Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 24; [2024] 1 S.C.R. 743
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 8 Jan 2024
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 491/2022
- Sections
- 432, 432(7), 432(2), 433, 433A, 376, 376(2), 435, 64, 435(1), 406, 360
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* Author [2024] 1 S.C.R. 743 : 2024 INSC 24 Bilkis Yakub Rasool v.
Union of India & Others (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 491 of 2022)
08 January 2024 [B.V. Nagarathna* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Writ petition filed u/Art. 32 by one of the victims challenging the order of State of Gujarat granting remission and early release of 11 convicts held guilty in Bilkis Bano matter, if maintainable; writ petitions filed as Public Interest Litigation, assailing the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022, if maintainable; Government of State of Gujarat, if competent to pass the impugned orders of remission in favour of convicts in Bilkis Bano case; Order of remission passed by the State of Gujarat in favour of convicts in Bilkis Bano case, if in accordance with law; and the 11 convicts having been granted liberty and released from imprisonment by virtue of the orders of remission which has been declared and quashed as wholly without jurisdiction and non est, should the convicts be sent back to prison.
Headnotes Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Grant of remission – Bilkis Bano matter – Order of State of Gujarat granting remission and early release of 11 convicts held guilty of committing heinous crimes of gangrape, murder and rioting armed with deadly weapons during the large-scale riots in Gujarat in the aftermath of the Godhra train burning incident – Challenge to:
Held: Government of State of Gujarat was not competent to pass the orders of remission in favour of the convicts as it was not the appropriate Government – State of Maharashtra, had the jurisdiction to consider the application for remission as the convicts were sentenced by the Special Court, Mumbai – Government of the State of Gujarat usurped the powers of the State of Maharashtra which only could have considered the applications seeking remission – Also the Remission Policy of 1992 of the State of Gujarat was not applicable to the convicts – Thus, the Orders of remission dated 744 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 10.08.2022 not being in accordance with law is illegal, vitiated and thus, quashed – Also the judgment dated 13.05.2022 passed by this Court directing the State of Gujarat to consider the application for pre mature release is a nullity and is non est in law since the said order was fraudulently obtained at the hands of this Court, and the said order being contrary to the larger bench decisions of this Court, is per incuriam – Thus, the rule of law is to prevail – 11 convicts to report to the concerned jail authorities within the stipulated period. [Paras 56, 70] Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Bilkis Bano matter – Writ petition filed u/Art. 32 by one of the victims challenging the order of State of Gujarat granting remission and early release of 11 convicts held guilty of committing heinous crimes of gangrape, murder and rioting armed with deadly weapons during the large-scale riots in Gujarat in the aftermath of the Godhra train burning incident – Maintainability:
Held: Writ Petition filed u/Art. 32 is clearly maintainable – It was not mandatory for the petitioner to have filed a writ petition u/ Art. 226 before the Gujarat High Court – Petitioner-Bilkis Bano filed writ petition u/Art. 32 to enforce her fundamental rights u/ Art. 21 and Art. 14 – Access to justice includes speedy remedy, the petition could not be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy u/Art. 226 – Furthermore, in view of the submission regarding the State of Gujarat not being the competent State to consider the validity of the orders of remission in a petition filed u/Art. 226, particularly, when the question of competency was raised, could not have been dealt with by the Gujarat High Court on the principle of judicial propriety. [Paras 22.2-22.3, 56] Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Public interest litigation – Bilkis Bano matter – Writ petition filed as public interest litigation challenging the order of State of Gujarat granting remission in favour of convicts guilty of committing heinous crimes of gangrape, murder and rioting armed with deadly weapons during the large-scale riots in Gujarat in the aftermath of the Godhra train burning incident – Maintainability:
Held: Writ petitions filed as public interest litigation assailing the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 are maintainable or not, is kept open to be raised in any other appropriate case – It is not necessary to answer the point regarding maintainability of the PILs inasmuch as one of the victims, also filed a writ petition [2024] 1 S.C.R. 745Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others invoking Art. 32 assailing the orders of remission which has been held to be maintainable – Consideration of that petition on its merits would suffice in the instant case. [Paras 27, 56] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Bilkis Bano matter – Grant of remission – Investigation transferred to CBI by this Court – Thereafter, trial of the case pending before the Sessions Judge, Dahod, Ahmedabad transferred to the competent court in Mumbai – 11 accused convicted for offence of gangrape and murder by Mumbai court which was upheld by the High Court and this Court – One of the victims, respondent no. 3 challenged the non-consideration of his application for premature release u/ss.433 and 433A before the Gujarat High Court – High Court held that since the trial had taken place in the State of Maharashtra, the ‘appropriate government’ would be the State of Maharashtra and not the Government of Gujarat to grant remission – Application for remission moved before the Government of Maharashtra, who sought opinion of CBI and Special CBI court which opined against premature release in view of the remission policy, as also against other convicts remission applications – Thereafter, respondent no. 3 filed writ petition before this Court seeking direction to the State of Gujarat to consider his application for pre-mature release under its policy of 1992 – Issuance of direction by this Court by order dated 13.05.2022, to the State of Gujarat to consider the application for pre mature release in terms of the policy of 1992, being the appropriate government – Subsequently, the State of Gujarat issued orders dated 10.08.22 granting remission and early release of 11 convicts – Government of State of Gujarat, if competent to pass the impugned orders of remission:
Held: When an authority does not have the jurisdiction to deal with a matter or it is not within the powers of the authority i.e. the State of Gujarat in the instant case, to be the appropriate Government to pass orders of remission u/s. 432 , the orders of remission would have no legs to stand – In view of s. 432 (7) read with s. 432 (1) and (2), the Government of State of Gujarat had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications for remission or pass the orders of remission on 10.08.2022 in favour of 11 convicts as it was not the appropriate Government within the meaning of the said provisions – It is the State of Maharashtra, which had the jurisdiction to consider the application for remission vis-à-vis 11 746 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports convicts as they were sentenced by the Special Court, Mumbai – Orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 made in favour of 11 convicts are illegal, vitiated and thus, quashed – Also the judgment dated 13.05.2022 passed by this Court is a nullity and is non est in law since the said order was sought by suppression of material facts as well as by misrepresentation of facts and thus, fraudulently obtained at the hands of this Court – Furthermore, the order dated 13.05.2022, being contrary to the larger bench decisions of this Court, (holding that it is the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced which is the appropriate Government which can consider an application seeking remission of a sentence) is per incuriam and is not a binding precedent – Thus, the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 are quashed. [Paras 33.8, 33.9, 46, 56] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Bilkis Bano matter – Investigation transferred to CBI by this Court – Thereafter, trial of the case pending before the Sessions Judge, Dahod, Ahmedabad transferred to the competent court in Mumbai – 11 accused convicted for offence of gangrape and murder by Mumbai court which was upheld by the High Court and this Court – One of the victims, respondent no. 3 challenged the non-consideration of his application for premature release u/ss.433 and 433A before the Gujarat High Court – High Court held that since the trial had taken place in the State of Maharashtra, the ‘appropriate government’ would be the State of Maharashtra and not the Government of Gujarat to grant remission – Application for remission moved before the Government of Maharashtra, who sought opinion of CBI and Special CBI court which opined against premature release in view of the remission policy as also against other convicts remission applications – Thereafter, respondent no. 3 filed writ petition before this Court seeking direction to the State of Gujarat to consider his application for pre-mature release under its policy of 1992 – Issuance of direction by this Court by order dated 13.05.2022, to the State of Gujarat to consider the application for pre mature release in terms of the policy of 1992, being the appropriate government – Subsequently, the State of Gujarat issued orders dated 10.08.22 granting remission and early release of 11 convicts – Order of remission dated 10.08.2022 passed by the State of Gujarat in favour of convicts, if in accordance with law:
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 747Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s Held: Order of remission dated 10.08.2022 passed by the State of Gujarat in favour of 11 convicts is not in accordance with law – Government of the State of Gujarat had usurped the powers of the State of Maharashtra which only could have considered the applications seeking remission – Hence, the doctrine of usurpation of powers applies – State of Gujarat never sought for the review of the order of this Court dated 13.05.2022 by bringing to the notice of this Court that it was contrary to s.432(7) and judgments of this Court – Policy of 1992 of the State of Gujarat was not applicable to the case of 11 convicts – Opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court before which the conviction of 11 convicts was made- Special Court, Mumbai (Maharashtra) was rendered ineffective by the Government of the State of Gujarat which in any case had no jurisdiction to entertain the plea for remission of convicts – Opinion of the Sessions Judge at Dahod was wholly without jurisdiction as the same was in breach of s.432(2) – Furthermore, while considering the applications seeking remission, the Jail Advisory Committee, Dahod and the other authorities lost sight of the fact that 11 convicts had not yet paid the fine ordered by the Special Court, Mumbai which had been upheld by the Bombay High Court. [Paras 50.4, 56] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 432(2) – Power to suspend or remit sentence – Application made to the appropriate Government for remission of a sentence – Requirement of the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the convicting court: Held: s. 432(2) states that when an application is made to the appropriate Government, inter alia, for remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion – The opinion must state as to, whether, the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion which must have bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case and be in tandem with the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists; and also must forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists – Having regard to the requirements which the Presiding Judge must comply with while stating his opinion to the appropriate Government on an application for remission of sentence made by a convict, the expression “may” has to be interpreted as “shall” and as a mandatory requirement 748 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports u/s.432 – Furthermore, it cannot be left to the whims and fancies of the appropriate Government either to seek or not to seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge or the Court before which the conviction had taken place. [Paras 51, 52.2, 52.3] Sentence/sentencing – Imprisonment undergone in default of payment of fine – Nature of:
Held: Sentence of imprisonment awarded to a person for committing an offence is distinct than the imprisonment ordered to be undergone in default of payment of fine – Latter is not a substantive sentence for commission of the offence but is in the nature of penalty for default in payment of fine – On facts, while considering the applications for remission, the Jail Advisory Committee did not take into consideration whether the convicts had tendered the fine imposed by the Special Court and affirmed by the High Court as well as by this Court – Had the State of Gujarat considered the opinion from the Presiding Judge of the Court which had convicted, the accused, the aspect regarding non-payment of fine would have surfaced – In the absence of non-compliance with the direction to pay fine, there would be default sentence which would be in the nature of penalty – Question whether the default sentence or penalty had to be undergone by these respondents, was a crucial consideration at the time of recommending remission to the State Government by the Jail Advisory Committee – This aspect of the matter has also not been taken into consideration by the State Government while passing the impugned orders of remission. [Paras 54.3-54.4] Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Bilkis Bano matter – Remission order by the State of Gujarat granting remission and early release of 11 convicts held guilty of committing heinous crimes of gangrape, murder and rioting armed with deadly weapons during the large-scale riots in Gujarat in the aftermath of the Godhra train burning incident – 11 convicts granted liberty and released from imprisonment by virtue of the orders – Said order has been declared and quashed as wholly without jurisdiction and non est – Effect of, on the beneficiaries of the remission order:
Held: Rule of law means wherever and whenever the State fails to perform its duties, the Court would step in to ensure that the rule of law prevails over the abuse of the process of law – Such abuse may result from, inter alia, inaction or even arbitrary action [2024] 1 S.C.R. 749Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others of protecting the true offenders or failure by different authorities in discharging statutory or other obligations in consonance with the procedural and penal statutes – Breach of the rule of law, amounts to negation of equality u/Art. 14 – On facts, convicts have been the beneficiaries of the orders passed by an incompetent authority inasmuch as the impugned orders are not passed by the appropriate Government within the meaning of s. 432 – Art. 142 cannot be invoked in favour of the convicts to allow them to remain out of jail as that would be an instance of this Court’s imprimatur to ignore rule of law and instead aid persons who are beneficiaries of orders which are null and void and therefore non est in the eye of law – Furthermore, respondent No.3 abused the process of law and the court in obtaining remission – Thus, in complying with the principles of rule of law which encompasses the principle of equal protection of law as enshrined in Art. 14, ‘deprivation of liberty’ vis-à-vis 11 convicts is justified in as much as the said respondents have erroneously and contrary to law been set at liberty – They were released pursuant to the impugned remission orders which have been quashed – Impugned orders of remission having been set aside, the natural consequences must follow – Thus, 11 convicts directed to report to the concerned jail authorities within the stipulated period. [Paras 62, 70] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432 and 433 – Expression ‘appropriate government’ – Meaning of – ‘Appropriate government’ when can assume power to grant remission:
Held: Expression “appropriate Government” used in s. 432 as well as in s. 433, is defined in sub-section (7) of s.432 – It clearly indicates that the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced, is the appropriate Government to pass an order of remission – Expression “appropriate Government” also finds place in sub section (1) of s. 432 which states that when any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any condition which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced – Sub-section (1) of s. 432 deals with a power vested with the appropriate Government which is an enabling power – Discretion vested with the appropriate Government has to be exercised judiciously in an appropriate case and not to abuse the same – However, when an application is made 750 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed and on considering the reasons for such opinion, may consider the application for remission – In almost all cases, the court before which the offender was sentenced is located within the territory of a State Government wherein the offence occurred and, therefore, in such a case, there can be no further doubt about the meaning of the expression appropriate Government – Even in a case where the trial has been transferred by this Court from a court of competent jurisdiction of a State to a court in another State, it is still the Government of the State within which the offender was sentenced which is the appropriate Government which has the jurisdiction as well as competency to pass an order of remission u/s. 432 – Thus, it is not the Government of the State within whose territory the offence occurred or the convict is imprisoned which can assume the power of remission. [Paras 32.2, 33.2, 33.3, 33.5, 33.6] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Power to grant remission on an application filed by the convict or on his behalf – Exercise of:
Held: Is an exercise of discretion by the appropriate Government – Where there is exercise of legal power coupled with discretion by administrative authorities, the test is, whether, the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers – This would not only mean that the concerned authority and the appropriate Government had not only the jurisdiction and authority vested to exercise its powers but it exercised its powers in accordance with law i.e., not in an arbitrary or perverse manner without regard to the actual facts or unreasonably or which would lead to a conclusion in the mind of the Court that there has been an improper exercise of discretion – If there is improper exercise of discretion, it is an instance of an abuse of discretion – There can be abuse of discretion when the administrative order or exercise of discretion smacks of mala fides or when it is for any purpose based on irrelevant consideration by ignoring relevant consideration or it is due to a colourable exercise of power; it is unreasonable and there is absence of proportionality – There could also be an abuse of discretion where there is failure to apply discretion owing to mechanical exercise of power, non application of mind, acting under dictation or by seeking assistance or advice or there is any usurpation of power. [Para 49] [2024] 1 S.C.R. 751Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433A – Application for remission under – Factors to be taken into account: Held: Application for remission u/s. 432 could be only before the Government of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant was convicted (appropriate Government) and not before any other Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant may have been transferred on conviction or where the offence has occurred – Consideration for remission must be by way of an application u/s. 432 which has to be made by the convict or on his behalf – Whether there is compliance of s. 433A must be noted – Guidelines u/s. 432(2) with regard to the opinion to be sought from the Presiding Judge of the Court which had convicted the applicant must be complied with mandatorily – Policy of remission applicable would be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application – Policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply – While considering an application for remission, there cannot be any abuse of discretion – Jail Advisory Committee which has to consider the application for remission may not have the District Judge as a Member inasmuch as the District Judge, being a Judicial Officer may coincidently be the very judge who may have to render an opinion independently in terms of s. 432(2) – Reasons for grant or refusal of remission should be clearly delineated in the order by passing a speaking order – Also, it is to be considered whether the order has been passed without application of mind; that the order is mala fide; that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; and that the order suffers from arbitrariness. [Para 55] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Remission – Grant of – Abuse of discretion by administrative authorities – Usurpation of power arises when:
Held: Usurpation of power arises when a particular discretion vested in a particular authority is exercised by some other authority in whom such power does not lie – In such a case, the question whether the authority which exercised discretion was competent to do so arises. [Para 50] 752 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 432, 433, 433A and 435 – Remission – Scope and ambit of – Principles covering grant of remission – Distinction from the concepts of commutation, pardon and reprieve – Stated and discussed – Constitution of India – Arts 72 and 161. [Paras 30-32.5] Rule of law – Meaning and concept of:
Held: Rule of law means, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law; it is the basic rule of governance and democratic polity – It is only through the courts that rule of law unfolds its contours and establishes its concept – Concept of rule of law is closely intertwined with adjudication by courts of law and also with the consequences of decisions taken by courts – Therefore, the judiciary has to carry out its obligations effectively and true to the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted the task and always in favour of rule of law – There can be no rule of law if there is no equality before the law; and rule of law and equality before the law would be empty words if their violation is not a matter of judicial scrutiny or judicial review and relief and all these features would lose their significance if the courts don’t step in to enforce the rule of law – Thus, the judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and the central pillar of a democratic State – Judiciary has to perform its duties and function effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it – This Court must be a beacon in upholding rule of law failing which it would give rise to an impression that this Court is not serious about rule of law and, therefore, all Courts in the country could apply it selectively and thereby lead to a situation where the judiciary is unmindful of rule of law – This would result in a dangerous state of affairs in our democracy and democratic polity – Therefore, it is the primary duty and the highest responsibility of this Court to correct arbitrary orders at the earliest and maintain the confidence of the litigant public in the purity of the fountain of justice and thereby respect rule of law. [Paras 63, 68] Precedents – Rule of precedents – Exception to rule of precedents:
Held: Although it is the ratio decidendi which is a precedent and not the final order in the judgment, however, there are certain exceptions to the rule of precedents which are expressed by the doctrines of per incurium and sub silentio – A decision rendered [2024] 1 S.C.R. 753Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others by ignorance of a previous binding decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law is per incurium – A decision per incurium is not binding – A decision is passed sub-silentio when the particular point of law in a decision is not perceived by the court or not present to its mind or is not consciously determined by the court and it does not form part of the ratio decidendi it is not binding – On facts, the submission that since this Court in the order dated 13.05.2022 had directed that the State of Gujarat was the appropriate Government, the same was binding on the parties even though it may be contrary to the earlier decisions of this Court, cannot be accepted inasmuch as when a judgment has been delivered per incuriam or passed sub silentio, the same cannot bind either the parties to the judgment or be a binding precedent for the future even between the same parties. [Paras 44.1, 44.2, 45] Per incuriam – Meaning of:
Held: Incuria legally means carelessness and per incurium may be equated with per ignorantium – If a judgment is rendered in ignorantium of a statute or a binding authority, it becomes a decision per incurium – Thus, a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law is per incurium – Such a per incurium decision would not have a precedential value – If a decision has been rendered per incurium, it cannot be said that it lays down good law, even if it has not been expressly overruled – Thus, a decision per incurium is not binding. [Para 44.1] Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Personal liberty – Protection of liberty – When:
Held: Personal liberty is the most important constitutional value which is a fundamental right enshrined in Art. 21 – It is an inalienable right of man and can be deprived of or taken away only in accordance with law – That is the quintessence of Art. 21 – Person is entitled to protection of his liberty only in accordance with law. [Paras 58, 60] Words and phrases –Fraud – Meaning of – Stated. [Paras 42, 43, 43.1] 754 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 :
(2016) 7 SCC 1; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, [1966] 3 SCR 744 : AIR 1967 SC 1 – followed.
Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal [2000] 1 SCR 796 : (2000) 2 SCC 595; Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85 : (2013) 2 SCC 452 – relied on.
Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : AIR 1980 SC 2147; Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah v.
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Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed [1976] 3 SCR 58 : (1976) 1 SCC 671; Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy [1981] 1 SCR 73 : (1980) 4 SCC 62; State of M.P. v.
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3 SCC 346; T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka [2000] 3 SCR 1040 : (2000) 6 SCC 168; Narinder Singh v.
State of Punjab [2014] 4 SCR 1012 : (2014) 6 SCC 466; Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat [2006] 1 SCR 477 : (2006) 2 SCC 359; Ahmed Hussain Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [2009] 8 SCR 719 : (2009) 7 SCC 254; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388; Rashidul Jafar v. State of U.P. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1201; State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) 9 SCC 292; Hitesh v.
State of Gujarat (Writ Petition (Crl.) No.467/2022); Satish v. State of UP (2021) 14 SCC 580; Abdul Gani v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950) SCC OnLine MP 119; Shahejadkham Mahebubkham Pathan v. State of Gujarat [2012] 8 SCR 1177 : (2013) 1 SCC 570; Satpal v. State of Haryana [2000] 3 SCR 858 : (2000) 5 SCC 170; Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha [2009] 7 SCR 1098 : (2009) 12 SCC 748; Anita Kushwaha v.
Pushap Sudan [2016] 9 SCR 560 : (2016) 8 SCC 509;
Union of India v. Ramesh Gandhi [2011] 16 SCR 126 :
(2012) 1 SCC 476; Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [2012] 1 SCR 145 : (2012) 2 SCC 648;
Ravji v. State of Rajasthan [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195 : (1996) 2 SCC 175; Soman v. State of Kerala [2012] 11 SCR 1155 : (2013) 11 SCC 382; Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal [2013] 8 SCR 471 : (2013) 9 SCC 363; S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, [1967] 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1967 SC 1427; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; State of Haryana v. Mahender Singh [2007] 11 SCR 932 : (2007) 13 SCC 606; Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan [2001] 3 SCR 656 : (2001) 6 SCC 296; OPTO Circuit India Ltd. v. Axis Bank [2021] 2 SCR 81 : (2021) 6 SCC 707; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 226 : (1992) 4 SCC 305; Subramanian Swamy v. Raju 756 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports [2013] 8 SCR 520 : (2013) 10 SCC 465; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [1987] 1 SCR 702 : (1987) 1 SCC 288; Abdul Wahab K. v. State of Kerala [2018] 11 SCR 155 : (2018) 18 SCC 448; A.R Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 500; Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand [2001] 2 SCR 1036 : (2001) 5 SCC 407; Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat [2017] 8 SCR 682 : (2017) 9 SCC 340; Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of A.P. [1978] 1 SCR 153: (1997) 3 SCC 287; State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 235 : (2003) 7 SCC 121; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 SCR 133 : AIR 1961 SC 334; State of Mysore v. H. Srinivasmurthy [1976] 3 SCR 255 : (1976) 1 SCC 817; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440;
Poonam Latha v. M.L. Wadhwan [1987] 2 SCR 1123 : (1987) 3 SCC 347; State, through Superintendent of Police, CBI v. Nalini [1999] 3 SCR 1 : (1999) 5 SCC 253; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (Dead)
through LRs [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 422 : (1994) 1 SCC 1; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481;
K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited [2008] 10 SCR 454 : (2008) 12 SCC 481; K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194;
Ram Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2022 SC 4705; State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [1991] 3 SCR 64 : (1991) 4 SCC 139; Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 623 : (1990) 1 SCC 109; Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 :
(2004) 8 SCC 387; Amrit Das v. State of Bihar [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 69 : (2000) 5SCC 488; Kehar Singh v.
Union of India [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 1102 : (1989) 1 SCC 204; Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 705 : (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of Haryana v. Balwan [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 211: (1999)
7 SCC 355; State of Haryana v. Bhup Singh [2008] 17 SCR 1306 : (2009) 2 SCC 268; Swaran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1998] 2 SCR 206: (1998) 4 SCC 75; Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 306; Shantilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007] 10 SCR 727 : (2007) 11 SCC 243; Sharad Hiru Kolambe v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 11 SCR 720 : (2018)
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 757Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others 18 SCC 718; Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v.
State of Gujarat [2012] 8 SCR 1177 : (2013) 1 SCC 570; Surya Baksh Singh v. State of UP [2013] 14 SCR 452 : (2014) 14 SCC 222 – referred to.
Vinter v. The United Kingdom (Applications Nos.
66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10), (2016) III ECHR 317;
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969)
2 WLR 163 : (1969) 1 All ER 208; Biddle, Warden v.
Perovich, 274 US 480 (1927) – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Weater’s Constitutional Law; Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers, 1980; Halsbury’s Law of India (Administrative Law) – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Bilkis Bano; Prevention and reformation; Remission; Heinous crimes; Gujarat riots; Godhra Train incident; Communal hatred; Gangrape; Murder; Rioting armed with deadly weapons; Jail Advisory Committees; Remission Policy; Premature release; Appropriate Government; Public Interest Litigation; Third party stranger; Fundamental rights; Persons aggrieved; Premature Release of Convicts Policy of 1992; Early release of prisoners; Judicial review; Imprisonment in default for the non-payment of fine; Arbitrariness; Mala fides; Alternative legal remedies; Administrative Law; Executive power; Constitutional morality; Recidivism; Judicial intervention; Locus standi; Administrative order; Judicial propriety; Rule of law; Administrative decisions; Pardon; Reprieve; Clemency powers; Respites; Incarceration; Commutation; Transferring of a trial; Territorial Jurisdiction; 1992 Policy of Remission of the State of Gujarat; Fraud; Remission Policy dated 23.01.2014; Suppression and misleading; Suppressio veri suggestio falsi; Judicial acts; Ratio decidendi; Per incurium; Sub silentio; Rule of precedents; Jail Manual; Usurpation of power; Opinion of the Presiding Judge; Remission of sentence; Wednesbury principles; Binding precedent; Abuse of the process of law; Deprivation of liberty; Protection of the liberty.
758 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022.
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
With Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos.319, 326, 352, 403 and 422 of 2022. Appearances for Parties Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Adv., Ms. Aparna Bhat, Ms. Karishma Maria, Ms. Shobha Gupta, Pratik R. Bombarde, Yogesh Yadav, Nizam P., Ms. Rashmi Singh, Ms. Sumita Hazarika, Ms. Vrinda Grover, Ms. Devika Tulsiani, Aakarsh Kamra, Soutik Banerjee, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Warisha Farasat, Paras Nath Singh, Rohin Bhatt, Harshit Anand, Aman Naqvi, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Ms. Mriganka Kukreja, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G., Mrs. Sonia Mathur, V. Chitambaresh, Sidharth Luthra, S. Guru Krishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Annam Venkatesh, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Rajat Nair, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Yashraj Singh Bundela, Simarjeet Singh Saluja, Nikhil Chandra Jaiswal, Divik Mathur, Ms. Pratiksha Mishra, Ms. Rupakshi Soni, Ms. Prerna Dhall, Surjeet Singh, Ms. Ronika Tater, Pawan Sharma, Ms. Jyoti Verma, Surjit Nehra, Satya Ranjan Swain, Vishnu Kant, Praneet Pranav, Alabhya Dhamija, Ms. Megha Sharma, Ms. Akanksha Gupta, Amit Tiwari, Shoumendu Mukherji, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Santosh Kumar, Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Rajni Gupta, Ms. Rajni Singh, Sheezan Hashmi, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Udbhav Sinha, Arsh Chauhan, Ayush Kaushik, Ayush Agarwal, Pankaj Singhal, Ayush Anand, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Santosh Kumar, Amit Sharma, Shreyas Balaji, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Sandeep Singh, Rajan K. Chourasia, Rajeev Ranjan, Ms. Snehlata Mishra, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Adarsh Pandey, Rishi Malhotra, Vishal Arun, Sushil Kumar Dubey, Santosh Kumar, Sayooj Mohan Das M., Bhaskar Gautham, Mrinal Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Ms. Aarushi Gupta, Divyansh Singh, Hira Singh Rawat, Shiv Kumar Vats, Shailja Sharma, Ms. Rinki Singh, Sandeep Singh, Prashant Padmanabhan, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 759Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nagarathna, J.
Table of Contents* Sr.
No.
Particulars Page No(s).
1 Preface 3-5 2 Details of the writ petitioners 5-9 3 Factual Background 9-25 4 Counter affidavit of State of Gujarat 25-47 5 Submissions 47-87 6 Reply Arguments 87-101 7 Points for consideration 101-251 (A) Re: Point No.1: Whether the petition filed by one of the victims in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable?
102-106 (B) Re: Point No.2:Whether the writ petitions filed as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) assailing the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 are maintainable?
106-117
(i) Remission : Scope & Ambit 117-136 (C) Re: Point No.3: Whether the Government of State of Gujarat was competent to pass the impugned orders of remission?
136-186 (D) Re: Point No.4 : Whether the impugned orders of remission passed by the respondent - State of Gujarat in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 13 are in accordance with law?
186-218
(i) Section 432(2)of the CrPC: Opinion of the Presiding Judge of the convicting court 218-227
(ii) Sentence in default of fine 227-237 (E) Summary of Conclusions 237-241 (F) Re: Point No.5: What Order? 241-251 8 Conclusion 251 * Ed. Note: Pagination is as per the original judgment. 760 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Preface:
Plato, the Greek Philosopher in his treatise, The Laws, underscores that punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and reformation (Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers, 1980). In his treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver, as far as he can, ought to imitate the doctor who does not apply his drug with a view to pain only, but to do the patient good. This curative theory of punishment likens penalty to medicine, administered for the good of the one who is being chastised (Trevor J. Saunders, Plato’s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology, Oxford University Press, 1991).
Thus, if a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts, and then set free again as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission. In addition, there are also competing interests involved– the rights of the victim and the victim’s family to justice vis-a-vis a convict’s claim to a second chance by way of remission or reduction of his sentence for reformation.
Over the years, this Court initially attached greater weight to the former and has expressed scepticism over the latter, particularly if the offence in question is a heinous one. This sentiment can be gathered from the following observations of Fazal Ali J. in Maru Ram vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 (“Maru Ram”):
“77. … It is true that there appears to be a modern trend of giving punishment a colour of reformation so that stress may be laid on the reformation of the criminal rather than his confinement in jail which is an ideal objective. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that such an objective cannot be achieved without mustering the necessary facilities, the requisite education and the appropriate climate which must be created to foster a sense of repentance and penitence in a criminal so that he may undergo such a mental or psychological revolution that he realises the consequences of playing with human lives. In the world of today and particularly in our country, this ideal is yet to be achieved and, in fact, with all our efforts it will take us a long time to reach this sacred goal.
××× ××× ××× [2024] 1 S.C.R. 761Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
79. The question, therefore, is — should the country take the risk of innocent lives being lost at the hands of criminals committing heinous crimes in the holy hope or wishful thinking that one day or the other, a criminal, however dangerous or callous he may be, will reform himself. Valmikis are not born everyday and to expect that our present generation, with the prevailing social and economic environment, would produce Valmikis day after day is to hope for the impossible.”
A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may be otherwise considered in society or to whatever faith she may follow or any creed she may belong to. Can heinous crimes, inter alia, against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and by granting them liberty? These are the issues which arise in these writ petitions.
