Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 687; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 683
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 13 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3816/2024
- Sections
- 477A, 7, 41A, 41(1), 41A(3), 41A(1), 439, 19, 41(2), 41, 43, 120B
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 683 : 2024 INSC 687 Arvind Kejriwal v.
Central Bureau of Investigation (Criminal Appeal No. 3816 of 2024)
13 September 2024 [Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The instant appeals are directed against the judgments and orders dated 05.08.2024 passed by the High Court, dismissing the appellant’s challenge to his arrest being illegal as well as his application for the grant of regular bail.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.41A – Penal Code, 1860 – s.477A – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.7 – The High Court upheld the arrest of the appellant by the CBI and congruously denied him regular bail – Propriety:
Held: [Per Surya Kant, J.]: CBI complied with Section 41A CrPC, in its true letter and spirit – The appellant’s arrest does not suffer with any procedural infirmity – Although the procedure for the Appellant’s arrest meets the requisite criteria for legality and compliance, continued incarceration for an extended period pending trial would infringe upon established legal principles and the appellant’s right to liberty, traceable to Article 21 of Constitution – The appellant satisfies the requisite conditions for the grant of bail – Thus, the appellant directed to be released on bail in connection with FIR registered by the CBI. [Paras 29, 36, 40, 47(ii)(a)] – [Per Ujjal Bhuyan, J. (concurring)]: It is evident that CBI did not feel the need and necessity to arrest the appellant from 17.08.2022 till 26.06.2024 i.e. for over 22 months – It was only after the Special Judge granted regular bail to the appellant in the ED case that the CBI activated its machinery and took the appellant into custody – Such action on the part of the CBI raises a serious question mark on the timing of the arrest; rather on the arrest itself – For 22 months, CBI does not arrest the appellant but after the Special Judge grants regular bail to the appellant in the ED case, CBI seeks his custody – In the circumstances, a view * Author 684 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports may be taken that such an arrest by the CBI was perhaps only to frustrate the bail granted to the appellant in the ED case – The belated arrest of the appellant by the CBI is unjustified and the continued incarceration of the appellant in the CBI case that followed such arrest has become untenable – Thus, appellant directed to be released on bail forthwith. [Paras 23, 41, 43] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.41A – Penal Code, 1860 – s.477A – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.7 – The primary basis for the appellant’s challenge rests on the contention that the procedure for arrest, as outlined u/ss. 41A of the CrPC, was not complied with:
Held: S.41A of the CrPC pertains to the issuance of a notice by a police officer to an individual when their arrest is not warranted u/s.41(1) of the CrPC, but their presence is still required before the investigating authority – In the present context, since the appellant was already in judicial custody at the relevant time in the ED case, the CBI filed an application on 24.06.2024 before the trial Court u/s.41A of the CrPC, inter alia seeking to interrogate and examine him – Such examination was allegedly necessitated by new facts and evidence uncovered by the CBI upon further investigation – The provision, however, does not outline any express procedure to be undertaken where the individual in question is already incarcerated – It is to be remembered that the Court is, in a way, the guardian of an undertrial, while he is in judicial custody – That being so, there could possibly be no other way to secure the appellant’s physical presence for the purpose of further investigation, except to seek prior permission of the trial Court for his interrogation – In the case in hand, the trial Court’s approval of the CBI’s application to interrogate the Appellant should be viewed as satisfying the essential requirements of Section 41A, as the issuance of a formal notice through the jail authorities would have had an adverse impact on the rights of the appellant – Thus, in considered view of this Court the CBI complied with the procedure encompassed within the framework of Section 41A of the CrPC. [Paras 17, 18, 20] [Per Surya Kant, J.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.41A(3) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.477A – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.7 – Whether there was violation of Section 41A(3) of the CrPC: Held: First, it is trite law that there is no insurmountable hurdle in the conversion of judicial custody into police custody by an order of [2024] 9 S.C.R. 685Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation a Magistrate – Thus, there is no impediment in terms of arresting a person already in custody for the purposes of investigation, whether for the same offence or for an altogether different offence – The appellant’s arrest by the CBI was thus entirely permissible, in light of the trial Court’s order dated 25.06.2024 wherein the trial Court, after considering the reasons, allowed the CBI’s application for the appellant’s arrest – Second, Section 41A(3) allows for arrest, provided the reasons are recorded, justifying the necessity of such a step, and the police officer is satisfied that the individual should be arrested – In this context, the CBI, in their application dated 25.06.2024, clearly recorded the reasons as to why they deemed the appellant’s arrest necessary – These reasons were also summarized in the arrest memo dated 26.06.2024 – Third, s.41A(1), when r/w.s.41A(3) CrPC, does not impose an absolute prohibition on the arrest of an individual against whom there exists reasonable suspicion of having committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years – This is evident from the language of the provision itself – S.41A(3) explicitly states that an arrest is permissible if the police officer believes it to be necessary and duly records the reasons for such arrest – This provision thus essentially carves out an exception to the general rule u/s. 41A, which mandates that an individual whose appearance is required should not be arrested u/s.41(1) of the CrPC. [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28] [Per Surya Kant, J.