Basavaraj v. Indira and Others
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 151; [2024] 2 S.C.R. 935
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Rajesh Bindal
- Decided
- 29 Feb 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2886/2012
- Sections
- 96(3)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 2 S.C.R. 935 : 2024 INSC 151 Basavaraj v.
Indira and Others (Civil Appeal No. 2886 of 2012)
29 February 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration High Court, if justified in allowing the amendment application, changing the nature of suit from partition to declaration. Headnotes Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. VI r. 17 – Amendment of pleadings – When allowed – On facts, suit for partition and separate possession – When the matter reached the stage of arguments, application for amendment of the plaint filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, seeking relief of declaration of the earlier compromise decree being null and void, pleading oversight and mistake, on the part of the respondents No. 1 and 2 – Trial court dismissed the application, however, the High Court allowed the same – Correctness:
Held: Application for amendment may be rejected if it seeks to introduce totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the suit – Ord. VI r. 17 prevents an application for amendment after the trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that despite due diligence the party could not have raised the issue before the commencement of trial – Important factor, to be considered is as to whether the amendment would cause prejudice to the other side or it fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case or a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred on the date of filing the application – On facts, the relief sought would certainly change the nature of the suit, which may be impermissible – If the amendment is allowed, it would certainly prejudice the 936 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports appellant – What cannot be done directly, cannot be allowed to be done indirectly – Application for amendment was filed 5 years after passing of the compromise decree, which is sought to be challenged by way of amendment – Limitation for challenging any decree is three years – As with the passage of time, right had accrued in favour of the appellant with reference to challenge to the compromise decree, the same cannot be taken away on account of delay in filing the application – Even if on any ground the amendment could be permitted, still no relief could be claimed as all the parties thereto were not before the Court in the suit in question – Impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside – Application for amendment of the plaint is dismissed. [Paras 8-14] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. 23 – Compromise decree – Challenge to, when:
Held: Appeal is not maintainable against a consent decree – No separate suit can be filed – Consent decree operates as an estoppel and binding unless it is set aside by the court by an order on an application under the proviso to Order XXIII r. 3 – Only remedy available to a party to a consent decree is to approach the Court which recorded the compromise as it was opined to be nothing else but a contract between the parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the Court. [Para 7] Case Law Cited Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others, [2009] 15 SCR 103 : (2009) 10 SCC 84 – relied on.
Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another, [2008] 17 SCR 505 : (2009) 2 SCC 409; Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy and others, (2001) 8 SCC 115; Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., [2001] Suppl. 3 SCR 68 : (2001) 8 SCC 97; Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through L.R.
Sadhna Rai (Smt.) v. Rajinder Singh and others, [2006] [2024] 2 S.C.R. 937Basavaraj v. Indira and Others Suppl. 3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566; M. Revanna v.
Anjanamma (Dead) by legal representatives and others, (2019) 4 SCC 332 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Application for amendment; Due diligence; Commencement of trial; Suit for partition and separate possession; Compromise decree; Oversight and by mistake; Delay; Consent decree.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2886 of 2012 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.08.2010 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in WP No. 82086 of 2010 Appearances for Parties Nishanth Patil, Ayush P. Shah, Vignesh Adithya S., Ankolekar Gurudatta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ashok Kumar Gupta II, Shankar Divate, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Rajesh Bindal, J.
1. Vide impugned order1 passed by the High Court2, an application filed by respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs for amendment of the plaint was allowed subject to costs of ₹2,000/-.
