO/Appellant) and Sl. No. 5 (AGI Greenpac/ Respondent 2), respectively.
7. Subsequently, in response to an e-mail by the Appellant seeking clarification with respect to the timeline for obtaining approval of CCI, the RP in an e-mail communication dated 25.08.2022, granted relaxation to Resolution Applicants, to procure CCI approval, after CoC’s approval of the Resolution Plan but prior to filing the application before NCLT.
8. On 27.09.2022, AGI Greenpac submitted an application with the CCI under Form I under Regulation 5(ii) of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to Transaction of Business relating to Combination) Regulations 2011 intimating that it proposed to enter into a combination with HNGIL, by acquiring 100% of HNGIL’s shareholding and business.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1799Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
9. On 22.10.2022, CCI declared the application filed by AGI Greenpac as ‘not valid’. Thereafter, final Resolution Plans were submitted for consideration by the CoC. It must however be noted that at that stage, neither AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan had the requisite CCI approval nor did they have any pending application, seeking such approval from the CCI.
10. Immediately thereafter, the Appellant objected to the approval accorded to AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan stating that they had not obtained the requisite CCI approval at the time, when their Resolution Plan had been put to vote, which had been the condition precedent. The Appellant also pointed out that Form I submitted by AGI Greenpac with the CCI had been rejected on 22.10.2022 and that a fresh Form II had been submitted which had not yet been approved till the date of the COC approval. Further, serious contradictions between the process undertaken and the process envisaged to be undertaken by the RP in an e-mail clarification dated 25.08.2022, were also highlighted to point out that preferential treatment had been granted to AGI Greenpac despite the rejection of their Form I, by the CCI.
11. However, on 28.10.2022, the CoC approved the AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan with 98% votes, while Appellant INSCO’s Resolution Plan, received 88% votes.
12. Thereafter, on 03.11.2022, AGI Greenpac submitted a detailed application (Combination Registration No. C-2022/11/983) under Form II seeking approval before CCI. At the same time, the Resolution Professional filed an IA under Section 30(6) of the IBC before NCLT Kolkata, seeking approval for AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan while INSCO filed an IA before NCLT Kolkata challenging the approval granted to AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan, by the COC.
13. On 10.03.2023, AGI Greenpac submitted a divestment plan to CCI in respect of one of the seven HNGIL plants (situated in Uttarakhand), as part of a voluntary modification, to comply with the requirements of Competition laws. On 15.03.2023, CCI granted an approval to AGI Greenpac’s combination proposal with HNGIL (Corporate Debtor/ Target Company), subject to the compliance of certain modifications including the divestment of one of the seven HNGIL plants (Rishikesh, Uttarakhand).
14. Challenging the approval to HNGIL and AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan and seeking reconsideration of INSCO’s Resolution Plan, INSCO 1800 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports filed an application before NCLT Kolkata. On 28.04.2023, the NCLT rejected the application, thereby upholding the approval granted to AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan, stating that the required CCI approval under Section 31(4) IBC had been obtained in the meantime. While challenging the NCLT rejection dated 28.04.2023, the Appellant filed the Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 735/2023 before the NCLAT.
15. The NCLAT vide judgment dated 18.09.2023 upheld the approval accorded to AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan, stating that although the requirement of approval by the CCI was mandatory in nature, its prior approval by the CoC, was only directory. This is because the timeline for CCI to decide upon a combination proposal is much longer and should not lead to a situation where the CIRP is frozen or halted because of a pending application before the CCI.
16. Meanwhile, the Appellant INSCO challenged the CCI approval dated 15.03.2023 vide Competition Appeal (AT) No. 7/2023 before the NCLAT, which upheld the approval vide judgement dated 28.07.2023.
17. It is these above decisions of the NCLAT (dated 28.07.2023 and 18.09.2023) that have been challenged by INSCO in the lead Civil Appeal. Arguments in support of INSCO’s stand have been advanced by learned Senior Advocates Dr. A. M. Singhvi and Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani. On the other side, the Successful Resolution Applicant i.e., AGI Greenpac is represented by learned Senior Advocates Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Parag Tripathi. The learned Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta, appears for the CoC. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. P. Chidambaram appears for the Resolution Professional while the CCI is represented by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Balbir Singh. For the other parties, submissions were advanced by learned Senior Advocates Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Mr. Dushyant Dave, Mr. Amit Sibal, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Mr. Rajshekhar Rao. SubMiSSionS
18. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for INSCO i.e., the unsuccessful Resolution Applicant. (Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6071/2023), inter alia, made the following submissions:
18.1. According to the Appellant’s counsel, the entire process from submission of AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan to its approval by the CoC was riddled with irregularities and should have been nullified.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1801Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
18.2. The appellant’s counsel contends that the RP violated Section 31(4) of the IBC & its proviso, the RFRP and the RP’s own e-mail dated 25.08.2022, by submitting AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan to the NCLT for approval, without the required statutory approval from the CCI. This contradicts AGI Greenpac’s undertaking before the NCLT (Clause 5.5), which stated that CCI approval would be secured prior to CoC approval and submission of the plan to the NCLT.
18.3. While Section 31(4) of the IBC permits statutory approvals within one year of NCLT approval, the proviso excludes combinations under Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002, requiring stricter compliance. This, according to Dr. Singhvi, underscores legislative intent for stringent adherence to the proviso.
18.4. It is contended that in case of non-compliance, both the CoC and RP are empowered to re-evaluate and approve any other compliant Resolution Plans. However, despite such circumstances existing here, neither the RP nor the CoC acted as needed, rendering the process invalid.
18.5. Relying on judicial precedents, the counsel emphasises that Section 31(4) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), mandates statutory compliance before the Resolution Plan is approved by the CoC. However, the RP disregarding the law granted unwarranted relaxation to AGI Greenpac, from procuring the necessary approvals.
18.6. It is then contended that the NCLAT judgment (dated 18.09.2023) failed to observe that there is no inconsistency between the timelines given under the IBC and Competition Act, as the CCI is mandated to form a prima facie opinion on adverse effects within 30 days. In the context, it was pointed out that the IBC’s 330 days’ CIRP timeline can be extended in deserving cases.
18.7. The appellants argue that the entire framework as envisaged under Section 29(1) of the Competition Act was bypassed, as no mandatory SCN was issued to the Corporate Debtor/Target Company. Also, neither details were published nor were public objections invited by the CCI, before approving AGI Greenpac’s Combination proposal on 15.03.2023.
1802 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
18.8. The Competition Act, according to the appellants, allows only the CCI to propose modifications to combinations post-SCN under Section 29(1) IBC, whereas the modifications in this case were done on the basis of suggestions by AGI Greenpac, contrary to the legal provisions.
18.9. The appellant argues that without the permission of CoC as per Section 28(1) of the IBC, the RP lacked authority to divest or sell Corporate Debtor/Target Company’s assets. No such permission was sought or granted. In fact, CoC had already approved the Resolution Plan on 28.10.2022, i.e., much before AGI Greenpac proposed modifications on 10.03.2023. Consequently, the CCI granted approval based on factually incorrect and misleading data, provided by AGI Greenpac.
18.10. It is then pointed out that AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan pending approval before NCLT, is conditional, violating the IBC framework. The CCI’s approval on 15.03.2023 also acknowledged that even after divestment, it must be demonstrated that the same is aligned with its approval. The plan creates an unfeasible sequence, as the divestment depends on the Resolution Plan’s implementation, which itself requires prior CCI approval, leading to unfeasible complications, which should have been avoided by the NCLAT.
19. Appearing for the CoC, Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General, inter alia, made the following submissions:
19.1. The IBC was introduced as an experiment to facilitate debtridden companies, to be taken over as going concerns, by avoiding liquidation. The Statement of Objects & Reasons of the IBC emphasises upon the need for a time-bound resolution process aimed at maximizing asset value. The CoC plays a pivotal role in assessing the feasibility and viability of a Resolution Plan from a commercial perspective.
19.2. According to Mr. Mehta, adherence to the IBC’s timelines is sacrosanct and must be followed. Further, it was argued that the timelines under the IBC and the Competition Act are incompatible and must be harmonised, with Section 31(4) and its proviso being interpreted appropriately.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1803Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
19.3. The interpretation suggested by INSCO, treating the proviso as ‘mandatory’ rather than ‘directory’ would undermine the IBC’s scheme. It is therefore argued that the proviso is directory, as upheld by various NCLAT judgments which have not been upset by the Supreme Court.
19.4. Mr. Mehta further contended that the Green Channel approval mechanism gave INSCO an unfair head start, disadvantaging established industry players. This, it is argued, goes against providing a level-playing field and undermining legislative intent while diminishing the competitive nature of the CIRP.
19.5. According to Mr. Mehta, after deliberating on feasibility, statutory approvals, and respective timelines, the CoC fully complied with the IBC, Competition Act, and relevant regulations, as per applicable jurisprudence.