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.41(1)(b)(ii) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.477A – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.7 – Whether s.41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable:
Held: Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC clearly stipulates that an arrest under this provision can be made based on a complaint or credible information that an individual has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, with or without a fine – However, such an arrest must be conducted subject to the satisfaction of specific conditions outlined in sub-sections
(a) to (e) – The said provision is inapplicable to the vicissitudes of the present factual matrix – Here is a case where the court upon application of judicial mind accorded its approval to the appellant’s arrest for which necessary warrant was issued – There was thus no occasion for the arresting police officer to form an opinion regarding the existence of valid reasons of arrest – The competent court having undertaken such a task, the police officer cannot be expected to sit over the order of the court. [Paras 32, 33] [Per Surya Kant, J.] 686 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Bail – Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.477A – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.7 – Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief of regular bail:
Held: The FIR was registered on 17.08.2022, and since then, the chargesheet along with four supplementary chargesheets have been filed – The fourth supplementary chargesheet was filed as recently as 29.07.2024 and the Trial Court has taken cognizance of the same – Additionally, seventeen accused persons have been named, 224 individuals have been identified as witnesses, and extensive documentation, both physical and digital, has been submitted – These factors suggest that the completion of the trial is unlikely to occur in the immediate future – Although the procedure for the appellant’s arrest meets the requisite criteria for legality and compliance, continued incarceration for an extended period pending trial would infringe upon established legal principles and the appellant’s right to liberty, traceable to Article 21 of our Constitution – The Appellant has been granted interim bail by this Court in the ED matter on 10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024, arising from the same set of facts – Additionally, several co-accused in both the CBI and ED matters have also been granted bail by the Trial Court, the High Court, and this Court in separate proceedings – So far as the apprehension of the Appellant influencing the outcome of the trial is concerned, it seems that all evidence and material relevant to the CBI’s disposition is already in their possession, negating the likelihood of tampering by the Appellant – Therefore, in the light of these extenuating circumstances and considering the foregoing analysis, it could be resolved that the Appellant satisfies the requisite conditions for the grant of bail. [Paras 39, 40, 41, 42] [Per Surya Kant, J.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Regular bail – Filing of charge-sheet – Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances warranting relegation to the trial court for grant of regular bail:
Held: It is true that generally the trial Court should consider the prayer seeking bail once the chargesheet is filed, since the material that an Investigating Authority may have been able to procure would undoubtedly facilitate that court to form a prima facie opinion with regard to (i) the gravity of offence; (ii) the degree of involvement of the applicant; (iii) the background and vulnerability of the witnesses;
(iv) the approximate timeline for conclusion of the trial based on [2024] 9 S.C.R. 687Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation the number of witnesses; and (v) the societal impact of granting or denying bail – However, there can be no straitjacket formula which enumerates that every case concerning the consideration of bail should depend upon the filing of a chargesheet – In fact, each case ought to be assessed on its own merits, recognizing that no one-size fits all formula exists for determining bail – An undertrial thus should, ordinarily, first approach the trial Court for bail, as this process not only provides the accused an opportunity for initial relief but also allows the High Court to serve as a secondary avenue if the trial Court denies bail for inadequate reasons – If an accused approaches the High Court directly without first seeking relief from the Trial Court, it is generally appropriate for the High Court to redirect them to the Trial Court at the threshold – This issue is however, more or less academic in the instant case as the High Court did not relegate the appellant to the trial Court at the preliminary stage – Since notice was issued and the parties were apparently heard on merits by the High Court, it not necessary at this stage to relegate the appellant to the trial Court even though filing of a chargesheet is a change in the circumstances – Thus, appellant directed to be released on bail. [Paras 43, 44, 45, 46] [Per Surya Kant, J.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Constitution of India – Art. 20(3) – Arrest – Grounds of arrest – Detention citing evasive reply:
Held: The respondent-CBI is definitely wrong when it says that because the appellant was evasive in his reply, because he was not cooperating with the investigation, therefore, he was rightly arrested and now should be continued in detention – It cannot be the proposition that only when an accused answers the questions put to him by the investigation agency in the manner in which the investigating agency would like the accused to answer, would mean that the accused is cooperating with the investigation – Further, the respondent cannot justify arrest and continued detention citing evasive reply – One should not forget the cardinal principle under Article 20(3) of the Constitution that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. [Paras 24, 25] [Per Ujjal Bhuyan, J.] Constitution of India – Art. 20(3) – No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself: Held: Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India states that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against 688 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports himself – This Court has held that such a protection is available to a person accused of an offence not merely with respect to the evidence that may be given in the court in the course of the trial, but is also available to the accused at a previous stage if an accusation has been made against him which might in the normal course result in his prosecution – Thus, the protection is available to a person against whom a formal accusation has been made, though the actual trial may not have commenced and if such an accusation relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution – An accused has the right to remain silent; he cannot be compelled to make inculpatory statements against himself – No adverse inference can be drawn from the silence of the accused – If this is the position, then the very grounds given for arrest of the appellant would be wholly untenable – On such grounds, it would be a travesty of justice to keep the appellant in further detention in the CBI case, more so, when he has already been granted bail on the same set of allegations under the more stringent provisions of PMLA. [Para 25] [Per Ujjal Bhuyan, J.] Bail – Bail jurisprudence:
Held: Bail jurisprudence is a facet of a civilised criminal justice system – An accused is innocent until proven guilty by a competent court following the due process – Hence, there is presumption of innocence – Therefore, this Court has been reiterating again and again the salutary principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception – As such, the courts at all levels must ensure that the process leading to and including the trial does not end up becoming the punishment itself – This Court has emphasized and re-emphasized time and again that personal liberty is sacrosanct – It is of utmost importance that trial courts and the High Courts remain adequately alert to the need to protect personal liberty which is a cherished right under Constitution. [Paras 39, 40] [Per Ujjal Bhuyan, J.] Case Law Cited In the judgement of Surya Kant, J:
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC 273 – relied on.
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni [1992] 3 SCR 158 : (1992) 3 SCC 141; Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public [2024] 9 S.C.R. 689Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation Prosecutor [1978] 2 SCR 371 : (1978) 1 SCC 240; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : AIR (2021) SC 712 – referred to. In the judgement of Ujjal Bhuyan, J:
Kanumuri Raghurama Krishnam Raju v. State of A.P. (2021) 13 SCC 822; Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [1978] 2 SCR 371 : (1978) 1 SCC 240 – relied on.
Manish Sisodia v. CBI (Criminal Appeal No. 3296 of 2024, decided on 09.08.2024 by the Supreme Court); Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. [1994] 3 SCR 661 : (1994) 4 SCC 260; Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2010] 4 SCR 103 : (2010) 6 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC 273; Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 18 SCR 494 : (2022) SCC Online SC 897; Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India [2020] 8 SCR 222 : (2020) 14 SCC 12 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
List of Keywords Section 41A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 41(1)(b)
(ii) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Article 20(3) of Constitution of India; Section 477A of Penal Code, 1860; Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Bail; Regular bail; Arrest; Grounds of arrest; Procedural infirmity; Article 21 of Constitution of India; Charge-sheet; Gravity of offence; Background and vulnerability of the witnesses; Societal impact of granting or denying bail; Personal Liberty; Necessity and timing of arrest.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3816 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.08.2024 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 2285 of 2024 With Criminal Appeal No. 3817 of 2024 690 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, N. Hariharan, Vikram Chaudhary, Narendra Hooda, Sr. Advs., Vivek Jain, Mohd. Irshad, Rajat Bhardwaj, Karan Sharma, Suchitra Kumbhat, Amit Bhandari, Sadiq Noor, Rajat Jain, Mohit Siwach, Kaustubh Khanna, Shailesh, Rishikesh, Indresh Upadhyay, Ms. Arveen, Ms. Muskaan Khurrana, Advs. for the Appellant.
