Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1110; [2025] 10 S.C.R. 169
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 12 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3826/2020
- Sections
- 7, 138, 65B, 5(8), 14, 2, 65
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 169 : 2025 INSC 1110 Mansi Brar Fernandes v.
Shubha Sharma and Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 3826 of 2020)
12 September 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the appellants, fall within the category of “speculative investors” so as to disentitle them from initiating proceedings u/s.7 of the IBC; whether the Ordinance/Amendment Act introducing threshold requirements for filing of s.7 IBC applications by allottees was applicable to the facts of the present case.
Headnotes† Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7 – NCLAT set aside the NCLT’s order and reversed the admission of the application filed u/s.7 by the appellants, holding that they were “speculative investors” and not genuine homebuyers/ financial creditors – Appellants, if fall within the category of “speculative investors” disentitling them from initiating proceedings u/s.7:
Held: 1.1 Yes – In C.A No. 3826 of 2020, the MoU executed reveals that possession was never contemplated – The agreement stipulated a buyback whereby Rs.35 lakhs invested would be returned with an additional Rs.65 lakhs as premium within 12 months – Though four apartments were notionally “allotted”, the appellant paid only Rs.35 lakhs with no provision for the balance – Instead, the corporate debtor issued post-dated cheques of Rs.1 crore, which were repeatedly dishonoured – Successive extensions of the MoU were granted without justification, and the appellant invoked proceedings u/s.138, N.I. Act for recovery. [Para 18.5] 1.2 Thus, the appellant’s true interest lay in assured returns, not possession – The MoU was in substance a buyback contract, not an agreement to sell flats – By the standard in Pioneer Urban case, the appellant was a speculative investor, disentitling her from invoking s.7. [Para 18.5] * Author 170 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 1.3 Further, in C.A. No. 3903 of 2022, the MoU provided for an investment of Rs.25 lakhs per unit with assured returns of 25% per annum after 24 months – It contained a compulsory buyback clause and provisions for profit-sharing over and above guaranteed returns – The repeated use of the term “investment” coupled with a risk-free exit option, confirms that possession was never intended – While the NCLT admitted the appellant’s s.7 application ex parte, the NCLAT correctly reversed the order – A homebuyer cannot simultaneously demand refund with guaranteed returns while retaining the option to refuse possession. [Para 18.6] 1.4 On the facts and law, both the appellants are speculative investors – Their claims are in the nature of recovery, not insolvency resolution – Findings of the NCLAT treating the appellants as speculative investors upheld – Both impugned orders, setting aside admission of the s.7 applications, affirmed. [Paras 18.7, 18.8] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 – IBC (Amendment) Act, 2020 – Appellants in C.A. No. 540 of 2021 and C.A. No. 5495 of 2025 assailed the first impugned order passed by NCLAT on the limited ground of non-compliance with the 2019 Ordinance, promulgated on 28.12.2019 – Appellants stated that the s.7 petition under the IBC filed by Respondent No.1 on 02.01.2020, was reserved on 04.12.2019, i.e., prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance – As on 28.12.2019, the application was still pending consideration – Thus, the Ordinance and the subsequent Amendment Act squarely applied to the proceedings and the failure of Respondent No.1 to satisfy the threshold requirement mandated under the Ordinance was fatal to the maintainability of the petition – NCLAT held that the Ordinance (later enacted as Amendment Act, 2020) was inapplicable to the present case:
Held: Once orders were reserved, the appellant could not have complied with the Ordinance until pronouncement – To insist otherwise would be to compel the appellant to perform an impossibility contrary to the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia – The outcome on grounds of equity should be determined as on the date the order was reserved, and no subsequent legislative or administrative change should prejudice the parties – Where orders were already reserved prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, the requirement cannot be retrospectively enforced [2025] 10 S.C.R. 171Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. so as to defeat vested rights – The subsequent compliance by the appellant during appellate proceedings sufficiently cures the defect, and the act of the Court must not prejudice the litigant – Therefore, the finding of the NCLAT in respect of the inapplicability of the Ordinance/Amendment Act to the facts of the present case requires interference, and the first impugned order is set aside to that effect – Ordinance/Amendment Act is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. [Paras 19.6, 19.7] Directions by Supreme Court – In the larger interests of bona fide homebuyers and the stability of the real estate sector – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) – Right to shelter, an integral part of the right to life u/Art.21 of the Constitution of India – Constitutional obligation of the state to protect homebuyers:
Held: 1.1 Vacancies in NCLT / NCLAT shall be filled on a war footing – Dedicated IBC benches with additional strength should be constituted – Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis until regular appointments are mad – This Court is cognizant of the fact that similar directions have been issued in the past, including in Pioneer Urban case, but no effective step has been taken on the ground. [Para 21.2] 1.2 The Union Government shall, within three months, file a compliance report on measures taken to upgrade NCLT/NCLAT infrastructure nationwide – The recent closure of Chandigarh NCLT and portions of Delhi NCLT due to water seepage in the Courtrooms and Chambers of Members underscores the urgency of robust infrastructural support. [Para 21.2] 1.3 Within three months, a Committee chaired by a retired High Court Judge shall be constituted, with representatives from the Ministry of law, Ministry of Housing, domain experts in Real Estate, Finance and IBC from NIUA, HUDCO’s HSMI, IIMs, NLUs, and NITI Aayog, as well as two eminent industry representatives – The Committee shall suggest commercially viable systemic reforms for cleansing and infusing credibility into the real estate sector – NITI Aayog/ NIUA shall provide research and secretarial support – The Committee shall submit its report within six months of its constitution. [Para 21.2] 1.4 States shall ensure that RERA authorities are adequately staffed with infrastructure, experts, and resource – At least one member 172 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of every RERA must be a legal expert or consumer advocate with proven expertise in real estate field – RERAs must conduct thorough diligence before granting approval to any project – Failure to do so, resulting in miscarriage of justice, shall amount to an error unpardonable in law and may invite strict intervention by this Court. [Para 21.2] 1.5 Since real estate is the second largest sector in IBC proceedings, IBBI , in consultation with RERA authorities, shall constitute a council to frame specific guidelines for insolvency proceedings in real estate, including timelines for project-wise CIRP, and safeguards for allottees. [Para 21.2] 1.6 Resolution of real estate insolvency should, as a rule, proceed on a project-specific basis rather than the entire corporate debtor, unless circumstances justify otherwise – This would protect solvent projects and genuine homebuyers from collateral prejudice – IBBI shall also devise a mechanism to enable handover of possession to willing allottees where substantial units in a project are complete. [Para 21.2] 1.7 The Union Government shall consider establishing a revival fund under NARCL or expanding the SWAMIH Fund, to provide bridge financing for stressed projects undergoing CIRP, thereby preventing liquidation of viable projects and safeguarding homebuyer interests – SWAMIH Fund is a commendable initiative; however, being a large fund involving public money, every rupee must be utilised strictly for its intended purpose of last-mile financing – To prevent misuse, directed that a comprehensive periodic performance audit by the CAG be carried out, with reports placed in the public domain in a form comprehensible even to laypersons. [Para 21.2] 1.8 Regulations shall ensure meaningful representation of allottees in the CoC through authorized representatives, with safeguards against conflicts of interest. [Para 21.2] 1.9 At the admission stage of s.7 petitions filed by allottees, NCLTs must record a prima facie finding on whether the applicant is a genuine homebuyer or speculative investor – This would prevent unnecessary admissions and reduce docket burden. [Para 21.2] 1.10 The Government shall prioritize e-filing, video-conferencing, and dedicated case management systems for IBC matters, in view of the heavy caseload before NCLTs. [Para 21.2] [2025] 10 S.C.R. 173Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. 1.11 Every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer/allottee – Further, to protect senior citizens and bona fide homebuyers, contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA Agreement to Sell, or that incorporate returns/buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks. [Para 21.2] 1.12 In projects at nascent stages, such as where land is yet to be acquired or construction has not commenced, proceeds from allottees shall be placed in an escrow account and disbursed in phases aligned with project progress, as per a RERA-sanctioned SOP – Every RERA shall devise such SOPs within six months from today. [Para 21.2] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Suggestions by Supreme Court – To the Union Government, for future reform – To protect the interests of genuine homebuyers; the economy at large and fortify safeguards for bona fide homebuyers – Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). [Para 21.2] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Distinction between speculative investors and genuine homebuyers – Role of speculative investors in residential real estate – Speculative investors cannot misuse the remedial framework of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code:
Held: While investors are integral to any industry and their interests warrant protection, speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, which is a remedial framework conceived for revival and the protection of sick companies and, in the case of real estate, genuine homebuyers – Such investors have alternative remedies under consumer law or RERA and even recourse to Civil Courts in appropriate cases – To admit speculative claims into insolvency proceedings would dilute the intelligible differentia underlying the legislative scheme, destabilize the residential real estate sector, and erode the social purpose embedded in housing as a fundamental right. [Para 21] Words and Phrases – “Speculation” and “Speculator” – Definition – Discussed. [Para 18.4] 174 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Objectives of the IBC – Legislative recognition of homebuyers – Safeguards introduced against speculative misuse – Discussed. [Paras 5 - 5.4] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Criteria to identify speculative investors – Determination of whether an allottee is a speculative investor, must be holistic, having regard to the terms of the agreement, the allotment letter, the payment terms, and the overall conduct of the allottee:
