Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. The State of Assam & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 834; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Rajesh Bindal
- Decided
- 5 Nov 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4451/2024
- Sections
- 202, 203, 2, 156(3), 300(1), 300, 173, 156, 34, 221, 159, 200
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 834 Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors.
v.
The State of Assam & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4451 of 2024)
05 November 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether after the acceptance of a negative Final Report in the first complaint, upon considering the written objections/protest petition and hearing the complainant, a fresh/second complaint on the same set of facts is maintainable or not.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Second respondentcomplainant filed second complaint dtd. 20.07.2011, after the dismissal of the protest petition and the acceptance of the negative Final Report in the first complaint dtd. 11.11.2010, on the same set of facts/allegations against the appellants and the other accused persons contained in the first complaint – Maintainability:
Held: Not maintainable – Maintainability or otherwise of the second complaint depends upon how the earlier complaint was rejected/dismissed at the first instance – If the earlier disposal of the complaint was on merits and in a manner known to law, the second complaint on ‘almost identical facts’ which were raised in the first complaint would not be maintainable if the core of both the complaints is same – In the present case, the core of the first complaint dated 11.11.2010 and the second complaint dated 20.07.2011 was the same – Further, the CJM dismissed the first complaint vide order dated 06.06.2011 after accepting the Final Report, hearing the second respondent and considering the protest petition holding that the investigation did not suffer from any infirmity – Despite the said order, the second respondent did not challenge the same but, chose to file a fresh complaint/ second complaint – Decision of the Sessions Judge and the High Court interfering with the order passed by the CJM which held that second complaint was not maintainable in law, set aside – Order of the CJM restored. [Paras 27, 31, 32, 34] * Author 2 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.202, 203:
Held: Merely because some of the decisions of this Court had held that when a Magistrate conducted an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., and dismissed a complaint on merits, a second complaint on the same facts would not be maintainable unless there are very exceptional circumstances, it cannot be said that in all cases where a complaint to a Magistrate was not proceeded under Section 202, Cr.P.C., and dismissed not at the stage of Section 203, Cr.P.C., a second complaint or a second protest petition would be maintainable. [Para 31] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156(3), 2(d) – Protest petition when to be treated as a complaint u/s.2(d):
Held: A ‘narazi’ viz., disapproval against a final report submitted in a case investigated by the police on a first information report registered pursuant to a complaint under Section 156(3) for investigation should be treated as a complaint only if it satisfies the requirement in law to constitute a complaint as defined under Section 2(d) – In the present case, since the narazi petition dated 05.05.2011 did not satisfy the ingredients to attract Section 2(d), it could not be treated as a complaint. [Paras 17, 18] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.300(1) – When not applicable – Maxim –“nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”:
Held: No one shall be vexed twice for one and the same cause – However, in the present case, there was no conviction or acquittal of the appellants in regard to the Sections involved on the same set of facts, by a Court of competent jurisdiction – Section 300 is thus, not applicable. [Para 9] Case Law Cited Samta Naidu & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. [2020] 2 SCR 1127 : (2020) 5 SCC 378 – relied on.
Vijayalakshmi v. Vasudevan (1994) 4 SCC 656; Bhagwat Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Anr [1985] 3 SCR 942 : (1985) 2 SCC 537; Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra [1967] 3 SCR 668 : AIR 1968 SC 117; Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar v. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda & Ors. [1971] 1 SCR 1 : (1970) 1 SCC 665; Sunil Majhi v. The State AIR 1968 (Cal) [2024] 12 S.C.R. 3Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. T he State of Assam & Anr.
238; Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr. [2011] 13 SCR 247 : (2012) 1 SCC 130; H. S. Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) [1981] 1 SCR 935 : AIR 1980 SC 1883; Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh [1977] 1 SCR 125 : AIR 1977 SC 2432; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Farzu [2010] 2 SCR 109 : (2010) 2 SCC 631; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janaradhan Reddy & Anr. [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 566 : (2003) 1 SCC 734; Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 297 : AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur [2001] 1 SCR 707 : (2001) 2 SCC 570; Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [2013] 1 SCR 243 : (2013) 9 SCC 245 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Protest petition; Second protest petition; Negative Final Report; First complaint/original complaint; Written objections; “narazi”; “Complaint”; Fresh/second complaint; Maintainability of the second complaint; Same set of facts/allegations; Identical facts; “nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”; Sections 202, 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4451 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2021 of the Gauhati High Court in CRLRP No. 95 of 2013 Appearances for Parties S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Amicus Curiae.