2. Briefly, the facts available on record are that respondents No. 1 and 2 filed a suit3 for partition of the ancestral property belonging to their grand father pleading that no actual partition of the property has ever taken place. When the suit was at the fag end, an application was filed by respondents No. 1 and 2 seeking amendment of the plaint. 1 Order dated 18.08.2010 passed in W.P. No. 82086 of 2010 2 High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Gulbarga 3 Original Suit No. 151 of 2005 938 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports The amendment sought was to add prayer in the suit for a declaration that an earlier compromise decree dated 14.10.2004 was null and void. As prayer was not made earlier, the court fee required thereon was also sought to be affixed. The ground on which the amendment was sought was that due to oversight and mistake, the respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs were unable to seek the relief of declaration. No prejudice as such would be caused to the defendants as limited relief is for fair partition of the ancestral property. The Trial Court4 dismissed the application. However, when the order5 was challenged before the High Court, the same was set aside and the amendment prayed for by the plaintiffs was allowed subject to payment of costs.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the case in hand, there was a family partition in Original Suit No. 401 of 2003 filed by Smt. Mahadevi and Smt. Sharnamma, wife and daughter-in-law respectively of defendant No.1/Shivasharnappa, impleading the plaintiffs and the defendants as party. A compromise decree dated 14.10.2004 was passed by the Lok Adalat, District Legal Services Authority, Gulbarga. Thereafter, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed a fresh suit in 2005 seeking partition of the ancestral property. Though in the suit pleading was there with reference to the earlier compromise decree, however for the reasons best known to the plaintiffs, no challenge was made to the same. As a result of the order passed by the High Court, the nature of the suit was changed from partition to declaration, which is impermissible.
3.1 Further in terms of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, no amendment could be allowed after commencement of the trial. In the case in hand, the suit was at the fag end, as fixed for arguments.
3.2 It was further submitted that the compromise decree was passed on 14.10.2004. In terms of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, the same could be challenged only before the same Court and not before any other Court.
3.3 He further contended that there was a specific stand taken by the appellant/defendant No. 2 in the written statement that 4 First Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Gulbarga 5 Order dated 31.05.2010 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 939Basavaraj v. Indira a n d O t h e r s there being a compromise decree in existence, no relief may be admissible to respondents No. 1 and 2, unless that decree is challenged. The written statement was filed in August 2005, still no steps taken by the respondents No. 1 and 2 in that direction. Part of the suit property having been sold, an amendment was carried out in the plaint in July 2006 to implead the subsequent purchaser. Even at that stage, this relief was not sought. 3.4 It was further contended that the relief of declaration of compromise decree being null and void prayed for by way of amendment otherwise also was time barred as the compromise decree was passed on 14.10.2004. The application for amendment was filed on 08.02.2010. Even the court fee was sought to be affixed at the time of filing of application for amendment.
3.5 The application filed by respondents No. 1 and 2 did not meet the pre-conditions laid down in Order VI Rule 17 CPC for permitting respondents No. 1 and 2 to amend the pleadings at the fag end of the trial. No due diligence was pleaded. All what was stated was that there was oversight on the part of respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs.
3.6 Referring to the parties who were there in the compromise decree, it was argued that some of them are not parties in the suit in question, hence otherwise also challenge to the compromise decree may not be maintainable.
3.7 In support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon the judgments of this Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others6 and Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another7
4. In response, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 submitted that it was merely an oversight mistake which occurred at the time of filing of the suit and at the subsequent stage for which the amendment was prayed for by respondents No. 1 and 2. It is not a case where the pleadings to that effect are not available on record. Respondents No. 1 and 2 had fairly pleaded about the earlier compromise decree. 6 [2009] 15 SCR 103 : (2009) 10 SCC 84 7 [2008] 17 SCR 505 : (2009) 2 SCC 409 940 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Inadvertently, the prayer for declaration thereof as null and void could not be made. The court fee also could not be deposited. No fresh evidence is to be led. The case is at the arguments stage. The same can be argued with mere re-framing of the issues. It will avoid multiplicity of litigation and ultimately complete justice will be done amongst the parties, who are merely praying for partition of the ancestral property. The other side can be compensated with costs, as was even done by the High Court. No prejudice as such will be caused to the appellant. Substantial justice will be done to the parties. In support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy and others 8 and Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.9
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant referred record.
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