Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through the Directorate of Enforcement
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 637; [2024] 8 S.C.R. 955
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 28 Aug 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3572/2024
- Sections
- 50, 25, 30, 45, 24, 420, 45(1), 4, 439, 21(4), 21, 106
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 955 : 2024 INSC 637 Prem Prakash v.
Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No. 3572 of 2024)
28 August 2024 [B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration When a person is in judicial custody/custody in another case investigated by the same Investigating Agency, whether the statements recorded (in the present case, the statements dated 03.08.2023, 04.08.2023, 11.08.2023) for a new case in which his arrest is not yet shown, and which are claimed to contain incriminating material against the maker, would be admissible under Section 50, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Headnotes† Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.50 – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.25 – Appellant was in judicial custody from 25.08.2022 in connection with another ECIR and while he was in aforesaid judicial custody his arrest was shown in the present ECIR on 11.08.2023 – Statement of the appellant recorded while he was in custody, if admissible u/s.50: Held: No – When an accused is in custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker – The person in custody pursuant to the proceeding investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person operating with a free mind and it will be extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the maker – Statement of the appellant if to be considered as incriminating against him, will be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act since he gave the statement whilst in judicial custody, pursuant to another proceeding instituted by the same Investigating Agency – As the appellant was taken from the judicial custody to record the statement, it will be a travesty of justice to render the statement admissible against him – Since the words ‘procedure established * Author 956 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports by law’ occurring in Article 21 has to be a reasonable and valid procedure – The statement of the appellant under Section 50 cannot be relied upon against him in ECIR No. 5 of 2023 even though the appellant was at that point in custody in ECIR No. 4 of 2022 – Further, statements of the co-accused will not have the character of substantive evidence and the law laid down under Section 30 of the Evidence Act by this Court while dealing with the confession of the co-accused will apply – Statement of the co-accused does not prima facie indicate anything about the role of the appellant in the forgery of sale deed and other documents or being involved in the offence of money laundering – Appellant satisfied the twin conditions under Section 45 – There are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is not guilty of the offence of money laundering as alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA and the appellant is not likely to commit any offence, if enlarged on bail – Impugned order quashed and set aside – Appellant granted bail. [Paras 27, 32, 34, 37, 45, 49] Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.45 – Twin conditions under, discussed – Scope of enquiry – “reasonable grounds for believing” – Meaning:
Held: Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail in PMLA need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the Court based on the available material available on record is required – The words used in Section 45 are “reasonable grounds for believing” which means that the Court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 13] Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Bail application – Counter/response in the original Court – Significance:
Held: In cases where the Public Prosecutor takes a considered decision to oppose the bail application, the counter affidavit of the Investigating Agency should make out a cogent case specifically crystallizing albeit briefly the material sought to be relied upon to establish prima facie the three foundational facts in the given case to help the Court at the bail application stage to arrive at a conclusion within the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case – It is only thereafter the presumption under Section 24 would arise and the burden would shift on the accused. [Para 15] [2024] 8 S.C.R. 957Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement Case Law Cited Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [2022] 6 SCR 382 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929; Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement SLP (Crl.) No. 3205; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2024 SCC online 1693; Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Another [2005] 3 SCR 345 : (2005) 5 SCC 294; Rajaram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 828; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and Another [1978] 3 SCR 608 : (1978) 2 SCC 424; Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 526 – relied on.
In Re Elukuri Seshapani Chetti, ILR 1937 Mad 358; Kodangi v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Mad 24 – referred to.
List of Acts Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872; Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Money laundering; Forgery of sale deed; Judicial custody; Person in judicial custody/custody in another case investigated by the same Investigating Agency; Admissibility of statements recorded; Incriminating material against the maker; Confession of the co-accused; Statements of the co-accused; Bail; ‘procedure established by law’; “reasonable grounds for believing”. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3572 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.03.2024 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in BA No. 9863 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Ranjit Kumar, Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Advs., Indrajit Sinha, Ms. Sneh Singh, Ms. Anusuya Sadhu Sinha, Sowjhanya Shankar, Harsh Yadav, Siddharth Naidu, M/s. KSN & Co., Advs. for the Appellant. 958 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports S.V. Raju, ASG, Zoheb Hussain, Annam Venkatesh, Kanu Agrawal, Mrigank Pathak, Ms. Aakriti Mishra, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 22.03.2024 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in B.A. No. 9863 of 2023. By the said judgment, the High Court dismissed the bail application of the appellant. The appellant sought for regular bail in connection with ECIR Case No. 5 of 2023 in ECIR-RNZO/10/2023 (hereinafter referred to as ECIR Case No. 5 of 2023) registered for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’) and pending before the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.