Pijush Kanti Roy, Sr. Adv., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali Roy, Rajan K. Chourasia, M.P. Parthiban, Adv. for the Appellants. Nalin Kohli, Sr. A.A.G., Ankit Roy, Ms. Nimisha Menon, Anshul Malik, Ayuushman Arora, Ms. Shruti Agarwal, Manish Goswami, Rongon Choudhury, Priyonkoo Gogoi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Respondents.
4 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment C.T. Ravikumar, J.
Leave granted.
1. An affirmative answer to the question of law raised before the High Court as to whether after the acceptance of a negative Final Report filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’), upon considering the written objection/ protest petition and hearing complainant, a fresh complaint on the same set of facts is maintainable, by the High Court of Gauhati and the consequential confirmation of the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cachar, Silchar in Criminal Revision Petition No.101/2012, as per judgment and order dated 08.01.2021 in Criminal Revision Petition No.95/2013 is under challenge in this appeal by special leave. As per the said judgment dated 08.01.2021, the High Court dismissed the revision petition and confirmed the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 28.02.2013 in Criminal Revision Petition No.101/2012 whereunder the order dated 12.07.2012 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, Silchar dismissing the complaint filed by the second respondent herein was set aside and case was remanded for consideration of the matter afresh for the purpose arriving at a finding as to whether any case for taking cognizance of the alleged offence(s) and for issuance of process has been made or not.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the captioned appeal, in succinct, are as under: - The second respondent herein filed a complaint on 11.11.2010 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, Silchar and it was forwarded for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Consequently, on 05.12.2010, FIR No.244/2010 under Sections 406, 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the ‘IPC’) was registered at Dholai Police Station against the appellants. On completion of the investigation, Final Report under Section 173, Cr.P.C., was filed before the learned Magistrate on 28.02.2011. Virtually, it was a negative report as can be seen from Annexure-P3 – Final Report No.11 of 2011 dated 28.02.2011. Aggrieved by the said Final Report, the complainant filed a written objection/narazi petition on 05.05.2011, alleging that [2024] 12 S.C.R. 5Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. T he State of Assam & Anr.
the investigation was not conducted properly and praying for taking cognizance on it. As per order dated 06.06.2011, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) accepted the Final Report, after hearing the second respondent-complainant and considering the narazi petition, upon holding that the investigation did not suffer from any infirmity. On 20.07.2011, the second respondent filed the second complaint with the same set of allegations against the appellants and the others who were shown as accused in the first complaint, before the learned CJM alleging commission of offence under the very Sections viz., 406, 420 and 34 IPC, and the same was numbered as C.R. No.159 of 2011. On 19.09.2011, as per Annexure P-7 order, the learned CJM exercising the power under Section 202 Cr.P.C., directed an investigation after recording the initial deposition of the complainant and the statements of the witnesses. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the learned CJM dated 19.09.2011, the appellant(s)/accused preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court. As per Annexure P-8 order dated 24.05.2012, the High Court set aside the order of the learned CJM and directed the appellants herein to file an appropriate application raising the question of maintainability of the second complaint viz., C.R. No.159 of 2011.
3. Pursuant to the order dated 24.05.2012, the learned CJM considered the application filed by the appellants raising the question of maintainability of the second complaint and dismissed the second complaint holding it not maintainable in law. Against the said order of the CJM dated 12.07.2012, the second respondent-complainant filed Criminal Revision Petition No.101 of 2012. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the said Criminal Revision Petition as per Annexure P-10 order dated 28.02.2013 and set aside the order of the CJM and remanded the case for reconsideration of the matter afresh for the purpose of finding whether any case for taking cognizance of the alleged offences and issuance of process have been made out or not. Aggrieved by the said order dated 28.02.2013 the appellants preferred Criminal Revision No.95 of 2013 which was dismissed by the High Court as per the impugned order dated 08.01.2021.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
5. In the wake of aforesaid factual background, the appellants, relying various decisions of this Court, contended that the second complaint 6 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports filed by the second respondent-complainant is not maintainable. It is contended that the High Court had failed to consider the provisions under Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., which resulted in dismissal of the revision petition. Dilating the said contentions, further grounds founded on Section 300 (1) of the Cr.P.C., are raised.
