In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents v.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 614; [2024] 8 S.C.R. 575
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 20 Aug 2024
- Case number
- SUO MOTO WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 3/2023
- Sections
- 6, 376, 19(6), 376(2), 363, 366, 5, 375, 482, 27, 2(14), 19
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 8 S.C.R. 575 : 2024 INSC 614 In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2023)
20 August 2024 [Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration
(i) When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, what are the essentials, which a judgment must contain; (ii) What was the duty of the High Court while ascertaining the offences u/s.6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 & Section 376 of the IPC and Can an act that is an offence punishable under the POSCO Act be described as “a romantic relationship”;
(iii) Whether the High Court can exercise the plenary powers to quash the order of conviction on the grounds of settlement or by consent; (iv) Whether the State was under an obligation to take care of the victim of an offence under the POCSO Act, who was fourteen years old; (v) Implementation of the provisions of section 19(6) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; (vi) Importance of rehabilitation of the victims of offences under the POCSO Act.
Headnotes† Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.6 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2)(n) – Conviction under – The accused, twenty-five years old, enticed victim, fourteen year old, to leave her house – A female child was born to the victim – Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child – The Special Judge appointed under the POCSO Act, convicted the accused for the offences punishable u/s. 6 of the POCSO Act and under s.363, s.366, under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of s.376 of the IPC – By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that the offences punishable u/s. 363 and s.366 of the IPC were not made out, and also set aside the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable u/s. 6 of the POCSO Act and sub-sections 2(n) and (3) of s.376 of the IPC – Correctness:
Held: In this case, there is no dispute about the fact that the accused committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim – As the victim became pregnant as a consequence of the sexual assault, in view * Author 576 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of sub-clause (ii) of clause (j) of Section 5 of the POCSO Act, it became a case of aggravated penetrative sexual assault – On facts, there cannot be any dispute that the commission of the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act by the accused was duly proved – Under Section 375 of the IPC, having penetrative intercourse with a victim who is under 18 years of age with or without her consent becomes an offence of rape – As the offence was repeatedly committed on the victim, clause (n) of sub-section
(2) of Section 376 of the IPC is attracted – Therefore, the accused was liable to be punished in accordance with Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC – As far as offences u/ss.363, 366 are concerned, in the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the accused took the victim out of the keeping of the lawful guardian – Similarly, there is no evidence of enticing the victim – The mother of the victim deposed that the victim left her house on her own – That is also the version of the victim – Hence, the prosecution did not establish kidnapping – The offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC are not made out – The findings and observations in the impugned judgment of the High Court, except the finding on the applicability of Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, cannot be sustained – Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the Special Court is restored to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under sub-sections (2)(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act – Accordingly, the accused stands convicted – The acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC is confirmed. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 44(a)] Judgment – When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, what are the essentials, which a judgment must contain:
Held: When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, the judgment must contain (i) a concise statement of the facts of the case, (ii) the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, if any, (iii) the submissions made by the parties, (iv) the analysis based on the re-appreciation of evidence, and (v) the reasons for either confirming the guilt of the accused or for acquitting the accused – The appellate court must scan through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and re-appreciate it – After re-appreciating the evidence, the appellate court must record reasons for either accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution – [2024] 8 S.C.R. 577In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents The Court must record reasons for deciding whether the charges against the accused have been proved – In a given case, if the conviction is confirmed, the Court will have to deal with the legality and adequacy of the sentence – In such a case, there must be a finding recorded on the legality and adequacy of the sentence with reasons – The ultimate object of writing a judgment is to ensure that the parties before the Court know why the case is decided in their favour or against them – Therefore, judgment must be in a simple language – The conclusions recorded by the Court in the judgment on legal or factual issues must be supported by cogent reasons. [Para 13] Judgment – Judgment cannot contain the Judge’s personal opinion – The judgment cannot contain irrelevant and unnecessary material:
Held: The Court can always comment upon the conduct of the parties – However, the findings regarding the conduct of the parties must be confined only to such conduct which has a bearing on the decision-making – A judgment of the Court cannot contain the Judge’s personal opinions on various subjects – Similarly, advisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the Court by incorporating advice to the parties or advice in general – The Judge has to decide a case and not preach – The judgment cannot contain irrelevant and unnecessary material – A judgment must be in simple language and should not be verbose. [Para 14] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.6 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.376 – What was the duty of the High Court while ascertaining the offences u/s.6 of the POCSO Act and s.376 of the IPC and Can an act that is an offence punishable under the POSCO Act be described as “a romantic relationship”:
Held: The duty of the High Court was to ascertain on the evidence whether the offences u/s.6 of the POCSO Act and s.376 of the IPC were made out – In view of “sixthly” in Section 375 of the IPC, penetrative intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent, constitutes an offence of rape – Therefore, whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant – An act that is an offence punishable under the POSCO Act cannot be described as “a romantic relationship” – The Courts must follow and implement the law – The Courts cannot commit violence against the law. [Para 19] 578 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Penal Code, 1860 – Exercise of Plenary Powers to quash the order of conviction:
Held: On a plain reading of “sixthly” in Section 375 r/w. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, notwithstanding the consensual sexual relationship, the offence punishable under clause (n) of subsection (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, was made out in the instant case – One of the objectives of the POSCO Act is to effectively address sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children, as both offences are very heinous – In the facts of the case, the accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old – When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are committed, by exercising its jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and/or s.482 of the Cr.PC, the High Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been proved – In the instant case, the High Court was influenced by the fact that the victim’s parents did not support her, and therefore, by sending the accused to jail, she and her child would be miserable as the accused and his family were taking care of them – There are various decisions of this Court holding that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction u/s. 482 of the Cr.PC to quash a prosecution on the grounds of settlement or by consent – However, in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all – Therefore, in view of the settled position of law, in the facts of the case, even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 23.1] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.19(6) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – s.27, s.2(14) – Whether the State was under an obligation to take care of the victim of an offence under the POCSO Act, who was fourteen years old:
Held: Under sub-section (6) of Section 19, it was the duty of the police to report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) [2024] 8 S.C.R. 579In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents and the Special Court within a period of twenty-four hours from the time the police had the knowledge about the commission of the offence – In the instant case, there is nothing placed on record which shows that compliance was made by reporting the case to CWC – Section 27 of the JJ Act provides for setting up the CWC – The authority of the CWC is to dispose of the cases for care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of children in need of care and protection, as well as to provide for their basic needs and protection – The authority conferred on the CWC creates a corresponding obligation – Even a child who has a parent or guardian and if such parent or guardian is found to be unfit to take care of the child, in such a case, the child is covered by the definition under sub-section (14) of s.2 of the JJ Act – Therefore, the CWC has to exercise the power to provide basic needs and protection to such children in need of care and protection – The JJ Act is a complete code that makes provisions for the care, protection, treatment, and development of children in need of care and protection – The JJ Act provides for making available their basic needs and protection – The Act takes care of all the needs of the victims under the POCSO Act who fall under the category of children in need of care and protection – The object is to undertake the rehabilitation and social re-integration process of such victims based on individual care plans as provided u/s. 39 of the JJ Act – Section 46 is a provision that requires the State Governments to frame rules to provide financial support to any child living in a child care institution upon completion of 18 years of age – The financial support has to be very exhaustive as the object of financial support is to facilitate a child’s re-integration into mainstream society – In the instant case, these statutory provisions were overlooked entirely, a situation was created which did not allow the victim to make an informed choice about her future – She did not get that opportunity even after attaining majority. [Paras 27.1, 28, 28.1, 28.2, 34] Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Importance of rehabilitation of the victims of offences under the POCSO Act – Compliance and implementation of 19(6) of POCSO:
