Chalasani Udaya Shankar and Others v. M/S. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and Others
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 671; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 235
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar
- Decided
- 9 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5735/2023
- Sections
- 59, 155, 111A, 423, 248, 111, 111(7), 430, 46
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 235 : 2024 INSC 671 Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v.
M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and others (Civil Appeal Nos. 5735-5736 of 2023)
09 September 2024 [Sanjiv Khanna and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration NCLT and NCLAT, if justified in dismissing the company petition by the appellant seeking rectification of the Register of Members of respondent No.1-Company by entering their names therein u/ss. 59 and 88 of the Companies Act, 2013, and to initiate action against respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, for oppression and mismanagement, and criminal proceedings u/ss. 447 and 448 of the 2013 Act, for committing fraud.
Headnotes† Companies Act, 2013 – ss. 59 and 88 – Rectification of registrar of members – Allegations of fraudulent transfer of shares and mismanagement in the company – Company petition by the appellant seeking rectification of the Register of Members of respondent No.1-Company by entering their names therein u/ss. 59 and 88, and to initiate action against respondent Nos. 2-4, for oppression and mismanagement, as also criminal proceedings u/ss. 447 and 448 for committing fraud – Dismissed by the NCLT – Appeal thereagainst and IA also dismissed – Correctness:
Held: National Company Law Tribunal exercising jurisdiction u/s. 59 has to examine the factual issues to ascertain the substance of the issue before it – Expression ‘rectification’ connotes something that ought to have been done but, by error, was not done, or what ought not to have been done but was done, requiring correction – Phrase ‘sufficient cause’ in s. 59 is to be tested in relation to the statutory mandate thereof-anything done or omitted to be done in contravention of the Act of 2013 or the Rules framed thereunder – If, on facts, an open-and-shut case of fraud is made out in favour of the person seeking rectification, the NCLT would be entitled to exercise such power u/s. 59 – Proper verification of * Author 236 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the assertions made by the parties was a sine qua non – Acting President of the NCLT, by failing to carry out the said exercise, failed to discharge the mandate of law – Exercise of power u/s. 59 is to be undertaken in right earnest by examining the material, evidence, and the facts on record – This was not done, rather, a narrow view was taken without calling upon respondent No. 2 to prove the veracity of the contrary story put forth by him, despite receiving monies from the appellants – Facts, material, and evidence had to be examined in the context of the underlying facts, which would have included the receipt of monies, the signatures on the transfer deeds, etc. – Questions of fact must be decided on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, giving due weight to the specific facts, as found, so as to draw the conclusion that a reasonable person, acquainted with the relevant field, would draw on the basis of the same facts – Interim order passed by the Member (Judicial) of the NCLT indicated, in clear terms, the issues that arose for consideration and the inquiry required to determine the same – However, the President of the NCLT ignored the said interim order, and chose to summarily dismiss the petition, without considering the material already placed on record and without further evidence being adduced – Also, the NCLAT did not even get the facts right – Judgment in Company Petition, in Company Appeal and I.A. set aside – Company Petition restored to the file of the NCLT, for consideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law, upon proper appreciation of evidence – Companies Act, 1956 – s. 155 (s.111A thereafter) – National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – r. 70(5).
Case Law Cited Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Modern Plastic Containers Pvt. Ltd. and others [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 413 : (1998) 7 SCC 105; High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Udaysingh and others [1997] 3 SCR 803 : (1997) 5 SCC 129; Jai Mahal Hotels Private Limited v. Devraj Singh and others [2015] 11 SCR 323 : (2016) 1 SCC 423; Adesh Kaur v. Eicher Motors Limited and others [2018] 5 SCR 200 : (2018) 7 SCC 709; Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another [1968] 3 SCR 662 – relied on. Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank Financial Services Limited [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (2006) 6 SCC 94; Shashi Prakash Khemka (Dead) through legal representatives and another v. NEPC MICON (Now NEPC India Limited) and others (2019) 18 SCC 569; IFB [2024] 9 S.C.R. 237Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v. M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other Agro Industries Limited v. SICGIL India Limited and others [2023] 1 SCR 527 : (2023) 4 SCC 209; Smiti Golyan and others v. Nulon India Ltd. and others Company Appeal (AT) No. 222 of 2018, decided on 25.03.2019 – referred to.