With the aforesaid philosophical preface, we proceed to consider these writ petitions, both on maintainability as well as on merits purely from a legal perspective.
Details of the writ petitioners:
2. These writ petitions have been filed assailing the Orders dated 10.08.2022, granting remission and early release of respondent Nos.3 to 13 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 (which petition shall be considered to be the lead petition), who were all convicted, having been found guilty of committing heinous crimes during the large-scale riots in Gujarat on 28.02.2002 and a few days thereafter which occurred in the aftermath of the burning of the train incident in Godhra in the State of Gujarat on 27.02.2002.
2.1. The grotesque and diabolical crime in question was driven by communal hatred and resulted in twelve convicts, amongst many others, brutally gang-raping the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022, namely, Bilkis Yakub Rasool, who was pregnant at that time. Further, the petitioner’s mother was gang raped and murdered, her cousin who had just delivered a baby was also gang raped and murdered. Eight minors including the petitioner’s cousin’s two-day-old infant were also murdered. The petitioner’s three-year-old daughter was murdered by smashing her head on a rock, her two minor brothers, two minor sisters, her phupha, phupi, mama(uncle, aunt and uncle respectively) and three-cousins were all murdered.
762 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
2.2. While eventually, the perpetrators of the crime, including the police personnel were convicted and sentenced, the petitioner, who was aged twenty-one years and pregnant at that time, having lost all members of her family in the diabolical and brutal attacks, has once again approached this Court seeking justice by challenging the en-masse remission granted to respondent Nos.3 to 13. Bilkis Yakub Rasool, being an unfortunate victim of the heinous crimes hereinabove narrated, has filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ, order or direction quashing the Orders dated 10.08.2022 passed by the State of Gujarat by which the convicts in Sessions Case No.634 of 2004, Mumbai (respondent Nos.3 to 13 herein), whose convictions were upheld by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and thereafter by this Court, have been released prematurely.
2.3. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.352 of 2022 titled Dr. Meeran Chadha Borwankar vs. State of Gujarat has been preferred by a former woman police officer, a woman bureaucrat who had served in the Indian Foreign Service and an academic, seeking, inter alia, the setting aside of the remission Orders dated 10.08.2022. The petitioners by way of the writ petition have also sought a writ or order in the nature of mandamus directing that the States must endeavour to have a pluralistic composition in Jail Advisory Committees, adequately representing the diverse nature of our society.
2.4. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022 titled Subhashini Ali vs. State of Gujarat being the first of the petitions filed in this batch has been preferred under Article 32 by Subhashini Ali, a former parliamentarian and presently the Vice-President of All India Democratic Women’s Association; Revati Laul, an independent journalist and Roop Rekha Verma, former Vice-Chancellor of Lucknow University, challenging the Orders dated 10.08.2022.
2.5. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.326 of 2022 titled Mahua Moitra vs. State of Gujarat has been preferred by Mahua Moitra, a Member of Parliament from the Krishnanagar constituency in West Bengal, seeking issuance of a writ, order, or direction, quashing the Orders dated 10.08.2022. The petitioner in the said writ petition has also sought the framing of guidelines and the equitable [2024] 1 S.C.R. 763Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others application of existing guidelines by the State Government for the grant of remission so as to channelise the exercise of discretion in granting remission and to prevent the misuse of such discretion, if found necessary upon an examination of the existing statutory framework.
2.6. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.403 of 2022 titled National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) vs. State of Gujarat has been filed by the National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW), which is a women centric organization that was established on 04.06.1954 for the purpose of securing women’s rights, seeking appropriate directions in the form of a writ of mandamus to the respondent to revoke the remission granted to respondent Nos.3 to 13 by the competent authority of the Government of Gujarat under the remission policy dated 09.07.1992 and to re-arrest respondent Nos.3 to 13 herein.
2.7. Writ Petition (Crl.) No.422 of 2022 titled Asma Shafique Shaikh vs. State of Gujarat has been filed by Asma Shafique Shaikh, a lawyer by profession and a social activist, seeking issuance of a writ, order or direction, quashing the Orders dated 10.08.2022.
2.8. As Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 has been filed by one of the victims, Bilkis Yakub Rasool, seeking quashing of the orders dated 10.08.2022, for the sake of convenience, the factual background, details as well as the status of the parties shall be with reference to Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022. Factual Background:
3. The factual background in which these writ petitions have been filed is that following the aforesaid unfortunate and grave incident, a First Information Report (“FIR” for short) was registered against unknown accused, on 04.03.2002. The Investigation Agency filed a closure report stating that the accused could not be traced and the said closure report was accepted by the Judicial Magistrate vide Order dated 25.03.2003. The closure report was challenged by the petitioner-victim-Bilkis Yakub Rasool, before this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.118 of 2003. This Court directed the reopening of the case and transferred the investigation of the same to the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI” for short).
764 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
3.1. The CBI commenced a fresh investigation and submitted a chargesheet on 19.04.2004 against twenty persons accused of the crime. Charges of gang rape, murder and rioting armed with deadly weapons with a common intention were framed against twelve persons, six police personnel and two doctors
3.2. The petitioner-victim approached this Court by filing Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.192 of 2004, seeking transfer of the trial from the State of Gujarat to a neutral place. This Court in Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.192 of 2004, by an Order dated 06.08.2004, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, considered it appropriate to transfer Sessions Case No.161 of 2004 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod, Ahmedabad to the competent Court in Mumbai for trial and disposal. Charges were framed on 13.01.2005 amongst others against the eleven convicts for the commission of offences under Sections 143, 147, 302, 376(2)(e) and (g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC” for the sake of brevity).
3.3. The Special Judge, Greater Mumbai, vide Judgment dated 21.01.2008 in Sessions Case No.634 of 2004 convicted the eleven accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the commission of the offences of, inter alia, gang rape and murder of the petitioner’s mother; gang rape and murder of her cousin Shamim; murder of twelve more victims including the three and a half year old daughter of the petitioner, rioting, etc. and one police personnel for deliberately recording the FIR incorrectly. However, the Trial Court acquitted the remaining five police personnel and the two doctors, against whom there were serious charges. Respondent Nos.3 to 13 herein were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 302 r/w 149 of the IPC for the murder of fourteen people; Section 376 (2)(e) & (g) for having committed gang-rape on the petitioner-victim; Section 376(2)(g) for having committed gang rape on other women. The police officer, Somabhai Gori was convicted of the offence punishable under Sections 217 and 218 of the IPC.
3.4. On 05.08.2013, a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay passed an Order in Criminal Writ Petition No.305 of 2013 titled Ramesh Rupabhai Chandana vs. State of Maharashtra, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 765Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others preferred by respondent No.13 herein, holding that where a trial has been transferred from one State to another and such trial has been concluded and the prisoner has been convicted, the prisoner should be transferred to the prison of his State.
3.5. Against the judgment of the Trial Court dated 21.01.2008, the persons convicted, as well as the State filed Criminal Appeals before the Bombay High Court. While the convicts filed criminal appeals assailing their conviction, the State filed criminal appeal against acquittal of the police officials and the doctors A bench comprising Mrs. Mridula Bhatkar and Mrs. V. K. Tahilramani, JJ. of the Bombay High Court upheld the conviction of the eleven persons accused of the offence of rioting armed with deadly weapons, gang-rape and murder by judgment dated 04.05.2017 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1020-1023 of 2009, 487 of 2010, 194 and 271 of 2011 titled Jaswantbhai Chaturbhai Nai vs. State of Gujarat. The five police officials and the two doctors who were acquitted by the Trial Court were also convicted by the High Court. The High Court also observed that the investigation by the Gujarat police was not proper and that the Gujarat police had taken the investigation in the wrong direction from the beginning i.e., the day of registering the FIR. That the investigation was not only unsatisfactory but it also smacked of dishonest steps to shield the culprits. It was further observed that the earlier investigation had played the role of a villain in the case. The High Court while going through the evidence also noted that “the truth and the falsehood are mixed up in such a manner that at every stage of investigation the truth is hidden under layers of intentional laxity, omissions, contradictions and falsehood and the truth is required to be unearthed”.
3.6. All the persons convicted filed Special Leave Petitions against the judgment of the High Court. This Court vide Order dated 10.07.2017 passed in SLP (Crl.) Nos.4290/2017, 4705/2017 and 4716/2017 and by Order dated 20.11.2017 passed in SLP (Crl.) No.7831/2017 dismissed the Special Leave Petitions preferred by the convicts and upheld the findings rendered by the High Court, as well as the sentence awarded.
766 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
3.7. It is noteworthy that the petitioner-victim approached this Court by way of Criminal Appeal Nos.727-733 of 2019 seeking just and adequate compensation for her ordeals. This Court vide order dated 23.04.2019 observed that the petitioner is a victim of riots which occurred in the aftermath of the Godhra train burning. This Court noted that the petitioner’s case had to be dealt with differently as the loss she has suffered surpassed normal cases. That the gruesome and horrific acts of violence had left an indelible imprint on the mind of the petitioner, which will continue to torment and cripple her. This Court therefore directed the State Government to pay Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) to the petitioner within two weeks noting that the petitioner had been coerced into living the life of a nomad and an orphan and was barely sustaining herself on the charity of NGOs, having lost her family members.
3.8. After undergoing 14 years 5 months and 6 days of his sentence, respondent No.3 herein, namely, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, filed Criminal Application No.4573 of 2019 before the Gujarat High Court challenging the non-consideration of his application for premature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, the “CrPC” for the sake of brevity). The High Court after considering the submissions observed that respondent No.3 herein had been tried in the State of Maharashtra, hence, as per Section 432 (7), the ‘appropriate government’ for the purpose of Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC would be the State of Maharashtra. The High Court placed reliance on the dictum of this Court in Union of India vs. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (“V. Sriharan”) and by Order dated 17.07.2019 directed the petitioner therein (respondent No.3 herein) to pursue his remedy within the State of Maharashtra.
3.9. Respondent No.3 then moved an application dated 01.08.2019 before the Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, State of Maharashtra, seeking premature release under Sections 432 and 433A of the CrPC. Respondent No.3 specifically relied on the order dated 17.07.2019 of the Gujarat High Court granting liberty to the convict to approach the State of Maharashtra seeking premature release.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 767Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
3.10. As the case was investigated and prosecuted by the CBI, the opinion of the said Agency was sought on the application for premature release. The CBI submitted its report dated 14.08.2019 wherein it was recommended that respondent No.3 should serve his sentence fully and no leniency should be given to him. The CBI submitted that respondent No.3 had actively participated in the heinous crime and that the offences committed by him and others were serious in nature and thus, he should not be pardoned or the sentence, suspended or remitted.
3.11. Further, on 03.01.2020, the Special CBI Court, Mumbai, also gave a negative report and objected to the prayer for premature release of respondent No.3 on the ground of seriousness of the offence. It was observed that the offences committed by the accused fell into category 5 (b) of the relevant State policy and were extremely serious, thus, it would be improper to grant remission to respondent No.3.
3.12. Similarly, on 03.02.2020, the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, in his report submitted to the Collector and District Magistrate, Dahod, gave a negative opinion against the pre-mature release of respondent No.3 on the ground that the victim and her family members apprehended serious crimes against them if respondent No.3 was released prematurely. The Office of the Collector and District Magistrate, Dahod, on 19.02.2020 also opined against the pre-mature release of respondent No.3 by relying on the opinion dated 03.02.2020 of the Superintendent of Police, Dahod.
3.13. Respondent No.3 again approached the High Court of Gujarat by way of Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1 of 2019 in Criminal Application No.4573 of 2019 seeking remission under Section 432 read with Section 433 of the CrPC. The High Court vide Order dated 13.03.2020 rejected the application preferred by respondent No.3 with a specific observation that the appropriate government under Section 432(7)(b) to exercise the powers of remission would be the State of Maharashtra and not the State of Gujarat. It was further recorded in the said order that the counsel for respondent No.3 had sought the permission of the Court to move the High Court of Bombay for the same relief and therefore the application was disposed of with liberty to 768 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the writ petitioner therein in the aforesaid terms. It is pertinent to note that this order still holds the field as it has neither been challenged nor recalled or set aside in accordance with law.
3.14. On 20.07.2021, a meeting of the Jail Advisory Committee of the State of Gujarat took place which comprised of four social workers; two members of the State Legislative Assembly; the Superintendent of Police, Godhra; the District and Sessions Judge, Godhra; the Secretary, Jail Advisory Committee and Superintendent, Godhra Sub-Jail and the District Magistrate, Godhra (Chairman of the Jail Advisory Committee, Godhra Sub-Jail).
3.15. The Sessions Judge, Godhra, being one of the ten members of the Jail Advisory Committee, after going through the case papers observed that the convict, respondent No.3 herein, had been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment in a sensitive case and that if he was released prematurely, it may create an adverse effect on the society and there is a possibility of peace being disturbed. The other Committee members recommended the grant of remission to respondent No.3, on the ground that he had completed fifteen years of imprisonment and that his conduct in prison had been good.
3.16. On 18.08.2021, the Additional Director General of Police, Prisons and Correctional Administration, State of Gujarat, vide his letter to the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Gujarat, after considering the opinion given by the Jail Advisory Committee, concurred with the opinion given by the Superintendent of Police, Dahod; CBI; the Special CBI Court, Mumbai and the District Magistrate, Dahod and did not recommend the premature release of the convict- respondent No.3.
3.17. In the interregnum, the rest of the convicts, respondent Nos.4 to 13 had applied for remission on varying dates in the month of February 2021 to the Superintendent, Godhra Sub-Jail. The opinion of the CBI was sought in this regard, and a negative opinion was given, so also by the Special Judge (CBI), Greater Mumbai. By a common opinion dated 22.03.2021, Special Judge (CBI), Greater Mumbai stated that since all the accused were tried and convicted in Mumbai, i.e., the State of Maharashtra, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 769Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others the Government Resolution issued by the Home Department, Government of Maharashtra would be applicable to them. The Special Judge after perusing the guidelines issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 16.11.1978 and 11.05.1992 and the Government Resolution dated 11.04.2008 (Policy dated 11.04.2008), observed that the said resolution dated 11.04.2008 would apply as it had superseded all earlier orders and guidelines and would have been applicable in the normal course to the convicts undergoing life imprisonment. The Special Judge further noted that the case of the convicts mentioned above would fall under categories 2(c), 2 (d) and 4(d) of the Policy dated 11.04.2008, according to which the minimum period of imprisonment to be undergone is 28 years (Category 2(d)). However, the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, gave a positive opinion with respect to the premature release of respondent Nos.3 to 13. His opinion was seconded by the Collector and District Magistrate, Dahod.
3.18. In the aforesaid backdrop, when various steps were in progress at various stages, stealthily a writ petition, being Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 titled Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah vs. State of Gujarat, (2022) 8 SCC 552 (“Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah”),was filed before this Court by respondent No.3 herein, seeking a direction in the nature of mandamus to the State of Gujarat to consider his application for pre-mature release under its policy dated 09.07.1992, which was existing at the time of commission of his crime and his conviction.