19.6. It was further contended that the terms of CCI’s approval did not modify AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan, and thus, specific CoC approval was not necessary.
20. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned senior counsel appearing for the Resolution Professional, argued that the RP did not contravene any provisions of law and adhered to legal position as was in force at the relevant time.
20.1. It was argued that the RP adhered to the law and followed NCLAT judgments correctly treating the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, as directory.
20.2. According to Mr. Chidambaram, RP’s role is procedural, with no substantive involvement in Resolution Plans. Therefore, there is no scope for controversy regarding the RP’s role.
21. For the Successful Resolution Applicant i.e., AGI Greenpac Ltd., Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate, inter alia, made the following submissions:
21.1. The counsel argued that it is already settled that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is directory in nature. The NCLAT judgments holding such a view have not been interfered by the Supreme Court, and this should be understood as the correct view, which is not upset by this Court. He further emphasised that a purposive interpretation is necessary to align the proviso with the legislative intent.
1804 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
21.2. Citing the amendment’s explanatory Memorandum, Mr. Rohatgi contended that the term ‘CoC’ in the proviso was a drafting error, and the intended reference was to the ‘Adjudicating Authority’. A literal interpretation, he argued, would defeat the IBC’s purpose and should be treated as a drafting oversight.
21.3. According to Mr. Rohatgi, if the proviso is interpreted as mandatory, the timelines in IBC would be unworkable and the objective of the IBC of ensuring that the stressed businesses survive as a going concern would be compromised. It was argued that the resolution applicants and stressed business cannot afford any delay and must remain bound by the timeline.
21.4. Since the legislature prescribed no consequences for noncompliance with the proviso, Mr. Rohatgi argues that the proviso should be deemed as directory.
21.5. Moreover, since there was no change in AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan, it was argued that Plan is not conditional. In any case, these issues should not be entertained by the Supreme Court at this premature stage, as these are pending for consideration before the NCLT.
21.6. The locus standi for Appellants as the unsuccessful resolution applicant is questioned, as they lack vested rights in the CIRP. It is also argued that the workmen and operational creditors have no standing to challenge a Resolution Plan.
21.7. Highlighting the RP’s lack of expertise in managing a glass furnace factory, Mr. Rohatgi emphasised upon the importance of concluding the CIRP swiftly to avoid jeopardising its survival.
22. Mr. Parag Tripathi, supplementing for AGI Greenpac, invoked the Principle of Scrivener’s Error, highlighting an inadvertent drafting error in the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC that rendered unclear the original legislative intent. It is therefore argued that courts can pierce through the alleged obvious error and discern the true purpose behind the enactment.
D iScuSSion & analySiS Objections on Locus Standi
23. At the outset, the preliminary objection regarding the locus standi of the Appellant(s) to prefer the present Appeal(s) must be dealt with. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1805Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
24. Section 61 of the IBC provides the statutory framework for appeals against orders of the Adjudicating Authority i.e., the NCLT, stipulating that ‘any person aggrieved’ by such an order may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority i.e., the NCLAT in this case. Further, Section 62 extends this right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
25. Similarly, Section 53B of the Competition Act provides that ‘any enterprise or any person aggrieved’ within the statutory framework may file an appeal against any order of the CCI to the Appellate Tribunal i.e., the NCLAT. Section 53T further extends this right of appeal to the Supreme Court against any decision or order of the
NCLAT.
26. Once the CIRP is initiated, the nature of proceedings are no longer in personam but rather become in rem. In light of the same, the expression ‘any person aggrieved’ in the context of the IBC has been held to be indicative of there being no rigid locus requirements to institute an appeal challenging an order of the NCLT before the NCLAT or an order of the NCLAT before this Court.1 Similarly, in the context of the Competition Act, even those persons that bring to CCI information of practices that are contrary to the provisions of the Competition Act, could be said to be ‘aggrieved’. 2 Therefore, the term ‘any person aggrieved’ appearing in Section 62 of the IBC and Section 53T of the Competition Act must be understood widely and not in a restricted fashion.
27. In the present case, the Appellant as an unsuccessful resolution applicant whose Resolution Plan could have otherwise been approved by the CoC, satisfies the requirement of being aggrieved. This preliminary locus standi objection vis-à-vis the Appellant, therefore, does not merit acceptance.
Proviso to Section 31(4) IBC
28. In these matters, the principal issue is whether the approval of a proposed combination by the CCI must mandatorily precede the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the CoC, as stipulated under the proviso to Section 31 (4) of IBC.
1. GLAS Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3032.
2. Samir Agrawal v. CCI & Ors., (2021) 3 SCC 136.
1806 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
29. In its impugned order dated 18.09.2023, the NCLAT concluded that while the approval of the CCI for the combination is mandatorily required in consonance with the proviso to Section 31 (4) of the IBC, the timing of such approval i.e., that it must be obtained prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan by the COC, should be construed as being ‘directory’ in nature, rather than ‘mandatory’.
30. A few paragraphs from the impugned NCLAT order being relevant are extracted herein below:
“... ... 33. The question of obtaining approval from the CCI only arises when Resolution Plan submitted contains a combination and require approval from the CCI. After submission of Plan, the Resolution Applicant applies for approval of combination from the CCI. It is not in his hand that as to when CCI will grant the approval. The CCI has to act as per statutory provisions of the Competition Act and it has been given 210 days to take a decision. If, we hold that prior approval of the CCI is mandatory prior to the approval of Plan by the CoC, it will lead to incongruous result, the CIRP cannot be frozen or cannot be put at halt because an application is submitted before the CCI. Looking to the timeline provided in the Code and that of the Competition Act and to hold that prior approval of CCI is required prior to approval of Plan by the CoC, mandatorily will lead to adverse effect on the CIRP... ...
... ... 34. In the present case, we have noticed that RFRP provided that CCI’s approval has to be obtained prior to approval of Plan by the CoC, which RFRP was in accordance with Section 31(4). Although the RP subsequently clarified that approval can be obtained even after the approval by the CoC, which was in accordance with the prevalent legal position as settled by this Tribunal in Arcelor Mittal and other cases. We thus are of the view that Section 31, sub-section (4) proviso has to be read to mean that though the approval by the CCI is ‘mandatory’, the approval by the CCI prior to approval of CoC is ‘directory’. .. ...”
31. The NCLAT, as can be seen from the above, concluded that though CCI’s approval is mandatory, obtaining ‘prior approval’, is directory. Such a conclusion was reached on the understanding that the [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1807Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Resolution Applicant does not have control over the timeline within which the CCI may render its approval or disapproval, towards the combination application. This may in turn, lead to a situation wherein the insolvency proceeding is unduly delayed because of a pending application seeking approval from the CCI. That might undermine the very objective of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [hereinafter referred to as ‘CIRP’] itself. The absence of any explicit statutory consequences for non-compliance with the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC was therefore interpreted by the NCLAT as an indication that the requirement for prior approval was meant to be only directory.
32. The proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2018. Post-amendment, the provision reads thus:
“(4) The resolution applicant shall, pursuant to the resolution plan approved under sub-section (1), obtain the necessary approval required under any law for the time being in force within a period of one year from the date of approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (1) or within such period as provided for in such law, whichever is later.
Provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for combination, as referred to in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002, the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.”
33. A proviso in a given statute may be introduced to serve various purposes, like qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment or insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable or as an optional addenda to explain the real intendment of the statutory provision.3 Ordinarily, however, the function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein.
3. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591. 1808 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
34. The introduction of a proviso, specifically addressing those Resolution Plans with provisions for combination, and the use of the term ‘prior’ therein, makes it starkly clear that the intent of the legislature was to create an exception. This ensures that in cases containing combination proposals, the approval of the CCI i.e., the regulatory body designated to ensure fair competition in markets and preventing anti-competitive practices, should first be obtained before the same is approved by the CoC. No other provision of the IBC has been pointed out that might suggest otherwise or cause disharmony between the scheme and intent of the IBC or the said proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC.
35. The above provision makes it abundantly clear that the proviso herein creates an exception for those Resolution Plans that contain provisions for combination. The language used therein appears to be clear, precise & straightforward. As such, to understand the legislative intent, the Rule of Plain Reading or literal interpretation should find favour rather than the rule of purposive interpretation as is suggested by the other side.
Undertaking Interpretation: Why Literal and not Purposive?
36. It has been strongly argued by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned counsel for AGI Greenpac, that the rule of purposive interpretation should be adopted in order to interpret the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. He, in fact, suggests a departure from the principles of literal interpretation. However, the proposition of law is well-settled that when the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, literal interpretation is the best way to understand the legislative intention behind enacting the particular provision.