List of Acts Companies Act, 2013; Companies Act, 1956; National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016.
List of Keywords Company petition; Rectification of the Register of Members; Oppression and mismanagement; Fraud; Fraudulent transfer of shares; Rectification; Sufficient cause; Jurisdiction of the civil court; Verification of the assertions made by parties; Principle of preponderance of probabilities; Interim order.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.5735-5736 of From the Judgment and Order dated 10.04.2023 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai in CA(AT) (CH) No.44 of 2021 and IA No.548 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., P B A Srinivasan, V. Aravind, Keith Varghese, Ms. Srishti Bansal, Sumit Swami, Ms. Aanchal Pundir, Amit K. Nain, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Byrapaneni Suyodhan, Ms. Tatini Basu, Kumar Shashank, Ruchi Kohli, Navanjay Mahapatra, Shiv Mangal Sharma, Prasenjeet Mahapatra, Ms. BLN Shivani, Amrish Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Kumar, J.
1. Orders alike, dismissing their claims, having been passed by the original and appellate forums, Chalasani Udaya Shankar, Sripathi Sreevana Reddy and Yalamanchilli Manjusha are in appeal under Section 423 of the Companies Act, 2013 [for brevity, ‘the Act of 2013’]. 238 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
2. The appellants had approached the National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad/Amaravati Bench [for brevity, ‘the NCLT’], by way of Company Petition No. 667/59 & 241/HDB/2018, seeking rectification of the Register of Members of M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, respondent No.1, by entering their names therein under Sections 59 and 88 of the Act of 2013, and to initiate action against Mantena Narasa Raju, Appa Rao Mukkamala and Suresh Anne, respondent Nos. 2,3 and 4, for oppression and mismanagement, apart from criminal proceedings under Sections 447 and 448 of the Act of 2013 for committing fraud.
3. Their case, as set out in the Company Petition, was as follows: M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, on 28.03.2000. Its authorized share capital was ₹1,50,00,000/-, divided into 15,00,000 equity shares of ₹10/- each. The issued, subscribed and paid-up capital of the company was ₹1,10,96,230/-, divided into 11,09,623 equity shares of ₹10 each. The company is in the business of software development and ancillary activities and it acquired land at Chinnakakani Village in Guntur District in January, 2002, for establishing its infrastructure. On 09.03.2004, Mantena Narasa Raju, respondent No.2, had entered into a share purchase agreement with one C. Suresh, shareholder of the company, and acquired 10,51,933 equity shares, representing 94.8% of the equity share capital of the company. Thereafter, Mantena Narasa Raju and Appa Rao Mukkamala, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, were appointed as Directors of the Company on 02.03.2004. Suresh Anne, respondent No.4, became a Director of the company on 30.09.2004. While so, on 18.04.2015, the appellants acquired the equity shares held by Mantena Narasa Raju, respondent No.2, i.e., 10,51,933 equity shares, by executing Securities Transfer Deeds in Form No. SH-4. Chalasani Udaya Shankar, appellant No.1, acquired 3,51,933 equity shares, representing 31.72% of the shareholding, while Sripathi Sreevana Reddy, appellant No.2, and Yalamanchilli Manjusha, appellant No.3, acquired 3,50,000 equity shares each, representing their 31.54% individual shareholding. Share certificates were issued to them, signed and authenticated by Appa Rao Mukkamala and Suresh Anne, respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The appellants claim to have paid consideration of ₹14,67,41,557/- to Mantena Narasa Raju, respondent No.2, towards the acquisition of their shares - Chalasani Udaya Shankar, appellant No.1, paid ₹4,90,91,557/- while Sripathi [2024] 9 S.C.R. 239Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v. M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other Sreevana Reddy and Yalamanchilli Manjusha, appellant Nos.2 and 3, each paid ₹4,88,25,000/- individually.