Held: Criteria to identify speculative investors (i) expectation of unusually high profits; and (ii) activity in the nature of business or trade – Non-exhaustive indicators include: (1) If the agreement substitutes possession with a buyback or refund option, or any other special arrangement, the allottee is likely a speculative investor –
(2) Insistence on refund with high interest, coupled with refusal to accept possession would indicate speculation – (3) Purchase of multiple units, especially in double digits, shall invite greater scrutiny, though it is not conclusive – If the terms of the agreement provide for possession or refund in the event of failure to give possession alone, this factor may not be held against the allottee –
(4) Special rights, preferential treatment, or unusual privileges to the allottee would signal investment intent – (5) Deviation from the RERA Model Agreement shall be a crucial indicator as to the nature of the transaction-the greater the departure, the greater the likelihood of speculation – (6) Unrealistic interest rates and promises of 20-25% returns over a short duration are indicative of speculation – However, the distinction between speculative investors and genuine homebuyers is relevant only at the stage of initiation of CIRP – Such allottees are not barred from filing claims for the principal amount invested, or from pursuing remedies before other fora in accordance with law. [Paras 18.4.4, 18.4.5, 18.4.6] Case Law Cited Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416 – relied on.
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1; Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17; Manish Kumar v. Union of India [2021] 14 SCR 895 : (2021) 5 SCC 1; Madhubhai Amathalal Gandhi v. The Union of India [1961] 1 SCR 191 : AIR 1961 SC 21; [2025] 10 S.C.R. 175Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. Duni Chand Rataria v. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd. [1955] 1 SCR 1071 : AIR 1955 SC 182; Jute Investment Co. Ltd v. CIT [1980] 1 SCR 902 : (1980) 1 SCC 117; Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal Council Tank and Others [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 227 : (1996) 6 SCC 100; High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. and Others, MANU/SC/0149/2024; Jang Singh v. Brijlal [1964] 1 SCR 145 : AIR 1966 SC 1631; State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari [1976] 2 SCR 82 : AIR 1976 SC 1177; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, MANU/SC/0002/1988; Samatha v. State of A.P. [1997] Supp. 2 SCR 305: (1997) 8 SCC 191; Chameli Singh v. State of U.P [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 827 : (1996) 2 SCC 549 – referred to.
Binani Industries Ltd v. Bank of Baroda (2018) 150 SCL 703; Subha Sharma v. Mansi Brar Fernandes [decided on 17.11.2020 in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 83 of 2020]; Sushil Ansal v. Ashok Tripathi Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 452 of 2020 – referred to.
Alexander Rodger v. The Comptoir D’escompte De, Paris Law Reports Vol. III 1869-71 page 465 at page 475 – referred to. Books and Periodicals Cited P. Ramanatha Iyer’s Law Lexicon (6th edition) – referred to. List of Acts Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019; Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA); Constitution of India; IBC (Amendment) Act, 2020.
List of Keywords Speculative investors; Speculative buyer; Not genuine homebuyers; Threshold requirements for filing of s.7 IBC applications by allottees; Buy-back agreement; Buy-back clause; Buy-back plan; Buyback contract; Buy back agreement for flats; Flats not delivered; Construction never commenced; Buy back the apartment; Pioneer Urban case; Real estate sector; Right to housing; Right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Right to shelter; CIRP proceedings against the Corporate Debtor set aside; NCLAT set aside the admission of the Section 7 application; Speculation; Speculator; Speculative misuse; Bonafide homebuyers; Cheques 176 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports dishonoured; CIRP proceedings; Profit from a lucrative agreement; Expectation of unusually high profits; Threshold requirement mandated under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019; Agreement substitutes possession with a buyback or refund option; Insistence on refund with high interest; Refusal to accept possession; Purchase of multiple units; Preferential treatment; Unusual privileges to the allottee; Deviation from the RERA Model Agreement; Unrealistic interest rates; Profit-sharing over and above guaranteed returns; Recovery; Insolvency resolution; Lex non cogit ad impossibilia; Stability of the real estate sector; Model RERA Agreement to Sell; Actus curiae neminem gravabit.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3826 of 2020 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2020 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in CAAT(I) No. 83 of 2020 With Civil Appeal Nos. 540 of 2021, 5495 of 2025, and 3903 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Saurabh Mishra, Sr. Adv., Chandra Shekhar Yadav, Awanish Sinha, Vineet Kumar, Ms. Harshita Gulati, Ms. Anindita Mitra, Akhil Anand, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Diksha Dadu.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Nupur Kumar, Kaustubh Shukla, Ms. Pushpanjali Singh, Praveen Kumar Singh, Ms. Harshita Gulati, Vineet Kumar, Vishal Sinha, Ms. Anindita Mitra, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Ms. Astha Sharma, Bhanu Mishra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
1. There are four appeals, which, having been heard together, are being disposed of by this common judgment.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 177Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr.