Suryaprakash V. Raju, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Zoheb Hussain, Annam Venkatesh, Vivek Gurnani, Samrat Goswami, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the judgements and orders dated 05.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), dismissing the Appellant’s challenge to his arrest being illegal as well as his application for the grant of regular bail. Consequently, the High Court upheld the legality of the Appellant’s arrest and has summarily declined to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’), thereby denying his prayer for regular bail.
Facts:
3. At the very outset, it is essential to advert to the brief factual background to provide context to the manner in which the present proceedings have arisen.
3.1. The Appellant is a public representative and has been elected thrice the Chief Minister of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereinafter ‘GNCTD’). He also happens to be the National Convenor of Aam Aadmi Party, a political party in India.
3.2. Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter ‘CBI’) – the Respondent registered an FIR No. RC0032022A0053 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 691Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter ‘FIR’), on 17.08.2022 under Sections 120B read with Section 477A of the Indian Penal Code, 1806 (hereinafter ‘IPC’) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter ‘PC Act’) against various persons. The FIR alleged irregularities, falsification, undue advantage, and a conspiracy among the persons holding positions of responsibility within the GNCTD, in framing and implementing the Excise Policy for the year 2021-2022 (hereinafter ‘Excise Policy’). However, the Appellant’s name did not figure in the FIR.
3.3. On 21.03.2024, the Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter ‘ED’), arrested the Appellant in the purported exercise of its power under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Subsequently, this Court granted the Appellant interim bail on 10.05.2024, until 01.06.2024. The Appellant surrendered thereafter before the jail authorities on 02.06.2024. We may hasten to add here that the question of law sought to be raised in the ED matter is presently pending consideration before a larger bench of this Court and is not relevant to the present controversy, and its particulars are included solely to ensure lucidity in the factual matrix.
3.4. The Special Judge vide order dated 20.06.2024 granted the Appellant regular bail while his bail in the ED matter was pending before this Court and reserved for judgement. However, the ED swiftly sought the cancellation of that bail order. The High Court on 21.06.2024 stayed the operation of that order, as a result of which, the Appellant continued to remain in jail.
3.5. CBI moved an application on 24.06.2024 before the Special Judge (PC Act) (hereinafter ‘Trial Court’) under Section 41A of the CrPC, seeking to interrogate the Appellant, which was thereupon allowed. Having completed interrogation and examination, the CBI filed an application on 25.06.2024 seeking permission to arrest the Appellant and for the issuance of production warrants. Thereafter, the Trial Court allowed the CBI’s application noting that the accused was already in judicial custody in the ED matter. In the meantime, the High Court conclusively stayed the order granting regular bail to the Appellant in the ED matter on 25.06.2024 itself.
3.6. Shortly thereafter, on 26.06.2024, the Appellant was produced before the Trial Court, whereupon he was arrested in the instant 692 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports CBI case and a copy of the arrest memo was handed over to the Appellant’s counsel. On the same day, on an application moved by the CBI, the Trial Court remanded the Appellant to police custody for five days. Subsequently, on 29.06.2024, the Trial Court remanded the Appellant to judicial custody till 12.07.2024. It may be noted that the investigation at that time was ongoing.
3.7. Both the above stated orders dated 26.06.2024 and 29.06.2024 of the Trial Court, came to be challenged by the Appellant before the High Court vide a Writ Petition, inter alia seeking a declaration that his arrest was illegal. On 02.07.2024, when the Petition was heard, the High Court issued notice to the CBI and scheduled the matter to be heard on 17.07.2024. In the interregnum, the Appellant also approached the High Court under Section 439 CrPC, seeking regular bail in connection with the subject FIR. On 05.07.2024, when the Bail Application came up for hearing, the High Court issued notice and renotified it to be heard on 17.07.2024, along with the Writ Petition challenging the very arrest of the Appellant.