4. It is the further case of the appellants that they shared a very congenial and cordial relationship with Mantena Narasa Raju, Appa Rao Mukkamala and Suresh Anne, respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4, and they left the complete managerial control with them despite being the majority shareholders. They claim that they had no suspicion whatsoever against the said persons, but due to their failure in conducting Annual General Meetings during the financial years 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17, the Registrar of Companies struck off the name of M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. from the Register of Companies on 21.07.2017, in exercise of power under Section 248 of the Act of 2013. The appellants claim that, it was only upon browsing the online portal, they came to know that the said persons had thereafter filed annual returns and financial statements for the years in question with false information, by erasing their shareholding from the records of the company. The appellants allege that the aforesaid persons committed various acts of oppression with the intention of grabbing the company property. They, accordingly, prayed for rectification of the Register of Members of the company, by entering their names, and to initiate appropriate action against respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Allegations were also made against V. Vasudev Reddy, respondent No.5, the Chartered Accountant associated with the company, to the effect that he was a co-conspirator and action was sought against him. The appellants also sought various interim reliefs pending disposal of the Company Petition. In the first instance, the NCLT directed status quo to be maintained as regards the company’s assets and invited objections from the other side.
5. The company, respondent No.1, filed a counter opposing the grant of interim reliefs. Therein, it contended that the appellants could not allege oppression and mismanagement as they were not members of the company and were, in fact, seeking rectification of the Register of Members in that regard. The transfer of shares, as claimed by the appellants, was denied and, in consequence, their locus to maintain the company petition was challenged. Issue of limitation was also raised as the appellants’ claim was that they had acquired the shares on 18.04.2015 but the company petition was filed only on 09.11.2018, i.e., after the lapse of over three years. The company alleged that it had received emails from respondent Nos. 3 and 4 stating that 240 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the appellants had forged their signatures on the purported share certificates and the company asserted that the NCLT would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate such allegations of fraud and only the competent civil court could decide the same.
6. A reply was also filed by Mantena Narasa Raju, respondent No.2, contesting the interim reliefs sought. While reiterating the contentions of the company in its counter, he disputed the appellants’ ownership of the shares. He asserted that he never sold any shares to the appellants and that they were complete strangers to him. He claimed that he had borrowed a sum of ₹5.66 crore from one L. Ramesh, his friend, who agreed to lend him the money through banking channels, by arranging for a total sum of ₹14.66 crore, out of which he would take back ₹9 crore and the balance ₹5.66 crore could be retained by respondent No.2. He further claimed that L. Ramesh arranged for his known persons to remit the amounts in his bank account and it was in this context that the appellants deposited the total sum of ₹14,66,39,400/- in his account. He further claimed that he returned the sum of ₹9 crore, as per the instructions of L. Ramesh, to one Swarna Bhaskar H. (₹7.5 crore) and to one Venkata Surya R (₹1.5 crore), i.e., in all, ₹9 crore. He further claimed that L. Ramesh forcibly obtained his signatures on several documents, including white papers, letter heads, blank non-judicial stamp papers and green sheets, at that time. He alleged that those blank papers might have been handed over to the appellants by L. Ramesh and they fabricated the documents. He pointed out that the share transfer deeds put forth by the appellants projected a total consideration of ₹14,67,41,557/- , but only the sum of ₹14,66,39,400/- had been remitted, leaving a balance of ₹1,02,157/-. He also alleged that the format of the appellants’ share certificates was not that of the company and the folio numbers therein were different, indicating that they had been fabricated by the appellants.
7. The appellants filed separate rejoinders to the replies filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Therein, they reiterated their claims and asserted that their petition was within time. They denied the financial transactions allegedly arranged by L. Ramesh and the alleged fabrication of documents by them. They pointed out that the signature of respondent No.2 appeared in the share transfer forms at the correct place, manifesting that the same were not fabricated on signed blank papers. As regards the shortfall in the consideration, [2024] 9 S.C.R. 241Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v. M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other they asserted that a portion of the stamp duty on the transfer was to be borne by respondent No.2 and it was accordingly adjusted, leading to the lesser sum of ₹14,66,39,465/- being paid.