37. On the need for literal interpretation of a statue, when the words are clear and unambiguous, Mr. Francis Bennion in his oft-quoted treatise Bennion on Statutory Interpretation stated:
“Where the enactment is grammatically ambiguous, the opposing constructions put forward are likely to be alternative meanings, each of which is grammatically possible. Where on the other hand, the enactment is grammatically capable of one meaning only, the opposing constructions are likely to contrast an emphasised version of the literal meaning with a strained construction. In the [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1809Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. latter case, court will tend to prefer the literal meaning, wishing to reject the idea that there is any doubt.”4
38. The principle of casus omissus, as articulated by this Court in Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC)5, underscoring boundaries of judicial interpretation, cautions the courts against transgressing into the legislative domain. The courts should not arrogate the legislature’s role by filling gaps in statutory text. Statutory enactments like the IBC demand strict adherence to legislative intent, guarding against procedural overreach that may upset the framework envisioned by the Parliament.
39. Likewise, the Supreme Court in multiple cases had underscored the rule that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, there cannot be a question of construction of the statute, as the provision would speak for itself. 6
40. In an oft-quoted case on literal interpretation Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, this Court stated as follows7 :
“If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the act.”
41. In fact, if the statute is plain and unambiguously-worded, the consequences of such construction no longer remain a matter for the court to decide on8 , even if they appear to be strange, surprising, unreasonable, unjust or oppressive. 9 Further, even hardship, inconvenience or penalty10 being the consequence of compliance with such construction cannot be deemed sufficient to alter the meaning
4. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn., Francis Bennion.
5. (2022) 2 SCC 401.
6. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 12 [Subbarao, J.]; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, (1982) 2 SCC 61; Nelson Motis v. UOI, (1992) 4 SCC 711.
7. 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8.
8. Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2007) 7 SC 636.
9. Mahalaxmi Mills Ltd., Bhaunagar v. CIT, Bombay, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 190; Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 2 SCC 671; Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Premdeva,
(1982) 3 SCC 270.
10. Tata Consultancy Services v. Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 1 SCC 308. 1810 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute or the rules.11
42. Where the language is clear, plain and unambiguous, the courts are duty-bound to give effect to the meaning that can be inferred from a statute, irrespective of the consequences. Mere inconvenience being caused to a party, by virtue of the plain and literal interpretation accorded to a statute, cannot be reason enough to forego such interpretation.
43. Emphasising on construing the meaning from the plain language of Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it then stood, Justice S. R. Das pertinently observed12 :
“The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.”
44. In other words, the so-called ‘spirit of the law’ is an indeterminate construct, whose nature renders it subjective and susceptible to varied interpretations depending on the personal predilections of those tasked with interpreting it. Therefore, it is almost unattainable as a definitive guide, especially in the face of or when put in opposition to the unambiguous, clear and plain language used in a particular provision, as is presently the case.
45. Therefore, it is almost necessary for the courts to interpret the provision in its natural sense, as it is through the words used in a provision that legislature expresses its intention. When the language is unambiguous, as in the present matter, the courts must respect its ordinary and natural meaning instead of wandering into the realm of speculation and unintended overreach invoking the so-called ‘spirit of the law’.
Principle of Plain Meaning
46. To better understand what constitutes the ‘Principle of Plain Meaning’, we will benefit by referring to the seminal treatise of Justice G.P. Singh
11. CIT, Agri. v. Keshab Chandra Mandal, (1950) SCC 205.
12. Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, (1954) 2 SCC 314. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1811Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. on Principles of Statutory Interpretation. The respected author has explained the concept with his usual clarity in the following terms 13 : “It may look somewhat paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not plain and requires some explanation. The rule, that plain words require no construction, starts with the premise that the words are plain, which is itself a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in the context and construed.
The rule, therefore, in reality means that after you have construed the words and have come to the conclusion that they can bear only one meaning, your duty is to give effect to that meaning... ...
... ... That seems to me a plain clear meaning of the statutory language in its context. Of course, in so concluding I have necessarily construed or interpreted the language. It would obviously be impossible to decide that language is ‘plain’ (more accurately that a particular meaning seems plain) without first construing it. This involves far more than picking out dictionary definitions of words or expressions used. Consideration of the context and setting is indispensable properly to ascertain a meaning. In saying that a verbal expression is plain or unambiguous, we mean little more than that we are convinced that virtually anyone competent to understand it and desiring fairly and impartially to ascertain its significance would attribute to the expression in its context a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than any other; and would consider any different meaning by comparison, strained, or far-fetched, or unusual or unlikely.”14
47. Similarly, a provision would not be considered ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different contexts, is capable of a different meanings, but instead if it contains a word or phrase
13. Pg. 41, 1.6. Appraisal of the Principle of Plain Meaning, Chapter 1 – Basic Principles, Justice G.P. Singh’s Principle of Statutory Interpretation (15th Edition), 2016.
14. Pgs. 1013, 1014, Ried Macdonald and Fordham, Cases and other Materials on Legislation, 2nd Edn; Hutton v. Phillips, (1949) 45 Delh 156, 70A 2d 15.
1812 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports which is capable of having more than one meaning in that particular context.
48. When the statute is clear and straightforward, the Supreme Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Private Limited 15 held as follows:
“25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words, statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified, unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable, or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”
49. Lord Atkinson in Corp. of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island16 observed:
“In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute, in which they occur, or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.”
50. That words in the statute are to be understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. This has been underscored by Justice Frankfurter, in the following opinion:
“After all legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed.”17
51. The above pronouncements make it clear that when the words used are clear, plain and unambiguous, the courts are duty-bound to give effect to the meaning emerging out of such plain words. The
15. (2003) 2 SCC 111.
16. 1921 SCC OnLine PC 75.
17. Wilma E. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US 607. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1813Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. intention of the legislature must be gathered from the language used and also, the words not used. It becomes imperative to understand those words in their natural and ordinary sense, and any interpretation requiring for its support addition or substitution or rejection of words as meaningless, must ordinarily be avoided.
52. Courts must always attempt to uphold a provision as it is and not invalidate it, merely because one of the possible interpretations could lead to such a result. When there is no ambiguity in the words used, the question of finding a disguised intention or purpose behind the use of a particular word (the word ‘prior’ in this case), would not ordinarily arise.
53. The legislative intent behind inserting the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC would suggest that prior approval of the CCI was specifically mandated and it should not be seen as a flexible provision to be ignored in certain exigencies. In fact, a contrary interpretation of the said proviso, i.e., that the prior approval is directory, would distort the objective for which the legislature inserted the proviso, thereby rendering the proviso totally inconsequential.
54. In the present interpretive exercise, one also needs to be mindful of the legal principle which says that where a statute requires one to do a certain thing in a certain manner, it must be done in that particular manner or not done at all. For this proposition, it would be relevant to extract the following from the judgment in A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak 18:
“22…….. It is unnecessary to refer to the long line of decisions commencing from Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426]; Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253
(2) : 63 IA 372 : (1936) 37 Cri LJ 897] and ending with Chettiam Veettil Ammadv. Taluk Land Board [(1980) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1979 SC 1573 : (1979) 3 SCR 839], laying down hitherto uncontroverted legal principle that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.”
18. (1984) 2 SCC 500.
1814 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
55. The language of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC appears to be clear with no ambiguity and in those situations, all words finding place in the provision must be given their due meaning.
56. The efforts must therefore be to construe any text, phrase and/or proviso in a reasonable manner without going beyond the limited range of permissibility within which the legislative meaning can be captured. The use of the word ‘prior’ in the proviso, must be given some meaning as by virtue of the same, the statute requires that the act of obtaining CoC approval for the Resolution Plan must be done in a particular manner i.e., the necessary CCI approval for Resolution Plans containing combination proposals must be obtained prior to such Plan, being granted the CoC’s approval.
57. The learned Solicitor General appearing for the CoC, had suggested the interpretation by which the requirement of obtaining prior approval from the CCI should be construed as directory. But this would inevitably require the Court to interpret the said proviso to mean something different than what has been expressly mentioned in the proviso. The following decisions of this Court which support the present proposition are reproduced for ready reference:
58. In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the Supreme Court held 19:
“25...The language of the Article being plain and unambiguous, it is not open to us to read into it limitations which are not there, based on a priori reasoning as to the probable intention of the legislature. Such intention can be gathered only from the words actually used in the statute; and in a court of law, what is unexpressed has the same value as what is unintended...”
59. In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court held the following 20 : “43. The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature enacting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role
19. 1954 SCC OnLine SC 25.
20. (2014) 3 SCC 92.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1815Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is some defect in the phraseology, etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The statute requires to be interpreted without doing any violence to the language used therein. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate.”
60. Significantly, the Supreme Court in Visitor, Aligarh Muslim University v. K.S. Misra 21 held:
“13…It is well-settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every part of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute...”
61. The intent of the legislature must therefore be gathered from the words it has used in the statute. Naturally, the Court should proceed with the assumption that no word has been used in vain or in an inapposite manner, by the legislature. 22 Courts, when confronted with clear statutory language, derive the meaning from the words used by the legislature and should avoid the assumption that the legislature by inserting the proviso, using certain words at certain places and/ or not using particular words at all, committed a mistake.