3.8. The High Court extensively heard the matter on 17.07.2024 and reserved judgement in the Writ Petition. The Bail Application was renotified for further hearing on 29.07.2024, which was also reserved. Finally, on 05.08.2024, the High Court vide the impugned judgement and order upheld the arrest of the Appellant by the CBI and congruously denied him regular bail, with liberty to approach the Trial Court for such relief.
3.9. As regard to the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, the High Court upheld the same on the following broad points: (i) The five circumstances delineated under Section 41(1)(b) of the CrPC apply only to arrests made without a warrant and does not pertain to arrests made under the aegis of Section 41(2) of the CrPC, which is an arrest upon the order of a court;
(ii) The arrest was made in accordance with Section 41(2) of the CrPC; and (iii) The plea of non-compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC was totally unsubstantiated.
3.10. As regard to the Appellant’s prayer for regular bail, the High Court has denied the same for the following reasons: (i) The complexity of the facts and material on record necessitated a more comprehensive determination of the Appellant’s role in the [2024] 9 S.C.R. 693Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation alleged conspiracy so as to assess his entitlement to bail; and
(ii) The Bail Application had been filed prior to the chargesheet being submitted, and since the chargesheet has now been filed before the Trial Court, the Appellant was directed to first approach the Court of the Sessions Judge.
3.11. Meanwhile, this Court vide order dated 12.07.2024, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024 directed the Appellant’s release on interim bail in the ED matter.1 However, the Appellant continues to face incarceration on account of the proceedings initiated by the CBI.
3.12. The instant appeals are therefore restricted to the Appellant’s challenges regarding the legality and propriety of his arrest by the CBI and his prayer for release on regular bail in connection with the proceedings initiated by the CBI via the subject FIR. C ontentions of the Parties
4. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel representing the Appellant, argued first and foremost that the Appellant had been arrested illegally, in violation of the procedure enumerated in Sections 41(1) and 41A of the CrPC. In this vein, he assailed that the Appellant was arrested without giving any reasons, thus violating the: (i) precondition of just and valid reasons for the change of a case from ‘non-arrest’ to ‘arrest’ under Section 41A (3) of the CrPC; and (ii) the mandatory details that have to be fulfilled under Section 41(1)(b)(ii), to satisfy that the arrest fell within the purview of any of the clauses (a) to (e). Considering that none of these stipulations were complied with, the Appellant’s arrest is fraught with illegality.
5. Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the High Court having erred in misapplying the provision of Section 41(2) of the CrPC to justify the non-compliances of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC and consequential arrest of the Appellant. He highlighted that Section 41(2) is attracted only to non-cognizable offences, whereas the arrest of the Appellant was made in a case of cognizable offence. This was fortified by contending that none of the applications moved by the CBI seeking remand, sought to invoke Section 41(2). These violations, Learned Senior Counsel contended, were squarely against the dictum of this 1 Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024 694 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar 2 and a plethora of other subsequent decisions.
6. Dr. Singhvi further argued that the Appellant deserves to be granted bail, as his continued incarceration is not necessitated, given that the entire material is in the safe custody of the CBI. He also emphasized that the Appellant has been granted both interim and regular bail in the ED matter by this Court, where the conditions are stricter, thus demonstrating that he would invariably meet the threshold explicated by the ‘triple test’ in the CBI matter as well: he has no criminal antecedents, is not a flight risk, and poses no threat of tampering with witnesses or evidence. He also assailed that the High Court ought not to have relegated the Appellant to the Trial Court, considering that it exercises concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. This measure, he underscored, was akin to taking the Appellant back to square one, leading to a travesty of justice and unwarranted delay in the adjudication of his bail application.
7. Lastly, Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the fact that the trial was not likely to be concluded in the near future, as the FIR was registered on 17.08.2022, with one chargesheet and three supplementary chargesheets having been filed, 17 accused persons arraigned, as many as 224 witnesses cited and the physical and digital records running into lakhs of pages. Further, the fourth supplementary charge sheet was filed on 29.07.2024, cognizance of which was taken only recently, and which was yet to be supplied to the Appellant. These reasons, he contended, irrefutably validated his apprehension of reasonable delay in the conclusion of trial.