2. The first three appeals, viz., C.A. No. 3826 of 2020, C.A. No. 540 of 2021, and C.A. No. 5495 of 2025 arise out of the final judgment and order dated 17.11.2020 1 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi2 , in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency)
No. 83 of 2020. The fourth appeal, viz., C.A. No. 3903 of 2022, is directed against the final judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 3 passed by the NCLAT in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1020 of 2019.
3. C.A. No. 3826 of 2020 has been preferred by the appellant – Mansi Brar Fernandes in her capacity as a homebuyer / financial creditor. Cross-appeals, viz., C. A. No. 540 of 2021 and C.A. No. 5495 of 2025 have been filed by Shubha Sharma and Ashlesh Gupta, respectively – former and present directors of Gayatri Infra Planner Private Limited – Respondent No. 2 / Corporate Debtor. C.A. No. 3903 of 2022 has been filed by the appellant – Sunita Agarwal, also a homebuyer / financial creditor, against the Corporate Debtor Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd.
4. By the first impugned order dated 17.11.2020, the NCLAT reversed the admission of the application filed under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 4 by the appellant – Mansi Brar Fernandes, holding that she was a “speculative investor” and not a genuine homebuyer / financial creditor. Following this, by its second impugned order dated 12.08.2021, the NCLAT set aside the admission of the Section 7 application filed by the appellant – Sunita Agarwal, holding that she too fell within the category of “speculative buyer” who sought to profit from a lucrative agreement. The directors of the Corporate Debtor, in their cross-appeals, have further challenged the first impugned order on the limited ground of non-applicability of the Ordinance / Amendment Act to the facts of the present case.
PREFATORY
5. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is a landmark economic legislation enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate 1 For short, “the first impugned order”
2 For short, “the NCLAT”
3 For short, “the second impugned order”
4 For short, “the IBC”
178 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports persons, partnership firms, and individuals in a time-bound manner. Its primary objectives are the maximisation of value of assets, promotion of entrepreneurship, availability of credit, and balancing of stakeholder interests – creditors, investors, employees and workmen inter alia. Yet, the IBC is also a highly misunderstood legislation. The nomenclature of the Code itself has often contributed to this perception. In popular imagination, the IBC is associated with bankruptcy and recovery of the “last drop of life” from a company. But a closer look reveals that the true character of the IBC lies not in its sombre title but in its design and purpose. It privileges resolution over ruin, revival over decay, and seeks to breathe life back into companies where revival is possible, while providing for an orderly and dignified closure where it is not. As emphasized by this Court in Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India5 and a catena of subsequent decisions, liquidation is not the primary object of the Code, but a measure of last resort. The Code is designed to revive and restructure distressed entities, so that they continue as going concerns – safeguarding business continuity, protecting employment, and maximising value of stakeholders.
5.1. Within this framework, the homebuyers occupy a distinct position. Although their advances were, in substance, financial contributions to real estate projects, they initially lacked representation in the Committee of Creditors (CoC). To correct this imbalance, Parliament amended the IBC to recognize allottees as “financial creditors”, thereby ensuring that their voices are represented in the resolution process. The legislative intent was to protect genuine homebuyers, secure completion of projects, and ensure delivery of homes. For such stakeholders, liquidation rarely yields meaningful relief.
5.2. However, this amendment also gave rise to an unintended consequence: a surge of individual Section 7 petitions, often filed not by genuine homebuyers but by speculative investors seeking premature exits or enhanced returns. Many of these applications were aimed at holding promoters to ransom by threatening commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. Such misuse burdened the adjudicatory machinery, strained the real estate sector, and stalled projects that could otherwise
5 (2019) 4 SCC 17
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 179Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. have been revived. To curb this mischief, through an ordinance and subsequent amendment, Parliament introduced a threshold requirement: at least 10% of the allottees or 100 in number must act collectively to file a Section 7 application against a real estate developer. This safeguard was designed to prevent a handful of disgruntled or speculative investors from derailing entire projects to the detriment of genuine homebuyers.