62. It must be presumed that the legislature inserted every word in a provision for a purpose and that every part of the statute should
21. (2007) 8 SCC 593.
22. Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Vandry, SCC OnLine PC 10; ESI Corpn. v. KEY DEE Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 17 SCC 379; UOI v. Hansoli Devi, (2010) 15 SCC 483. 1816 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports have effect as well. 23 In that context, in situations wherein there is no ambiguity with respect to the provisions of a statute, the Court’s interpretative exercise would be restricted. In other words, the Court is duty-bound to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it expressed in the statute (or proviso, in this case). Beyond that, the Court’s exercise cannot be stretched to involve a re-writing, re-casting or re-framing of the legislation or statute.
63. In that light, while interpreting Section 2(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that in case the legislature intended to expand the scope of Part-I of the Act to arbitrations seated in foreign countries, it would have added such words in the provision itself. Therefore, for the Court to add words that are not expressly provided by the legislature in the statute itself would tantamount to a ‘drastic and unwarranted rewriting or alteration of the language’. 24
64. Rules of interpretation permit courts to read a certain word, term or phrase in the statute differently from its plain meaning if it leads to absurdity but the courts must always remain conscious of the fine dividing line, separating adjudication and legislation, which must not be crossed. In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.25, the Court in the context held as follows:
“15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased... ...
.. .. 16. Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of
23. JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002).2 SCC 135; Ramphal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, (2004) 9
SCC 278.
24. Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552.
25. (2006) 2 SCC 670.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1817Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself... ... ...”
65. In the present case, the use of the word ‘prior’ at the appropriate place in the proviso besides being direct, clear and unambiguous also does not lead to any absurd consequences. The proviso to Section 31(4) of IBC mentions that the approval to the Resolution Plan from CCI shall be obtained ‘prior’ to its approval by the CoC. Therefore, to interpret the specific word to mean that such an approval can be obtained even ‘after’ and not necessarily ‘prior’ to the approval by the CoC would amount to reconstructing a statutory provision, which is not permissible.
Different Threshold for Combinations
66. To further fortify that the proviso has been interpreted as above in the correct manner, an analysis of the context in which and the intent with which the proviso to Section 31 (4) of the IBC was brought into effect, guides us further:
67. While literal interpretation must remain the judiciary’s guiding light, insights gained from legislative debates, committee reports and/or historical contexts may be looked at with a degree of caution, lest they obscure the plain meaning of the text or elevate subjective predilections of the judge above the clear mandate of the law. Such an inquiry into legislative history, therefore needs to be carefully undertaken as a supplement to but not as substitute of the literal interpretation of the statutory language, mindful of the risks of wandering too far afield into the uncertain waters of committee reports, memorandums and legislative debates.
68. Let us now pay attention to the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee (dated 01.03.2018), which recommended that specific timelines be incorporated in the IBC, to seek approval from government authorities as well as the CCI. The relevant extracts from the Report are as follows:
“16.1... ... However, the timeline within which such approvals are required to be obtained, once a resolution plan has been approved by the NCLT, has not been provided in the Code or the CIRP Regulations. The Committee deliberated... the Code should specify that the timelines will be specified in 1818 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the relevant law, and if the timeline for approval under the relevant law is less than one year from the approval of the resolution plan, then a maximum of one year will be provided for obtaining the relevant approvals, and section 31 shall be amended to reflect this... ...
16.3... ... Thus, as the CIRP period is sacrosanct, the Committee, keeping in mind the practicalities of the issue, deemed it fit to provide for a period for obtaining the necessary approvals as mentioned in paragraph 16.1 above, after the approval of the plan by the NCLT.
16.4. However, the Committee was of the opinion that approval from CCI may be dealt through specific regulations for fast tracking the approval process in consultation with the CCI. The Committee was informed that pursuant to discussions with CCI, it has been agreed that CCI will have a period of 30 working days for approval of combinations arising out of the Code, from the date of filing of the combination notice to the CCI. Further, this timeline of 30 days may be extended by another 30 days, only in exceptional cases. In the event that no approval or rejection is provided by the CCI within the aforementioned timelines, the said combination would be deemed to have been approved. Details forms and relevant regulations in this regard may be provided by CCI in due course of time.”
69. As can be appreciated from above, a timeline was incorporated to plug a loophole and provide for a schedule to obtain the necessary approvals, which was hitherto not provided. At the same time, a distinction was drawn between necessary approvals required to be received from different statutory bodies and regulatory authorities vis-à-vis the CCI’s approval. In case of other statutory bodies, a timeline of one year subsequent to the CoC’s approval of the Resolution Plan was deemed to be sufficient, whereas the timeline for procuring the CCI’s approval was brought ahead in the sense that the same was required to be obtained prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the COC.
70. The statute, as can be observed, provided a different threshold for the CCI’s approval as compared to approvals to be received from other statutory and regulatory bodies. Such arrangement appears to be [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1819Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. deliberate as the Competition Act contains both specific restrictions with respect to combinations that may lead to an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) in the relevant market as well as a detailed procedure of enquiry and scrutiny of such combinations, to prevent such AAEC. Based on the same, the CCI is empowered to either approve, reject or modify such a combination or to mould it in a manner that is in consonance with the scheme of the Competition Act. Notes on Clauses, Memorandum & Scrivener’s Error
71. Let us now consider another aspect which is brought forth by the learned counsel to indicate the legislative intent of the IBC. This is in reference to the Notes on Clauses to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2018 which might have some significance for the present discussion. The Notes on Clauses read as follows: “Clause 24 of the Bill seeks to amend section 31 of the Code to provide that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an order for approval of resolution plan satisfy that the resolution plan has provisions for its effective implementation and that the resolution applicant shall obtain the necessary approvals required within a period of one year from the date of approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority or within such period as provided for in such law, whichever is later and where it contains a provision for combination for approval of the Competition Commission of India shall be obtained prior to the approval of resolution plan by the committee of creditors.”
72. The Memorandum explaining modifications made in the Bill introduced to replace the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 supplements the aforementioned Notes on Clauses, stating: “(d) in clause 24 of the Bill, in sub-section (4) of section 31 of the Code, a new proviso is inserted “provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for combination as referred to in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002, the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors” so as to clarify that the approval for the 1820 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports combinations from Competition Commission of India has to be obtained prior to the approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.”
73. Both the Notes on Clauses and the Memorandum clearly mention that the approval from the CCI for the combination must be obtained prior to, the approval of the Resolution Plan by the CoC. However, the last line in the Memorandum states that the same is to clarify that the approval from CCI for the combination, shall be obtained prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the Adjudicating Authority, instead of CoC, as mentioned in the preceding line and also the inserted proviso. A question might therefore arise – whether it was an inadvertent legislative error? As can be appreciated, the erstwhile Ordinance provided for a ‘post-Adjudicating Authority’ approval stage. The Memorandum clarified that a new step had been added at a ‘pre-Adjudicating Authority’ approval stage. It would therefore be logical to hold that obtaining prior approval of the CCI before the CoC approval, would seamlessly cover the ‘pre-Adjudicating Authority’ approval stage without any possible disruption.
74. The error as noticed above, appears to have been inadvertently made while drafting the Memorandum but this is not the case in the drafting of the statute. The particular line in the Memorandum could also be a Scrivener’s Error, a judicial doctrine developed in the USA, as put forth by Mr. Parag Tripathi, learned senior counsel for AGI Greenpac. This doctrine was explained by legal scholars in the following terms26 :
“In the literal sense, then, a “scrivener’s error” is a mistake of transcription, which is to say a mismatch between original (e.g., spoken word, manuscript) and copy. Today, of course, Congress does not use actual scriveners. Indeed, the phrase “scrivener’s error” came into popular usage only once reliance upon scriveners was uncommon. The phrase is thus a term of art, referring to a particular sort
26. Ryan Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 110 (2016); Justice Antonion Scalia, Common Law Courts in Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, 3 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997).
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1821Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. of legislative mistake. Specifically, and as explained more fully throughout Part I, a “scrivener’s error” is a case in which the words of a legislative text diverge from what Congress meant to say. Such a case contrasts with one in which Congress simply should have said something else.”
75. Assuming that there is no such error in the Memorandum and therefore the Memorandum presents a conflicting view vis-à-vis the Notes on Clauses in explaining the legislative intent behind introducing the said proviso, the implication thereof can be understood from the following passage from the three Judge Bench opinion in a similar context. In Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, the Court opined 27 that the final Act would be the guiding factor:
“20. Strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners on the memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, 1987, wherein the explanatory note relating to clause 4(a) of the Bill proposing insertion of clause (10-C) in Section 10 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 appears under the heading ‘Welfare Measures’. It may be mentioned that this heading is only in the explanatory memorandum and not in the ‘Notes on Clauses’ appended to the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the Bill. [ See (1987) 165 ITR (Statutes) at pp. 119, 122 and 155] We would presently show that the petitioners cannot draw support from this heading in the explanatory memorandum. Moreover, an explanatory memorandum is usually ‘not an accurate guide of the final Act’. [See Francis Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation, 1984 edn. at p. 529].”