8. Per contra, Mr. S.V. Raju, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India argued that the arrest of the Appellant had been conducted in due compliance with the statutory procedure as contemplated in Section 41(1) and 41A of the CrPC. He contended that these provisions do not, in any manner, mandate a blanket ban on the arrest of an individual, against whom there is a reasonable suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The law only stipulates that the investigating authority ought to be satisfied with the necessity of such an arrest, which has been duly met in the present case. He strenuously 2 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 695Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation urged that the pre-requisites set out in Section 41(1)(b)(ii) had been fulfilled as the CBI deemed it imperative to conduct the custodial interrogation of the Appellant to unearth a larger conspiracy hatched amongst the accused persons and to establish the money trail of ill-gotten proceeds.
9. Mr. Raju contended that the requirement of notice under Section 41A of the CrPC is intended solely to compel the accused to appear before the investigating authority. Since the accused in the instant case was already in judicial custody, such notice would have been an empty formality. He argued that the CBI had obtained permission from the Trial Court, under whose custody the Appellant was. He supported his contention by referencing Section 41A (4) of the CrPC, which outlines the procedure for situations where an accused fails to comply with a Section 41A notice. Mr. Raju maintained that, given the Appellant’s incarceration, the circumstance envisaged under Section 41A (4) becomes inapplicable, and therefore, the requirement of notice thereunder was not necessary. In regard to the misgivings on the erroneous application of Section 41(2) of the CrPC, he explained that the High Court had inadvertently mistyped the provision and that it ought to be read as Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC instead.
10. While strongly opposing the Appellant’s prayer for bail, Mr. Raju contended that there was a likelihood of witness intimidation, should the Appellant be released on bail, resulting in the trial proceedings being severely derailed. Mr. Raju also alluded to certain instances having occurred in the context of M/s. Mahadev Liquors of Punjab, thus pointing to the influence exerted by the Appellant, whose political outfit is ruling more than one State.
11. Mr. Raju vehemently pressed into aid his preliminary objection to relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court, who he stressed ought not to have approached the High Court directly, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. He urged that the Appellant should not be granted any special treatment merely because of the position of power he holds or his political stature. Mr. Raju canvassed that the Appellant deserves to be treated like any other undertrial and, hence, he must firstly approach the Trial Court, emphasizing that the High Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary and should be exercised only in rare and exceptional circumstances. 696 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
12. According to the Learned ASG, the High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction because the Appellant had failed to make out an exceptional case warranting such special scrutiny. Furthermore, Mr. Raju highlighted a significant anomaly: the Appellant’s failure to annex the chargesheet while applying for bail. He argued that a crucial aspect of seeking bail is to demonstrate, based on the material on record, that no prima facie case exists against the accused. Due to these oversights, Mr. Raju asserted that the Appellant should first seek relief from the Trial Court.
13. Lastly, Mr. Raju submitted that since the chargesheet and some supplementary chargesheets have been filed after the Appellant had approached the High Court for his enlargement on bail, it is a significant change in circumstances and therefore, in light of this too the Appellant should be relegated to the Trial Court. Such relegation would aid in his bail claim being considered with reference to the nature of evidence gathered by the CBI and the complicity of the Appellant, if any, as may be discernible from such evidence. Issues
14. Having considered the material on record and the extensive submissions made by the parties, the following questions fall for our deliberation:
i. Whether there was any illegality in the Appellant’s arrest? If so, whether the Appellant is entitled to be released forthwith, even in the absence of a formal bail application?
ii. Whether the Appellant, regardless of his lawful arrest, is entitled to be enlarged on regular bail?
iii. Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances of such a decisive nature that an accused would be liable to be relegated to the Trial Court to make out a case for grant of regular bail?
Analysis
15. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival contentions, along with the sequence of events that culminated in the Appellant’s arrest. Given the nature of the issues pending determination, it is essential to address them each independently and arrive at a definitive conclusion.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 697Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation A. Whether the procedure undertaken in arresting the Appellant was illegal?