5.3. The residential real estate sector plays a systemic role in the Indian economy. It is closely interlinked with banking, steel, cement, and allied industries, and is among the largest employment generators. Despite robust demand, the sector has been plagued by delays, defaults, and lack of accountability, leaving countless families without possession of homes despite having invested their life savings. In this backdrop, this Court has consistently reiterated that the IBC is not a recovery mechanism or a bargaining chip for individual disputes. Rather, it is a collective mechanism intended to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers.
5.4. With this prefatory discussion on the objectives of the IBC, the legislative recognition of homebuyers, and the safeguards introduced against speculative misuse, we now turn to the facts of the present case.
BRIEF FACTS
6. The appellant (Mansi Brar Fernandes) and Respondent No. 2 (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd) had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 06.04.2016 which a buy back agreement for four flats in Gayatri Life at Plot No. 1F, Sector 16, Greater Noida (West), Uttar Pradesh. She paid a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- via cheque towards part consideration, and the MoU included a buy-back clause exercisable solely at the discretion of the Corporate Debtor. If the buy-back option was not exercised, the appellant was entitled to receive possession of the flats without payment of any additional amount. Despite the MoU having been extended twice (first on 07.04.2017 and second on 07.10.2017), neither flats were delivered, nor payment made; and post-dated cheques worth Rs.1 crore handed over by the Corporate Debtor, were returned dishonoured upon presentation. The appellant thereafter initiated section 7 IBC 180 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports proceedings in the capacity as an allottee / Financial Creditor, before the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi 6 , besides initiating the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 7 . The NCLT issued notice to the Corporate Debtor and after detailed arguments, admitted the application vide order dated 02.01.2020. Challenging the same, Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the NCLAT, which allowed the appeal and set aside the CIRP proceedings initiated by the appellant against the Corporate Debtor, by the first impugned order.
7. The appellants in C.A. No. 540 of 2021 and C.A. No. 5495 of 2025 assail the first impugned order dated 17.11.2020 passed by the NCLAT on the limited ground of non-compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, promulgated on 28.12.2019. The appellants stated that the Section 7 petition under the IBC filed by Respondent No. 1 (Mansi Brar Fernandes) on 02.01.2020, was reserved on 04.12.2019, i.e., prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance. As on 28.12.2019, the application was still pending consideration. Consequently, the Ordinance and the subsequent Amendment Act squarely applied to the proceedings. It was urged that the failure of Respondent No. 1 to satisfy the threshold requirement mandated under the Ordinance is fatal to the maintainability of the petition.
7.1. The appellants further stated that specifically, the third proviso to Section 7 IBC mandated compliance even for insolvency applications filed by financial creditors that had not yet been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority within thirty days of the promulgation of the Ordinance / Amendment Act. In the absence of such compliance, the proviso expressly deemed such pending applications to have been withdrawn prior to admission. Therefore, the finding of the NCLAT that the Ordinance was inapplicable to the facts of the present case, is erroneous, untenable, and unsustainable in law, and the admission order was liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
7.2. The appellants also stated that compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance / Amendment Act cannot be subsequently 6 For short, “the NCLT”
7 For short, “N.I. Act”
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 181Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. cured in appellate proceedings before the NCLAT. Hence, after the Ordinance / Amendment Act, a Section 7 IBC petition could not have been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority, unless the statutory threshold prescribed for allottees to initiate CIRP against a real estate project was met. The admission order dated 02.01.2020, therefore, failed to give effect to the binding mandate of the Ordinance / Amendment Act. Consequently, the appellants submitted that the requirements of the Ordinance / Amendment Act are squarely attracted, and to that extent, the first impugned order of the NCLAT warrants interference by this Court.
8. The facts of the case in CA. No. 3903 of 2022 are that Respondent No. 2 (Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd) approached the appellant (Sunita Agarwal), and represented that they were in the process of developing a housing project in the name and style of “Antriksh Urban Greek” at L-Zone, Dwarka, New Delhi - 110 075. The appellant agreed to invest a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- and paid the same by cheque dated 08.07.2015. Pursuant thereto, Respondent No. 2 issued letters dated 13.07.2015, stating that a 4BHK residential unit on the 6 th floor, admeasuring 2500 sq.ft. @ Rs. 5000/- per sq.ft., had been booked in the name of the appellant under buy-back plan, and also issued receipt No. 0492 dated 13.07.2015 acknowledging the payment of Rs.25,00,000/-. On 28.07.2015, an Agreement / MoU was executed between Respondent No.2 and the appellant. As per Clause 2(a) of the Agreement, Respondent No. 2 admitted the payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- and agreed to provide a return of 25% per annum at the end of 24 months or upon the issuance of final LTC by the competent authority, whichever was earlier. The 24-month period ended on 07.07.2017.