3.19. This Court noted that the policy on the date of conviction was as per the resolution dated 09.07.1992 passed by the State of Gujarat. Hence, respondent No.3 (petitioner therein) would be governed by the same. This Court placed reliance on the dictum in State of Haryana vs. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 (“Jagdish”) to observe that the application for grant of premature release will have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood as on the date of conviction. The other pertinent findings of this Court in its judgment and Order dated 13.05.2022, in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 are culled out hereunder:
770 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports i. The argument advanced by the respondents – State of Gujarat therein that since the trial had been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the ‘appropriate Government’ as referred to under Section 433 of the CrPC would be the State of Maharashtra, was rejected by this Court holding that the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat and ordinarily, the trial would have been concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) of the CrPC, the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would have been the State of Gujarat but in the instant case, the case was transferred under exceptional circumstances by this Court for the limited purpose of trial and disposal to the State of Maharashtra. However, after the conclusion of trial and on conviction, the case stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed and the State of Gujarat remains the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) of the CrPC.
ii. This Court observed that once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial came to be concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings would have to be considered, including remission or pre-mature release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stood transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court.
iii. This Court directed the State of Gujarat to consider the application of the petitioner therein for pre-mature release in terms of its policy dated 09.07.1992 which was applicable on the date of conviction.
3.20. Pursuant to the judgment of this Court dated 13.05.2022, a meeting of the Jail Advisory Committee of the State of Gujarat took place on 26.05.2022 and all the members recommended grant of remission to respondent Nos.3 to 13.
3.21. The Sessions Judge, Godhra, also considered the applications of respondent Nos.3 to 13 and upon going through the particulars provided by the Jail Superintendent, Sub-Jail, Godhra noted that [2024] 1 S.C.R. 771Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s the said report recorded that the convicts had demonstrated good behavior and conduct during the period of incarceration and that no adverse incident had been recorded against the convicts even when they were on furlough or on parole, except against one convict, namely, Mitesh Chimanlal Bhatt. That all convicts, by and large, surrendered themselves within the time after enjoying parole/furlough and participated in rehabilitation and corrective programmes. That the convicts still had substantial years of life remaining. Accordingly, the Sessions Judge applied the policy dated 09.07.1992 and gave an ‘affirmative’ opinion as regards the premature release of respondent Nos.3 to 13.
3.22. The Additional Director General of Police, Prisons and Correctional Administration, State of Gujarat, addressed a letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of Gujarat, regarding the premature release of accused Kesarbhai Khimabhai Vahoniya. In the said letter, the details of the opinion given by the concerned authorities regarding the premature release of the said convict were also discussed. It was stated in the letter that the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, had given a positive opinion regarding premature release from jail; the Superintendent of Police, Special Crime Branch, Mumbai, however, had given a negative opinion about premature release from jail; the District Magistrate, Dahod, had given a positive opinion about the premature release from jail; the Sessions Court, Mumbai, which pronounced the sentence had given a negative opinion about premature release; however, the Jail Advisory Committee of Gujarat had given a positive opinion about the convict’s premature release and the Superintendent, Godhra Sub-Jail had also given a positive opinion about the premature release. Thus, the Additional Director General of Police, Prisons and Correctional Administration, State of Gujarat gave a positive opinion regarding the premature release of Kesarbhai Khimabhai Vahoniya to the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of Gujarat. So also, as regards the other convicts, namely, Salesh Chimanlal Bhatt, Pradip Ramanlal Modhhiya, Mitesh Chimanlal Bhatt, Bipinchand Kanhaiyalal Joshi, Rajubhai Babulal Soni, Bakabhai Khimabhai Vahoniya, Jaswantbhai Chaturbhai Nai (Rawal) and Ramesh Rupabhai Chandana.
772 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
3.23. On 28.06.2022, the Department of Home Affairs, Government of Gujarat, addressed a letter to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, seeking sanction from the Government of India on the proposal for the premature release of the prisoners, respondent Nos.3 to 13.
3.24. By letter dated 11.07.2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India conveyed its approval under Section 435 of the CrPC for the premature release of all 11 convicts, respondent Nos.3 to 13.
3.25. Pursuant to the concurrence of the Central Government, the State of Gujarat issued the impugned orders dated 10.08.2022.
3.26. In the above background, these writ petitions have been filed, praying,inter-alia, for issuance of a writ, order, or direction, quashing the Orders dated 10.08.2022.
Counter affidavit of State of Gujarat:
4. Under Secretary, Home Department, State of Gujarat (first respondent) has filed his affidavit stating that he is acquainted with the facts of the case as appearing from the official records of the case. While denying every assertion, contention and statement made by the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022, which was the first of the writ petitions filed before this Court, certain preliminary submissions have been advanced at the outset.
4.1. It is contended that the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by the petitioners (Subhashini Ali and others) is neither maintainable in law nor tenable on facts. That a third party has no locus to challenge the orders of remission passed by a competent authority under the garb of a PIL. A PIL is not maintainable in a criminal matter as the petitioners are in no way connected with the proceedings with which the convicted persons have been granted remission. Therefore, the writ petition may be dismissed on that ground alone. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ (VIII) vs. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 613 (“Rajiv Ranjan”); Gulzar Ahmed Azmi vs. Union of India, (2012) 10 SCC 731 (“Gulzar Ahmed”); Simranjit Singh Mann vs. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 653 (“Simranjit Singh”); and, Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 (“Ashok Kumar”). [2024] 1 S.C.R. 773Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s It is submitted that a third party/stranger either under the provisions of the CrPC or under any other statute is precluded from questioning the correctness of grant or refusal of ‘sanction for prosecution’ or the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court after a regular trial. Similarly, a third party stranger is precluded from questioning a remission order passed by the State Government which is in accordance with law. Therefore, dismissal of the petition at the threshold is sought.
4.2. It is next averred that the petitioners have not pleaded as to how they have the locus to seek a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders of remission passed by respondent no.1 with respect to the eleven convicts sentenced by the Special Judge, Greater Mumbai in Sessions Case No.634 of 2004. That the petitioners have not pleaded as to how their fundamental rights have been abridged or how they are aggrieved by the action of the State Government. Therefore, filing of the writ petition as Public Interest Litigation (in short, ‘PIL’) is an abuse of PIL jurisdiction and is motivated by political intrigues and machinations. In this regard, reliance has been placed on Tehseen Poonawalla vs. Union of India, (2018) 6 SCC 72 (“Tehseen”); and Ashok Kumar.
4.3. It is further submitted that the petitioners not being aggrieved persons have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for extraneous purposes. As the petitioners are not the “persons aggrieved”, the writ petition is not maintainable. On the scope and ambit of the expression “person aggrieved”, reliance has been placed on State of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 (“M.V. Dabholkar”); Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671 (“Jasbhai Motibhai”); and Thammanna vs. K. Veera Reddy, (1980) 4 SCC 62 (“Thammanna”).
4.4. On merits, it is stated that one of the respondents/prisoners, namely, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah had filed Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022, inter alia, praying to consider his remission application. This Court by its order dated 13.05.2022 held that the policy which will be applicable for deciding the remission application is the one which was in vogue at the time of conviction i.e. Premature Release of Convicts Policy of 1992. Further, this 774 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Court held that for the purposes of Section 432 of the CrPC, the “appropriate Government” for considering the remission application is the State in which the offence was committed and not the State in which the trial was conducted and therefore, directed the State of Gujarat to consider the application of the prisoner within a period of two months. Accordingly, the State of Gujarat considered the application of the prisoners as per Section 432 read with Section 435 of the CrPC along with the Premature Release of Convicts Policy of 1992. That, the State Government vide its Circular dated 09.07.1992 had issued a policy for early release of prisoners who have completed fourteen years of imprisonment and who were imposed punishment of life imprisonment. As per the aforesaid Policy of 1992, the Inspector General of Jail is mandated to obtain the opinion of the District Police Officer, District Magistrate, Jail Superintendent and Advisory Board Committee for early release of a convict. Thereafter, the Inspector General of Jail is mandated to give his opinion with the copy of the nominal roll and copy of the judgment and the recommendation of the Government. Further, the Jail Advisory Board at the time of consideration of the premature release application shall be guided by the Policy of 1992. A copy of the policy has been annexed as Annexure R-2. It is further submitted that the State Government considered the case of all the eleven convicts as per the Policy of 1992. Further, the remission in these cases was not granted under the Circular governing grant of remission to prisoners as part of celebration as ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav”.
4.5. The State Government in fact directed the Additional Director General of Prisons, Ahmedabad to send the necessary proposal of remission as per the direction of this Court before 31.05.2022 vide letter dated 25.05.2022. A reminder was also sent on 08.06.2022. Ten proposals were received on 09.06.2022 and one proposal was received on 17.06.2022. The applications of the accused were considered according to the remission policy dated 09.07.1992 in accordance with the directions issued by this Court. As laid down in the abovementioned policy, the Department received the opinions of the concerned District Police Officer, District Magistrate and Chairman of Jail Advisory Board Committee. It is further stated that the State Government has considered the opinions of the Inspector General of Prisons, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 775Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Gujarat State, Jail Superintendent, Jail Advisory Committee, District Magistrate, Police Superintendent, CBI, Special Crime Branch, Mumbai and Sessions Court, Mumbai (CBI). Therefore, the opinions of seven authorities were considered. Further, having regard to the provisions of Section 435 of the CrPC, sanction of the Government of India was also necessary. As the CBI was a central investigating agency, the State Government obtained the approval/suitable orders of the Government of India. The prisoners/convicts had completed fourteen years of imprisonment and the opinions of the concerned authorities were obtained as per Policy dated 09.07.1992. The same was submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India vide letter dated 28.06.2022 and sought the approval/suitable orders of the Government of India. The Government of India vide its letter dated 11.07.1992 conveyed its concurrence/ approval. On considering all the opinions, the State Government decided to release the eleven convicts since they had completed fourteen years and above in jail and their behaviour was found to be good.
4.6. Reliance has been placed on Jagdish and V. Sriharan to contend that if a policy which is beneficial to the convict exists at the time of consideration of the application of premature release then the convict cannot be deprived of such beneficial policy and that judicial review of the order of remission is not permissible in law. The Under Secretary has further proceeded to place the following facts to contend that the impugned orders are in accordance with law:
“29. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Kesharbhai Khimabhai Vahoniya, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 19.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 11.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
776 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay C o n s i d e r i n g t h e G o v t .
Resolution dated 11.04.2008, i s s u e d b y t h e S t a t e o f Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
T h e c o m m i t t e e h a s unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt.
of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
Recommended premature release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Kesharbhai Khimabhai Vahoniya is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE R-3.
30. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Shaileshbhai Chimanlal Bhatt, is as under:
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 777Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 23.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 11.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
778 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Shaileshbhai Chimanlal Bhatt is annexed herewith as Annexure-RG-4.
31. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 23.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 11.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 779Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE RG-5.
32. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Mitesh Chimanlal Bhatt, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 18.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay.
C o n s i d e r i n g t h e G o v t .
Resolution dated 11.04.2008, i s s u e d b y t h e S t a t e o f Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 25.05.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 25.05.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
780 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Mitesh Chimanlal Bhatt is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE RG-6.
33. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Bipinchandra Kanaiyalal Joshi, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 16.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay.
Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 781Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Bipinchandra Kanaiyalal Joshi is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE RG-7.
34. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Rajubhai Babulal Soni, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 15.02.2021.
- 782 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
2. Letter dated 11.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay.
Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
Recommended premature release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Rajubhai Babulal Soni is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE RG-8.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 783Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s
35. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Bakabhai Khimabhai Vahoniya, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document O p i n i o n o f t h e c o n c e r n e d Authority
1. Premature release application dated 18.02.2021.
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay.
Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022.
The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India.
784 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Bakabhai Khimabhai Vahoniya is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE R-9.
36. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Govindbhai Akhambhai Nai (Raval), is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 15.02.2021 -
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022 The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 785Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt.
of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
Recommended premature release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India.
Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
37. Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Govindbhai Akhambhai Nai (Raval) is annexed herewith as Annexure R-10.
38. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Jashvantbhai Chaturbhai Nai (Raval), is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 15.02.2021 -
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay C o n s i d e r i n g t h e G o v t .
Resolution dated 11.04.2008, i s s u e d b y t h e S t a t e o f Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
786 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022 The committee has unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
Recommended premature release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India.
Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Jashvantbhai Chturbhai Nai (Raval) is annexed herewith as Annexure R-11.
39. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Rameshbhai Rupabhai Chandana, is as under:
Sl.
No.
Document Opinion of the concerned Authority
1. Premature release application dated 25.02.2021 -
2. Letter dated 10.03.2021 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 22.03.2021 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay Considering the Govt. Resolution dated 11.04.2008, issued by the State of Maharashtra, prisoner should not be released prematurely.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 787Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s
4. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 07.03.2022 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub-Jail, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 26.05.2022 T h e c o m m i t t e e h a s unanimously given the opinion in favour of the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 09.06.2022 to the Home Department, Govt.
of Gujarat, from the Addl.
Director General of Police, Pris o n s & C o r r e c t i o n a l Administration, Ahmedabad.
No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
Recommended premature release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt.
of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India.
Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Rameshbhai Rupabhai Chandana is annexed herewith as Annexure R-12.
40. I say that the relevant records pertaining to the application for remission qua the prisoner, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah @ Lala Vakil, is as under:
788 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Sl.
No.
Document O p i n i o n o f t h e c o n c e r n e d Authority
1. Premature release application dated 01.08.2019 -
2. Letter dated 14.08.2019 from the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SCB, Mumbai.
Prisoner should not be released prematurely.
3. Letter dated 03.01.2020 from the Special Judge (CBI), City Civil & Sessions Court, Gr.
Bombay Objected to the premature release of the prisoner.
4. Letter dated 13.02.2020 from the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, Gujarat.
Objected to the premature release of the prisoner.
5. Letter dated 19.02.2020 from the Collector & DM, Dahod, Gujarat Objected to the premature release of the prisoner.
6. O p i n i o n o f t h e J a i l Superintendent, Godhra Sub- Jail, Gujarat No objection to the premature release of the prisoner.
7. Opinion of the Jail Advisory Committee, dated 20.07.2021 9 out of 10 members of the Committee has recommended the premature release of the prisoner.
8. Letter dated 18.08.2021 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, from the Addl. Director General of Police, Prisons & Correctional Administration, Ahmedabad.
Did not recommend to the premature release of the prisoner.
9. Letter dated 28.06.2022 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India from Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat.
R e c o m m e n d e d p r e m a t u r e release of the prisoner.
Sought approval/ suitable orders from the Govt. of India
10. Letter dated 11.07.2022 to the Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India.
Approved the premature release of the prisoner.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 789Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Copy of the relevant records qua the prisoner, Radheshyam Bhgwandas Shah @ Lala Vakil is annexed herewith as Annexure R-13.”
4.7. Therefore, it has been contended that PIL is not maintainable as it is misconceived and devoid of any merit and as such is liable to be dismissed.
5. Respondent No.2 has not filed any pleading in this matter. Even though respondent Nos.3 to 13 have filed their counter affidavits, we do not find it necessary to advert to the same as they would be replicating the stand of the State of Gujarat.
Submissions:
6. We have heard learned counsel Ms. Shobha Gupta for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022; learned ASG, Sri S.V. Raju appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat and Union of India;and learned senior counsel Mr. Sidharth Luthra and other counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 13 and perused the material on record. 6.1 We have also heard learned senior counsel and learned counsel Ms. Indira Jaising, Ms. Vrinda Grover and Ms. Aparna Bhat, for the petitioners in the public interest litigations.