16. The primary basis for the Appellant’s challenge rests on the contention that the procedure for arrest, as outlined under Sections 41(1)(b)
(ii) and 41A of the CrPC, was not complied with. For the purpose of analysing the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, there are two key aspects which we propose to examine separately, namely: (i) whether the issuance of a notice under Section 41A of the CrPC was duly complied with, in the context of the present factual scenario; and
(ii) whether Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
i. Compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC
17. Section 41A of the CrPC pertains to the issuance of a notice by a police officer to an individual when their arrest is not warranted under Section 41(1) of the CrPC, but their presence is still required before the investigating authority. Issuance of a notice under Section 41A(1) therefore would be imminent, when there is a complaint made, credible information received or there is a reasonable suspicion of the individual having committed a cognizable offence. Clause (2) of Section 41A thereafter, demands that an individual to whom such a notice has been issued, complies with the same. Section 41A (3) bears out that an individual who complies and continues to comply with such notice is not to be arrested in respect of the offence mentioned, unless the police officer, for reasons to be recorded, deems it necessary to arrest them. Finally, Section 41A (4) stipulates that if an individual fails to comply with the notice or refuses to identify themself, the police may arrest such an individual for the offence recorded in the notice, subject to any orders passed by a competent court.
18. Given the lucid nature of the language of the provision, it is crucial to examine the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s arrest in order to gauge whether there was due compliance with the procedural safeguards enshrined within Section 41A. In the present context, since the Appellant was already in judicial custody at the relevant time in the ED case, the CBI filed an application on 24.06.2024 before the Trial Court under Section 41A of the CrPC, inter alia seeking to interrogate and examine him. Such examination was allegedly necessitated by new facts and evidence uncovered by the CBI upon further investigation. The CBI, vide this application, outlined 698 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the reasons prompting such examination, including the purported irregularities in the framing and implementation of the Excise Policy, and its manipulation to facilitate the monopolization and cartelization of wholesale and retail liquor trade in India.
19. The application also alleged that, upon further investigation, statements from several witnesses, incriminating documents and messages exchanged between the accused persons named in the chargesheets, revealed that the Appellant was a critical component in the criminal conspiracy related to the Excise Policy. It was claimed that the Appellant, in connivance with the other accused persons, engaged in tweaking the policy to enhance the profit margin of wholesalers from 5% to 12%, resulting in significant windfall gains. These gains were ultimately alleged to have been utilised by the Appellant’s political party towards election related expenses, during the 2021-22 Goa Assembly elections. The application highlighted that the emergence of these new facts, pointing toward the Appellant’s complicity, required further examination, as there was reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of the offence. Upon considering these reasons, the Trial Court, by its order dated 24.06.2024, allowed the CBI’s application seeking to interrogate the Appellant.
20. At this juncture, it is pertinent to first address the Appellant’s allegations regarding the CBI’s non-compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC, particularly concerning the issuance of notice or lack thereof. In this regard, it is crucial to draw reference to the language and intent of the provision, which aims to ensure an individual’s appearance through the issuance of a notice. The provision, however, does not outline any express procedure to be undertaken where the individual in question is already incarcerated. It is to be remembered that the Court is, in a way, the guardian of an undertrial, while he is in judicial custody. That being so, there could possibly be no other way to secure the Appellant’s physical presence for the purpose of further investigation, except to seek prior permission of the Trial Court for his interrogation.
21. In fact, given what was contended by the Appellant, it must be explicated that Section 41A does not envisage or mandate the issuance of a notice to an individual already in judicial custody. As such a person is already under the court’s authority, any request to include them in an investigation in another case must be approved by the competent court. The CBI has thus followed the procedure which is contemplated in terms of the intent and purpose of Section 41A CrPC.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 699Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation
22. Contrarily, if the Appellant’s contention is taken to its logical conclusion, it could lead to detrimental consequences. For instance, serving a notice upon an undertrial in jail through the Jail Superintendent, without informing the court that placed them in judicial custody, would effectively enable the police to arrest such individuals in a new case without the court’s knowledge. This could result in a misuse of police authority and a violation of the Constitutional and procedural rights afforded to undertrials. Alternatively, when the court’s permission is sought, it ensures the application of judicial scrutiny to assess whether custodial interrogation is necessary and, if so, for what duration.