8.1. Since construction was never commenced and, as reported by the Insolvency Resolution Professional appointed by the NCLT, even land had not been acquired by Respondent No. 2, the appellant issued a demand notice/e-mail dated 01.02.2019 demanding a sum of Rs. 47,31,164.38 (comprising the principal amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- plus interest @ 25% per annum till 08.02.2019). Respondent No. 2, however, refused to accept the notice. The appellant also sent the notice through e-mail on 01.02.2019.
182 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
8.2. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Section 7 IBC before the NCLT. On 02.05.2019, the NCLT issued notice to Respondent No. 2 and directed filing of an affidavit of service, renotifying the case on 10.05.2019. The appellant served the complete set of the petition and documents on Respondent No. 2 through e-mail on 07.05.2019, and filed an affidavit of service along with a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act on 14.05.2019. Vide order dated 15.05.2019, the NCLT directed that the matter proceed ex parte as Respondent No. 2 failed to appear. Arguments were heard on 30.08.2019, and by order dated 17.09.2019, the NCLT admitted the Section 7 IBC petition and appointed an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) to act in accordance with the Code.
8.3. Challenging the said order, Respondent No. 1 preferred Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1020 / 2019 before the NCLAT. In support, Respondent No. 1 relied upon the NCLAT judgment dated 17.11.2020 in Subha Sharma v. Mansi Brar Fernandes and others [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 83 of 2020] wherein, the NCLAT, referring to clauses of a similar agreement, held that at the end of the stipulated period, the corporate debtor was obliged to buy-back the apartment and refund the amount along with premium, which was a lucrative agreement for the investor, thereby making the allottee a speculative investor. On this reasoning and applying the ratio of this Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India8, the NCLAT by the second impugned order dated 12.08.2021, set aside the NCLT’s admission order. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court with the present appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
9. According to the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the appellant (Mansi Brar Fernandes) is a homebuyer and qualifies as a financial creditor under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. She entered into a MoU dated 06.04.2016 with the Corporate Debtor (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd) for the purchase / buy-back of four apartments in its project
8 (2019) 8 SCC 416
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 183Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. “Gayatri Life”, and paid a sum of Rs.35 lakhs through cheque as part consideration. The MoU, which was commercially structured by the Corporate Debtor itself, contained a buy-back clause that was entirely at the option of the Corporate Debtor. It could either buy back the units after 12 months for Rs.1 crore or hand over possession of the flats to the appellant at no extra cost. The MoU was extended twice, i.e., on 07.04.2017 (for six months) and 07.10.2017 (for twelve months), and all post-dated cheques issued by the Corporate Debtor for Rs.1 crore, were dishonoured upon presentation. Despite the expiry of the final extension period on 06.10.2018, the Corporate Debtor failed to hand over the flats or honour its buy-back commitment, thereby constraining the appellant to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, and subsequently, file a Section 7 IBC petition.
9.1. Continuing further, it was submitted that the NCLT, by order dated 02.01.2020 admitted the petition, holding that the appellant was a homebuyer / financial creditor under Section 5(8)(f), and that the Corporate Debtor had committed default. However, on appeal, the NCLAT reversed the admission, branding the appellant as a speculative investor. The learned counsel submitted that this finding is wholly erroneous, as it was based merely on the existence of the buy-back clause, the dishonour of post-dated cheques, and the appellant’s resort to remedies under the N.I. Act. None of these, it was argued, demonstrate speculative intent. On the contrary, the appellant never withdrew from the MoU and was always willing to accept possession of the flats, while the option of buy-back was solely with the Corporate Debtor, not the appellant. The NCLAT’s approach, according to the learned counsel, disregards the builder’s default and unfairly penalise the homebuyer.
9.2. It was also submitted that the transaction clearly bears the hallmarks of a financial debt, having the commercial effect of borrowing and carrying the element of time value of money, as recognized in the IBC. The sum of Rs.35 lakhs was duly received by the Corporate Debtor, reflected in its financial records, and is undisputed. The transaction is not alleged to be preferential, undervalued, fraudulent, or extortionate under Sections 43 to 50 IBC, and the appellant is not a related party of the Corporate Debtor or its promoters. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Pioneer Urban Land and 184 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (supra), wherein the 2018 amendment recognising homebuyers as financial creditors was held to be clarificatory in nature. It was submitted that the presence of a buy-back clause in the MoU does not exclude a homebuyer from the purview of Section 5(8)(f), especially where such clause was devised by the builder and not at the instance of the allottee.
