Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 626; [2024] 8 S.C.R. 670
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 23 Aug 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3114/2024
- Sections
- 406, 482, 420, 202, 200, 204, 405, 156(3), 190, 190(1), 155(2), 415
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 8 S.C.R. 670 : 2024 INSC 626 Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors.
v.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3114 of 2024)
23 August 2024 [J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration High Court, if justified in declining to quash and set aside the summoning order passed by the Magistrate, against the appellantscompany and its office bearers, for offence punishable u/ss. 406 and 420 IPC.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420 and 120B – Criminal breach of trust and cheating – Private complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 in the court of Magistrate against the appellants for the offence punishable u/ss.406, 420 and 120B, alleging that certain amount was due and payable to him by the appellants towards the sale of horse grains and oats over a period of time – Trial court issued process for the offence punishable u/s.406 – Application u/s.482 CrPC by the appellants seeking quashing of the summoning order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate – Rejected by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: There was total non-application of mind by the High Court – Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question as to whether the appellant Nos. 2 and 3-office bearers of the appellant No. 1 Company, were personally liable for any offence – Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 – Vicarious liability of the office bearers would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute – Furthermore, at the stage of pre-cognizance, the Magistrate is obliged to look into the complaint threadbare so as to reach to a prima facie conclusion whether the offence is disclosed or not, then he is expected to be more careful when he is actually taking cognizance upon a private complaint and ordering issue of process – High Court completely * Author [2024] 8 S.C.R. 671Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. lost sight of the said aspect while rejecting the application u/s.482 CrPC – Issuance of summons is a serious matter and, thus, should not be done mechanically and it should be done only upon satisfaction on the ground for proceeding further in the matter against a person concerned based on the materials collected during the inquiry – Plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the ingredients of ss. 406 and 420 – At the most, the Magistrate could have issued process for the offence punishable u/s.420-cheating but in any circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust made out, because there was no entrustment of any property – Not even the case of the complainant that any property was lawfully entrusted to appellants and that the same has been dishonestly misappropriated – Case of the complainant is that the price of the goods sold by him has not been paid – Once there is a sale, s. 406 goes out of picture – Even if the Magistrate would have issued process for the offence punishable u/s.420-cheating the same would have been liable to be quashed and set aside, as none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating disclosed from the materials on record – If it is the case of the complainant that a particular amount is due and payable to him then he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the amount against the appellants – But he could not have gone to the court of the Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of cheating and criminal breach of trust – Till date, the complainant has not filed any recovery suit – Continuation of the criminal proceeding nothing but abuse of the process of law – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court as also the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance upon the complaint, set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 26, 27, 31, 32, 39, 40, 45] Penal Code, 1860 – u/ss.406, 420 – Criminal breach of trust and cheating – Specific ingredients – Difference between: Held: In both the sections, ss. 406 and 420, mens rea-intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception – Distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one – In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test – 672 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed – Thus, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence – Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it – Said property must be either of some person other than the accused or beneficial interest in or ownership’ of it must be of some other person – Accused must hold that property on trust of such other person – Although the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept – There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating – For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false/misleading representation since inception – In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient – Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same, whereas, in case of cheating, offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property – In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. [Paras 25, 26, 30] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.202 – Magistrate issuing process – Inquiry under – Scope and ambit of – Discussed. [Paras 6, 7] Judicial deprecation – Offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating – Courts below not been able to understand the fine distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating: Held: IPC remained in force for almost a period of 162 years until it was repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita-BNS in December 2023 which came into effect on 01.07.24 – Even after these many years, the courts below have not been able to understand the fine distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating – Casual approach has been adopted by the courts below – In contrast, when a case arises from a FIR, responsibility is of the police to thoroughly ascertain whether the allegations levelled by the informant indeed falls under the category of cheating or criminal breach of trust – Unfortunately, it has become a common practice for the police officers to routinely and mechanically proceed [2024] 8 S.C.R. 673Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. to register FIR for both the offences, criminal breach of trust and cheating on a mere allegation of some dishonesty or fraud, without any proper application of mind – Police officers across the country to be imparted proper training in law so as to understand the fine distinction between the offence of cheating viz-a-viz criminal breach of trust – Both offences are independent and distinct – Two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts – They are antithetical to each other – Two provisions of the IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive without each other. [Paras 41-43] Case Law Cited D.N. Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal [1972] 3 SCR 973; (1972) 3 SCC 414 : AIR 1972 SC 1607 : (1972) Cri LJ 1037; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Kanjalgi [1976] Supp. 1 SCR 123 : (1976) 3 SCC 736; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749; Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda [2015] 4 SCR 841 : (2015) 12 SCC 420; Sunil Bharti Mittal v. C.B.I. [2015] 1 SCR 377 : (2015) 4 SCC 609; S.W. Palanitkar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 397 : (2002) 1 SCC 241; Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [2009] 7 SCR 563 : (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC); Lalit Chaturvedi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171 – relied on.
Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. (MESCO Steel Ltd.) and Others v. State of Jharkhand and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 301 – approved.
Legal Remembrancer, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji, AIR 1950 Cal 437; R.R. Chari v. State of U.P [1951] 1 SCR 312: AIR 1951 SC 207; Tilak Nagar Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2011) 15 SCC 571; Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424; Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 823; State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal [1968] 2 SCR 408; Velji Raghvaji Patel v. State of Maharashtra; [1965] 2 SCR 429; Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [1956] 1 SCR 483; Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 360 : (1996) 5 SCC 591 – referred to.
674 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Summoning order by Magistrate; Criminal breach of trust; Cheating; Quashing of summoning order; Vicarious liability; Pre-cognizance stage; Entrustment of property; Abuse of the process of law; Mens rea; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.3114 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.04.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 15453 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Suhail Dutt, Sr. Adv., Sankalp Goswami, Azhar Alam, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Advs. for the Appellants.
Rajat Singh, Neeraj Kumar Sharma, Sarthak Chandra, Raghav Garg, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
1. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 03.04.2024 in Application No. 15453 of 2023 filed by the appellant herein by which, the High Court rejected the same and thereby declined to quash and set aside the summoning order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar in Complaint Case No. 547 of 2021.
2. Facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under:
(i) The respondent No. 2 herein is the original complainant. He lodged a private complaint in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar against the appellants herein for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 120B respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”). [2024] 8 S.C.R. 675Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. The complaint reads thus:
“It is most respectful that the Applicant Vipin Kumar Agarwal, son of Late Shri Bhagwat Swaroop Agarwal, who is the owner of a firm Agarwal Udyog, New Mandi, Khurja. The applicant’s firm used to supply horse feed, barley and oats to Delhi Race Club 1940 Limited, New Delhi since 1990. In the year 1995, the then head of the Race Club, Shri PS Vedi and the then Secretary Sehgal told the applicant that from now on the bills for the supply of horse grain and oats would be made in the name of Delhi Horse Trainers Association, Race Course Road, New Delhi. And the Head and Secretary of the same association have now been made separate, they will pay you for the goods supplied. Till the year 2017, the payment of the applicant’s firm continued to be regular and now at present Delhi Horse Trainers Association President Kazim Ali Khan and Secretary Sanjeev Charan owe a payment of Rs 9,11,434/- to the applicant’s firm.
Whenever the applicant makes demands, they keep evading when the applicant tried to talk to the current President of the Race Club, J. S. Vedi and the current Secretary about this. Then the Secretary GS Vedi said that you should demand your dues from Delhi Horse Trainers Association only, we have no relation with them, then the applicant tried to meet Kazim Ali Pradhan along with Manish Kumar Sharma, son of Mahesh Kumar Sharma, resident of Nawalpura Khurja and Chirag Agarwal, son of Vijay Agarwal, resident of Malpura, Khurja but they refused to talk to the applicant and threatened that if he came here again, it would be very bad and started a scuffle. The applicant feels that both the above mentioned officials of Delhi Race Club 1940 Limited, New Delhi and Delhi Horse Trainers Association, in connivance with each other, cheated the applicant and dishonestly obtained the goods from the applicant’s firm in bad faith and they used it for their club and association and now they do not want to pay for the goods given by the applicant.