6.2 We have perused the material on record as well as the judicial dicta cited at the Bar.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022, Ms. Shobha Gupta at the outset submitted that the enmasse remission granted to respondent Nos.3 to 13 by Orders dated 10.08.2022 has not only shattered the victim-petitioner and her family but has also shocked the collective conscience of the Indian society. That in the present case, the right of the victim and the cry of the society at large have been ignored by the State and Central Governments while recommending the grant of remission to all convicts in the case.
7.1. It was asserted that though the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, the investigation and trial were carried out in the State of Maharashtra pursuant to the orders of this Court. Hence, in view of the unambiguous language of Section 432(7) (b), only the State of Maharashtra would be the appropriate government which could have considered the applications filed 790 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports by respondent Nos.3 to 13 seeking remission of their sentences. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments to buttress her argument, namely, State of M.P. vs. Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470 (“Ratan Singh”); Government of A.P. vs. M.T. Khan, (2004) 1 SCC 616 (“M.T. Khan”); Hanumant Dass vs. Vinay Kumar, (1982) 2 SCC 177 (“Hanumant Dass”) and V.Sriharan.
7.2. According to learned counsel, once a competent Court in the State of Maharashtra had tried and convicted the accused then that State is the ‘appropriate Government’. Therefore, the Orders of remission passed by the State of Gujarat in respect of respondent Nos.3 to 13 is without jurisdiction and a nullity and thus, are liable to be quashed.
7.3. As regards the applicability of the relevant remission policy, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the ‘appropriate government’ in the instant case is the State of Maharashtra, the remission policy of the State of Maharashtra would be applicable. Thus, the remission policy of the State of Gujarat dated 09.07.1992 would be wholly inapplicable. It was contended that the remission policy dated 09.07.1992 of the State of Gujarat was not even in existence as on the date for consideration of the remission applications as it was scrapped by way of a Circular dated 08.05.2014 pursuant to the letter of the Central Government circulated to all the States/UTs requiring the implementation of the judgment of this Court in Sangeet vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 (“Sangeet”), wherein this Court held that before actually exercising the power of remission under Section 432 of the CrPC, the appropriate government must obtain the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the convicting or confirming court and that the remission shall not be granted in a wholesale manner, such as, on the occasion of Independence Day etc. That pursuant to the cancellation of the policy dated 09.07.1992, the State of Gujarat came up with a new remission policy dated 23.01.2014, and even this policy would not entitle remission of the accused herein, for two reasons: firstly, because the remission policy of the State of Maharashtra would be applicable as it is the ‘appropriate government’, and secondly, the 2014 policy of the State of Gujarat bars the grant of remission to convicts of heinous crimes. [2024] 1 S.C.R. 791Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
7.4. Relying on the opinion of the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Greater Mumbai, it was submitted that the Special Judge had rightly stated that the remission policy applicable in the present case would be the Policy dated 11.04.2008 of the State of Maharashtra in respect of which the Circular dated 13.06.2008 of the State of Maharashtra was issued, wherein a convict of communal crime, gang rape and murder would fall under the categories 2(c), 2(d) and 4 (e) of the Policy which prescribes that the minimum period of imprisonment to be undergone by the convict before remission can be considered would be twenty eight years. Thus, respondents-convicts were not entitled to be granted remission as they had not completed the minimum period of imprisonment as per the applicable remission policy.
7.5. It was further contended that the remission orders under challenge failed to meet the criteria laid down by this Court in Sangeet; and Ram Chander vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 12 SCC 52 (“Ram Chander”), wherein it has been stated that the appropriate government must obtain the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the convicting court before deciding the remission application. That the State of Gujarat granted remission to all the convicts by completely ignoring the negative opinions expressed by two major stakeholders i.e., the Presiding Judge of the convicting Court in Mumbai and the prosecuting agency (CBI).
7.6. Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 394 (“Mohinder Singh”); Sangeet; Ratan Singh,and Laxman Naskar vs. State of West Bengal, (2000) 2 SCC 595 (“Laxman Naskar”) to emphasize that a convict cannot claim remission as a matter of right. The remission policies only give a right to the convict to be considered and do not provide an indefeasible right to remission.
7.7. Further, reference was made to the dicta of this Court in Mohinder Singh; Epuru Sudhakar vs. State of A.P., (2006) 8 SCC 161 (“Epuru Sudhakar”); Maru Ram; Sangeet; Ratan Singh and Laxman Naskar to contend that the decision to grant remission should be well informed, reasonable and fair and that the power cannot be exercised arbitrarily.
792 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7.8. Emphasizing the gravity of the offences in this case and the grotesque nature of the crimes committed by the accused, learned counsel Ms. Shobha Gupta submitted that while considering the application for remission, the appropriate government was required to bear in mind the effect of its decision on the victim and the family of the victims, the society as a whole and the precedent it would set for the future. To buttress the said submission, she relied on Epuru Sudhakar, Swamy Shraddhananda (2) vs. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, (“Shraddhananda”), and Jagdish. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Laxman Naskar wherein this Court had discussed the factors to be considered before granting remission.
7.9. It was urged that the prerogative power of remission is not immune from judicial review, vide Epuru Sudhakar wherein it was observed that judicial review of the order of remission is available on the following grounds: (i) non-application of mind;
(ii) order is malafide; (iii) order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (iv) relevant materials kept out of consideration; (v) order suffers from arbitrariness.
7.10. It was contended that in the present case, remission was granted to all the convicts mechanically and without application of mind to each of the cases andthat the relevant factors were not considered. That the State Government failed to consider the relevant material and make an objective assessment while considering the applications of the convicts for remission. The nature and gravity of the crime, the impact of the remission orders on the victim and her family, witnesses and society at large, were not considered. That mere good behaviour in jail and completion of fourteen years in jail are not the only pre-requisites while considering the application for premature release of the convicts.
7.11. Attention was drawn to the fact that respondent No.3 herein had approached the High Court of Gujarat by way of Crl. Application No.4573 of 2019 seeking a direction to the State Government to consider his application for remission. The High Court vide Order dated 17.07.2019 dismissed the same in view of Section 432 of the CrPC. Respondent No.3’s second [2024] 1 S.C.R. 793Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others application was also dismissed vide Order dated 13.03.2020 passed by the Gujarat High Court. That infact, within fourteen days of the First Order dated 17.07.2019, respondent No.3 had approached the Government of Maharashtra by way of an application dated 01.08.2019. Upon his application, opinion was sought from the (i) Investigating Agency (CBI) and the
(ii) Presiding Officer of the convicting court (Special Judge, Sessions Court, Greater Mumbai), both of whom opined in the negative and against remission being granted to the said respondent. Further, the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, vide letter dated 03.02.2020 gave a negative opinion by noting that the victim and her relatives stated that respondent No.3 should not be released. The District Magistrate, Dahod, also gave a negative opinion vide letter dated 19.02.2020, so also the Jail Advisory Committee at its meeting held on 20.07.2021. That it was thereafter that respondent No.3 approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 and by Order dated 13.05.2022 this Court directed the State of Gujarat to consider respondent No.3’s application within a period of two months from the date of the order.
7.12. Further adverting to the sequence of events, it was stated that in the meanwhile, the rest of the convicts had also applied separately for remission in February 2021. The Presiding Officer (Special Judge, Greater Mumbai) vide a common letter dated 22.03.2021 gave a negative opinion against the premature release of the remaining ten convicts, respondent Nos.4 to 13 herein. That thereafter, for one good year, their case was kept pending and only after 07.03.2022 the new Superintendent of Police, Dahod, gave a ‘no objection’ for the premature release of all the convicts by separate letters of the same date. The District Magistrate, Dahod, also gave a positive opinion in favour of the premature release of all the convicts. On 26.05.2022, a meeting of the Jail Advisory Committee of Gujarat was held and this time, all the members of the Committee gave a positive opinion. The Additional Director General of Police, Prisons and Correctional Administration vide letter dated 09.06.2022 this time gave a positive opinion and did not raise any objection for the release of the ten convicts.
794 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7.13. That although the reference by the Jail Advisory Committee to the State Government, was only qua respondent Nos.4 to 13, the State Government erroneously recommended the name of respondent No.3 also, to the Central Government for remission even in the absence of any application pending before the State Government.
7.14. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the Presiding Judge’s reasoned negative opinion opposing the premature release was disregarded and this was contrary to the mandate of Section 432(2) of the CrPC. The remission Orders dated 10.08.2022 of respondent No.1 are in the teeth of the negative opinion of the Presiding Judge, Special Judge (CBI), Sessions Court, Greater Mumbai, dated 03.01.2020 and 22.03.2021, thereby, defeating the purpose of Section 432(2) of the CrPC. Further, the remission Orders dated 10.08.2022 are conspicuously silent about the opinion of the Presiding Judge to be mandatorily obtained under Section 432(2) of the CrPC. Not even a reference is made to the said opinion. This amounts to an erasure of record by removing from consideration a document that is statutorily mandated to be considered and judicially held to be determinative. Reliance was placed on Ram Chander to contend that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court that convicted the offender will ‘have a determinative effect’ on the exercise of executive discretion under Section 432 of the CrPC. Further, reference was made to the decision of this Court in V.Sriharan, wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the procedure stipulated in Section 432(2) of the CrPC is mandatory and that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court which had tried the convict is critical and an essential safeguard to check that the power of remission is not exercised arbitrarily.
7.15. It was next contended that the premature release was granted illegally as the imprisonment in default for the non-payment of fine was not served. The Trial Court while sentencing the respondents-convicts had also imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/- on each of them, for each of the fourteen counts of murder and three counts of rape and in the event of default in payment of said fine, sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two years each for each count. The [2024] 1 S.C.R. 795Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others total fine payable by the respondents-convicts amounted to Rs.34,000/- each and, in default, they were liable to serve rigorous imprisonment for a period of thirty-four years (two years each for each count). The Trial Court had further directed that the ‘substantive sentences’ shall run concurrently and that the period of detention, if any, undergone by the respondentsconvicts during the investigation, enquiry, trial, shall be set off against the terms of imprisonment, not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine imposed on the accused. That as per the nominal roll of respondent Nos.3 to 13, none of them had paid the fine sentenced by the Trial Court, making them liable to serve the penalty of rigorous imprisonment for default in payment of fine. But the respondents have neither paid the fine of Rs. 34,000/- to which each of them was sentenced, nor have they served any sentence in default of the non-payment of fine. It was submitted that the penalty of imprisonment ordered for default in payment of fine stands on a completely different footing from the substantive sentence of imprisonment to be undergone for an offence. While under Section 432 of the CrPC, the Government has the power to remit ‘punishment for offence’, the executive discretion does not extend to waiving off the penalty of imprisonment for default in payment of fine under Section 64 of the IPC. In this regard, reliance was placed on Sharad Hiru Kolambe vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 18 SCC 718 (“Sharad Kolambe”) and Shantilal vs. State of M.P., (2007) 11 SCC 243 (“Shantilal”).
7.16. It was asserted that respondent No.1 while granting premature release failed to apply its mind and address the determinative factors outlined by this Court in Laxman Naskar. Thus, the orders of remission are vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness for non-consideration of relevant facts and factors. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, a bare perusal of the Orders dated 10.08.2022 would make it clear that premature release was granted mechanically and arbitrarily, without giving due consideration to the factors enumerated in Laxman Naskar, qua each of the respondents-convicts. That the Order(s) dated 10.08.2022 are conspicuous in their silence on the behavior and the following acts of misconduct of each of the respondentsconvicts, including the offences committed while on parole/ furlough, namely,:
796 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports i. Case Crime No.1121001200158/2020 was registered against the respondent-convict, Mitesh Chimanlal Bhatt, under Sections 354, 304 and 306 of the IPC, committed on 19.06.2020 during parole/furlough; and ii. Case Crime No.02/2015 was registered against the respondent-convict, Rameshbhai Rupabhai Chadana under the Prisons Act.
7.17. It was further submitted that it is trite that in cases where a convict has been sentenced to more than one count of life imprisonment, he can only be released if remission is duly granted as per law for each count of life imprisonment. That it is a matter of record that the respondents-convicts were sentenced on fifteen counts of life imprisonment. However, the Orders dated 10.08.2022 have not granted remission for each of the fifteen counts and is only a generic and blanket order, making the release of the convicts illegal and arbitrary.
7.18. That respondent No.3 approached this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022, without disclosing that he had already acted on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 17.07.2019 and had submitted his application to the Home Department, State of Maharashtra, and that his application had already been considered by the authorities concerned, whereby, the major stakeholders had written against the grant of remission to him. Further, when the matter was listed before this Court, no notice was issued to the petitioner– victim and neither was she heard by this Court in the matter.
7.19. That the Orders dated 10.08.2022 have blatantly ignored the grave and real apprehension regarding the safety and security of the victims-survivors raised by public functionaries whose opinions are required to be taken into account by respondent No.1 State before granting premature release as per the 1992 policy. That this Court in a catena of judgments, such as, Epuru Sudhakar and Rajan vs. Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu (2019) 14 SCC 114 (“Rajan”) has highlighted the importance of considering the impact of premature release on the victims in particular and the society in general. That even the Superintendent of Police, Dahod, on 03.02.2020 had recommended against the release of [2024] 1 S.C.R. 797Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Radheyshyam Bhagwandas Shah as he had cited the possibility of peace being disturbed. The Sessions Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra also raised questions regarding the security of the victim – petitioner herein.
7.20. Learned counsel next asserted that the en-masse and nonspeaking “sanction” of the Central Government dated 11.07.2022 under Section 435(1)(a) of the CrPC does not meet the statutory requirement of “consultation”. The said sanction conveys its approval for the premature release of eleven convicts sans any reason as to why the case of each respondent-convict is deemed fit for grant of remission. Thus, the approval was granted without considering the relevant factors outlined in Laxman Naskar.
7.21. That non-application of mind is evident in the non-speaking and stereotyped orders dated 10.08.2022 which are bereft of any reason. The Orders are devoid of reasons or grounds as to why the respondents-convicts were found fit for the grant of remission. All of the eleven orders are a verbatim replication of each other, having only substituted the name and personal details of the respondents-convicts. Further, the recommendations of the Jail Advisory Committee dated 26.05.2022 as regards remission of respondent Nos.3 to 13 are untenable, being arbitrary and mechanical and vitiated by non-application of mind. The said opinions are verbatim and mechanical reproductions of each other that show no independent consideration of facts of each case of the convicts.
7.22. With the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 be allowed and a writ, order or direction be issued quashing the Orders dated 10.08.2022 passed by the State of Gujarat by which the convicts in Sessions Case No. 634 of 2004, Mumbai (respondent Nos.3 to 13 herein), were released prematurely.
8. Learned senior counsel Ms. Indira Jaising appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.326 of 2022, at the outset submitted that the petitioner is a Member of Parliament and is a public personality and consequently possesses the locus to file this petition as a bona fide person and citizen of India. That the petitioner seeks to discharge her fundamental duty under Article 51A(e) of the Constitution of India, 798 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports seeking to promote harmony and the spirit of brotherhood amongst the people of India, as well as to denounce the derogation of the dignity of women. That the petitioner seeks to uphold the rule of law and thus is not a mere busybody.
8.1. The following submissions were made to contest the orders of remission:
(i) that when the actions of the State cause some harm to the general public, an action by a concerned citizen would be maintainable and reliance was placed on B.P Singhal vs. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331 (“B.P Singhal”) in this regard.