9.3. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that during the pendency of the present appeal, another Section 7 IBC petition filed by Amit Joshi and others against the same Corporate Debtor was admitted by the NCLT on 28.03.2023 and a CIRP is presently ongoing. The appellant has already submitted her claim in those proceedings. She clarified that she does not seek revival of her original Section 7 IBC petition, but only challenges the erroneous finding of the NCLAT branding her as a “speculative investor”, which prejudices her rights in the ongoing CIRP and under other proceedings including those under the N. I. Act.
9.4. In view of this subsequent CIRP, it was submitted that it is not necessary for this Court to adjudicate on other issues raised in the first impugned order, including the maintainability of her Section 7 IBC application in light of the 2018 amendment to the IBC requiring a threshold number of homebuyers to initiate insolvency proceedings. For the same reason, the cross-appeals preferred by Shubha Sharma and Ashlesh Gupta also do not require consideration.
9.5. With these submissions, the learned senior counsel prayed that the impugned finding of the NCLAT describing the appellant as a “speculative investor” be set aside, she be recognised as a homebuyer and financial creditor under Section 5(8)(f) IBC, and she be treated at par with similarly situated allottees in the ongoing CIRP in Amit Joshi (supra).
10. The learned counsel for the applicant in IA. No. 9936 of 2021 in C.A. No. 3826 of 2020 / intervenor submitted that the applicant– Gayatri Life Buyers Welfare Society – comprises allottees of the now-defunct residential housing project “Gayatri Life” promoted by the corporate debtor / Respondent No. 2. The members of the applicant who hold 89 apartment units in the said project, had supported the appellant – [2025] 10 S.C.R. 185Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. Mansi Brar Fernandes – before the NCLAT by filing affidavits in support of initiation of CIRP against the corporate debtor. They continue to support the appellant / homebuyer in seeking admission of the builder to insolvency proceedings. Therefore, there is material and substantial compliance with the amendment introduced on 28 th December 2019 to Section 7 of the IBC, and the hyper-technical objections taken by the corporate debtor in this regard merit rejection.
11. On behalf of Respondent No. 2 (Gayatri Infra Planner Private Limited), the Resolution Professional made the following submissions:
(i) The appellant, claiming to be a financial creditor, seeks to rely on a Memorandum of Understanding dated 06.04.2016, which was purely provisional in nature and did not result in final allotment. The appellant had paid Rs.35 lakhs out of a total consideration of Rs.1,03,78,521/- for four flats and the MoU provided the company a discretionary option to repurchase the flats for Rs.1 crore within 12 months, failing which the appellant would be entitled to possession. This optional buyback clause does not create any binding repayment obligation, and therefore, does not constitute a “financial debt” under the IBC. The appellant’s own case confirms that the buy-back was at the sole discretion of the respondent, and no evidence has been adduced to show that the company exercised the option or agreed to repay Rs.1 crore. The transaction was clearly speculative in nature, structured to yield an abnormal return of over 350% within a short duration, reflecting an investment for profit and not a genuine homebuying intent.
(ii) Furthermore, the appellant fully aware of the project’s construction timeline, instead sought to recover money under the garb of insolvency proceedings. As held in Pioneer Urban and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (supra), the IBC cannot be used by speculative investors to initiate coercive proceedings. Therefore, the appellant not being a financial creditor under section 5(8)(f) had no locus to initiate CIRP, and the Admission Order was rightly set aside. The first impugned order correctly distinguishes the appellant as a “speculative investor” rather than a genuine allottee, and upholds the principles underlying the Code.
186 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(iii) The appellant is not a genuine allottee but a speculative investor who entered into a transaction with the Corporate Debtor purely for assured financial returns and not for the purpose of acquiring residential property. A speculative allottee, as recognized in law, is one who seeks short term gains through devices like buy-back clauses and post-dated cheques (PDCs) with no genuine intent to obtain possession or use the property for residential purposes. In contrast, a genuine allottee under section 5(8)(f) is a person who seeks a home for personal use and falls within the protective ambit of the Code. In the present case, the appellant was issued Post-dated cheques against the investment made, a practice not followed in respect of genuine homebuyers, thereby clearly indicating the speculative nature of the transaction. The MoU executed between the appellant and the Corporate Debtor included a buy-back clause offering the appellant an exorbitant return of Rs.1 crore on an investment of Rs.35 lakhs within 12 months, reflecting a commercial arrangement rather than a residential purchase. The structure of the MoU, absence of a builder-buyer agreement, lack of follow-up for possession, and reliance on section 138 N.I. Act proceedings all point to the appellant’s intent to profit financially rather than obtain residential possession.