6. Before dealing with the other contentions raised to assail the judgment dated 08.01.2021, we think it is only appropriate to consider the contentions raised by the appellants founded on Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., reads thus: - “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.—(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.”
7. In view of the indisputable and undisputed facts, referred hereinbefore, revealing the outcome of the first complaint dated 11.11.2010 and taking into account the stage of the second complaint the question is whether Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., is applicable or not to the case at hand.
8. Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., is found on the maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”, which means that no one shall be vexed twice for one and the same cause. The Section provides that no man once convicted or acquitted shall be tried for the same offence again for one and the same cause. Thus, it can be seen that in order to bar the trial in terms of Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C., it must be shown: a. that the person concerned has been tried by a competent Court for the same offence or one for which he might have been charged or convicted at that trial, on the same facts. b. that he has been convicted or acquitted at the trial and that such conviction or acquittal is in force.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 7Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. The State of Assam & Anr.
9. This fundamental rule of our criminal law revealed from this Section enables raising of the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, subject to the satisfaction of the conditions enjoined thereunder. This position has been made clear by this Court in Vijayalakshmi v. Vasudevan. 1 In the case at hand, the undisputed facts stated hereinbefore would reveal that the appellants were never ever tried before a Court of competent jurisdiction for the aforesaid offence(s) on the basis of the aforesaid set of facts. Therefore, indisputably there was no verdict of conviction or acquittal in regard to the aforesaid Sections in respect of the appellants on the aforesaid set of facts, by a Court of competent jurisdiction. When that be the position, we have no hesitation to hold that the grounds founded on Section 300 (1), Cr.P.C. raised by the appellants merit no consideration.
10. As noted at the outset, the question of law raised before and decided by the High Court was whether after the acceptance of the Final Report filed under Section 173, Cr.P.C., upon considering the written objection/protest petition and hearing the complainant, a fresh complaint on the same set of facts is maintainable or not. There can be no two views as relates the position that there can be no blanket bar for filing a second complaint on the same set of facts. We will deal with the moot question and the aforesaid position a little later.
11. Firstly, the question as to what are the courses available to a Magistrate on receipt of a negative report is to be looked into and in fact, that question was considered by this Court in Bhagwat Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Anr.2 This Court held that on receipt of a negative report, the following four courses are open to the Magistrate concerned: -
1. to accept the report and to drop the proceedings;
2. to direct further investigation to be made by the police.
3. to investigate himself or refer the investigation to be made by another Magistrate under Section 159, Cr.P.C., and
1 (1994) 4 SCC 656
2 [1985] 3 SCR 942 : (1985) 2 SCC 537 8 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
4. to take cognizance of the offence under Section 200, Cr.P.C., as private complaint when materials are sufficient in his opinion as if the complainant is prepared for that course.
The indisputable position is that in the case at hand the learned CJM on receipt of the negative report accepted it after rejecting the written objections/protest petition, which is one of the courses open to a Magistrate on receipt of a negative report, in terms of Bhagwat Singh’s case (supra).
12. In view of the confirmance of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge carrying the following observations/findings it is not inappropriate to delve into them for the limited purpose. They, in so far as relevant, read thus:- “(i) Thus, the present complaint in question is truly qualify to the definition of the term complaint and the same has been filed on being aggrieved against the final report, submitted against his previous complaint. Hence, in my considered opinion the learned court below misconstrued the definition of the term complaint, by treating the simple objection petition as Narazi complaint, whereas terming the present complaint in question as second complaint.
(ii) Situated thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court of India, in the said decision, (referring to the decision in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra, reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 117) specifically observed that even after accepting the final report, it is open to the Magistrate to treat the respective protest petitions as complaints and to take further proceedings in accordance with law.”
13. According to us, the observations/findings referred above as (i) is actually an outcome of a misconstruction on the part of the learned Sessions Judge. In troth, the learned CJM termed the subject complaint dated 20.07.2011 as second complaint not with reference to the written objection/protest petition dated 05.05.2011 and it was so treated with reference to the original complaint dated 11.11.2010. This fact is evident from the recitals in Annexure-P9 order dated 12.07.2012 passed by the learned CJM in complaint numbered as Case No.159/2011, which was challenged before the learned Sessions Judge. In the said order the learned CJM observed and held thus:- [2024] 12 S.C.R. 9Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. The State of Assam & Anr.