Held: It is the responsibility of the State to take care of helpless victims – The right to live a dignified life is an integral part of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution 580 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of India – Article 21 encompasses the right to lead a healthy life – The minor child, who is the victim of the offences under the POCSO Act, is also deprived of the fundamental right to live a dignified and healthy life – The same is the case of the child born to the victim as a result of the offence – All the provisions of the JJ Act regarding taking care of such children and rehabilitating them are consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Therefore, immediately after the knowledge of the commission of a heinous offence under the POCSO Act, the State, its agencies and instrumentalities must step in and render all possible aid to the victim children, which will enable them to lead a dignified life – The failure to do so will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the victim children under Article 21 – The police must strictly implement sub-section (6) of Section 19 of the POCSO Act – If that is not done, the victim children are deprived of the benefits of the welfare measures under the JJ Act – Compliance with Section 19(6) is of vital importance – Non-compliance thereof will lead to a violation of Article 21. [Para 37] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Formation of expert committee – Directions issued:
Held: Directions issued to the State to form a expert committee – The State Government to provide all the material particulars/details of the benefits which it is willing to extend to the victim – Thereafter, the committee shall meet the victim of the offences at such a place as it desires to communicate what the State Government is offering to her – The Committee must also inform the victim about the availability of the benefits of the scheme of the Government of India – The duty of the committee shall be to help the victim to make an informed choice whether she wants to continue to remain in the company of the accused and his family or wants to avail of the benefits offered by the State Government – The coordinator of the committee shall submit a report in a sealed cover to this Court. [Paras 44(b)(d)(e)(h)] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Implementation of – Directions issued:
Held: The Registry of the Supreme Court directed to forward copies of this judgment to the Secretaries of Law and/or Justice Departments of all the States and Union Territories – The Secretaries to convene meetings of the Secretaries of the concerned [2024] 8 S.C.R. 581In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents departments and other senior officials – The object of holding such meetings is to ensure that appropriate directions are issued to all concerned to strictly implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and the relevant provisions of the JJ Act. [Para 44(i)] Case Law Cited Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 – relied on.
List of Acts Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Section 376(2)(n) of Penal Code, 1860; Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Minor; Penetrative sexual assault on minor; Lawful guardian; Evidence of enticing the victim; Out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of minor; Judgment; Essentials of Judgment; Object of writing a judgment; Judge’s personal opinions; Advisory jurisdiction; Rape; Consent; Romantic relationship; Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children; Kidnapping; Exercise of Plenary Powers; Quashing of order of conviction; Quashing the order of conviction on the grounds of settlement or by consent; Obligation of State under POCSO; Child Welfare Committee under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Care; Protection; Treatment; Development and rehabilitation of children in need of care and protection; Financial support to any child living in a child care institution; Child’s re-integration into mainstream society; Informed choice to victim; Fundamental right to live; Dignified life; Welfare measures. Case Arising From ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023 (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
With Criminal Appeal No.1451 of 2024 582 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Ms. Madhavi Divan, Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Advs., (Amicus Curiae), Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Sameer Choudhary, Ms. Aishani Narain, Ms. Aandrita Deb, Subham Saigal, Ms. Bagavathy Vennimalai, Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Ms. Astha Sharma, Sanjeev Kaushik, Shreyas Awasthi, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Ms. Lihzu Shiney Konyak, Dibyadyuti Banerjee, Ms. Sumedha Halder, Ms. Sunita Kumari, Abhijit Sengupta, Advs. for the appearing parties. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. Criminal Appeal no.1451 of 2024 has been preferred by the State of West Bengal, aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 18 th October 2023, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The learned Special Judge appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’), Baruipur, South 24 Parganas, convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’). For the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four and five years, respectively, for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. Though the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act concluded that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed.
2. The victim girl was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The victim’s mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29 th May 2018. The victim’s mother stated in her complaint that the victim, who was her minor daughter, escaped from her home at 5:30 p.m. on 20 th May 2018 without informing anyone. On inquiry, it was found that the accused enticed her to leave her house. The accused did so [2024] 8 S.C.R. 583In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents with the help of his two sisters. The victim’s mother repeatedly visited the house of the accused and requested him to facilitate the return of her daughter. However, the victim did not come back. A female child was born to the victim. Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child. There was a gross delay in the investigation, and the accused was arrested on 19 th December 2021. The chargesheet was filed on 27 th January 2022 against the accused for the offences for which he was convicted. In addition, the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. We may note here that as the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act found that there was no evidence of marriage between the victim and the accused, the charge under Section 9 of the 2006 Act was held as not substantiated.
3. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC were not made out, and therefore, the High Court acquitted the accused for the said two offences. Considering the factual scenario that the High Court noticed, it purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr. PC’) to set aside the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sub-sections 2(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC. The High Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the accused along with their minor child.
4. The Suo Motu writ petition was initiated based on the directions issued by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for challenging the impugned judgment. The State Government has preferred the criminal appeal to challenge the order of acquittal.
5. Considering the nature of the observations made by the High Court and the findings recorded by it, this Court appointed Ms. Madhavi Divan and Ms. Liz Mathew, the learned senior counsel, as amicus curiae to assist the Court. Both of them have rendered valuable assistance to the Court. Along with them, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Advocate-on-Record, has also assisted the Court. We have heard Mr.Huzefa Ahmadi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State Government and the learned counsel representing the accused 584 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and the victim. The learned senior counsel for the State Government has taken a fair stand. The accused and the victim are on the same page and want to continue their cohabitation.
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE
6. We have perused the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr. PC. From the statement and the evidence on record, it becomes an admitted position that the age of the victim on the date of the incident was fourteen years, and the age of the accused was about twenty-five years. When the statement of the accused was recorded, the age of the victim’s daughter was about ten months. Though it is the case of the prosecution that the marriage between the accused and the victim was solemnised on 20th May 2018 in a temple, there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution on this aspect.
7. The evidence of the victim reveals that she also claimed that she married the accused. She stated that her daughter was ten months old. She stated in the cross-examination that she left her house of her own will and married the accused. She stated that since the year 2019, she has been residing in the house of the accused. She stated in the cross-examination that she would like to stay in the house of the accused.
8. The first informant, the victim’s mother, deposed that on 20th May 2018, the victim was fourteen years and three months old. She produced the victim’s birth certificate in the evidence. She stated that her daughter was kept in Narendrapur Sanlaap home, from where she was brought to her house. After staying in the house for a few months, she again went to the house of the accused.
9. We are not referring to the medical evidence as it is an admitted position that the accused kept physical relations with the victim, and the victim has given birth to a female child. There is no dispute that the accused is the biological father of the child. There is no explanation for the gross delay in investigation and the delay in arresting the accused. As stated earlier, the accused was arrested on 19 th December 2021. Later on, he was enlarged on bail.
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
10. Section 6 of the POCSO Act reads thus:
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 585In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents “6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.— Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”
‘Penetrative sexual assault’ is defined under Section 3 of the POCSO Act. In this case, there is no dispute about the fact that the accused committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim. As the victim became pregnant as a consequence of the sexual assault, in view of sub-clause (ii) of clause (j) of Section 5 of the POCSO Act, it became a case of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. On facts, there cannot be any dispute that the commission of the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act by the accused was duly proved.
11. Under Section 375 of the IPC, having penetrative intercourse with a victim who is under 18 years of age with or without her consent becomes an offence of rape. As the offence was repeatedly committed on the victim, clause (n) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC is attracted. Therefore, the accused was liable to be punished in accordance with Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. Sub-section (3) of Section 376 provides for a minimum punishment of twenty years for the offence of rape when the victim is less than sixteen years of age.
12. Section 361 of the IPC defines “Kidnapping from lawful guardianship”. The said provision reads thus:
“361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.—Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.”
In the facts of the case, there is no evidence to prove that the accused took the victim out of the keeping of the lawful guardian. Similarly, there is no evidence of enticing the victim. The mother of the victim deposed that the victim left her house on her own. That is also the version of the victim. Hence, the prosecution did not establish kidnapping. Therefore, the offences punishable under Sections 363 586 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and 366 of the IPC are not made out. But, there is no doubt that the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Subsections (2)(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC were made out.