676 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports All of them under conspiracy want to grab the money of the applicant’s firm, after which the applicant had given a legal notice to the above mentioned people through his advocate on 18th June 2020 but even after receiving the notice, the above people neither gave any reply to the notice nor was the applicant’s outstanding amount paid. In this context, the applicant gave an application to Inspector-in-charge of Kotwali Khurja Nagar on 25.07.2021 and on 06.08.2021, an application letter was sent to SSP Sir Bulandshahar through postal registry, but till date no action has been taken nor has the applicant’s report been registered.
Therefore, it is prayed that after the investigation, please summon the accused along with evidence to the court and punish them for the crime committed by them.
Date 27.08.2021”
(ii) The plain reading of the complaint would indicate that the appellant No. 1 is a legal entity. The appellant No. 2 is the Secretary of the appellant No. 1 Company, and the appellant No. 3 is the Honorary President and Non-Executive Director of the appellant No. 1 Company. They used to purchase grains and oats from the complainant meant to be fed to the horses maintained by the appellant No. 1 Company. According to the complainant, an amount of Rs. 9,11,434/- (Rupees Nine Lakh Eleven Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Four) is due and payable to him by the appellants towards the sale of horse grains and oats over a period of time. It is alleged that as the appellants failed to make the payment, he thought fit to file the complaint as according to him he has been cheated by the appellants.
(iii) The court concerned initially took cognizance upon the complaint but postponed the issuance of process as it thought fit to initiate magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”). The statement of the complainant recorded by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in the course of the magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC reads thus:
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 677Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. “Name of the witness Ankit Agarwal S/o Vipin Agarwal aged about 34 years, Occupation-Businessman, resident of 13, Malpura, Subhash Road, Khurja, PS- Khurja Nagar, District Bulandshahar today on 08.3.22 on oath gave statement that:- Vipin Kumar Agarwal is the owner of a firm Agarwal Udyog which is located in New Mandi Khurja. Delhi Race Course Club 1940 Limited has been purchasing horse feed from the above mentioned firm for a long time and payment for the same has been done on time After the year 2017, Delhi Horse Trainers Association President Kazim Ali and Secretary Sanjeev Charan kept paying the goods. Since thereafter, the above mentioned people owe Rs 9,11,434/- to the above firm. After repeated requests, both the above mentioned firms have been telling to make payment to each other but the opposite party has also not made the payment.
Delhi Race Course Club President JS Bedi and Secretary HK Uppal are delaying the payment of horse feed purchased by them. The people of the above two firms have colluded with each other and do not want to pay for the goods taken. Vipin Agarwal, proprietor of Agarwal Udyog, is my father hence I am aware of the entire matter”
(iv) The Magistrate also recorded the statement of one Manish Kumar in course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC. The statement reads thus:
“Witness name Manish Kumar Sharma father’s name aged 33 years occupation labourer resident of Nawalpura, Khurja Police Station Khurja Nagar District Bulandshahar today on 08.03.22 on oath gave statement that:- I have been working as a bookkeeper for the last 17 years at Vipin Kumar Agarwal’s firm Agarwal Udyog, which is located in New Mandi Khurja. From the above mentioned firm, Delhi Race Course Club 1940 Limited which is a New Delhi based firm. Have been buying 678 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports horse grain and oats. President of this firm J S Bedi and Secretary H K Uppal have been coming to our firm to buy horse feed and oats and the firm has been paying for the purchased goods. It was said by the above two that now the bills for horse feed and oats will be made in the name of Delhi Horse Trainers Association Delhi and the Head of this firm, Kazim Ali and Secretary Sanjeev Charan will pay it. On the request of the above people, horse grain and oats continued to be supplied from our firm. The above mentioned people owes Rs. 9,11,434/- to our firm, upon being repeatedly asked for payment, the above mentioned people are evading. Once Chirag Agarwal and I went to their office in New Delhi, they refused to talk to Vipin Agarwal and us and they threatened that if they come here again, it will be very bad and they started scuffle. The outstanding amount of Rs.
9,11,434/- has not yet been paid by the officials of the above two firms. The above mentioned people have fraudulently obtained the goods from our firm in bad faith and do not want to pay for the same.
They have used the supplied goods. Certified after reading and listening.”