76. Additionally, it is not necessary to refer to Memorandum explaining particular clauses of a Bill when the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, as has been held in ACG Associated Capsules v. Commissioner of Income Tax28. In any case, a Memorandum explaining a particular proviso stands at a lower footing when compared with Notes on Clauses, explaining the entire amendment, especially in cases where the language in the statute is definite and straightforward.
27. (1990) 4 SCC 366.
28. (2012) 3 SCC 321.
1822 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports In fact, the Memorandum does not even feature in the Hindi version of the Bill whereas the Notes on Clauses elaborately explaining the intent behind introducing each amendment, features prominently in both the English and Hindi versions. This would also indicate that the Memorandum can never play the decisive role.
77. More importantly, such external aids of interpretation could have a limited role only when repugnancy within the statute fall for consideration. But that is not the situation here as the language of the statute is clear, specific and unambiguous.
78. The legislative intent in the proviso to Section 31(4) IBC, is in clear and unambiguous terms. The same specifically provides for prior approval of the CCI before the approval of the Resolution Plan, by the COC. This provision introduced with straightforward and clear words must be interpreted and understood as being mandatory in nature. Otherwise the object behind the enactment of the said proviso, would be defeated.
79. Bearing in mind the fact that the CCI is empowered to approve, reject and/or modify a proposed combination, a Resolution Plan approved by the CCI should only be placed before CoC. The ‘commercial wisdom’ accorded to the CoC being paramount, the legislature in our understanding, intentionally provided for a prior approval of the CCI with respect to Resolution Plans, containing combination proposals.
80. Additionally, the CCI has also been empowered under Section 31(3) of the Competition Act as well as Regulation 25(1)(A) of the Combination Regulations to direct modifications to the Resolution Plan or a combination proposal. Therefore, the approval from CCI must be obtained before the same is approved by the CoC. Otherwise, an illogical situation may arise since any modifications so directed by the CCI, would be kept out of the scrutiny of the CoC and the CoC would be forced to exercise its commercial wisdom without complete information.
81. It is for the above reasons that the legislature has devised a scheme wherein the Resolution Plan with its proposed modifications must be placed before the COC to enable it to compare all possible plans of prospective Resolution Applicants. Only then can the CoC’s commercial wisdom be exercised assiduously.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1823Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
82. To decide whether a particular provision should be identified as mandatory in nature, we may benefit by referring to the following precedents:
83. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, the Supreme Court held 29 as follows:
“9… In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory… Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow.”
84. The long-standing principle of the consequence of non-compliance being the determinative factor, was later reaffirmed in several judgments, such as Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd.30 , Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union 31 , as well as Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal. 32
85. Earlier, emphasising on the consequence theory to understand the binding nature of the statute, Justice K. Subba Rao in his majority opinion in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya 33, held as follows: “29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus : When a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and
29. (1980) 1 SCC 403.
30. (2022) 10 SCC 1.
31. (2015) 4 SCC 544.
32. (2020) 8 SCC 129.
33. 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5.
1824 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.”
86. When a Resolution Plan containing a provision for a combination that leads to an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) is placed before the CoC for approval before securing prior approval from the CCI, the Plan is incapable of being enforced or implemented. Specific consequences in law are provided under the IBC and the Competition Act for the same. As is clear, such a major omission cannot be cured at a later stage. Therefore, approval by CoC to such a deficient Resolution Plan can have no legal implications. In the present case, the CCI-unapproved Resolution Plan does not pass the muster. The same cannot be approved by this Court as it is in violation of Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3), 30(4) and 34(4)(a) of the IBC. It therefore does ‘contravene provisions of the law for the time being in force’.
(Dis?) Harmony between Stipulated Timelines
87. On the aspect of a possible disharmony between the stipulated timeline to be followed under the IBC and the Competition Act, the NCLAT in the impugned order has held the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, to be directory in nature since mandatory prior approval of the CoC, would lead to disruption in the CIRP timeline, as stipulated under the IBC.
88. However, it must be noted that the model timelines prescribed under any regulations, i.e., in the current case, Regulation 40A of CIRP Regulations, cannot by any stretch, supersede a statutory provision i.e., the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. In fact, the subordinate legislation must be interpreted in a manner that conforms to the statute, and not the other way around, as was unacceptably rationalised by the NCLAT.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1825Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
89. As far as the two timelines stipulated under the IBC and the Competition Act are concerned, the same do not usually cause any disharmony or conflict. The only exception could be in the extremely rare circumstances discussed below, influenced by external factors. But such extreme and unlikely situations cannot and should not be allowed to influence our interpretative exercise on the functioning of the legislative framework which will fit in with most cases.
90. In that context, the timeline of 210 days as stipulated under the Competition Act would be attracted only in cases which involve an extremely high degree of AAEC, mostly indicative of a complicated super-monopolistic behemoth. In fact, it must be borne in mind that CCI itself in its Annual General Report for the year 2022–2023 stated that the average time required to dispose of combination applications, is usually 21 working days. There has been no recorded instance till date where, more than 120 days were taken by the CCI to approve a combination proposal. Additionally, of the 99 combination proposals approved by the CCI, an overwhelming 85 of those were approved within 30 days and the rest 14 approvals took less than 120 days in toto. Therefore, the extreme and rare examples projected by the counsel for AGI Greenpac and CoC need not be given undue importance, in the present interpretative exercise.
91. In the rare extreme cases involving a high degree of AAEC, public consultation and behavioural remedies are ordinarily required, which might lead to an elongated timeline going beyond 120 days. However, only one such combination proposal has been received in the past few years.
92. In the context of arguments that have been made on the disharmony between the two timelines, reference must also be made to Section 6(2) of the Competition Act. The same is reproduced as follows: “6(2). Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), any person or enterprise, who or which proposes to enter into a combination, 13 [shall] give notice to the Commission, in the form as may be specified, and the fee which may be determined, by regulations, disclosing the details of the proposed combination, within14 [thirty days] of— 1826 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
1. (a) approval of the proposal relating to merger or amalgamation, referred to in clause (c) of section 5, by the board of directors of the enterprises concerned with such merger or amalgamation, as the case may be;
2. (b) execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition referred to in clause (a) of section 5 or acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of that section.
15[(2A)No combination shall come into effect until two hundred and ten days have passed from the day on which the notice has been given to the Commission under sub-section(2) or the Commission has passed orders under section 31, which- ever is earlier.]”
93. The point at which the applicant is allowed to give notice to CCI of a combination, i.e., the trigger event, need not therefore be limited to when the Resolution Plan is submitted to the Resolution Professional. On the contrary, such notice can be given immediately after or within thirty (30) days of the execution of ‘any agreement’ or ‘other document’, disclosing details of the proposed combination. Regulation 5(8) of the CCI (Procedure in regard to the Transaction of Business relating to Combinations) Regulations, 2011 defines ‘other document’ as including any document conveying an agreement or decision to acquire control over a target company. Therefore, the submission of an application before the CCI can be done at different stages and need not necessarily wait until the Resolution Plan is submitted.
94. The argument that the application to obtain approval from the CCI can only be submitted at the stage when the Resolution Plan is submitted i.e., T + 135 days, in the timeline would be erroneous and unacceptable. The application under the statutory scheme, can be submitted at various stages, including but not limited to, at the time of Expression of Interest i.e.., T + 60 days, or issuance of RFRP i.e., T + 105 days, or even when the list of provisional Resolution Applicants is published i.e., T + 85 days. Taking this into account, submitting the combination proposal before the CCI at either of these stages, would have still resulted in the culmination of the entire process, within the stipulated time limit of 330 days, under the IBC.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1827Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
95. On the upper limit of 330 days within the CIRP timeline, it has been pertinently this Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar vs. Satish Kumar Gupta observed the following 34 :
“124. Given the fact that timely resolution of stressed assets is a key factor in the successful working of the Code, the only real argument against the amendment is that the time taken in legal proceedings cannot ever be put against the parties before NCLT and NCLAT based upon a Latin maxim which subserves the cause of justice, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit.
127… Given the fact that the time taken in legal proceedings cannot possibly harm a litigant if the Tribunal itself cannot take up the litigant’s case within the requisite period for no fault of the litigant, a provision which mandatorily requires the CIRP to end by a certain date — without any exception thereto — may well be an excessive interference with a litigant’s fundamental right to non-arbitrary treatment under Article 14 and an excessive, arbitrary and therefore unreasonable restriction on a litigant’s fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. … while leaving the provision otherwise intact, we strike down the word “mandatorily” as being manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and as being an excessive and unreasonable restriction on the litigant’s right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The effect of this declaration is that ordinarily the time taken in relation to the corporate resolution process of the corporate debtor must be completed within the outer limit of 330 days from the insolvency commencement date, including extensions and the time taken in legal proceedings. However, on the facts of a given case, if it can be shown to the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal under the Code that only a short period is left for completion of the insolvency resolution process beyond 330 days, and that it would
34. (2020) 8 SCC 531.