JUDGMENT
13. When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, the judgment must contain (i) a concise statement of the facts of the case, (ii) the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, if any, (iii) the submissions made by the parties, (iv) the analysis based on the reappreciation of evidence, and (v) the reasons for either confirming the guilt of the accused or for acquitting the accused. The appellate court must scan through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and reappreciate it. After reappreciating the evidence, the appellate court must record reasons for either accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution. The Court must record reasons for deciding whether the charges against the accused have been proved. In a given case, if the conviction is confirmed, the Court will have to deal with the legality and adequacy of the sentence. In such a case, there must be a finding recorded on the legality and adequacy of the sentence with reasons. The ultimate object of writing a judgment is to ensure that the parties before the Court know why the case is decided in their favour or against them. Therefore, judgment must be in a simple language. The conclusions recorded by the Court in the judgment on legal or factual issues must be supported by cogent reasons.
14. No doubt, the Court can always comment upon the conduct of the parties. However, the findings regarding the conduct of the parties must be confined only to such conduct which has a bearing on the decision-making. A judgment of the Court cannot contain the Judge’s personal opinions on various subjects. Similarly, advisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the Court by incorporating advice to the parties or advice in general. The Judge has to decide a case and not preach. The judgment cannot contain irrelevant and unnecessary material. A judgment must be in simple language and should not be verbose. Brevity is the hallmark of quality judgment. We must remember that judgment is neither a thesis nor a piece of literature. However, we find that the impugned judgment contains personal opinion of the Judges advice to the younger generation and advice to the legislature.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 587In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents
OBJECTIONABLE PORTIONS OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
15. Ms Madhavi Divan, the learned senior counsel appointed as amicus curiae, has culled out the portions of the impugned judgment which, according to her, are highly objectionable. We are reproducing the same:
i. “We feel it prudent to mention here that we noticed a rustic lady with a rumpled saree and unkempt hair, looking more aged than her age standing in a corner of the Court with a baby in her arms.” (Para 2)
ii. “[…]Non-exploitative sexual relationship without any intent is in rise among adolescents in our country. We may only say that may be for the reason of climatic change, change in food habits etc. girls are attaining puberty now-a-days in a younger age and sexuality develop in them very early may be owing to peer pressure, influence by social media, free availability of porn materials and free mixing with friends of opposite sex in a taboo free atmosphere.
This being, however, sociological study by experts, we do not want to comment on these aspects. To top it all we do not want to go to the pathology of the offence(s) statutorily outlined in the POCSO Act.”
(Para 13)
iii. “The discussion so far stresses on a “Rights based approach” so far as adolescents are concerned. We may sound narrow in our view, but the practicality of the facts is that a “Rights based approach” as a panacea for all the problems that come is not the solution, and in our view, not the just and correct approach. For conferring the Rights suggested in the aforesaid discussion on the “captioned group” i.e. adolescents between the age fold of 16 to 18 in “romantic relationship”, some test are to be satisfied first. Those are:
i) Whether conferment of suggested Rights on the “captioned group” is/are in their best interest?
588 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports ii) Whether the captioned group has the discretion and maturity to use that Rights for their best interest?
iii) Whether such rights at such age is conducive for over all development of their personality or it is destructive of their self development?
iv) Who are the persons on whom such Rights are to be conferred, are they disciplined adolescents or a wayward lot, who have no control on their trivial urge to have sex?
v) Whether conferment of such Rights on the captioned group is in the best interest of the society?” (para 29)
iv. “To find answers to these tests opinions of some individuals, Rights activists, or view of so called liberals are not at all sufficient. [...]” (Para 29.1)
v. “Fundamental Rights in the Constitution and various other Rights in different statutes have been given to individuals for a balance in society, to check arbitrariness of the Government and development of best self of an individual. If we go deep into our old texts, we find that Rights are not conferred but they are earned by action of an individual. If we look at Bentham’s theory, it is found that every right has corresponding duty/duties or obligation/ obligations. By performing the obligation, you have to earn the Right/Rights. It is somewhat similar to the old oriental philosophy “Do your duty and earn your Right.” (para 30)
vi. “The principal androgenic steroid is testosterone, which is secreted primarily from the testes in men and ovaries in women and in small amounts from the adrenal glands, both in men and women.