(v) At the end of the magisterial inquiry, the court issued process for the offence punishable under Section 406 of the IPC. The order issuing process reads thus:
“Date:- 28.02.2023 The file was presented for orders. The complainant has been heard on the question of summons on an earlier date.
On behalf of the complainant Vipin Kumar Aggarwal, the above complaint was presented against the opposite parties Delhi Race Club etc. to the effect that the firm of the complainant was supplying horse grain, barley and oats to Delhi Race Club since the year 1990. In the year 1995, the President of the Race Club, Mr. P.S. Vedi and the then Sachin Sehgal [2024] 8 S.C.R. 679Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. ji said that the bill would be made in the name of Delhi Horse Trainers Association, Race Course Road, New Delhi and the Head and Secretary of the same association have now been made separately. They will make the payment for the goods given by you.
Till the year 2017, the applicant’s firm’s payment continued to be regular and now at present the payment of Rs 9,11,434/- is outstanding from the applicant’s firm when the applicant talked about this to the current President of the Race Club, J.S. Vedi and the current Secretary then the secretary said that you should demand your dues from Delhi Horse Trainers Association only. Then the applicant tried to meet Kajim Ali but he refused to talk to the applicant and got into a scuffle. The above two associations and officials unanimously cheated the applicant and obtained goods from the applicant’s firm and do not want to pay for the goods given by the applicant.
The applicant had given a legal notice to the above people through his advocate on 18 June 2020 but even after receiving the notice, the above people neither gave any reply to the notice nor paid the outstanding amount of the applicant. In this context, the applicant gave an application to Khurja Nagar police station and on 06.08.2021 an application was given to SSP Bulandshahar but no action has been taken till date.
On behalf of the complainant, he got himself examined under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and under Section 202 CrPC, the statement of witnesses Ankit Aggarwal as PW-1 and Manish Kumar Sharma as PW-2 was recorded. In which they supported the statements mentioned in the complaint.
One copy of the application sent by the complainant to the Senior Superintendent of Police as documentary evidence in support of his statements, a photocopy of the registry receipt, one copy of the net receipt postal registry, five copies of the bill book, one true 680 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports copy of the remaining balance, one copy of receipt of goods, one copy of remaining balance, one copy of legal notice were filed per receipt.
The complainant has stated in his statement under Section 200 CrPC, “after five years of 1990, these people said that we will not make the payment. A separate organization has been formed for payment, which will do it. An organization named Delhi Trainers Association has been formed. Now I owe these people nine lakh eleven thousand four hundred thirty-four rupees. When we asked for money several times, we did not receive it. The President of Delhi Race Course is not ready to talk. I am suffering from cancer. Business is seen by children only. We also gave them legal notice but nothing happened.”
Perused the entire evidence material available on file. On the basis of the evidence presented by the complainant under section 200 CrPC and section 202 CrPC, there is prima facie basis for summoning the opposition parties Delhi Race Course Club, Delhi Race Horse Trainers Association, JS Bedi, HK Uppal, Kazim Ali Khan and Sanjeev Charan for consideration under section 406 IPC. There are sufficient grounds for summoning for trial of a punishable offense under Section 406 IPC.
ORDER
The opposite parties Delhi Race Course Club, Delhi Race Horse Trainers Association, JS Bedi, HK Uppal, Kazim Ali Khan and Sanjeev Charan are summoned for trial for the offense under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant should process the summons against the opposition parties within a week, every summons should be issued along with a copy of the complaint letter, the complainant list should be filed and the witnesses should be filed.
The case file be put up on 27.04.2023 for appearance.”
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 681Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr.
3. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants preferred an application under Section 482 of the CrPC in the High Court, praying for quashing of the summoning order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar.
4. The High Court rejected the application filed by the appellants herein, observing as under:
“15. On the basis of averments made in the complaint, it is a case of the complainant who was regularly supplying Oats, used for horses. In the year 1995, the complainant was asked to raise invoice in favour of the ‘Association’. The complainant agreed and continued to raise invoice in favour of the ‘Association’. After 2017, an amount of Rs. 9,11,434/- became due upon the applicants. He contacted Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and he was directed to contact the ‘Association’. The applicant Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and ‘Association’ are not separate legal entity. The applicants and the ‘Association’ were in collusion and committed fraud with complainant. The goods supplied by complainant were received but its payment was not made.