“After the original complaint has been duly investigated by the police and Final Report submitted therein has been accepted by the Court in a Judicial Proceeding; therefore, in my considered view it cannot be re-opened by means of filing of a second complaint in respect of the same facts and circumstances.”
In view of the afore-extracted recital from the order dated 12.07.2012 of the learned CJM, it is evident that it was with reference to the original complaint that he termed the complaint filed by the second respondent on 20.07.2011 as the second complaint.
14. The second observation/finding referred above as (ii) also requires a clarification. It is true that correctly this Court held in the decision in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra 3 that even after accepting the final report it would be open to the Magistrate concerned to treat respective protest petition as complaint and to take further proceedings in accordance with law. Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. defines the term ‘complaint’. No doubt in Cr.P.C., no form for filing complaint is prescribed. However, the essentials to constitute a complaint can be briefly mentioned thus: -
(i) An oral or written allegation;
(ii) That some person(s) known or unknown has committed an offence;
(iii) It must be made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action.
15. In Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar v. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda & Ors.,4 this Court, as regards the meaning of a complaint, held thus: - “11. The word “complaint” has a wide meaning since it includes even an oral allegation. It may, therefore, be assumed that no form is prescribed which the complaint must take. It may only be said that there must be an allegation which prima facie discloses the commission of an offence with the necessary facts for the magistrate to take action. Section 190(1)(a) makes it necessary that the alleged facts must disclose the commission of an offence.” 3 [1967] 3 SCR 668 : AIR 1968 SC 117 4 [1971] 1 SCR 1: (1970) 1 SCC 665 10 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
16. In the decision in Sunil Majhi v. The State,5 the Calcutta High Court in paragraph 6 held thus: - “6.The term ‘naraji’ means ‘disapproval’ and in the context of things it signifies disapproval of the report in relation to which it is filed. It may simply challenge the report on grounds stated and pray for its rejection: it may while praying for rejection of the report also reiterate the allegations made in the petition of complaint and pray for further action by the court and in that view of the matter it would be a fresh complaint. In the case Jamini Kanta v. Bhabanath. AIR 1939 Cal 273, it was observed:
“The word ‘naraji’ is often loosely used and it is necessary to examine the petition which is filed in a particular case “to determine its true import in that case on an examination of the petition it was found that it was not a complaint. The reports of the cases cited by Mr. Banerji do not contain any discussion about the nature of the statements made in the naraji petitions in those cases, but from the fact that the naraji petitions were treated as complaints it would appear that they did satisfy the requirements of a complaint as defined in section 4(h) of the Code in order to be a complaint the petition must contain allegations of an offence and also a prayer for judicial action thereon. If therefore, the protest petition filed against an enquiry report filed or to be filed, while lodging a protest recites also the allegations already made and prays for action of the court thereon, there is no difficulty in treating it as a complaint and taking action thereon under Sections 202, 203 or 204 of the Cr PC. In the cases of Lachmi Shaw. AIR 1932 Cal 383 (1) (Supra) and Satkari Ghose. AIR 1941 Cal 439 (Supra) there were complaints to the police which were found on investigation to be false and the police submitted final reports and at the same time prayed for prosecuting the complainant under section 211 I.P.C. Naraji petitions were filed against the police reports but prosecutions were launched without considering them and it was held that 5 AIR 1968 (Cal) 238 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 11Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. T he State of Assam & Anr.
the procedure followed was irregular and that the naraji petitions should be treated as complaints and treated and disposed of as such before the prayer for prosecuting the complainant could be entertained.”
17. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, we are of the view that a ‘narazi’ viz., disapproval against a final report submitted in a case investigated by the police on a first information report registered pursuant to the forwarding of a complaint under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., for investigation should be treated as a complaint only if the same satisfies the requirement in law to constitute a complaint as defined under Section 2(d), Cr.P.C. As held in Sunil Majhi’s case (supra), if while praying for rejection of a final report after reiterating the allegations made in the original complaint and prayer for further action by the court, the same could be treated as a fresh complaint, but then, we may hasten to add that its maintainability depends upon the question as to how the original/protest petition was disposed of.