(ii) that the impugned decisions of remission is characterized by arbitrariness and mala fides and bear no consideration of relevant factors That the power of the executive must be exercised in line with constitutional ideals and must be for the benefit of the public. In this regard, reliance is placed on Maru Ram and S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, (1981) Supp SCC 87 (“S.P. Gupta”).
(iii) that there exists no statutory right of appeal against an order of remission. The only avenue available to assail an order of remission is either under Article 32 or Article
226. Reliance was placed on Epuru Sudhakar and Ram Chander. Further, the jurisdiction of this Court is not ousted by the existence of alternative legal remedies. Reliance was placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni vs. States of Madras and Kerala, (1960) 3 SCR 887 (“Kochuni”).
(iv) that the present proceedings pertain to administrative law and not criminal law and as a result, the principle of being a stranger to the criminal proceeding does not apply to the case at hand. Nevertheless, this Court has entertained petitions filed by ‘strangers’ in criminal matters in the past, as in the case of K. Anbazhagan vs. Superintendent of Police, (2004) 3 SCC 767 (“K. Anbazhagan”).
(v) that such exercises of executive power may be challenged on the basis of the grounds laid down in Epuru Sudhakar and Maru Ram.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 799Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
(vi) that an important question of law arises in the present proceedings, namely, whether it is appropriate to grant remission after a period of fourteen years to convicts of heinous crimes. That a further question arises, as to whether, the victims of such crimes must be heard and due consideration given to their vulnerability prior to the grant of remission. That there needs to be a consideration of how compliant such executive actions and the associated policies are with constitutional morality. Therefore, this Court may quash the remission orders passed under Section 432 of the CrPC if they appear to be poorly reasoned.
(vii) that there is a need to situate the crimes committed in the larger context of sectarian and communal violence that was ensuing in the 2002 riots in Gujarat State. That the crimes were specifically targeted at the victim on the basis of her religion and gender. That these heinous crimes constitute crimes against humanity. It was submitted that the nature of the crime is important to consider while deciding whether to grant remission. The heinousness of the crimes committed by respondent Nos.3 to 13, the communal motivation of the crimes and the context in which those took place are contended to have not been considered by the State while granting remission. Reliance was placed on Sanaboina Satyanarayana vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2003) 10 SCC 78 (“Sanaboina Satyanarayana”), wherein a certain Government Order issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh that excluded from the scope of remission those prisoners who had committed crimes against women and were sentenced to life imprisonment was upheld by this Court considering the nature of the offences.
(viii) that the Executive is bound not merely by provisions of the CrPC but also by the overarching spirit of the Constitution that seeks to promote the upliftment of women, children, and minorities and to protect these groups from further vulnerability and marginalization. That the policies and actions of the State must be guided by this vision.
800 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(ix) that, in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional principles, grant of remission to those persons sentenced to life imprisonment and accused of crimes under the Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the Explosive Substances Act and the Indian Arms Act, as well as crimes against women under Sections 376 and 354 of the IPC must not be permissible. Factors such as the opinion of the Presiding Judge, public interest, potential for recidivism, impact on the victims and on society and the nature of the offence must be borne in mind by the State, as held in Epuru Sudhakar, Sanaboina Satyanarayana and Zahid Hussain vs. State of West Bengal, 2001 (3) SCC 750 (“Zahid Hussain”). That the non-consideration of these factors proves the mala fide, arbitrary and unreasonable manner in which the impugned orders were passed.
(x) that the 1992 Policy of remission of the State of Gujarat does not contain any substantive guidelines pertaining to remission and merely deals with procedural formalities. That the 2014 Policy is thus the first instance at which categories of crimes for which remission may not be granted was outlined. As such, it is the 2014 Policy that would apply to the question of remission for respondent Nos.3 to 13.
(xi) that the grant of remission to the respondent Nos.3 to 13 is in violation of India’s obligations under international law, specifically instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. That rape was used as a tool of oppression by the perpetrators and the victim in the instant case experienced significant trauma as a consequence.
(xii) that the grant of remission in the instant case is in violation of the obligation to prevent crimes against humanity, which itself forms a part of the norm of jus cogens. That there is a link between the peremptory norm of jus cogens and fundamental values, making the former non-derogable [2024] 1 S.C.R. 801Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s and a part of domestic law even if not explicitly codified. Reliance was placed on State of Punjab vs. Dalbir Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 346 (“Dalbir Singh”) on this aspect.
(xiii) that the acts of violence that were committed in Gujarat in 2002 are crimes against humanity, owing to their widespread nature and communal motivations. That remission must not be granted to perpetrators of crimes of such gravity.
8.2. With the above submissions learned senior counsel for the petitioners sought quashing of the impugned orders.
9. Learned counsel Ms. Vrinda Grover for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.352 of 2022, submitted that it was absolutely necessary to consider the opinion of the Presiding Judge. Reliance was placed on Ram Chander and V. Sriharan. Her further submissions are recorded as under:
(i) that the Presiding Judge, namely the Special Judge (CBI), Sessions Court, Mumbai gave negative opinions dated 03.01.2020 and 22.03.2021 as to grant of remission to respondent Nos.3 to 13. The said opinion was well-reasoned and took into account all of the relevant factors, but this was completely disregarded by the respondent-State.
(ii) that a fine was imposed on each of the respondent-convicts as a part of their sentence, amounting to Rs. 34,000/- per person. That they had defaulted in paying these fines and thus would be required to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of 34 years. The Trial Court had clarified that these sentences were substantive in nature and would run concurrently. In this context, reliance was placed on Sharad Kolambe and Shantilal.
(iii) reiterating the submissions regarding the remission orders being arbitrary by virtue of non-consideration of relevant factors, it was urged that the criteria outlined in the decision of this Court in Laxman Naskar were not considered at all. Reliance was further placed on the decision of this Court in Mohinder Singh, wherein it was held that the decision to grant remission must be reasonable, well-informed and fair. That non-application of mind and the mechanical nature of the remission orders utterly belie these principles.
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(iv) that reference has only been made to four documents, namely
(1) the order of this Court dated 13.05.2022, (2) the letter of the Additional Director General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons, State of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, (3) the Department Circular dated 09.07.1992 and (4) the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India in the impugned orders of remission. It was contended that the non-consideration of determinative factors has rendered the remission orders mechanical and arbitrary, with reliance placed on what is described as the untenable and unlawful en-masse approval of the Central Government.
(v) that one of the criteria that is required to be considered which was highlighted in Laxman Naskar is the possibility of reformation and recidivism. That these factors have been given no consideration as there is no mention of the respondentconvicts’ behavior while in prison, as well as offences committed while out on parole/furlough. That a case has been registered against one of the respondent-convicts under Sections 304, 306 and 354 IPC while on parole. That a range of punishments were imposed on the respondent-convicts in prison hence, the possibility of recidivism cannot be entirely ruled out.
(vi) that there is a real and grave apprehension of danger to the victim if the respondent-convicts are released into society. This has been reflected in the recommendation of Superintendent of Police, Dahod as well as the questions raised by the Principal and Sessions Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra in the Jail Advisory Committee meeting dated 26.05.2022.
(vii) that remission must be granted for each particular count of life imprisonment, as all of these are superimposed over each other. Remission granted qua one sentence does not automatically extend to the others as well. That a generic, mechanical and unreasoned blanket order of remission has been passed by the respondent-State, as remission is not stated to have been granted for all of the life sentences of each respondent-convict.
(viii) that Section 435(1)(a) of the CrPC makes it mandatory for the State Government to consult the Central Government regarding the exercise of power to grant remission. But the en-masse and non-speaking nature of the sanction granted by the Central [2024] 1 S.C.R. 803Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s Government, merely conveys approval of the premature release of the respondent-convicts, which do not meet the requirement of ‘consultation’. Reliance was again placed on Laxman Naskar.
(ix) further, the opinion of the Sessions Judge, Panchmahal, Godhra is of a casual and perfunctory character, that doesn’t pay heed to the heinous nature of the crimes committed.
(x) it was further submitted that the remission orders having thus been established as unreasoned, untenable and vitiated by arbitrariness and mala fides, there is a need for judicial intervention in the same.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.319 of 2022, Ms. Aparna Bhat submitted that the aforesaid writ petition has been filed purely in the interest of the general public and out of concern for the impact on society if the respondents-convicts were released. That there is no political agenda behind the filing of this writ petition by the petitioner, who is a member of a national political party and an advocate for women’s rights.
11. Sri Mohammad Nizamuddin Pasha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.403 of 2022 submitted that the cases which are at stages prior to conviction. i.e., investigation and trial must be treated as being on a different footing as guilt would not have been established and the fair trial rights of the accused still subsisted. However, there is no right to remission post-conviction as held in V.Sriharan. That it is only upon conviction that the need for the accused to remain in prison becomes a concern of the society. That all theories of punishment, including those of retributivism and utilitarianism, emphasize the impact on society as being of primary importance. Reliance was placed on T.K. Gopal vs. State of Karnataka, (2000) 6 SCC 168 (“T.K. Gopal”), Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 (“Narinder Singh”), Shailesh Jasvantbhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359 (“Shailesh Jasvantbhai”) and Ahmed Hussain Vali Mohammed Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 (“Mohammed Saiyed”).
12. Sri. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat and Union of India, at the outset submitted that the writ petitions filed by persons other than the victim are not maintainable. That the said persons are strangers and 804 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports have no locus-standi to challenge the remission orders passed by the State of Gujarat. The said petitioners are in no way connected with the proceedings which convicted the respondents herein nor the proceedings which culminated in the grant of remission to the convicts. Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Rajiv Ranjan; Gulzar Ahmed Azmi; Simranjit Singh and Ashok Kumar to contend that no third party/stranger’s interference in criminal matters is permissible in law in the garb of filing a PIL.
12.1. Referring to Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022, it was contended that nowhere has the petitioner therein, namely, Subhasini Ali pleaded as to how her fundamental rights had been abridged and as to how she was aggrieved by the action of the State Government. That the petitioner therein was nothing but an interloper and a busybody and not a ‘person aggrieved’ as per the dicta of this Court in M. V. Dabholkarand Jasbhai Motibhai. Thus, the PIL filed by such a person is nothing but an abuse of the PIL jurisdiction of this Court and against the principles laid down in Tehseen and Ashok Kumar. Therefore, learned ASG sought for dismissal of all the PILs challenging the impugned orders of remission on the ground of maintainability.
12.2. It was next contended that there was no illegality in the Orders granting remission to respondent Nos.3 to 13, dated 10.08.2022. That this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 vide judgment dated 13.05.2022 had held that the policy which would be applicable for deciding the remission application was the one which was in vogue at the time of conviction i.e., the premature release policy of 1992 and that for the purposes of Section 432 of the CrPC, the ‘appropriate government’ for considering the remission application is that State in which the offence was committed and not the State in which the trial was conducted and therefore, had directed the State of Gujarat to consider the application of respondent No.3, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah. Accordingly, the respondent- State of Gujarat had considered the application of the convict as per the procedure prescribed under Section 432 of the CrPC read with Section 435 of the CrPC, along with the Premature Release of Convicts Policy of 1992. The State Government considered the cases of all eleven prisoners as per the policy of 1992 and remission was granted on 10.08.2022.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 805Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
12.3. That further, the Order(s) dated 10.08.2022 were passed after duly considering the opinions expressed by Inspector General of Prisons, Gujarat State; Jail Superintendent; Jail Advisory Committee, District Magistrate; Superintendent of Police, CBI, Special Crime Branch, Mumbai; and the Special Court, Mumbai (CBI). That as per Section 435 of the CrPC, it is indispensable to obtain the sanction of the Government of India in cases in which the investigation of the offence was carried out by a central investigation agency. In the present case, the investigation was carried out by CBI, hence, the State Government obtained the approval of Government of India.
12.4. It was next submitted that respondent Nos.3 to 13 had completed more than fourteen years in custody, that their behaviour had been good and the opinions of the concerned authorities had been obtained as per the policy of 09.07.1992. The State Government submitted the opinions of the concerned authorities to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India vide letter dated 28.06.2022 and sought the approval of the Government of India which conveyed its concurrence/ approval under Section 435 of the CrPC for the premature release of eleven convicts vide letter dated 11.07.2022. Hence, after following the due procedure, Orders were issued on 10.08.2022 to release the convicts which would not call for any interference by this Court.
12.5. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Jagdish wherein it was held that if a policy which is beneficial to the convict exists at the time of consideration of his application for premature release, then the convict cannot be deprived of such a beneficial policy. It was held in the said case that, “In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he should be given the benefit thereof.” That bearing in mind such considerations, the applications of respondent Nos.3 to 13 for remission were considered and decided.
12.6. That the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat and ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432 (7) of the CrPC, the appropriate government in the ordinary course would be 806 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the State of Gujarat. However, the trial in the instant case was transferred under exceptional circumstances by this Court to the neighboring State of Maharashtra for the limited purpose of trial and disposal by an order dated 06.08.2004 but after the conclusion of trial and the prisoners being convicted, the matter stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed and thus, the State of Gujarat was the appropriate government for the purpose of Section 432(7) of the CrPC.
12.7. It was submitted that the Orders dated 10.08.2022 were passed by the Government of Gujarat after following the due procedure laid down in this regard and on an application of mind. Therefore, the same do not call for any interference by this Court in these petitions.
13. Learned Counsel for respondent No.3, Sri Rishi Malhotra at the outset attacked the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that in substance, the petitions seek to challenge the judgment of this Court dated 13.05.2022 in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.135 of 2022; that the same is impermissible and is in the teeth of the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388, (“Rupa Ashok Hurra”) wherein it has been held that a writ petition assailing the judgment or order of this Court after the dismissal of the Review Petition is not maintainable. Thus, the only remedy, if any, available to the petitioner-victim herein against the dismissal of the Review Petition, is to file a Curative Petition as propounded by this Court in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra.
13.1. Sri Rishi Malhotra further submitted that in this proceeding this Court cannot sit over the judgment passed by another coordinate bench. It was further submitted that this Court by its judgment dated 13.05.2022 was right in categorically directing the State of Gujarat to consider the application for premature release of respondent No.3 in terms of the policy dated 09.07.1992 which was applicable on the date of conviction. That after duly taking into account the fact that respondent No.3 had undergone over fifteen years of imprisonment and that no objections were received from the Jail Superintendent, Godhra and that nine out of ten members of the Jail Advisory Committee had recommended his premature release. That coupled with the aforesaid facts the Home Department of the State of [2024] 1 S.C.R. 807Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s Gujarat as well as the Union Government had recommended and approved the premature release of respondent No.3. This clearly demonstrates that the remission order was correct. Further, it is nowhere mentioned in the 1992 policy that all stakeholders must give a unanimous opinion for the release of the convict. All it says is that the State Government should collate various opinions from different quarters in order to arrive at a decision.
13.2. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the petitionervictim to the effect that the Orders are illegal inasmuch as those were passed without consulting the Presiding Judge of the convicting court as required under Section 432(2) of the CrPC, it was submitted that the said provision categorically stipulates that the appropriate government ‘may require’ the Presiding Judge of the Trial Court to give his opinion, hence obtaining such an opinion is not mandatory; whereas, Section 435 of the CrPC uses the word ‘shall’ in respect to the State Government to act only after consultation with the Central Government. The legislature is conscious to use the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ whenever it deems appropriate and necessary and that the said procedure has been followed in the instant case.