Brief Facts
3. The predicate offence on the basis of which ECIR No. 5 of 2023 was recorded on 07.03.2023 is an FIR bearing Sadar P.S. Case No. 399 of 2022 registered on 08.09.2022 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 447, 504, 506, 341, 323 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). The appellant was not named as an accused there.
4. In view of Section 420 and 467 of IPC, being Scheduled Offences, ECIR No. 5 of 2023 was registered and investigation under the PMLA was initiated. Even here the appellant was not named though the ECIR did mention certain unknown persons being involved. It is alleged that the investigation revealed falsification of the original records in the Circle Office, Bargain, Ranchi and the Office of Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata respectively and as such custody of the original registers were taken in accordance with law.
5. The substratum of the allegation leading to the complaint lodged under PMLA are as follows:- Umesh Kumar Gope complained that Rajesh Rai, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Lakhan Singh, Punit Bhargava and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal fraudulently acquired one [2024] 8 S.C.R. 959Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement acre of land situated at Plot No. 28, Khata No. 37 Village Gari, Cheshire Home Road P.S. Sadar, Ranchi. The allegation was that accused Rajesh Rai S/o Jagdish Rai illegally and fraudulently made a Power of Attorney in the name of Imtiaz Ahmad and accused Bharat Prasad and on the basis of said Power of Attorney prepared a forged sale deed and sold the above-mentioned parcel of land to accused Punit Bhargava, an accomplice of the appellant for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-. It is further alleged that the said land was transferred by accused Punit Bhargava to accused Bishnu Kumar Agarwal vide two sale deeds dated 01.04.2021 for a total amount of Rs. 1,80,00,000/- (Rs.1,02,60,000/- and Rs.77,40,000). According to the Enforcement Directorate, accused Bishnu Kumar Agarwal paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/- to accused Punit Bhargava in the account of his firm Shiva Fabcons (Proprietorship firm of accused Punit Bhargava) and out of which Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred to M/s Jamini Enterprises, which according to the respondent-Investigating Agency, was a firm whose beneficial owner is the appellant. The appellant was arrayed as Accused No.8 in the Prosecution Complaint of the Investigating Agency.
6. According to the Investigating Agency, it was confirmed by the Directorate of Forensic Science that Deed No. 184 of 1948, a purported sale deed, by which the property was transferred by the predecessors of Umesh Gope to Jagdish Rai, father of Rajesh Rai was forged. A separate FIR bearing No. 137 of 2023 dated 10.05.2023 for offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC came to be registered at Hare Street Police Station Kolkata on the basis of the report of the Fact Finding Committee of the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata. It is stated that the said FIR was also merged into ECIR No. 5 of 2023.
7. It is alleged that it was on the directions of the appellant that the sale deed was executed in favor of Punit Bhargava by Rajesh Rai for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-; that only Rs. 25 lakhs were transferred from Shiva Fabcons (Proprietorship firm of Punit Bhargava) to Rajesh Rai although the consideration amount was Rs. 1,78,55,800/- and it was shown to have been paid in the sale deed; that out of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 25 lakhs, an amount of Rs. 18 lakhs were transferred from the Bank account of Rajesh Rai to the Bank account of Green Traders (Partnership firm under the control of Md. Saddam 960 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Hussain); that Rs. 7 lakh cash was withdrawn through cheques by Rajesh Rai; that on the directions of the appellant, mutation of the property was done in the name of Punit Bhargava, who was an accomplice of the appellant; that Punit Bhargava sold the property to the Bishnu Kumar Agarwal within a span of two months for Rs. 1.80 crore; that an amount of Rs.56,62,600/- was paid from the account of M/s Chalice Real Estate (Company of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal) on 05.04.2021 to Punit Bhargava’s bank account and on 24.06.2021 an amount of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred from the account of Adarsh Heights Pvt Ltd (Company of Bishnu Agarwal) to Punit Bhargav’s bank account; that the entire payment was made in the month of April and June, 2021 but the registration was done on 1 st April, 2021 before the receipt of consideration. Finally, it is alleged that an amount of Rs.1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the Bank account of M/s Jamini Enterprises, which is alleged to be a firm controlled and beneficially owned by appellant - Prem Prakash.