1828 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports be in the interest of all stakeholders that the corporate debtor be put back on its feet instead of being sent into liquidation and that the time taken in legal proceedings is largely due to factors owing to which the fault cannot be ascribed to the litigants before the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal, the delay or a large part thereof being attributable to the tardy process of the Adjudicating Authority and/or the Appellate Tribunal itself, it may be open in such cases for the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal to extend time beyond 330 days... ...”
96. The attempt must therefore be to conclude the entire process of insolvency, ‘ordinarily’ within 330 days but in rare circumstances, the same can be elongated, particularly when the delay cannot be ascribed to the applicants or parties involved but the tardy process of the Tribunal or the Adjudicating Authority.
97. However, if notice for the proposed combination under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act has been given within the stipulated time and no dilatory tactics have been employed, the parties should not be held responsible for any delay on the part of the CCI, in examining the combination. The CCI, as their counsel Mr. Balbir Singh points out, has been able to approve bulk of the proposed combinations, in a time-bound and reasonable manner, as can be gleaned from the Annual General Reports and material placed on record, by Mr. Singh.
98. In the present case, even though dilatory tactics are said to have been adopted in the submission of notice under the Combination Regulations, with Form II submitted on 03.11.2022, the combination was approved on 15.03.2023 i.e., within 132 days. The recent Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 which reduced the timeline for approving combination proposal from 210 days to 150 days and requiring the CCI to give a prima facie opinion on the likelihood of a combination causing an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) from 30 days to 15 days, is indicative of the more realistic and shorter timelines that the CCI ordinarily requires for its analysis and decision-making, pertaining to such combination proposals.
99. Flowing from the above, it is difficult to interpret the provisions disjunctively, as has been done by the NCLAT, in the impugned order dated 18.09.2023.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1829Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Distinguishing cases relied upon by the NCLAT
100. The NCLAT in its analysis placed heavy reliance on the decision of the three-judge bench of the NCLAT in Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Abhijit Guhathakurta 35. However, this reliance is misplaced, as the factual and legal context of that case materially differs from the present matter.
101. For instance, the CIRP in Arcelor commenced prior to the introduction of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. The NCLT, in Arcelor, explicitly held that the proviso could not be applied retrospectively, given that it imposed an additional procedural obligation requiring resolution applicants to furnish CCI approval, prior to submitting a Resolution Plan. As such, the amendment was deemed inapplicable to the CIRP initiated before the enactment of the proviso. In contrast, the CIRP in the present case was initiated post-enactment of the proviso, rendering the procedural requirements therein, fully applicable.
102. In fact, if we look at the impugned NCLAT reasoning it can be noticed that the NCLT in Arcelor implicitly mentioned that the clear change in procedure i.e., obtaining the prior approval of the CCI, has to be implemented prospectively. However, this additional procedural obligation cannot be imposed retrospectively in that particular case.
103. Also in that case, the CCI’s approval did not address issues relating to a potential Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) in the relevant market. The approval so granted by the CCI did not impose any modifications to the Resolution Plan either. On the other hand, the present case involves substantive concerns regarding an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC), which required CCI’s careful consideration and proposed modifications if any, to ensure compliance with appropriate laws.
104. Importantly, the Arcelor judgment lacks detailed reasoning or analysis by which the NCLAT concluded that the proviso to Section 31(4) is only directory. Further, this judgement was also not challenged before this Court. Consequently, its precedential value in the present context is limited, and it cannot be relied upon to determine the issues arising in this appeal.
35. 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 920.
1830 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
105. The reliance on the decision in Makalu Trading Ltd. v. Rajiv Chakraborty 36, is equally misplaced, as the judgment merely reiterates the findings in Arcelor Mittal, without any independent analysis or discussion on the merits of the relevant legal propositions. Pertinently, Makalu does not address the applicability of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, or engage with the legal or factual nuances, that may distinguish the cases.
106. Further, it does not also discuss the object behind the IBC or the introduction of the proviso. In fact, the CCI approval in Makalu does not pertain to a situation where a prima facie opinion regarding the existence of an AAEC was formed. The absence of such consideration underscores the limited relevance of the decision to the present matter where, significant issues pertaining to both the IBC and Competition law have been raised, requiring a thorough examination of the CCI’s observations and the implications of its approval.
107. As such, the precedential value of Makalu is insufficient, to support the NCLAT findings in the present matter, although Makalu’s decision was challenged before this Court and was dismissed vide Order dated 12.10.2020, as not involving any substantial question of law. However, it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP in limine without giving any detailed reasons do not constitute any declaration of law or binding precedent, but simply implies that the case was not considered worthy of examination for a reason, other than on merits. 37
108. Besides, Vishal Vijay Kalantri v. Shailen Shah 38 was also relied on by the NCLAT, which again is entirely misplaced as the factual and legal circumstances in that case differ fundamentally from the present matter. On the issue of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC being directory in nature, Vishal Vijay Kalantri merely follows the earlier discussed and discarded ratio, in Arcelor Mittal.
109. The question of obtaining approval from the CCI did not arise in that case, as the acquisition in question, did not qualify as a ‘combination’
36. 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 643.
37. Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187; State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270.
38. 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1013.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1831Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. under the Competition Act, 2002. Consequently, the legal principles concerning the necessity of CCI approval and the implications of such approval, particularly in cases involving the possibility of an AAEC, were not addressed or analysed in that decision. This was challenged before a two-Judge Bench of this Court which found no reason to interfere and dismissed the Appeal at the threshold, vide Order dated 06.08.2021.
110. Therefore, the impugned NCLAT order incorrectly relied upon the aforementioned NCLAT decisions. Being distinguishable, those decisions could not have been unreservedly applied, to the present matters. Reliance on those decisions in different context, both on facts and on law, would lead to an erroneous interpretation on the applicability of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. Relevance of CCI & its scrutiny
111. Even if the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is kept aside, by virtue of the provisions incorporated under Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3) and 31(1) of the IBC, the Resolution Professional has the legal obligation to examine each Resolution Plan and determine whether it contravenes any provisions of law for the time being in force. In this context, the relevant extracts from the IBC are reproduced below:
S. 30 of the Code states:
“30. Submission of resolution plan. — (1) A resolution applicant may submit a resolution plan along with an affidavit stating that he is eligible under Section 29-A to the resolution professional prepared on the basis of the information memorandum.
(2) The resolution professional shall examine each resolution plan received by him to confirm that each resolution plan— …(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force …
(3) The resolution professional shall present to the committee of creditors for its approval such resolution 1832 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports plans which confirm the conditions referred to in subsection (2).
(6) The resolution professional shall submit the resolution plan as approved by the committee of creditors to the Adjudicating Authority.”
S. 31 of the Code states:
“31. Approval of resolution plan.—(1) If the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved by the committee of creditors under sub- section (4) of Section 30 meets the requirements as referred to in sub-section
(2) of Section 30, it shall by order approve the resolution plan which shall be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority to whom a debt in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force, such as authorities to whom statutory dues are owed, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan: Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an order for approval of resolution plan under this sub-section, satisfy that the resolution plan has provisions for its effective implementation.
…”
112. The extracts of the Competition Act relevant for the present discussion is reproduced below for ready reference:
6. Regulation of combinations. — (1) No person or enterprise shall enter into a combination which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India and such a combination shall be void.
(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), any person or enterprise, who or which proposes to enter into a combination, shall give notice to the Commission, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1833Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. in the form as may be specified, and the fee which may be determined, by regulations, disclosing the details of the proposed combination, within thirty days of— …
(b) execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition referred to in clause (a) and clause (d) of Section 5 or acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of that section.
(2-A) No combination shall come into effect until two hundred and ten days have passed from the day on which the notice has been given to the Commission under subsection (2) or the Commission has passed orders under Section 31, whichever is earlier.
(3) The Commission shall, after receipt of notice under sub-section (2), deal with such notice in accordance with the provisions contained in Sections 29, 30 and 31.
…”
31. Orders of Commission on certain combinations. —
(1) Where the Commission is of the opinion that any combination does not, or is not likely to, have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, it shall, by order, approve that combination including the combination in respect of which a notice has been given under subsection (2) of Section 6:
(2) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition, it shall direct that the combination shall not take effect.
(3) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination, it may propose appropriate modification to the combination, to the parties to such combination.
… 1834 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(11) If the commission does not, on the expiry of a period of two hundred and ten days from the date of notice given to the commission under sub-section (2) of Section 6, pass an order or issue direction in accordance with provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (7), the combination shall be deemed to have been approved by the Commission.