14. At the outset, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.13, Sri Sidharth Luthra contended that a writ petition does not lie against the final order of this Court, thus the petitioners could have only filed a Curative Petition. He further submitted as follow: i) In this regard reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra, wherein it was held that a writ petition under Article 32 assailing a final judgment of this Court is not maintainable. That since the Review Petition against the Order dated 13.05.2022 has been dismissed by this Court, similar contentions cannot be re-agitated in the guise of the present writ petition. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 (“Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar”), wherein it has been held that a writ shall not lie against an order of a Constitutional Court. It was thus submitted that the order dated 13.05.2022 has attained finality and cannot be questioned by way of a 808 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports writ petition under Article 32. Furthermore, in view of the Rules framed by this Court, Order XLVIII thereof lays down how an order of this Court can be questioned by means of a Curative Petition and thus, a natural corollary is that the same cannot be done through a writ petition.
ii) As regards the issue of appropriate government and appropriate policy, learned senior counsel Sri Luthra submitted that the said issues stood settled in view of this Court’s Order dated 13.05.2022. The judgments of this Court in Rashidul Jafar vs. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1201 (“Rashidul Jafar”); State of Haryana vs. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 (“Raj Kumar”) and Hitesh vs. State of Gujarat (Writ Petition(Crl.) No.467/2022)(“Hitesh”) were pressed into service wherein it had been held that the policy as on the date of conviction would apply, and therefore, the 1992 Policy of the State of Gujarat will apply for the grant of remission in the present case. iii) Learned senior counsel thereafter raised the plea that in India, a reformative/rehabilitative and penal sentencing policy is followed and not one which is punitive in nature. The same was reiterated when the Model Prison Act, 2023 was finalized which aims at “reforming prison management and ensuring the transformation of inmates into law-abiding citizens and their rehabilitation in society.” Furthermore, in the case of Vinter vs. The United Kingdom (Applications Nos.66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10), (2016) III ECHR 317(“Vinter “) in the context of rehabilitation and reformation it was held by the European Court of Human Rights that, “Moreover, if such a person is incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he can never atone for his offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable.”Learned senior counsel submitted that respondent No.13 had exhibited unblemished behaviour in prison and there was no criminality attached to his conduct in prison.
iv) Sri Luthra refuted the argument of the petitioners that in the light of the grievous nature of the offence, the convicts herein do not deserve remission. At the stage of remission, the length of sentence or the gravity of the original crime cannot be the [2024] 1 S.C.R. 809Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others sole basis for refusing premature release as held in Satish vs. State of UP, (2021) 14 SCC 580 (“Satish”). Therefore, any argument regarding the factual nature of the crime or the impact it had on society are not relevant for consideration of remission was the submission of Sri Luthra.
v) That it is open for the High Court as well as this Court to modify the punishment by providing for a specific period of incarceration without remission, considering the purported heinous nature of the offence but neither the High Court nor this Court chose to exercise the said power to incarcerate the private respondents herein for a duration which was non-remittable. This shows that the aforesaid argument advanced by the petitioner is only a red herring.
vi) It was emphasized that an order of remission passed by an authority merely affects the execution of the sentence, without interfering with the sentence passed by the Court. Therefore, since the matter has already attained finality, it is not possible to question the validity of such an order on factual grounds alone, such as, the nature of crime, impact on society and society’s cry for justice.
vii) Learned senior counsel submitted that the mere fact that fine had not been paid or that there was a default in payment of the fine imposed does not impact the exercise of the power of remission. The sentence is something which an offender must undergo unless it is set aside or remitted in part or in whole either in appeal, or in revision, or in other appropriate judicial proceedings or ‘otherwise’, whereas, a term of imprisonment ordered in default of payment of fine stands on a different footing vide Shantilal;Abdul Gani vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1950) SCC OnLine MP 119 (“Abdul Gani”) and Shahejadkham Mahebubkham Pathan vs. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 570 (“Shahejadkham Mahebubkham Pathan”). Further, reliance was placed on Sharad Kolambe, wherein it was observed by this Court that, “If the term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is a penalty which a person incurs on account of non-payment of fine and is not a sentence in strict sense, imposition of such default sentence is completely different and qualitatively distinct from a substantive sentence.” 810 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
15. Learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.7 Mrs. Sonia Mathur, while adopting the submissions of other senior counsel further contended as under:
15.1. That as per Section 432 (7)(b) of the CrPC and the judicial precedent set in Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, the appropriate government would be the State of Gujarat. The said judgment has attained finality as the Review Petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed by this Court on 13.12.2022. Thus, the said judgment must be followed for the sake of judicial propriety.
15.2. As to the nature of the requirement under Section 432 (2) of the CrPC, i.e., whether mandatory or directory, it was submitted that as observed by this Court in Ram Chander the opinion so obtained is not to be mechanically followed and the government has the discretion to seek an opinion afresh. That the said view would demonstrate that the discretion vests with the concerned government as to whether or not to seek and rely upon the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Trial Court.
15.3. As regards the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-victim as to non-payment of fine, it was submitted that a fine of Rs.6,000/- was paid by respondent No.7 without any objection on 27.09.2019 before the Sessions Court, Greater Mumbai. However, without prejudice to the said payment, there is no provision in the Prison Manual of Gujarat, which bars remission from being granted if the fine is not paid. The grant of remission cannot be restricted just because a convict is not financially capable to bear the fine. The same would cause discrimination based on the economic and financial capacity of a convict to pay fine, resulting in the violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
15.4. We have heard learned counsel for the other respondents. With the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that these writ petitions be dismissed.
Reply Arguments:
16. Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner-victim submitted in her rejoinder on the point that the writ petition was maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution as follows:
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 811Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s
(i) that the order of grant of remission being an administrative order, there was neither a statutory nor substantive right of appeal available to the aggrieved parties. The only remedy available was to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat, or to file a writ petition before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
(ii) that this Court has on multiple occasions entertained writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution in those cases where there existed a “gross violation of fundamental rights”, or when an executive or administrative decision “shocked the conscience of the public, the nation or of this Court”. In this context, reliance was placed on the judgments of this Court in Epuru Sudhakar; Satpal vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 170 (“Satpal”) and Mohammed Ishaq vs. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748 (“Mohammed Ishaq”). It was submitted that a similar issue of maintainability arose in Mohammed Ishaq, wherein this Court observed that the mere existence of an alternative remedy in the form of Article 226 does not preclude an aggrieved person from approaching this Court directly under Article 32. The rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedies was described as being one of “convenience and discretion” as opposed to being absolute or inflexible in nature.
(iii) that this Court had in the past entertained writ petitions under Article 32 filed by convicts seeking intervention in matters of premature release or the issuance of appropriate directions. Reliance was placed on the judgments in Ram Chander, Laxman Naskar and Rajan.
(iv) that this Court had earlier entertained a writ petition filed by none other than respondent No.3 himself and no question was raised as to the maintainability of that writ petition. All of the other private respondents are beneficiaries of the order dated 13.05.2022 passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. It is thus incongruous to raise the objection of maintainability only against the writ petition filed by the petitioner-victim. That the petitioner-victim was totally unaware of Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 filed by respondent No.3 seeking premature release before this Court. The petitioner learnt about the release, like the general public did, from the news and social media. 812 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports That the petitioner had barely begun to recover from the shock of respondent Nos.3 to 13 being released when several PILs were filed, and this Court was already seized of the matter. This left the petitioner with no choice but to approach this Court.
(v) that the petitioner had also filed a Review Petition seeking review of the order dated 13.05.2022, wherein this Court held the State of Gujarat to be the appropriate government to consider the grant of remission, being the State in which the crime took place. The said order was perincuriam and contrary to the judgements of this Court. On this aspect, reliance was again placed on V.Sriharan, Rattan Singh, M. T. Khan and Hanumant Dass. Hence, the petitioner was under the impression that the said Review Petition and this writ petition would be considered together by this Court. But the Review Petition has been dismissed. Hence, this writ petition has to be considered on its own merits.
(vi) that the challenge to the maintainability of this writ petition is fallacious in the context of the specific argument raised by respondent Nos.1 and 2, namely, that the direction given by this Court as on 13.05.2022 was a mandate that was merely being adhered to in the remission order and therefore the same would not be open to challenge. That this further exemplifies non-application of mind and a hasty and mechanical manner of granting remission by misrepresenting about the order dated 13.05.2022.
(vii) It was submitted that the ‘right to justice’ was recognized as an indispensable human and fundamental right in Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan, (2016) 8 SCC 509 (“Anita Kushwaha”), and that this writ petition was maintainable on that basis also. In light of the aforementioned submissions, learned counsel contended that the filing of a writ petition under Article 32 before this Court is the most efficacious remedy available to the petitioner.
16.1. Reiterating her submissions regarding the non-consideration of the negative opinions of the investigating agency, namely the CBI as well as the Judge of the Special CBI Court, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 813Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s Mumbai, learned counsel went on to refute the claim of the learned Additional Solicitor-General that the relevant opinion would be that of the Presiding Judge of the Godhra Court who was convinced of the merits of grant of remission. That this contention of learned ASG would contradict the plain language of Section 432(2) which specifies that the Presiding Judge should have been the one who awarded or confirmed the sentence. Reliance was again placed on the judgments of this Court in Sangeet, Ram Chander and V. Sriharan. Learned counsel further contended that the submission of the learned ASG that the use of the word ‘may’ in Section 432(2) would imply that there is no necessary requirement to seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge is erroneous in light of the dictum of this Court in V.Sriharan.
16.2. It was next contended that a letter dated 17.11.2021 was filed along with the application dated 10.08.2022. The said letter by the State of Gujarat addressed to the State of Maharashtra detailed that the State of Gujarat possessed no powers of remission with respect to respondent No.3 and that the appropriate government in this respect would be the State of Maharashtra. Despite taking this view, which is in accordance with the position of law laid down by this Court in various cases, including V. Sriharan, no review petition was filed by the State challenging the 13.05.2022 order.
16.3. It was next submitted that the learned Additional Solicitor- General had placed on record the opinion of the CBI dated 09.07.2022 wherein, after an apparent change of mind, grant of remission to respondent Nos.3 to 13 was recommended. That neither of the documents, namely, the letter of the State of Gujarat and the changed opinion of the CBI find any mention in the counter-affidavit filed by the State on 17.10.2022. It was further submitted that these additional documents establish the rapid timeline of the process adopted by the Central Government in affirming the orders of remission, as the State Government’s communication was received on 06.07.2022, the opinion of the CBI was sought and received on 09.07.2022 and the Central Government expressed its concurrence on 11.07.2022.
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16.4. It was further contended that respondent No.3 produced a document dated 18.06.2022 during the course of his arguments, stating that the same was the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Mumbai Special Court (CBI). However, the veracity of the said document cannot be established as the State claimed to be not in possession of and is entirely unaware of the same.
16.5. Learned counsel reiterated that the above facts reveal nonapplication of mind and the mechanical manner in which the orders of remission were passed in the instant case.
16.6. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that on 30.08.2023, the fine amounts owed were deposited by respondent Nos.3 to 13. That this is as an admission on their part of the non-payment of fine. It was contended that they would ordinarily have had to undergo a further period of six years of imprisonment. That non-consideration of this fact further proves the non-application of mind and a mechanical exercise of power by the State of Gujarat and Union of India in granting remission.
16.7. Learned counsel went on to submit that in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 filed by respondent No.3, there was no mention of material particulars, such as, the name of the petitioner-victim and the nature of the crimes in question, i.e., gang rape and mass murder in the petition. Also the fact that his application for grant of remission before the State of Maharashtra had been negatively opined by all the concerned authorities. That respondent No.3 did not place on record the judgements and orders of the Trial Court, High Court, and this Court that had upheld his conviction. That he made “incorrect and misleading” statements with reference to the orders of the Bombay High Court dated 05.08.2013 and Gujarat High Court dated 17.07.2019, namely, that the two courts had given differing opinions, and this fact played a role in this Court’s decisionmaking while passing the order dated 13.05.2022. Respondent No.3 made it seem like both High Courts were sending him to the other State and that there was a contradiction. However, the aforesaid order of the Bombay High Court was dealing with the transfer of convicts to another jail in their parent State and did not discuss the issue of remission, which could not have arisen in the year 2013.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 815Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
16.8. It was reiterated that the investigating agency of the State of Gujarat had filed a closure report stating that the accused persons were not traceable. That the FIR contained erroneous recording of facts merely to hinder the investigative process. That the case was transferred by this Court to the State of Maharashtra as a consequence of the tainted nature of investigation. That the only reason the petitioner could get justice was because the investigation was conducted by the CBI. That this demonstrates the highly biased and partisan treatment of the petitioner by the State of Gujarat. That the State has been granting parole and furlough to the respondents in a liberal manner once they were transferred to the Godhra Jail. That in light of the highly diabolical and gruesome nature of the crimes, the treatment awarded to the respondents by the State indicates favouritism and leniency.
16.9. Learned counsel reiterated that the nature of the crimes committed by the respondent Nos.3 to 13 were unusual and egregious. That these crimes were very shocking to the society as a whole and the treatment of the respondents upon being granted remission invoked a common sense of pain in the nation. That in fact the Bombay High Court had described the brutal treatment of the victims by the respondent Nos.3 to 13, which was reflected in the condition of the dead bodies. These factors require that respondents Nos.3 to 13 be treated differently from other ordinary criminals.
17. Learned senior counsel, Ms. Indira Jaising, appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.326 of 2022 in her rejoinder at the outset submitted that the State of Gujarat does not have a policy of any kind for the release of prisoners under Section 432 of the CrPC. That the 1992 Policy merely outlines the procedure to be followed when releasing convicts on remission. That the State must abide by the law laid down by this Court as well as the constitutional mandate to protect the fundamental rights of women, particularly when they are victims of sexual violence in relation to ethnic conflict.
17.1. Further, it was contended that the State of Gujarat is not the appropriate government and therefore the order of this Court dated 13.05.2022 is per incuriam by virtue of failing to follow the binding precedent in V. Sriharan. That the impugning of the order of the Gujarat High Court that held the State of 816 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Maharashtra to be the appropriate Government in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022, filed by respondent No.3, is completely contrary to the position of law laid down in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, wherein it was held that no writ petition alleging the violation of fundamental rights would lie against the judgement or order of a court. That the respondent No.3 committed fraud on this Court by misrepresenting the order of the Bombay High Court dated 05.08.2013 in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.135 of 2022. That the question of two High Courts taking “dramatically different views” did not arise as the issue of appropriate Government was not in question before the Bombay High Court at all. That this amounts to suppressio veri, expression falsi. That this Court in Union of India vs. Ramesh Gandhi, (2012) 1 SCC 476 (“Ramesh Gandhi”), has held that any judgement that is a consequence of misrepresentation of necessary facts would constitute fraud and would be treated as a nullity. That this error of the Court cannot lead to the deprivation of justice to the victims. While the criminal justice system must strive to adopt a reformative approach, proportionality of sentence must be treated as an equally important ideal. Reliance was placed on the judgements of this Court in Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 (“Alister Anthony Pareira”), Ravji vs. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175(“Ravji”) and Soman vs. State of Kerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382 (“Soman”).