8. It is alleged that the appellant conspired with the other accused persons, namely, Afshar Ali @ Afsu Khan, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan Singh, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Saddam Hussain, Punit Bhargava, Chhavi Ranjan and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in the acquisition of proceeds of crime in the form of landed property. It is specifically alleged that the appellant being an accomplice of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal used his connections to assist Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in acquiring the land and that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal transferred the money to Punit Bhargava and the amount was further transferred to Jamini Enterprises.
9. The appellant was taken into custody on 11.08.2023. He was already in custody from 25.08.2022 in ECIR No. 4 of 2022. His application for bail was rejected by the Special Judge on 20.09.2023. He preferred a bail application before the High Court. The High Court has declined bail to the appellant. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
10. We have heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Learned Senior counsel for the appellant, ably assisted by Mr. Indrajit Sinha and Mr. Siddharth Naidu, learned advocates. We have also heard Mr. S.V. Raju, Learned Additional Solicitor General, ably assisted by Mr. Zoheb Hussain and Mr. Kanu Agarwal for the respondents. Learned Senior Counsels on both sides have placed their respective contentions and also filed detailed written submissions.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 961Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement
SECTION 45 PMLA-CONTOURS
11. Considering that the present is a bail application for the offence under Section 45 of PMLA, the twin conditions mentioned thereof become relevant. Section 45(1) of PMLA reads as under:- “45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence [under this Act] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm or is accused either on his own or along with other co-accused of moneylaundering a sum of less than one crore rupees, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by-
(i) the Director; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government.”
In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs Union of India and Ors. reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929, this Court categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. Para 131 is extracted hereinbelow:- 962 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “131. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court, which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. …”
These observations are significant and if read in the context of the recent pronouncement of this Court dated 09.08.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 3295 of 2024 [Manish Sisodia (II) Vs. Directorate of Enforcement], it will be amply clear that even under PMLA the governing principle is that “Bail is the Rule and Jail is the Exception”. In para 53 of [Manish Sisodia (II), this Court observed as under:- “53…..From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception.”
All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be satisfied.
12. Independently and as has been emphatically reiterated in Manish Sisodia (II) (supra) relying on Ramkripal Meena Vs Directorate [2024] 8 S.C.R. 963Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement of Enforcement (SLP (Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024 dated 30.07.2024) and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2024 SCC online 1693, where the accused has already been in custody for a considerable number of months and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short span, the rigours of Section 45 of PMLA can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty. Further, Manish Sisodia (II) (supra) reiterated the holding in Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh (Supra), that keeping persons behind the bars for unlimited periods of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive the fundamental right of persons under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty ought not to be permitted to become the punishment without trial. In fact, Manish Sisodia (II) (Supra) reiterated the holding in Manish Sisodia (I) Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (judgment dated 30.10.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 3352 of 2023) where it was held as under:- “28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not become punishment without trial.
If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be established and proven. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be guided to exercise 964 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the power to grant bail. This would be truer where the trial would take years.”
It is in this background that Section 45 of PMLA needs to be understood and applied. Article 21 being a higher constitutional right, statutory provisions should align themselves to the said higher constitutional edict.