18. It is relevant to note that in paragraph 9 of the judgment dated 28.02.2013 (Annexure-P10), the learned Sessions Judge after referring to the term ‘complaint,’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. and taking note of the aforesaid essentials to constitute a complaint made a scrutiny of the written objection dated 05.05.2011 submitted by the second respondent-complainant against the negative report dated 28.02.2011 held that the said objection dated 05.05.2011 could not be termed as a ‘narazi complaint’ and found that it did not qualify to the definition of the term ‘complaint’. In that context, with reference to the definition in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. and the essentials to constitute a complaint as referred above, it can only be said that the said finding of the learned Sessions Judge is perfectly in tune with the position of law. Once that is so found and when it is a fact that the negative report on the original complaint dated 11.11.2010 was accepted after rejecting the written objection/protest petition dated 05.05.2011 it cannot be said that the learned CJM has gone wrong in describing the complaint dated 20.07.2011 as the second complaint. The clarification required to the observation/finding referred to as (ii), with reference to the Abhinandan Jha’s case (supra) is that though it would be open to the Magistrate to treat a protest petition as complaint and to take further proceedings in accordance with law even after accepting final report that is permissible only if the protest petition concerned satisfies the ingredients to constitute 12 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a complaint as defined under Section 2(d), Cr.P.C. Since the narazi petition dated 05.05.2011 did not satisfy the ingredients to attract Section 2(d), Cr.P.C., it could not be treated as a complaint as held by the learned Sessions Judge. At the same time, in view of what is stated above and taking note of the fact that the allegations made in the original complaint are reiterated in the complaint dated 20.07.2011 and pray for further action by the court, it is rightly taken by the courts below as a complaint. Since the final report on the original complaint was already accepted after rejecting the narazi petition the complaint dated 20.07.2011 which satisfies all requirements of a complaint, if at all having the characteristics of a protest petition, could be treated as a complaint and hence, the learned CJM and the learned Sessions Judge have rightly treated it as a complaint.
19. Now, we will consider the question whether the construction of the law laid down by this Court in regard to the maintainability of a second complaint, in the circumstances mentioned hereinbefore that led to the moot question, by the High Court as reflected under paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment and the consequential direction can be sustained. Paragraphs 20 and 21 in the impugned judgment read thus: -
20. Evidently, the learned Magistrate did not act upon the said protest petition, inasmuch as, the learned Magistrate did not proceed under Section 200/202 of the CrPC treating the same as narazi complaint. When the learned Magistrate did not proceed under Section 200 to 204 CrPC for taking cognizance upon received of the first protest petition nor the protest petition was dismissed under Section 203 CrPC, the complaint in question though considered to be a second narazi complaint with reference to the first protest petition as indicated above, the same is not barred under law, reason being that the alleged first protest petition did not contain detailed particulars of the case required for decision nor the learned Magistrate proceed on the basis of the first petition under Section 200/202 CrPC and therefore the alleged first protest petition in my cosndiered (sic: considered) view cannot be held to have been dismissed after full consideration under Section 203 CrPC. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the [2024] 12 S.C.R. 13Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury & Ors. v. T he State of Assam & Anr.
first protest petition was dismissed after full consideration, the narazi complaint in question is maintainable for special circumstances, namely the first protest petition did not contain the full facts and particulars necessary to decide the case and the same was considered on incomplete facts and particulars and the learned Magistrate also did not examined the complainant or any witnesses under Section 200 CrPC nor proceeded under Section 202 CrPC to decide whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding. Therefore, in any view of the matter, the present complaint in question cannot be considered as second complaint and the same also cannot be held to be barred for acceptance of the final report. Secondly, even if it is considered to be second narazi complaint with reference to the first protest petition, then also the complainant is not barred in the facts situation of the case because of the special on exceptional circumstances as indicated above.
21. For the reasons stated above, this court do not find any fault with the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. The matter be remanded back to the learned Magistrate to proceed with the complaint in accordance with law.
20. Paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, as extracted above, would reveal that the High Court also treated the petition dated 20.07.2011 filed by the second respondent as a complaint. Since it is filed by the second respondent after the acceptance of the original complaint dated 11.11.2010 that too, after the rejection of his protest petition dated 05.05.2011, there can be no dispute regarding the status of the complaint dated 20.07.2011 as the second complaint of the second respondent.
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