Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project Llp & Others
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 631; [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1024
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 27 Aug 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 7595/2021
- Sections
- 125, 32, 56, 100, 15Z, 15T, 79, 86, 110, 111, 120
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1024 : 2024 INSC 631 Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v.
Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others (Civil Appeal No. 7595 of 2021)
27 August 2024 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the extension of the Scheduled Commissioning Date (SCD) was occasioned under the force majeure clause of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), and consequently, whether the reduction in tariff payable to the respondents is justified. Headnotes† Electricity Act, 2003 – State of Karnataka introduced a policy dated 26.08.2014 to identify and promote solar energy projects by land-owning farmers – These solar power plants of 1-3 MW capacity would generate and sell power to the State Electricity (Distribution) Supply Companies at the tariff determined by the Karnataka Electricity Regulatory Commission (KERC) – Respondent no. 2-farmer applied under the policy – Respondent No.1 is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to undertake the solar power project – In the year 2015, the appellant entered into a PPA with respondent no. 2 and the same was approved by KERC – The SPV had to achieve commercial operation within 18 months from the effective date – Several farmers, including the respondent, raised concerns regarding delay in the execution of the project on account of delay in getting land use conversion, delay in getting evacuation approvals, demonetisation, and other reasons – KERC rejected the various causes of delay put forth by the respondents and held that the force majeure clause must be strictly interpreted – KERC reduced the tariff payable to the respondent to Rs. 4.36 per unit for the term of the PPA by relying on Article 5.1 of the PPA – However, the APTEL found that the respondents had taken all necessary care and caution and acted with due diligence and held that respondents are entitled to the benefit of the force majeure clause and an extension of time – Also held that reduction in * Author [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1025Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others tariff from Rs. 8.40 to Rs. 4.36 per unit would adversely affect them – Hence, it directed the appellant to pay the difference in per unit tariff along with the late payment surcharge as provided under Article 6.4 of the PPA – Correctness:
Held: The KERC’s appreciation of the evidence has led it to the conclusion that the delay in commissioning was due to the respondents’ delay in making the applications, despite the approval of the PPA – However, the APTEL has taken note of certain additional factors affecting the time taken to secure the approvals that were not considered by the KERC – These include the time taken by the government to provide the PTCL that is required for approval of land conversion, and the delay caused by the authority in evacuation approval – Considering these additional factors, the APTEL has re-appreciated the evidence to find that the delay was not attributable to the respondents but to the government bodies and relevant authorities – There is no error in the APTEL’s approach, and it is reasonable in its re-appreciation of evidence – In light of the above findings of fact by the APTEL that the delay is not attributable to the respondents and that the force majeure clause is applicable, it rightly held that the extension of time under Article 2.5 is warranted and the commissioning of the project on 24.08.2017 is within the extended period of 24 months – Consequently, the APTEL also rightly held that there is no occasion for the imposition of liquidated damages under Articles 2.2 and 2.5.7 or for the reduction of tariff under Article 5.1 of the PPA. [Paras 10.4, 12] Electricity Act, 2003 – s.125 – Scope and ambit of appellate jurisdiction:
Held: The position that emerges in this case, it is a little more restrictive as the requirement under Section 125 is not merely a ‘question of a law’ but a ‘substantial question of law’ – The restrictive scope of appellate jurisdiction is a product not only of the statutory preconditions, but also a necessary measure to enable freedom to statutory regulator and Tribunal to develop sectorial laws through a principled and consistent approach. [Paras 1, 7.4] Contract Act, 1872 – Chapter III – ss.32 and 56 – Power Purchase Agreement – Force Majeure:
Held: The law on force majeure, specifically in the context of PPAs, has been comprehensively dealt with by this Court in Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission – The Court delved into contractual jurisprudence on force majeure 1026 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports clauses and frustration of contracts – It held that Sections 32 and 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 govern the law on force majeure – When the contract contains an express or implied force majeure clause, it is governed under Chapter III of the Contract Act, specifically Section 32 – In such cases, the ‘doctrine of frustration’ in Section 56 does not apply and the court must interpret the force majeure clause contained in the contract – It held that a force majeure clause must be narrowly construed. [Para 10.1] Case Law Cited Chennamangathihalli Solar Power Project LLP v. BESCOM, 2020 SCC OnLine APTEL 75; SEBI v. Mega Corporation Limited [2022] 2 SCR 546 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 361; Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [2017] 3 SCR 153 : (2017) 14 SCC 80 – referred to.
List of Acts Electricity Act, 2003; Contract Act, 1872.