23. In the case in hand, the Trial Court’s approval of the CBI’s application to interrogate the Appellant should be viewed as satisfying the essential requirements of Section 41A, as the issuance of a formal notice through the jail authorities would have had an adverse impact on the rights of the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the CBI complied with the procedure encompassed within the framework of Section 41A of the CrPC.
24. That being said, let us now address the specific contention pertaining to the alleged violation of Section 41A(3) of the CrPC. The provision elucidates, at the risk of reiteration, that an individual who complies with the notice issued under Section 41A should not be arrested, unless the police officer for reasons recorded, opines that arrest is necessary. The vital takeaway from this provision is that while compliance with the notice generally shields an individual from arrest, the police may still proceed with the arrest if they conclude that it is essential and provide duly recorded reasons for doing so.
25. In the present case, following the interrogation, the CBI moved another application to the Trial Court on 25.06.2024, seeking permission to arrest the Appellant. The CBI justified the arrest on the grounds that the Appellant had allegedly given evasive responses during questioning and that custodial interrogation was necessary to confront him with evidence and uncover a purported larger conspiracy involving the accused persons in the implementation of the excise policy. The Trial Court, after considering these reasons, allowed the CBI’s application for the Appellant’s arrest and issued production warrants on the same day.
26. In this respect, our analysis is confined to assessing whether Section 41A(3) was violated, thereby rendering the arrest per se illegal. First, it is trite law that there is no insurmountable hurdle in 700 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the conversion of judicial custody into police custody by an order of a Magistrate. Thus, there is no impediment in terms of arresting a person already in custody for the purposes of investigation, whether for the same offence or for an altogether different offence. 3 The Appellant’s arrest by the CBI was thus entirely permissible, in light of the Trial Court’s order dated 25.06.2024.
27. Second, Section 41A(3) allows for arrest, provided the reasons are recorded, justifying the necessity of such a step, and the police officer is satisfied that the individual should be arrested. In this context, we have already noted that the CBI, in their application dated 25.06.2024, clearly recorded the reasons as to why they deemed the Appellant’s arrest necessary. These reasons were also summarized in the arrest memo dated 26.06.2024. It is important to clarify that our current analysis is limited to verifying whether the CBI followed the correct procedure, including the recording of sufficient reasons. This issue would not detain us further, as the reasons as to why the Appellant’s arrest was necessitated are discernible from the CBI’s application dated 25.06.2024.
28. Third, Section 41A(1), when read with Section 41A(3) CrPC, does not impose an absolute prohibition on the arrest of an individual against whom there exists reasonable suspicion of having committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. This is evident from the language of the provision itself. Section 41A(3) explicitly states that an arrest is permissible if the police officer believes it to be necessary and duly records the reasons for such arrest. This provision thus essentially carves out an exception to the general rule under Section 41A, which mandates that an individual whose appearance is required should not be arrested under Section 41(1) of the CrPC.
29. Therefore, in view of these considerations, we do not find any merit in the Appellant’s contention that the CBI failed to comply with Section 41A CrPC, in its true letter and spirit.
ii. Whether Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable?
30. At the outset, it is imperative to clarify that our analysis will be restricted to the procedure outlined under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the 3 Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 701Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation CrPC. This is because Section 41(1), in its entirety, addresses multiple situations and complexities regarding the procedure for arrest, which may not be directly applicable to the intricacies of the present case.
31. In this vein, the language of Section 41(1)(b) postulates as follows: “41. When police may arrest without warrant.—
(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person— …..
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:—
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:
702 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
……”
32. Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC clearly stipulates that an arrest under this provision can be made based on a complaint or credible information that an individual has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, with or without a fine. However, such an arrest must be conducted subject to the satisfaction of specific conditions outlined in subsections
(a) to (e). The rigors of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) have been extensively examined by this Court in Arnesh Kumar (supra), where it was observed that:
“7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a person accused of offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction that such person had committed the offence punishable as aforesaid. Police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on facts.
7.2. The law mandates the police officer to state the facts and record the reasons in writing which led him to come to a conclusion covered by any of the provisions aforesaid, while making such arrest. Law further requires [2024] 9 S.C.R. 703Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation the police officers to record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
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