16. Admittedly, no civil proceedings are pending for the amount in question between the parties. It is not the case of the applicants that transaction was a commercial transaction whereas the case of opposite party No. 2 is for the supply made by him. He is bound to raise his payment on the direction of the Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. He raised invoices in favour of the ‘Association’ from 1995. There is no change in the manner of raising invoices by the complainant. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. continued to make payment upto the year 2017. The complainant was not being paid Rs. 9,11,434/- by the applicants who instead transferred their responsibility to the ‘Association’.
17. Suffice to mention here that the copies of the invoices are brought on record through counter affidavit by the complainant and the same are not controverted by the applicants. Prima facie, it reflects that the invoices were raised by complainant in accordance with the advice received by him and he continued to receive payment on 682 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the basis of such invoices and when the payment of Rs.
9,11,434/- was not paid to the complainant he contacted Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. which averted him to the ‘Association’. It appears that Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and the ‘Association’ are not separate entity.
18. On the face of record, it appears that originally complainant was supplying oats to the ‘Company’. In the year 1995, the complainant was directed to raise invoices in favour of the ‘Association’. The Company continued to receive supply of Oats made by the complainant even after 1995, whereas invoices were raised in favour of the ‘Association’. This direction of the company goes to show that there was some mala fide intention on the part of the Company. The complainant bona fide continued to make supply under the direction of the Company. The invoices were raised by the complainant in similar manner since 1995 to 2017 and thereafter. It appears that there was an oral direction to raise invoices in favour of ‘Association’ made by the Company, which indicates mala fide of the Company.
19. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the impugned order, this Court is of the opinion that impugned order has been passed on the basis of facts and circumstances of the case after considering the evidence on record. There is no legal infirmity in the impugned orders, which may call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C.”
5. Thus, according to the High Court, the intention on the part of the company was prima facie mala fide and the payment of Rs. 9,11,434/could be said to be intentionally withheld.
SCOPE OF INQUIRY UNDER SECTION 202 OF THE CRPC
6. It is by now well settled that at the stage of issuing process it is not the duty of the Court to find out as to whether the accused will be ultimately convicted or acquitted. The object of consideration of the merits of the case at this stage could only be to determine whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding further or not. Mere [2024] 8 S.C.R. 683Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. existence of some grounds which would be material in deciding whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted does not generally indicate that the case must necessarily fail. On the other hand, such grounds may indicate the need for proceeding further in order to discover the truth after a full and proper investigation. If, however, a bare perusal of a complaint or the evidence led in support of it shows essential ingredients of the offences alleged are absent or that the dispute is only of a civil nature or that there are such patent absurdities in evidence produced that it would be a waste of time to proceed further, then of course, the complaint is liable to be dismissed at that stage only. What the Magistrate has to determine at the stage of issue of process is not the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case on the assumption that what is stated can be true unless the prosecution allegations are so fantastic that they cannot reasonably be held to be true. [See : D.N. Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal : (1972) 3 SCC 414 : AIR 1972 SC 1607 : (1972 Cri LJ 1037)].
7. Further it is also well settled that at the stage of issuing process a Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its inherent jurisdiction which is to be sparingly used. The scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC is extremely limited — only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint — (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out, and
(iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact in proceedings under Section 202 of the CrPC, the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or 684 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The discretion given to the Magistrate on this behalf has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it is not for the High Court or even the Supreme Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. These considerations are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC which culminates into an order under Section 204. [See : Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Kanjalgi : (1976) 3 SCC 736]. It is no doubt true that in this very decision this Court has enumerated certain illustrations as to when the order of Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside. These illustrations are as under :— “(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as want of sanction or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.”
8. Each Penal Section of the Indian Penal Code or of the other laws can be subjected to an analysis by posing and answering the following questions: - [2024] 8 S.C.R. 685Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U ttar Pradesh & Anr. I. What is the overt act stipulated in the Section, which overt act has resulted in an injury?
II. What is the state of mind stipulated in respect of the accused and which state of mind must precede or accompany the act of the accused?
ANALYSIS
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