List of Keywords Section 125 of Electricity Act, 2003; Section 32 and section 56 of Contract Act, 1872; Power Purchase Agreement; Force Majeure; Reduction in tariff; Frustration of contract; Question of law; Substantial question of law; Solar Power Project.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7595 of 2021 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2021 of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, New Delhi in Appeal No. 38 of 2019 With Civil Appeal Nos. 7608 and 6386 of 2021 Appearances for Parties K.M. Nataraj, ASG, Yasobant Das, Sr. Adv., Ms. Garima Jain, Arnav Khanna, Tushar Mahindroo, Mohit Singh, Arunav Patnaik, Ms. Bhabna Das, Advs. for the Appellants.
Prateek K. Chadha, A.A.G., Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini, Syed Faraz Alam, Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Aggarwal, Ujjal Banerjee, Anmol Sehgal, V. N. Raghupathy, Sreekar Aechuri, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1027Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Table of Contents* Facts: ........................................................................................ 2 KERC’s order: .......................................................................... 5 APTEL’s impugned order: ......................................................... 6 Submissions: .............................................................................. 10 Scope of Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Act: ................................................................ 13 Analysis on merits: .................................................................... 16 Clauses of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA): ................. 17 Re: Applicability of the force majeure clause: ............................ 21 Conclusion ............................................................................... 26 Judgment Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1. The short issue arising from these appeals is whether the extension of the Scheduled Commissioning Date 1 was occasioned under the force majeure clause of the Power Purchase Agreement, 2 and consequently, whether the reduction in tariff payable to the respondents is justified. While upholding the decision of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity3 we have examined the scope and ambit of our appellate jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 4 We have held that the restrictive scope of appellate jurisdiction is a product not only of the statutory preconditions, but also a necessary measure to enable freedom to statutory regulator and Tribunal to develop sectorial laws through a principled and consistent approach.
2. Facts : Since the facts and the PPAs are similar in all three appeals, we will deal with the facts in the lead Civil Appeal No. 7595/2021, where the most relevant facts are as follows:
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1 Hereinafter “SCD”.
2 Hereinafter “PPA”.
3 Hereinafter “APTEL”.
4 Hereinafter “the Act”.
1028 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 2.1 State of Karnataka introduced a policy dated 26.08.2014 to identify and promote solar energy projects by land-owning farmers. These solar power plants of 1-3 MW capacity would generate and sell power to the State Electricity (Distribution) Supply Companies 5 at the tariff determined by the Karnataka Electricity Regulatory Commission. 6 2.2 Respondent no. 2 is one of the many farmers who applied under the policy and is recognised as a solar power developer 7 under the policy. Respondent No.1 is a special purpose vehicle to undertake the solar power project in Chitradurga district in Karnataka.
2.3 Pursuant to a Letter of Award dated 28.08.2015, the appellant entered into a PPA with respondent no. 2 on 29.08.2015. This PPA was approved by the KERC on 07.09.2015. The relevant clauses of the PPA will be discussed later, but an important aspect to note at this juncture is that the SPV must achieve commercial operation within 18 months from the effective date as per Article 1.1(xxviii) read with Article 4.1(c) of the PPA. Effective date is defined under Article 1.1(xii) as the date of signing the PPA. Hence, the SCD for the project was 28.02.2017 as per these clauses.
2.4 The SPV (respondent no. 1) was incorporated on 05.02.2016. The respondents then submitted an application for land conversion on 16.02.2016. On 10.03.2016, they paid the evacuation approval processing fee. On 27.12.2016, they paid the land conversion processing fee, and the approval for conversion was granted on 07.01.2017. The evacuation scheme was provisionally approved on 13.05.2016, and the final approval was on 22.08.2016.
2.5 Several farmers, including the respondent, raised concerns regarding delay in the execution of the project on account of delay in getting land use conversion, delay in getting evacuation approvals, demonetisation, and other reasons. Hence, the 5 Hereinafter “DISCOMs”.
6 Hereinafter “KERC”.
7 Hereinafter “SPD”.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1029Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others Government of Karnataka by a letter dated 24.11.2016 directed all DISCOMs to set up 3-member committees to examine each request for extension.
2.6 The present respondents requested a 6-month extension under Article 2.5 of the PPA on 03.12.2016. This was approved by the appellant through a letter dated 02.03.2017.
2.7 However, by a letter dated 05.04.2017, KERC directed the DISCOMs that all requests for extensions must be filed before it. Pursuant to this letter, the respondents filed a petition before the KERC seeking extension of time for the commercial operation of the project and invoked the force majeure clause in the PPA (Article 8.3).
2.8 During the pendency of the petition, the respondents’ solar power project was commissioned on 24.08.2017, within the extended period of 24 months.