(iv) The NCLAT, in the first impugned order, rightly found that the appellant was a speculative investor and not a genuine allottee. It specifically observed that the MoU was a highly lucrative agreement designed to yield massive returns with no real obligation on the part of the appellant to pay the balance amount for the flats. Further, the appellant never sought possession during the term of the MoU, nor monitored the project’s progress, thereby indicating the absence of genuine buyer conduct. The transaction lacked the characteristics of a real estate allotment protected under the IBC or the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The appellant’s failure to produce any registered builder-buyer agreement or other formal documentation also supports the conclusion that the arrangement was speculative in nature.
(v) Moreover, the appellant’s attempt to use the IBC framework only after dishonour of the PDCs and commencement of CIRP [2025] 10 S.C.R. 187Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. proceedings reflects a coercive and opportunistic invocation of the Code, which has been disapproved by this Court in Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (supra), wherein, it was clearly held that speculative investors cannot misuse the IBC for recovery of returns or enforcement of investment contracts disguised as real estate allotments. The present case squarely falls within that prohibition. Similarly, in Binani Industries Ltd v. Bank of Baroda9, it has been reiterated that the IBC is not a recovery mechanism for investors who do not qualify as genuine stakeholders affected by insolvency.
(vi) The NCLAT, by order dated 17.11.2020 in Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No.83 of 2020, directed initiation of reverse CIRP against Respondent No. 2, and the construction of the project continues smoothly under IRP supervision.
(vii) The respondent company has always been ready and willing to allot the four flats on a fully paid-up basis to the appellant, which would entitle the appellant to take possession of the same upon completion of construction. However, the appellant was only interested in the premium of Rs.1 crore from the respondent company, instead of delivery of the flats. That apart, the appellant sought to encash the cheques and even filed a complaint under section 138 of the N.I. Act.
(viii) Respondent No. 2 was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) on 28.03.2023, pursuant to an order passed by the NCLT in C.P. (IB) No. 350/(PB)/2021, under Section 7 IBC, whereupon a moratorium under Section 14 came into effect.
(ix) The Respondent company is currently undergoing CIRP, and the construction is progressing under the supervision of the IRP, who is ensuring that possession is handed over to genuine homebuyers in a fair and lawful manner. The CoC proceedings have been stayed by the NCLAT, and the project continues to be developed smoothly. The appellant’s speculative claim, if allowed, would upset the priority and fairness principle enshrined in the Code and prejudice the rights of genuine homebuyers and creditors.
9 (2018) 150 SCL 703
188 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(x) In view of the above submissions, it was prayed that the appeal be dismissed, and the findings of the NCLAT -holding the appellant to be a speculative investor not entitled to initiate proceedings under section 7 of the IBC – be confirmed.
12. The learned senior counsel for the appellants in C.A. No. 540/2021 and C.A No. 5495 of 2025 assailed the finding of the NCLAT in the first impugned order in respect of inapplicability of Ordinance / Amendment Act, to the facts of the present case, on the following grounds:
(i) The NCLAT erred in concluding that the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 (later enacted as Amendment Act, 2020) were inapplicable to the present case. The Ordinance was promulgated on 28.12.2019, prior to the NCLT’s admission order dated 02.01.2020. Hence, its provisions squarely governed the present proceedings.
(ii) The Ordinance / Amendment Act does not envisage any carveout or exception in favour of real estate allottees. The statutory threshold introduced by the amendment applies uniformly, and an allottee is required to comply with the threshold requirement before initiating proceedings under Section 7 IBC. The company cannot be deprived of its right to insist on such compliance before being subjected to CIRP.
(iii) The NCLAT erroneously assumed that this court’s interim order in the earlier proceedings had the effect of staying the Ordinance /Amendment Act. It failed to appreciate that the legal effect of an interim order is entirely distinct from that of a stay order. The statutory amendments remained fully operative and binding at the relevant time.
(iv) The impugned order runs contrary to the plain language and intent of the Ordinance / Amendment Act, which clearly applied to the present case. The finding of inapplicability is legally impermissible as well as factually unsustainable.
(v) This Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India10 upheld the constitutional validity of the Ordinance / Amendment Act and
10 (2021) 5 SCC 1
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 189Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. recognized the crucial importance of the threshold prescribed for financial creditors who are allottees.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.