(13) Where the Commission has ordered a combination to be void, the acquisition or acquiring of control or merger or amalgamation referred to in Section 5, shall be dealt with by the authorities under any other law for the time being in force as if such acquisition or acquiring of control or merger or amalgamation had not taken place and the parties to the combination shall be dealt with accordingly.…”
113. When the aforementioned provisions of the IBC and the Competition Act are juxtaposed together, it is clear that any combination that leads to an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition in the relevant market, is void. Any Resolution Plan containing provisions for a combination that results in an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition would therefore be not compliant with the provisions of the Competition Act. In that light, the Competition Act mandates that a notice of combination be given to the CCI and approval obtained at the earliest.
114. The provisions also make it incumbent upon the Resolution Professional to examine whether the Resolution Plan submitted by an applicant, complies with the ‘provisions of the law for the time being in force’. Only those Resolution Plans which meet the requisite lawful criteria, can be placed before the CoC, by the Resolution Professional. Further, the Competition Act bestows upon the CCI the power to reject or modify a combination proposal.
115. In the above backdrop, prior approval of the CCI should advisedly be secured for the Resolution Plans which are to be scrutinised and approved by the CoC i.e., the body with expertise and resources to appropriately analyse the possible effects of an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC), in the relevant market due [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1835Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. to a proposed combination as well as the viability of the concerned Resolution Plan. If prior approval of the CCI is not obtained, it may lead to an incongruous situation where the CoC approves a Resolution Plan which may be in violation of Section 6 of the Competition Act i.e., causing an AAEC in the relevant market or that subsequent to such approval by CoC, the CCI rejects the said combination, thereby rendering the entire exercise futile. In other words, the Resolution Professional should not place any Resolution Plan before the CoC, without the scrutiny of and prior approval by CCI.
116. In any case, it is well-settled that the Resolution Professional does not possess any adjudicatory powers under the IBC. 39 In fact, the role of the Resolution Professional, as a facilitator of the CIPR, is almost entirely administrative in nature. Therefore, the Resolution Professional, not being an adjudicating authority, could not have mandated that the requirement of obtaining prior approval of the CCI before placing the Resolution Plan before the NCLT, can be relaxed. Granting such relaxation on a whim, oddly enough through an e-mail in the present case, was in our opinion beyond the scope of the Resolution Professional’s powers.
117. In the current case, a prima facie opinion under Section 29(1) of the Competition Act was found to the effect that AGI’s Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC, was in contravention of Section 6 of the Competition Act. Only after the proposed divestment proposed by AGI Greenpac, did the CCI approve the proposed combination. Importantly, much before the proposed divestment and the approval to such combination was given by the CCI, the Resolution Plan was placed, voted upon and approved by the CoC. Therefore, it is apparent that AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan as approved by the CoC was without the requisite approval of the CCI on that date. Therefore this would be in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Competition Act for the combination in question.
118. What is also of great relevance is that after the COC’s approval, the Resolution Plan cannot be modified in any manner since the Adjudicating Authority can only approve the Resolution Plan, as has been approved by the CoC. This is made clear by Section 31(1) of the IBC.
39. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17. 1836 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Procedural Lapses under the Competition Act
119. Before delving into the substantive aspects of the Competition law, the relevant facts and procedural trajectory that lead to the present appeal needs to be referred. Upon AGI Greenpac’s Form I submission on 27.09.2022, the CCI found the information submitted to be insufficient and directed them to file a detailed Form II. On 15.03.2023, the CCI approved the proposed combination, predicated upon voluntary modifications offered by AGI Greenpac, including the divestment of an HNGIL plant located in Rishikesh, to mitigate the Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC).
120. Vide its Order dated 28.07.2023, the NCLAT upheld the CCI’s conditional approval, holding that the voluntary remedies sufficiently mitigated competitive concerns and that the absence of notice to HNGIL did not vitiate the approval, especially given the RP’s nonobjections.
121. The interplay between the IBC and the Competition Act presents a delicate balance. While the IBC focused on expeditious revival of distressed assets, the Competition Act ensures that the resolution process does not distort market dynamics. The critical regulatory risk that emerges at this intersection is the issue of gun-jumping - a term, denoting premature or unauthorised consummation of a transaction, prior to obtaining mandatory approvals from the CCI.
122. The Competition Act operates on a suspensory regime, under which no transaction involving a combination can be completed, without prior approval from the CCI. Such mandate ensures that competitive equilibrium in the market is not disrupted during the CIRP. In fact, Section 43A of the Act prescribes severe penalties for any attempt to consummate the transaction, prior to securing the CCI’s approval.
123. Bearing in mind the above discussion, it appears that several procedural deficiencies have occurred in the approval process of the combination.
124. Section 29(1) of the Competition Act and Regulation 2(f) of the Competition Regulations, 2011 mandate the issuance of a Show Cause Notice [hereinafter referred to as ‘SCN’] to the ‘parties to the combination’ if and when the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that a combination is likely to cause or has caused Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC), within the relevant market. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1837Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. The term ‘parties to the combination’ as explicitly defined under Regulation 2(f) includes both entities entering into the combination and the combined entity, if the combination has come into effect.
125. In the present case, it is evident that the CCI, while exercising its powers under Section 29(1), failed to issue the mandatory SCN to all relevant parties, most notably, the target company itself i.e., the HNGIL. The SCN dated 10.02.2023 was issued only to the acquirer company i.e., in the present case, AGI Greenpac, although the involvement of both parties is integral, to the assessment of potential AAEC, in the relevant market. This omission constitutes a major procedural lapse, as the law clearly requires all parties to the combination to be notified of such finding by the CCI. The opportunity to respond must also be given to them.
126. The CCI was obligated to issue an appropriate SCN to both the acquirer and the target. The term ‘to the parties to the combination’ cannot be restricted to the proposed acquirer alone. The finding of the NCLAT on this aspect is therefore not to be faulted.
127. The statutory requirement under Section 29 and Regulation 2(f) could not be bypassed and for this omission. the CCI’s order (dated 15.03.2023) was procedurally deficient, undermining the fairness and completeness of the investigative process. The importance of adhering to the procedural safeguards enshrined in the Act is to ensure that all parties to a combination, are given due notice and an opportunity to present their respective case. Sections 29 and 30 of the Competition Act, 2002 when read holistically, delineate a structured procedural roadmap that the CCI must traverse when it scrutinises combinations that may exert an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) in the relevant market.
128. Apart from mandating the issuance of a SCN to the concerned parties, upon the formation of a prima facie opinion that the combination in question warrants investigation, the statutory obligations in the form of Sections 29(2) to 29(6) outline the consequential steps, aimed at gathering comprehensive data from not just the acquirer and the target company, but also from other stakeholders, potentially impacted by the combination. The legislative wisdom embedded within these provisions attempts to recognise the ripple effects of the existence of an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition 1838 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in a market, which would transcend the immediate parties to the transaction, thereby necessitating a broader consultation and data collection process.
129. Further clarity on this procedural rigour is provided by Section 30, which explicitly directs that the prima facie opinion formed under Section 29(1) must guide subsequent steps under Section 29. The procedural design mandates an expansive fact-finding mission, including consultation with stakeholders and detailed scrutiny, to ensure that the combination either withstands the muster of competitive fairness or is modified to avert any deleterious market impact.
130. A compelling aspect of this statutory scheme is the deliberate use of the term ‘investigation’ in Section 29, contrasting sharply with ‘inquiry’ as employed in Section 26, which pertains to anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant market position. This Court in CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. 40 drew a pivotal distinction between these terms, underscoring that ‘investigation’ is a far-reaching exercise of evidence-gathering and fact-finding, especially when compared to an ‘inquiry’. Such an investigation, as per the mandate of Section 29(1A), is to be executed under the aegis of the Director-General, thereby reaffirming the seriousness of the scrutiny, envisaged in cases of combinations.
131. In the present matter, the procedural sanctity prescribed under the scheme has been regrettably disregarded, with the Commission failing to solicit inputs from public, affected stakeholders and those likely to be affected by such combination under Section 29(2). This omission not only contravenes the statutory intent but also diminishes the transparency and inclusivity that underpin the review mechanism for combinations. The legislative scheme unambiguously envisions an investigation that encompasses a wide array of stakeholders, as combinations inherently possess the potential to reshape market dynamics in ways that ripple across the competitive landscape.
132. The reasoning advanced by the CCI to avoid the issuance of SCN to HNGIL under Section 29(1) is unacceptable. Only because the Resolution Professional did not object to the same does not override the statutory requirements prescribed under the scheme of the Act,
40. (2010) 10 SCC 744.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1839Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. especially because the target company’s participation is central to assessing the competitive impact of the combination.
133. While the term ‘parties’ may appear broad and/or encompassing all related entities associated with the combination, such an interpretation cannot dilute the inherent plurality attached to the word ‘parties’, as explicitly stated in the Competition Act and its Regulations. The use of the plural form signifies a clear legislative intent to address not just one entity but multiple parties directly involved in the combination process, including but not limited to the acquirer, the target, and, where applicable, the combined entity, if the combination has come into effect.