3. KERC’s order : In its order dated 18.09.2018, the KERC rejected the various causes of delay put forth by the respondents and held that the force majeure clause must be strictly interpreted. First, delay in approval of the PPA by KERC was held to have no bearing on the initial obligations of the SPD in applying for approvals, loans, etc as the respondents had not proved the same. Second, it found that the respondent had applied for conversion of land only on 18.02.2016, over five months after signing the PPA and paid the charges only on 27.12.2016, after which it was allowed on 07.01.2017. Hence, the delay in conversion of land use was attributed to the respondent. Third, the delay in disbursement of loan also did not delay the implementation as the respondent had commenced implementation from its own funds. Fourth, the respondent applied for the evacuation approval only on 25.02.2016, and the regular approval was finally granted on 22.08.2016. Hence, the respondent delayed the application and cannot attribute the same to the authorities. Similarly, the KERC also rejected delay on other grounds such as time taken for delivery of the breaker, and inspection of the project and grant of safety approval. 3.1 It also found that the respondents had not submitted a notice as contemplated under Article 8.3(b)(i) and hence, they are not entitled to invoke force majeure and claim an extension of time under Article 2.5. Since the KERC found that the delay in 1030 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports securing approvals and the consequent delay in commissioning was attributable to the respondents, it imposed liquidated damages under Articles 2.2 and 2.5.7 of the PPA.
3.2 Lastly, the KERC reduced the tariff payable to the respondent to Rs. 4.36 per unit for the term of the PPA by relying on Article 5.1 of the PPA.
4. APTEL’s impugned order : The respondent’s appeal against the order of the KERC was allowed by the APTEL by the order impugned before us. The APTEL dealt with each ground of delay raised by the respondents. First, it took note that the respondent’s application for land conversion was on 16.02.2016, after which it had to procure several documents, including a PTCL certificate, as provided under Rule 106A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Further, these documents must be secured from various government departments, which is a laborious process. The PTCL certificate was issued by the government only on 04.10.2016, although the respondent had applied for it even before signing the PPA. Hence, it found that the respondent could not be blamed for the delay in getting approval for land use conversion.
4.1 Further, the APTEL also took note of the State Government’s opinion to grant deemed conversion in such projects due to the number of SPDs facing similar issues. However, the APTEL observed, the guidelines to revenue authorities were unclear and hence the SPDs could not benefit from the same. The delay in the issuance of these guidelines and the confusion among authorities regarding deemed conversion had also resulted in a delay in obtaining land use conversion, which the respondents cannot be faulted for.
4.2 Second, the APTEL found that although the application for grid connectivity and evacuation approval were submitted on 25.02.2016, the final approval was only given on 22.08.2016, after a lapse of 5 months. Until this approval is given, the authorities will not prepare the bay SLD and layout drawings with estimation of bay erection. The bay intimation notice was received by the respondents only a few days before the original SCD, and it was 170 days after the grant of final evacuation approval. Hence, there was a delay in the construction of the bay that was not caused by the respondents.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1031Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others 4.3 Relying on other decisions by the APTEL, it held that the date of signing the PPA will not be the effective date, as provided in Article 1.1(xxviii). Rather, the PPA becomes effective only when it is approved by the KERC, which in this case was on 07.09.2015. Hence, 18 months must be calculated from this date.
4.4 The APTEL observed that the appellant had itself approved the extension of time by 6 months after a Technical Committee constituted by it had scrutinised all relevant documents. Hence, the appellant could not take the stance that the respondents were not diligent. Even before the KERC, the appellant had not objected to the grounds raised by the respondents, and hence they could not take a contrary stance at this stage.
4.5 Considering the delay in obtaining the PTCL certificate and approval for land conversion, the approval for evacuation, and construction of the bay, the APTEL found that the respondents had taken all necessary care and caution and acted with due diligence. Hence, it held that the respondents could not be blamed for the delay as the time taken by government authorities to provide approvals was not within their control and they had taken all the measures that they could. Consequently, the APTEL found that the respondents are entitled to the benefit of the force majeure clause and an extension of time, as was already approved by the appellant. The respondents were able to commission the project on 24.08.2017, which falls within the extended period of 24 months from 07.09.2015.
4.6 With regard to the reduction in tariff by the KERC, APTEL considered that the government scheme, under which these PPAs were signed, was intended to create opportunity and benefit for farmers by establishing solar power plants. The farmers had invested huge amounts, sometimes through loans, in these projects and a reduction in tariff from Rs. 8.40 to Rs. 4.36 per unit would adversely affect them. Hence, it directed the appellant to pay the difference in per unit tariff along with the late payment surcharge as provided under Article 6.4 of the PPA.
4.7 Lastly, it also set aside the imposition of liquidated damages under the PPA as it found that there was no delay in securing approvals and commissioning the project.
1032 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
5. Submissions: We have heard Mr. K.M. Nataraj, ASG and Mr. Yasobant Das, senior advocate appearing for the appellants, and Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, senior advocate for the respondents. The learned counsels have, through the course of their submissions, emphasised on whether or not the delay in the present matter would be covered under the force majeure clause of the PPA.