8. Thereupon, the NCLT, through the Member (Judicial), passed an interim order on 27.06.2019. Having considered the matter, the NCLT noted as follows: Respondent No.2 had addressed letter dated 29.12.2014 (Annexure A-1) to the Board of Directors of the company expressing his intention to sell his shareholding therein. A Board Meeting was held on 24.01.2015 to consider his request and it was found that there was no buyer within the existing shareholders who was willing to purchase the shares of respondent No. 2. This was stated to have been communicated to respondent No.2 leaving it open to him to make his own arrangement for sale of his shares to outsiders. It was in these circumstances that the appellants purchased the shares of respondent No.2. By e-mail dated 20.04.2015 (Annexure A-4), respondent No.3 sought the approval of the other shareholders for sale of these shares in favour of the appellants. A meeting was held on 27.04.2015 in this regard and share certificates were also issued on the said date to the appellants. These share certificates were signed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as Directors of the company. It was noted that respondent No. 2 had contested this claim, by asserting that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not even in India on the said date and that the share certificates were fabricated. Various discrepancies were pointed out by him in the said certificates, including absence of the signature of the company secretary. The NCLT, however, noted that respondent No.2 did not dispute the receipt of monies from the appellants. Further, the NCLT also noted that respondent No.2 did not dispute his signatures appearing in the share certificates and share transfer forms but his attempt was to explain the same, by claiming that L. Ramesh had obtained blank papers from him which had been misused. Noting the details of the financial transactions sought to be put forth by respondent No.2 in relation to the receipt of ₹14.66 crore, the NCLT observed that this aspect needed to be probed as the undisputed fact remained that the said sum was remitted into the account of respondent No.2. The NCLT observed that it was necessary to go into the issue as to whether this amount was actually remitted at the instance of L. Ramesh as there was no evidence at that point of time in proof of the claims of respondent No.2 in that regard. The NCLT noted that it was a question to be 242 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports enquired into as to whether respondent No.2 has returned ₹5.66 crore, which he claimed to have received as a loan, and this was a question to be thoroughly looked into during a full inquiry. The NCLT further noted that on the strength of these oral contentions, it was not possible to accept at that stage that the said monies were given to him only as a loan and not for the sale of his shares. His further claim that he had signed various blank papers, judicial stamp papers, letter heads, etc. also required to be examined at the time of final disposal of the matter. It was noted that respondent No.2 was a doctor by profession. The NCLT went on to observe that Form SH-4 was a printed form, as were the share certificates, and it was not believable that the same could have been fabricated on signed blank papers. Dealing with the contention that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not even in the country on the date in question, the NCLT noted that none had appeared on their behalf and they had not chosen to file any counter in support of the stand taken by them. As on that date, per the NCLT, respondent No.2 relied upon the communication allegedly received by him from respondent Nos. 3 and 4, but the authenticity of the same still remained to be proved, as respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had not filed any affidavit. The NCLT also noted that there were conflicting materials produced by both sides and at that stage, it could not be decided whether the signatures in the share certificates did not belong to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the issue required to be thoroughly examined at the time of final hearing.
9. Dealing with the issue of limitation, the NCLT observed that the case of the appellants was that they came to know of their names being excluded only after the company filed financial accounts and statements for the years 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17, and the petition was filed within three years from the date of such knowledge. Opining that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law, the NCLT stated that it needed to be examined at the final hearing stage, after the parties filed all their documents. The NCLT also rejected the contention of the respondents that it had no jurisdiction to try the petition as it involved issues of fraud, etc. The NCLT, therefore, observed that an interim order restraining the company and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 from either disposing of or creating encumbrances over the assets of the company would not affect either of the parties, pending disposal of the main petition, and accordingly granted an interim order to that effect.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 243Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v. M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other
10. This being the tone and tenor of the NCLT’s interim order, the final order dated 21.08.2021 passed by the NCLT, dismissing the Company Petition, makes for an interesting reading. Be it noted that the interim order was passed by the Member (Judicial) of the NCLT and the final order came to be passed over two years later by its Acting President. Significantly, no reference whatsoever was made to the 46-page interim order in the body of the final order. It is as if the Acting President of the NCLT was completely oblivious of what had transpired in the matter earlier, though a passing reference was made by him to an interim order passed on 22.10.2019, impleading three more respondents in the Company Petition.
11. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 again filed counters in the main Company Petition essentially replicating the stands taken by them in their earlier counters. The appellants also filed their rejoinder thereto along with several documents. Having referred to the facts, as set out in the Company Petition, the Acting President of the NCLT noted that separate counters had been filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, on the one hand, and by the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 8 to 10, who claimed independent rights in the same shareholding. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had filed Memos adopting the counter filed by the company, respondent No.1. Perusal of the judgment dated 21.08.2021 reflects that the Acting President of the NCLT extracted the gist of the pleadings of the parties and went on to reproduce the caselaw cited by them at great length. His actual findings commence from paragraph 9 at page 60 of his 67-page order. The points that fell for consideration were set out by him in paragraph 9.1, which reads as under:
‘(1) Whether the Petition filed is well within the time.
(2) Whether purported transfer of shares is in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act and in accordance with clauses of the Articles of Association.
(3) Whether the amount purportedly paid should be treated as consideration to the shareholders of the Company, by the Petitioners.
(4) Whether the share certificates purportedly issued to the Petitioners are genuine.
(5) Whether any relief can be granted to the Petitioners or whether the petition is maintainable.’ 244 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
12. On the issue of limitation in point No.1, the Acting President baldly summed up that filing of the petition by the appellants was an afterthought and, therefore, the question of limitation did not arise, as the petition was not filed within the limitation period of three years. This cryptic approach in para 9.2 was not in keeping with the observation of the Member (Judicial) of the NCLT in the interim order that limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, required to be examined fully.
13. On point No.2, the Acting President rejected the case of the appellants, by way of brief para 9.3, completely ignoring the points set out by the Member (Judicial) in the interim order and the material placed on record, such as the share transfer forms, share certificates and emails/ correspondence, which supported the case of the appellants. His categorical finding that ‘not a single document existed between the parties to show that there was a transfer of shares and not a single document was filed to show that the existing shareholders were given an opportunity to buy the shares’ was clearly contrary to the material available on record, viz., the emails, transfer forms, share certificates, etc. No doubt, the genuineness of these documents required to be verified but without even venturing to do so, they could not have been dismissed thus.
14. As regards point No.3, the Acting President observed that there was no covering letter or correspondence to support the claim that the amount transferred into the account of respondent No.2 was for purchase of shares. He noted the discrepancy in the sale consideration amount to the extent of ₹1,02,157/- and the claim of respondent No.2 that one L. Ramesh was also involved. He then went on to surmise that there were some other transactions between the parties and the company had been entangled in the dispute for reasons best known to the parties. On that basis, he strangely concluded that it could not be accepted that the monies transferred into the account of respondent No.2 were for purchase of shares. The version put forth by respondent No.2, as rightly pointed out in the interim order, required to be proved and could not have been taken to be the truth straightaway in this abrupt and self-serving manner.
15. As regards point No.4, the Acting President opined that the appearance of the share certificates was dubious and the numbers therein were also completely different. He held that, without going deep into the aspect, it could be concluded that the share certificates were not [2024] 9 S.C.R. 245Chalasani Udaya Shankar and others v. M/s. Lexus Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other genuine and were fabricated. Again, no evidence whatsoever was led or considered on the issue. Surprisingly so, as the appellants produced the original share certificates given to them along with their rejoinder and filed applications for production of the original record of shareholders of the company and their share certificates of 2004, Board Resolutions, Minutes of Meetings, etc.
16. On point No.5, the Acting President concluded that the appellants had failed to prove their case and had not bothered to realize their rights as shareholders, if at all they had considered themselves to be so. He observed that the very manner and conduct of the appellants indicated that the transaction which seems to have taken place between the parties was completely different, without involving the company, and for no reason, the company had been entangled in the dispute. The case of the appellants was held to be fraudulent in nature and devoid of fact and law. He, accordingly, dismissed the case with costs of ₹5,00,000/-.
17. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their petition, the appellants approached the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai Bench (NCLAT), by way of Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 44 of 2021. They also filed I.A. No. 548 of 2021 therein for interim relief pending its disposal. However, the NCLAT dismissed their appeal and I.A. by judgment dated 10.04.2023. Speaking for the Bench, the Member (Technical) referred to the facts of the case; the contentions of the parties; the points for consideration set out by the NCLT and its findings thereon. Thereafter, the relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 were extracted at length and again, reference was made to the contentions of both sides. Having done so, the NCLAT curiously concluded that L. Ramesh had remitted through his ‘known persons’ the sum of ₹14,66,39,400/- into the bank account of respondent No. 2. The NCLAT then strangely observed as follows:
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