134. Plurality of entities ensures that all perspectives, interests, and potential implications are considered in assessing the combination’s impact on competition. The exclusion of the target company from the scope of parties especially in cases of insolvency where the target retains critical relevance, would undermine the procedural safeguards, designed to achieve transparency and fairness. The term ‘parties’ must be understood to cover both entities participating in and directly affected by the combination, ensuring the integrity of competition assessment and compliance with statutory provisions under Sections 29(1) and 29(2). To argue otherwise would not only mutilate the term ‘parties’ but would also result in procedural lapses and incomplete analysis, defeating the very purpose of the regulatory oversight.
135. Those identified lapses demonstrate a departure from the procedural rigour, mandated under the Competition Act. Such deviations, if permitted, would end up compromising on the transparency and fairness requirement in a regulatory process. The failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of Sections 29(2) to 29(6) read with Section 30 of the Competition Act, undermines the robustness of the investigative process, rendering the CCI order (dated 15.03.2023), susceptible to a bona fide challenge.
136. In light of the voluntary modification proposed by the acquirer i.e., AGI Greenpac, pursuant to Regulation 25(1A) of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations, 2011 [hereinafter referred to ‘Combination Regulations’], the aforementioned 1840 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Regulation 25(1A) unequivocally mandates that a voluntary modification submitted to the CCI, must bear the imprimatur of both parties to the combination, namely, the acquirer and the target. This statutory requirement is not just a procedural formality. It is in fact a substantive safeguard, designed to ensure that interests of all stakeholders are duly represented and protected. In the present matter, the proposed modification seeks the divestment of the Target’s plant, a move that inherently attracts the provisions of the IBC. The active participation and explicit approval of the target company are indispensable pre-requisites, to the submission of any voluntary modification and steps to the contrary, cannot be countenanced.
137. Furthermore, the legislative intent underpinning Regulation 25(1A) necessitates a holistic and inclusive approach to such modifications, particularly where the proposed measures, impinge upon the operational and structural integrity of the target company. The facts of this case underscore the criticality of this requirement, as the proposed divestment scheme is a vital component of the revival of the stressed target company under the resolution framework contemplated by the IBC.
138. As earlier noticed, the failure to issue a SCN under Section 29(1) to the Target Company/Corporate Debtor, constitutes a major procedural lapse with significant consequence. The statutory scheme of the Competition Act, as well as the synergistic framework of the IBC, demands that all parties to the combination are afforded a fair opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, particularly when the proposed measures bear a direct and material impact on their interests. The absence of such notice undermines the procedural sanctity of the modification process and renders the resultant approval susceptible to bona fide challenge.
139. The issuance of SCN to both the acquirer and the target under Section 29(1) of the Competition Act in our opinion, is a non-negotiable procedural imperative. The interplay between the provisions of the Competition Act and the IBC necessitates a careful balancing of competing interests, underscoring the indispensability of procedural compliance. The lack of participation by the Target in the voluntary modification process, especially where the modification entails the divestment of their assets, vitiates the approval granted by the CCI and warrants remedial intervention by this Court.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1841Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors. Discrepancies in Data
140. Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned senior counsel, had highlighted material discrepancies in the operational capacity data furnished by AGI Greenpac and HNGIL, including but not limited to:
140.1. Bahadurgarh Plant: While the capacity reported to the CCI was 490 TPD, the Resolution Plan records it as 820 TPD.
140.2. Puducherry Plant: Different figures have been submitted, casting doubt on the authenticity and reliability of the data.
140.3. Aggregate Impact: Such discrepancies misrepresent the competitive dynamics and render the divestiture conditions inadequate to mitigate AAEC concerns.
141. Similar variances are observed across multiple plants. These discrepancies undermine the credibility of the data, relied upon for regulatory approvals, raising serious questions about the adequacy of the divestiture plans as well.
142. Any particular decision by a regulatory body is only as sound as the foundation of facts and the data, on which it is founded. The discrepancies noted above are glaring and distort the factual matrix of the case, undermining the basis on which competitive assessments and market dynamics, were evaluated. It is a cardinal principle of regulatory jurisprudence that decisions impacting market structures must be anchored in verifiable and transparent information. Here, the inconsistent capacity figures as pointed out by Mr. Rao significantly dilute the effectiveness of divestiture remedies, potentially exacerbating rather than mitigating the anti-competitive effects.
143. Transparent and accurate data disclosures are fundamental to the regulatory mechanism. The identified discrepancies compromise the very basis of the CCI’s decision-making process. It is imperative to therefore underscore that discrepancies in operational capacity data would strike at the very root of the regulatory mechanism. While we do not intend to embark on a fact-finding expedition afresh, the prima facie inconsistencies in the submitted data ought to have been examined with greater care by the NCLAT. But this was not done. Consequently, the conditional approval should have 1842 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports been revoked, especially in light of the CCI’s express mention in its order (dated 15.03.2023) that the order may be revoked if the information provided by the acquirer is found to be incorrect at any particular time.
Practical Challenges with Conditional Approvals
144. Conditional approvals, by their very nature, necessitate rigorous and ongoing enforcement to ensure compliance with the prescribed conditions in both letter and spirit. For the AGI Greenpac-HNGIL combination, the absence of a robust and comprehensive monitoring mechanism reveals a significant lacuna within the regulatory framework. Such deficiencies pose considerable risk of noncompliance or deliberate circumvention, thereby defeating the entire purpose of imposing these conditions. The systemic inefficiencies apparent in this instance highlight the existing fragility of conditional approvals when not accompanied with robust enforcement mechanisms.
145. Furthermore, conditional approvals are fundamentally ill-equipped to mitigate the risks that manifest during the interim period, preceding the full implementation of remedial measures. The underlying assumption that post-approval remedies will rectify present market distortions, fails to account for the practical challenges and complexities associated with enforcing such remedies, retroactively. This approach creates an enforcement lag that can result in significant and potentially irreparable harm to the competitive landscape and the interests of the stakeholders. The temporal gap between the grant of approval and the implementation of effective remedies fosters a regulatory vacuum, thereby exacerbating the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct, during this transitional phase. The failure to mitigate present risks undermine the efficacy of conditional approvals and their intended regulatory objectives.
146. The absence of mandatory oversight mechanisms, such as thirdparty audits or independent verifications, creates loopholes for the circumvention of regulatory conditions. For example:
146.1. A divestiture mandate may fail to achieve its intended purpose if the acquiring party lacks the operational capacity or genuine strategic intent to effectively compete in the market.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1843Independent Sugar Corporation L td. v. G irish Sriram Juneja & Ors.
146.2. Structural remedies, such as the sale of plants or other assets, may lead to unanticipated or unintended market gaps, if compliance monitoring remains inadequate.
147. In essence, the conditional approval granted by the CCI is predicated on the presumption of future compliance. While the legislative intent behind CIRP is to create a process characterised with finality and decisiveness, conditional approval appears to be a perilous deviation from the stated objectives. As underscored in the CCI’s conditional approval order, the order remains subject to revocation if the information furnished by the parties is later found to be inaccurate. This acknowledgment, however, exposes the system’s vulnerability to abuse or misrepresentation, particularly in the absence of a system, enforcing checks and balances. Further, such a conditional approval can foster uncertainty, prolong negotiations, and necessitate further modifications, thereby putting at peril the sanctity of the resolution framework. 41 concluSion
148. As India aspires to establish itself as a global manufacturing powerhouse and investment hub, it is imperative that it is able to provide a reliable, robust and competitive business environment for both domestic and international stakeholders. In essence, the introduction of the Green Channel route, which strives to create a level-playing field and enable new entrants to effectively compete with established players in the Indian market, is a significant step in that direction. However, to ensure that entities operate with utmost confidence in the sanctity and fairness of India’s legal and regulatory system, the objectives of the IBC and the Competition Act must also necessarily be in harmony with one another.
149. Within that context, while the IBC’s primary objective is the timely resolution of stressed assets with maximised value realisation for the stakeholders, the significant delay seen in the present case is both unfortunate and regrettable. Nevertheless, expeditious resolution cannot come at the cost of disregarding statutory provisions.
41. Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. CoC of Educomp Solutions Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 401. 1844 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Providing relief for stressed assets must necessarily align with the statutory framework, as adherence to legal principles is fundamental to a fair and just resolution process.
150. In the present case, for reasons discussed above, the statutory provision and legislative intent unequivocally affirm the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. For a Resolution Plan containing a combination, the CCI’s approval to the Resolution Plan, in our opinion, must be obtained before and consequently, the CoC’s examination and approval should be only after the CCI’s decision. This interpretation respects the original legislative intent, and deviation from the same would not only undermine the statute but would also erode the faith posed by the stakeholders in the integrity of our legal and regulatory framework.
151. Where the provisions allow for dilution or departure from the intended scheme of the IBC or the Competition Act, it is the responsibility of the legislature to rectify such inconsistencies through appropriate legislative measures and the judiciary should not normally venture into the legislative domain.
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