Hypothalamus and pituitary gland control the amount of testosterone, which is primarily responsible for sex urge and libido (in men). It’s existence is there [2024] 8 S.C.R. 589In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents in the body, so when the respective gland becomes active by stimulation, sexual urge is aroused. But activation of the respective responsible gland is not automatic. It needs stimulation by our sights, hearing, reading erotic materials and conversation with opposite sex. So sexual urge is created by our own action. Sex in adolescents is normal but sexual urge or arousal of such urge is dependent on some action by the individual, may be a man or woman. Therefore, sexual urge is not at all normal and normative. If we stop some actions), arousal of sexual urge, as advocated in our discussion supra, ceases to be normal.” (Para 30.1)
vii. “Ask any parents of an adolescent, may be a boy or girl, you shall get the answer how difficult it is to give a right upbringing to him/her in view of free flow of negative materials from the web and social media, which hamper their thinking process and living. We, therefore, propose to take a “Duty/obligation based approach” to the issue in hand.” (Para 30.2)
viii. “It is the duty/obligation of every female adolescent to:
(i) Protect her right to integrity of her body.
(ii) Protect her dignity and self-worth.
(iii) Thrive for overall development of her self transcending gender barriers.
(iv) Control sexual urge/urges as in the eyes of the society she is the looser (sic) when she gives in to enjoy the sexual pleasure of hardly two minutes.
(v) Protect her right to autonomy of her body and her privacy.
It is the duty of a male adolescent to respect the aforesaid duties of a young girl or woman and he should train his mind to a respect a woman, her self worth, her dignity & privacy, and right to autonomy of her body.” (Para 30.3)
590 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports ix. “[...] Similarly, parental guidance and education so far as boys are concerned is to include how to respect a woman; how to keep dignity of a woman; how to protect the integrity of body of a woman; and how to befriend a woman without being aroused by sexual urge even if there is advances from the other side till he becomes capable to maintain a family. [.].”
(Para 31)
x. “We do not want our adolescents to do anything that shall push them from dark to darker side of life. It is normal for each adolescent to seek the company of opposite sex but it is not normal for them to engage in sex devoid of any commitment and dedication. We want them to spread their wings high with a view to realise their best selves. Sex shall come automatically to them when they grow self-reliant, economically independent and a person which they dreamt one day to be.
Along with sex in such a stage shall come love with commitment and dedication towards each other as they shall have the discretion and maturity to understand each other, adjust with each other and forgive each other. We beseech our adolescents to follow a salutary legal principle of Mahabharata “Dharmo Rakshyati Rakshyita” (one who protects law is protected by law) and proceed in their path of self-development without being influenced by bashful urge of urgent sex.” (Para 32)
xi. “So far as the case of criminalisation of romantic relationship between two adolescents of opposite sex is concerned it should better be left to the wisdom of the judiciary. Each judiciary in the world has the nicety of pluralism. Each individual judge has his/her own opinion. He/She has his/her own unique style of addressing an issue. [..] We are, therefore, of the view that the grey area of adolescent consensual sex about which much commotion is made should be left to the discretion and wisdom of the judiciary.
It is also found from decisions of different Hon’ble [2024] 8 S.C.R. 591In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents High Courts that such matters have been dealt with in proper perspective taking into consideration the peculiarity of case placed before the court” (Para 33)
xii. “Coming to the present case we find that this is a case of non-exploitative consensual sexual relationship between a minor girl and an older adolescent or may be a young adult. [...]” (Para 38)
xiii. “In the present case things are even on better footing. The girl was 14+ when the occurrence happened. The boy was also an old adolescent or a young adult at that time. [.]” (Para 39)”
(emphasis added)
15.1 We need not waste pages dealing with every observation/ finding quoted above. The observations are utterly irrelevant for deciding the controversy. To say the least, these observations are shocking, which will ex-facie invite a finding of perversity.
REASONS RECORDED BY THE HIGH COURT FOR ACQUITTAL
16. Now, we come to the reasons recorded by the Division Bench. The Division Bench has invited a very peculiar concept of “non-exploitative sexual acts” while dealing with the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. We fail to understand how a sexual act, which is a heinous offence, can be termed as non-exploitative. When a girl who is fourteen years old is subjected to such a horrific act, how can it be termed as “nonexploitative”? In paragraph 17, the High Court refers to “marital rape”. In this case, there is no evidence of marriage. The Bench has also invented a non-existent category of “older adolescents” and lamented about the lack of recognition of the consensual behaviour of older adolescents. We fail to understand this concept of “older adolescents”. Further, the Division Bench goes on to observe that sexual behaviour in adolescents, particularly from the onset of puberty, is established as being a natural, normative and integral part of an adolescent’s development.