Scope of Inquiry under Section 45 of PMLA
13. Coming back to the scope of inquiry under Section 45, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Supra), while reiterating and agreeing with the holding in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra and Another reported in (2005) 5 SCC 294, held that the Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail in PMLA need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the Court based on the available material available on record is required. It held that the Court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation. The words used in Section 45 are “reasonable grounds for believing” which means that the Court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. We deem it fit to extract the relevant portion (Para 131) from Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra): “131. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under section 45 of the 2002 Act. While dealing with a similar provision prescribing twin conditions in MCOCA, this court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra), held as under: “44. The wording of section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such [2024] 8 S.C.R. 965Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the Legislature. Section 21(4) of the MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby” We are in agreement with the observation made by the court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra). The 966 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports court while dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on available material on record is required. The court will not weigh the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of course, the work of Trial Court. The court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken into consideration by the Trial court in recording its finding of the guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during the trial. As explained by this court in Nimmagadda Prasad (supra), the words used in section 45 of the 2002 Act are “reasonable grounds for believing” which means the court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.” (emphasis supplied)
Importance of the foundational facts-under Section 24 PMLA
14. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) dealing with Section 24 of the PMLA, the three-Judge Bench held as under:- “97. Be that as it may, we may now proceed to decipher the purport of section 24 of the 2002 Act. In the first place, it must be noticed that the legal presumption in either case is about the involvement of proceeds of crime in money-laundering. This fact becomes relevant, only if, the prosecution or the authorities have succeeded in establishing at least three basic or foundational facts. First, that the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence has been committed. Second, that the property in question has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of that criminal activity. Third, the person concerned is, directly or indirectly, involved in any process or activity connected with the said property being proceeds of crime. On establishing the fact that there existed proceeds of crime and the person concerned was involved in any process or activity connected therewith, itself, constitutes offence of money-laundering. The nature [2024] 8 S.C.R. 967Prem Prakash v. Union of India Through The Directorate of Enforcement of process or activity has now been elaborated in the form of Explanation inserted vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. On establishing these foundational facts in terms of section 24 of the 2002 Act, a legal presumption would arise that such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering. The fact that the person concerned had no causal connection with such proceeds of crime and he is able to disprove the fact about his involvement in any process or activity connected therewith, by producing evidence in that regard, the legal presumption would stand rebutted.
99. Be it noted that the legal presumption under section 24(a) of the 2002 Act, would apply when the person is charged with the offence of money-laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational fact, to be established by the prosecution, including the involvement of the person in any process or activity connected therewith. Once these foundational facts are established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of offence of money-laundering-to rebut the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money-laundering, by producing evidence which is within his personal knowledge. In other words, the expression “presume” is not conclusive. It also does not follow that the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering is to be invoked by the Authority or the court, without providing an opportunity to the person to rebut the same by leading evidence within his personal knowledge.
100. Such onus also flows from the purport of section 106 of the Evidence Act. Whereby, he must rebut the legal presumption in the manner he chooses to do and as is permissible in law, including by replying under section 313 of the 1973 Code or even by cross-examining prosecution witnesses. The person would get enough opportunity in the proceeding before the Authority or the court, as the case may be. He may be able to discharge his burden by showing that he is not involved in any process or activity 968 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports connected with the proceeds of crime. In any case, in terms of section 114 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Considering the above, the provision under consideration [section 24(a)] by no standards can be said to be unreasonable much less manifestly arbitrary and unconstitutional.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Importance of the counter to the bail application – filed in the original Court
15. In view of the importance of the three basic foundational facts that the prosecution needs to establish, the counter/response to the bail application in the original Court is very significant in PMLA bail matters. In cases where the Public Prosecutor takes a considered decision to oppose the bail application, the counter affidavit of the Investigating Agency should make out a cogent case as to how the three foundational facts set out hereinabove are prima facie established in the given case to help the Court at the bail application stage to arrive at a conclusion within the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). It is only thereafter the presumption under Section 24 would arise and the burden would shift on the accused. The counter to the bail application should specifically crystallize albeit briefly the material sought to be relied upon to establish prima facie the three foundational facts. It is after the foundational facts are set out that the accused will assume the burden to convince the court within the parameters of the enquiry at the Section 45 stage that for the reasons adduced by him there are reasonable grounds to believing that he is not guilty of such offence. Analysis and Reasons
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.