5.1 Learned ASG argued that a force majeure clause must be strictly interpreted. There must be a specific pleading by the party claiming force majeure and the burden is on him to prove the same. In this regard, he made two primary submissions: first, there was no force majeure event that warrants an extension of time under Article 2.5 of the PPA; and second, the respondents have not complied with the requirement of submitting a written notice invoking force majeure as required under Article 8.3(b)(i). Further, he has also argued that the APTEL was not justified in granting late payment surcharge to the respondent as the same was not pleaded before the KERC or in appeal.
5.2 In regard the argument on force majeure, Mr. Nataraj has taken us through the various dates concerning approval for change in land use and the evacuation approval. He has submitted that the delay in securing these approvals is attributable to the respondents, who were required to obtain these permissions within the contractually stipulated period of 365 days under Article 2.1 of the PPA, and to finally commission the project within a period of 18 months. Despite being aware of these timelines, he submits that the respondents delayed the applications and payment of requisite fees. The government departments provided the approvals within a few days from the time when the respondents fulfilled all requirements. He therefore submits that the delay is attributable to the respondents and hence, as per Article 8.3(b)(iv), they cannot claim benefit of force majeure. Consequently, the tariff must be reduced as per Article 5.1 as a higher tariff increases the burden on consumers and hence, affects public interest.
5.3 Mr. Das supplemented these submissions by arguing that in Civil Appeal No. 6386 of 2021, the respondents therein had also raised the ground of demonetisation as a reason for delay in commissioning. He submits that Article 8.3 of the PPA does not cover such a ground as a force majeure event.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1033Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Hirehalli Solar Power Project LLP & Others
6. Mr. Patil, appearing for the respondents, has submitted that there are three primary factors, among several others, that caused the delay – (i) time taken for converting the land; (ii) time taken for the KERC to approve the PPA; and (iii) time taken for the evacuation approval. He submits that these concerns have been raised by not only the respondents in the present case but in several other cases. Due to the extent to which SPDs were facing these issues, the government directed DISCOMs to set up committees to look into the same and consider the facts of each case individually. It is pursuant to this direction that the respondents’ case was considered by the appellant, who granted a 6-month extension on 02.03.2017 by exercising its power under Article 2.5 read with Article 8.3 of the PPA. He submits that it was incorrect for the KERC to then require the respondents to file a separate petition to seek extension as the same is not as per the terms of the PPA. He further submits that the KERC had perversely appreciated the evidence regarding delay and that it should not have rejected the petition when the appellant had already granted the extension. Further, he submitted that the respondents were able to complete the project within the extended time period.
6.1 Mr. Patil also took us through several orders of this Court 8 that dismiss appeals arising out of similar orders by the APTEL. He has specifically referred to the APTEL’s decision in Chennamangathihalli Solar Power Project LLP v. BESCOM 9 and has submitted that this decision has been relied on by the APTEL in several subsequent decisions arising out of similar facts, including the present impugned order. This Court has dismissed the appeal arising out of Chennamangathihalli (supra) 10 and appeals from other APTEL orders relying on it. Mr. Nataraj, in his written submissions, has sought to differentiate these cases from the present matter on facts.
7. Scope of Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Act: Before we deal with the submissions of the learned counsels, we must take note of the scope of our appellate jurisdiction under Section 125, which reads:
8 In Civil Appeal No. 3958/2020; Civil Appeal No. 897/2022; Civil Appeal No. 5134/2021; Civil Appeal Diary Nos. 32980/2022, 33053/2022 and 33572/2022.
9 2020 SCC OnLine APTEL 75.
10 In Civil Appeal No. 3958/2020.
1034 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “Section 125. (Appeal to Supreme Court):
Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908…”
7.1 Section 100 of the CPC restricts the High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeals to cases that involve ‘substantial questions of law’. There are two components to this requirement – (i) there must be a ‘question of law’; and (ii) such question of law must be ‘substantial’.
7.2 In SEBI v. Mega Corporation Limited, 11 this Court analysed the meaning of ‘question of law’ to determine the scope of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, 1992. 12 It held that this phrase is open textured and must be interpreted by looking at the words in their context. 13 The relevant portions are extracted:
“17. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 15Z to consider any question of law arising from the orders of the Tribunal should therefore be seen in the ‘context’ of the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Sections 15K, 15L, 15M, 15T, 15U and 15Y of the Act. It is in the functioning of the Tribunal to re-examine all questions of fact at the appellate stage while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15T of the Act. In Clariant and National Securities Depository, this Court had an occasion to examine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and explain that the Tribunal has wide powers. Being a permanent body, apart from acting as an appellate 11 [2022] 2 SCR 546 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 361 12 Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, 1992 reads:
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