18. Ms. Vrinda Grover, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.352 of 2022 reiterated the contentions as to the centrality and non-optional nature of seeking the opinion of the Presiding Judge under Section 432(2) of the CrPC, the non-serving of the concurrent sentences for the non-payment of fine by the respondent Nos.3 to 13 as well as the need to consider the nature of the crimes and the impact on public welfare while considering the grant of remission. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Ram Chander, Sharad Kolambe, Devendra Kumar vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2013) 9 SCC 363 (“Devendra Kumar”) and Abdul Gani.
18.1. It was further submitted that the State of Gujarat has not considered the possibility of recidivism and whether there was any evidence of reformation of respondent Nos.3 to 13. That as per the record, respondent Nos.3 to 13 have not demonstrated [2024] 1 S.C.R. 817Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s any sign of reform and have not expressed any remorse for the crimes they have committed. That their applications for remission do not contain reference to feelings of remorse felt by them for their actions. The non-payment of fine is further indication of the absence of remorse. Also fresh cases have been registered against two of the respondents, and this serves as proof of their non-reformation.
18.2. It was also contended that reliance cannot be placed on documents, such as, letter dated 09.07.2022 of the C.B.I, wherein an affirmative opinion on remission was expressed as well as a letter produced by respondent No.3 containing the affirmative opinion of the Special Judge (C.B.I), Civil and Sessions Court, Mumbai as these documents have not been listed among the documents relied upon by the State of Gujarat while granting remission to the respondent Nos.3 to 13.
19. Ms. Aparna Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.319 of 2022 in her rejoinder submitted that the remission granted by the State of Gujarat to respondent Nos.3 to 13 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That prison statistics from the year 2021 reveal that 66.7% of the convicts in Gujarat are undergoing life imprisonment, at least a fraction of whom have completed fourteen years of incarceration. That no special case has been made out either by the State of Gujarat or the Union of India as to why respondent Nos.3 to 13 are singularly entitled to remission over all of the other convicts. Reliance was placed on judgements in S. G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427(“S. G. Jaisinghani”) and E.P. Royappa vs. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 (“E.P. Royappa”), wherein this Court held that arbitrary and mala fide exercise of power by the State would constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. That discretionary and en-masse remission on festive occasions was held to be impermissible in the case of Sangeet.
19.1. It was further submitted that there is no right to remission that a convict can necessarily avail. That remission must be an exercise of discretion judiciously by the concerned authorities. Reliance was placed onthe judgments of this Court inSangeet, V. Sriharan, State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606 (“Mahender Singh”); Mohinder Singh, Maru Ram and Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296 (“Shri Bhagwan”).
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20. Mr.Mohammad Nizamuddin Pasha, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.403 of 2022 reiterated the contention that materials not relied upon by the State of Gujarat while deciding on the question of remission for respondent Nos.3 to 13 cannot be used to justify the decision retrospectively. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in OPTO Circuit India Ltd. vs. Axis Bank, (2021) 6 SCC 707 (“OPTO Circuit”). That contrary to the submission of the learned ASG, the State has to consider the gravity of the offence while deciding whether to grant remission or not. That in cases, where the crimes are of a much less serious nature, remission has not been granted owing to the perceived seriousness of the offences by the State but in these cases of gruesome crime, remission has been simply granted. Further, there is a need to consider the fact that the victim and the convicts live in close proximity while granting remission, which fact has been considered in other cases but not in the impugned remission orders.
Points for consideration:
21. Having heard learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respective petitioners as well as learned ASG, learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respondents, the following points would arise for our consideration:- 1) Whether the petition filed by one of the victims inWrit Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable?
2) Whether the writ petitions filed as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) assailing the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 are maintainable?
3) Whether the Government of the State of Gujarat was competent to pass the impugned orders of remission?
4) Whether the impugned orders of remission passed by the respondent-State of Gujarat in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 13 are in accordance with law?
5) What Order?
The aforesaid points shall be considered in seriatim. A detailed narration of facts and contentions would not call for reiteration at this stage.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 819Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others Re: Point No.1:“Whether the petition filed by one of the victims in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable?”
22. Sri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel for respondent No.3, while placing reliance on the decisions of this Court, made a specific plea regarding maintainability of Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 filed by the victim by contending that the said petitioner had filed a review petition challenging the order dated 13.05.2022 passed in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.135 of 2022 and the same was dismissed. Therefore, the only remedy open to the petitioner was to file a curative petition in terms of the judgment of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurrah and not challenging the remission orders by filing a fresh writ petition. We shall answer this contention in detail while considering point No.3.
22.1. One of the contentions raised by learned Senior Counsel, Sri S. Guru Krishna Kumar appearing for one of the private respondents was that the petitioner inWrit Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022, Bilkis Bano, ought to have challenged the orders of remission before the Gujarat High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution rather than invoking Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court. In this regard, it was submitted that by straightaway filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution a right of approaching this Court by way of an appeal by an aggrieved party has been lost. It was submitted that if victims file petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court challenging orders of remission, floodgates would be opened and persons such as the petitioner would straightaway file writ petitions before this Court. That when an alternative remedy of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is available which is also a wider remedy than Article 32 of the Constitution, the petition filed by the writ petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 must be dismissed reserving liberty to her to approach the High Court, if so advised.
Similar arguments were made by learned senior counsel Sri Chidambaresh.
22.2. At the outset, we state that Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of Part-III of the Constitution of India which deals with Fundamental Rights. The right to file a petition under Article 32 820 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of the Constitution is also a Fundamental Right. In the instant case, the petitioner - Bilkis Bano has filed her writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in order to enforce her Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution which speaks of right to life and liberty and Article 14 which deals with right to equality and equal protection of the laws. The object and purpose of Article 32 of the Constitution which is also recognised to be the “soul of the Constitution” and which is a Fundamental Right in itself is for the enforcement of other Fundamental Rights in Part-III of the Constitution. We think that the aforesaid constitutional remedy is also to enforce the goals enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution, which speak of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Bearing in mind the expanded notion of access to justice which also includes speedy remedy, we think that the petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 cannot be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution or on the ground of its maintainability under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court.
22.3. There is another stronger reason as to why the said petitioner has approached this Court by filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution rather than invoking Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. That is because earlier, one of the respondents, namely, respondent No.3 Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah had preferred Writ Petition(Crl.) No.135 of 2022 invoking Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court by seeking a direction to the State of Gujarat to consider his case for remission under the Policy of 1992. This Court issued a categorical direction to that effect. In fact, the respondent-State has understood the said direction as if it was a command or a direction to grant remission within a period of two months. But, before this Court in the said proceedings, one of the serious contentions raised by the State of Gujarat was that it was not the appropriate Government to grant remission which contention was negatived by the order dated 13.05.2022. In fact, that is one of the grounds raised by the petitioner victim to assail the orders of remission granted to respondent Nos.3 to 13. That being so, the High Court of Gujarat would not have been in a position to entertain the aforesaid contention [2024] 1 S.C.R. 821Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s in view of the categorical direction issued by this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 disposed on 13.05.2022. In the teeth of the aforesaid order of this Court, the contention regarding the State of Gujarat not being the competent State to consider the validity of the orders of remission in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly, when the question of competency was raised, could not have been dealt with by the Gujarat High Court on the principle of judicial propriety. Therefore, for this reason also the petitioner in Writ Petition(Crl.) No.135 of 2022 has, in our view, rightly approached this Court challenging the orders of remission. The contentions of learned Senior Counsel, Sri S. Guru Krishna Kumar and Sri Chidambaresh are hence, rejected. Thus, we hold that Writ Petition (Crl.) No.491 of 2022 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is clearly maintainable.
Re: Point No.2:“Whether the writ petitions filed as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) assailing the impugned orders of remission dated 10.08.2022 are maintainable?”
23. We now record the submissions made with regard to maintainability of the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) assailing the orders of remission in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 13 herein.
23.1. Learned ASG appearing for the State of Gujarat as well as Union of India submitted that the writ petitions filed as public interest litigations are not maintainable as the petitioners are strangers to the impugned orders of remission and they are in no way connected with the matter. In this context, reliance was placed on certain decisions referred to above including Rajiv Ranjan, Simranjit Singh, and, Ashok Kumar, to contend that there can be no third party interference in criminal matters in the garb of filing public interest litigations. It was also contended that the petitioners who have filed the public interest litigation are interlopers and busybodies and are not persons who are aggrieved. In the aforesaid context, reliance was placed on M.V. Dabholkar and Jasbhai Motibhai.
23.2. Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel has also voiced the arguments of the respondents by referring to certain decisions of this Court while contending that the grant of remission is in the exclusive domain of the State and although no convict 822 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports can seek remission as a matter of fundamental right has nevertheless the right to be considered for remission. That remission is a matter between the convict and the State and, therefore, there can be no third party inference in such a matter. The detailed submissions of the learned counsel have already been adverted to above and, therefore, it is unnecessary to reproduce the same once again.
23.3. Respondent No.3 has challenged the locus of the petitioners in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022 and connected writ petitions and contended that the petitioners therein are not related to the said case and are third-party/strangers to the case. If petitions filed by third- party strangers are entertained by this Court, then it would unsettle the settled position of law and would open floodgates for litigation. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 Sri Rishi Malhotra placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 (“Janata Dal”) which was reiterated and followed in Simranjit Singh and in Subramanian Swamy vs. Raju, (2013) 10 SCC 465 (“Subramanian Swamy”) where it has consistently been held that a third party, who is a total stranger to the prosecution has no ‘locus standi’ in criminal matters and has no right whatsoever to file a petition under Article 32.
23.4. In Simranjit Singh, this Court was faced with the situation where a conviction of some of the accused persons by this Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, (TADA Act) was sought to be challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution by the President of the Akali Dal (M), namely, Simranjit Singh Mann which was dismissed. In paragraph 5 of the judgment in Simranjit Singh, this Court categorically dealt with the said issue and held that the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was not maintainable for the simple reason that the petitioner therein did not seek to enforce any of his fundamental rights nor did he complain that any of his fundamental rights were being violated. This Court was of the view that a total stranger in a criminal case cannot be permitted to question the correctness of a decision.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 823Bilkis Yakub Rasool v . U n i o n o f India & O t h e r s
24. Per contra, learned senior counsel, Ms. Indira Jaising, has made her submissions on the issue of locus standi of the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.326 of 2022. According to her, even when no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by an act or omission of the State or any public authority but when an injury is caused to public interest, a concerned citizen can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of public duty. (Vide B.P Singhal).
24.1. She asserted that the writ petition raises questions of great public importance in that, in a democracy based on the rule of law, no authority has any unfeterred and unreviewable discretion. All powers vested in an authority, are intended to be used only for public good. The exercise of executive power must be informed by the finer canons of constitutionalism, vide Maru Ram. That the impugned decision of granting remission to the convicts violates rule of law, is arbitrary and not based on any relevant consideration. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner in public interest is maintainable. In this regard reliance was placed on S.P. Gupta.
24.2. As regards respondents’ contention that by entertaining the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the convicts have been denied the right of appeal, it was submitted that there exists no statutory right of appeal against an order denying or permitting remission. Such an order can only be challenged under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Further, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kochuni observed that, “… the mere existence of an adequate alternative remedy cannot per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Article 32, if the existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or threatened, of such right is alleged and is prima facie established on the petition.”
24.3. As regards the respondents’ submission that a stranger to the criminal proceedings under any circumstance cannot file a petition under Article 32, it was contended that the instant proceedings are not criminal in nature, they fall within the realm of administrative law as they seek to challenge orders of remission which are administrative decisions. Learned 824 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports senior counsel brought to our notice the fact that this Court had entertained a petition filed by a DMK leader under Section 406 of the CrPC seeking the transfer of a pending criminal trial against his political opponent, J. Jayalalithaa, from the State of Tamil Nadu to the State of Karnataka vide K. Anbazhagan.
25. Ms. Vrinda Grover, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.352 of 2022, at the outset, submitted that the said petition has been filed in the larger public interest by the petitioners who have vast knowledge and practical expertise on issues of public policy, governance and upholding the rule of law. Their petition challenges not only the arbitrary and mala fide exercise of executive prerogative under Section 432 of the CrPC, but also prays for a shift in practices related to the grant of remission by bringing in more accountability and transparency to the process of grant of remission. Thus, the writ petition is maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation.
25.1. Learned counsel contended that the petition does not constitute an intervention into criminal proceedings but is rather a challenge to arbitrary executive action, which is amenable to judicial review. That it is settled law that the exercise of power under Section 432 of the CrPC is an administrative act which neither retracts from a judicial order nor does it wipe out the conviction of the accused and is merely an executive prerogative exercised after the judicial function in a criminal proceeding has come to an end vide Epuru Sudhakar and Ashok Kumar.
25.2. It was further submitted that all the judgments cited by the respondents-convicts as also the respondent-State to argue that the petitioners have no locus standi in the matter refer to different stages of criminal proceedings, viz. petitions related to investigation, trial, sentencing or quashing of the FIR. However, the present petition is a challenge to the arbitrary and mala fide administrative action which has arisen after the criminal proceedings have attained finality in the eye of law.
25.3. Learned counsel submitted that it is trite that the exercise of executive discretion is subject to rule of law and fairness in State action as embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. The exercise of such discretion under Section 432 of the CrPC which [2024] 1 S.C.R. 825Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others is arbitrary or mala fide amounts to State action in violation of constitutional and statutory obligations and is detrimental to public interest. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in S. P. Gupta to submit that this Court has in many cases held that in case of public injury caused by an act or omission of the State which is contrary to the rule of law, any member of the public acting bona fide can maintain an action for redressal of a public wrong. In the case at hand, the mala fide and arbitrary grant of premature release to the respondents-convicts by State action is de hors constitutional mandate and abets immunity for violence against women. (Vide Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288 (“Sheonandan Paswan”) and Abdul Wahab K. vs. State of Kerala, (2018) 18 SCC 448 (“Abdul Wahab”).
25.4. Learned counsel next submitted that this Court in Subramanian Swamy, while adjudicating on the locus of a public-spirited intervenor in a case requiring interpretation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, held that the intervenor had sought an interpretation of criminal law which would have a wide implication beyond the scope of the parties in that case and hence, allowed the same. Thus, when larger questions of law are involved, which include interpretation of statutory provisions for the purpose of grant of premature release/remission, public-spirited persons who approach the Court in a bona fide manner, ought not to be prevented from assisting the Court to arrive at a just and fair outcome.
25.5. Learned counsel Ms. Grover further submitted that in cases where offences have shocked the conscience of the society, spread fear and alarm amongst citizens and have impugned on the secular fabric of society, like in the instant case, this Court has allowed interventions by members of the public seeking to bring to the attention of the Court the inaction and apathy on the part of the State in discharging its duty within the criminal justice system. It has been held in some cases that the technical rule of locus cannot shield the arbitrary and illegal exercise of executive discretion in violation of constitutional and statutory principles, once the same have been brought to the attention of this Court.
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26. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022, Smt. Aparna Bhat submitted that the petitioner has locus standi to approach this Court against the remission orders dated 10.08.2022. It was submitted that upholding the constitutional values and protection of all citizens is the responsibility of the State and there is a legitimate expectation that the State conducts all its actions in accordance with constitutional values. That the aforesaid petition has been filed in public interest as the premature release of respondent Nos.3 to 13 cannot be permitted since the convicts pose a danger to society. That the petitioners in the connected matters fulfil the wide ambit of the expression “person aggrieved” as envisaged under PIL jurisdiction since they are challenging the release of convicts who have committed heinous and grave offences against society.
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