17. We must deal with some of the observations made by the High Court. The High Court concluded that by equating consensual and non-exploitative sexual acts with rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault, the law undermines the bodily integrity and dignity 592 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of adolescents. The High Court was not called upon to discuss the merits and demerits of the existing laws. What is shocking is the observation made in paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment where the High Court observed that while achieving ostensible objectives to protect all children below 18 years from sexual exploitation, the law’s unintended effect has been the deprivation of liberty of young people in consensual relationship. The Court, surprisingly, carved out a non-existing category of romantic cases in the rape cases. While dealing with the offences under the POCSO Act, shockingly, the Court observed that the law undermines the identity of adolescent girls by casting them as victims, thereby rendering them voiceless. The Court says that, on the other hand, adult boys are discriminately treated as children in conflict with the law. Thereafter, in paragraph 25, the Court proceeded to criticise the POCSO Act by observing that it clubs all persons below eighteen years without considering their developing sexuality, evolving capacity and the impact of such criminalisation on their best interests. In paragraph 28, the Court went further. It held that instead of protecting the adolescents from abuse, the law exposes them in factually consensual and non-exploitative relationships to the risk of criminal prosecution. It compromises the mandate of protecting the children. Therefore, the Court observes that an amendment is necessary to decriminalise consensual sexual acts involving adolescents above sixteen years. The High Court, while dealing with an appeal against the order of conviction, was not called upon to make the observations which we have referred to above. Perhaps these were the subjects on which only the experts could have debated at a different forum. The judges ought to have avoided expressing their personal views even assuming that there was some justification for holding the views. While the High Court observed this, it forgot that in the facts of the case, the Court was not dealing with the sexual acts involving adolescents above sixteen years, as the age of the victim was fourteen years and the accused was twenty-five years at the relevant time.
18. In paragraph 29, the Court went into the question of rights based approach, which was completely unwarranted. In paragraph 30.1, the Court referred to the generation of androgenic steroids and secretion from the pituitary gland. Thereafter, the Court laid down the duties and obligations of every female and adolescent in paragraph 30.3, which we have quoted above. No reasons are required to be recorded [2024] 8 S.C.R. 593In Re: Right To Privacy of Adolescents for holding that incorporation of the same in the judgment is entirely irrelevant and unwarranted. After that, the Court proceeded to lay emphasis on incorporating the aspects of reproductive health and hygiene into the school curriculum. There are several statements and conclusions in the impugned judgment which, to say the least, are shocking. Perversity is writ large on the face of the judgment, which can be seen in several paragraphs of the impugned judgment.
19. The duty of the High Court was to ascertain on the evidence whether the offences under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 of the IPC were made out. In view of “sixthly” in Section 375 of the IPC, penetrative intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent, constitutes an offence of rape. Therefore, whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant. How can an act that is an offence punishable under the POSCO Act be described as “a romantic relationship”? The High Court went to the extent of observing that the case of criminalisation of a romantic relationship between two adolescents of opposite sex should be best left to the wisdom of the judiciary. The Courts must follow and implement the law. The courts cannot commit violence against the law. The findings and observations in the impugned judgment, except the finding on the applicability of Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, cannot be sustained.
EXERCISE OF PLENARY POWERS TO QUASH THE ORDER OF
CONVICTION
20. Now, coming to the conviction of the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the Division Bench proceeds on the footing that the said offences have been established. However, the Court purported to exercise its “plenary powers” under Section 482 of the Cr.PC coupled with Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set aside the conviction of the accused. In short, as we can see from the last few paragraphs of the impugned judgment, the High Court was swayed away by the following aspects:
(a) There was a “non-exploitative” consensual sexual relationship between the two consenting adolescents;
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