R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 884; [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1099
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Sanjay Karol
- Decided
- 21 Nov 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3015/2013
- Sections
- 96, 420, 811, 20, 16, 9
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1099 : 2024 INSC 884 R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors.
v.
T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 3015 of 2013)
21 November 2024 [Dipankar Datta* and Sanjay Karol, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale by the buyer. High Court allowed the appeal thereagainst and granted decree for specific performance. Whether the impugned judgment of the High Court warrants any interdiction in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. Whether an omission on the part of the trial court to frame an issue on maintainability of a suit touching jurisdictional fact by itself takes away the powers of the higher court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed.
Headnotes† Specific performance – Suit for specific performance – Time when not the essence of the contract – Readiness and willingness not proved – High Court decreed the buyer’s suit for specific performance holding that time was not of essence as the sellers had received payments, without protest, even after the final date fixed for the performance of the agreement and that the buyer was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract – Challenge to:
Held: Time was not the essence though the Agreement provided that “time mentioned in this agreement shall be of the essence” – On a bare reading of the two clauses of the Agreement, it cannot be said that the latter clause destroys the effect of the former clause altogether so much so that it has to be discarded – On the contrary, both the clauses were such that the same had to be read together and given effect upon ascertaining the intention of the parties as disclosed by the Agreement as a whole – The latter clause could not have been read divorced from the former, having *Author 1100 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports regard to the intent of the parties that is discernible – Further, on facts, the buyer was not ready and willing to have the terms agreed by and between the parties to be performed – There was no readiness and willingness on the buyer’s part to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed despite multiple reminders – Also, admittedly the buyer did not have enough fund in either of her bank accounts to pay the balance sale price – First appellate judgment and decree of the High Court set aside – Decree of the Trial Court restored – Suit filed by the buyer dismissed. [Paras 31, 33, 35, 36, 48] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Suit – Maintainability, ‘jurisdictional fact’ – Failure of the trial court to frame an issue on maintainability of suit touching jurisdictional fact, if takes away the powers of the higher court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed: Held: No – I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani [2013] 17 SCR 24 held that in absence of a prayer for declaratory relief that termination of the agreement is bad in law, a suit for specific performance is not maintainable – However, A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed [2017] 2 SCR 610 distinguished the aforesaid case and held that unless an issue as to maintainability is framed by the Trial Court, the suit cannot be held to be not maintainable at the appellate stage only because appropriate declaratory relief has not been prayed – Kanthamani though did not deal with the effect of non-existence of a jurisdictional fact i.e., what would be its effect on the right to relief claimed by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract – Clarified – Omission on the part of the trial court to frame an issue on maintainability of a suit touching jurisdictional fact does not by itself take away the powers of the higher court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed, provided no new facts were required to be pleaded and no new evidence led. [Paras 22, 24, 46] Suit for specific performance – Law as regards the principles governing – Discussed.
Case Law Cited I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani [2013] 17 SCR 24 : (2013) 15 SCC 27; A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed [2017] 2 SCR 610 : (2017) 4 SCC 654 – Clarified.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1101R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. Ferrodous Estates (P) Ltd v P. Gopirathnam [2020] 13 SCR 673 : 2020 SCC Online 825; Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 798 : (1993) 1 SCC 519; Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi [2011] 8 SCR 874 : (2011) 12 SCC 18; Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal (1979) 4 SCC 393; N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao (Dr) [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 53 : (1995) 5 SCC 115; Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd. [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 706 : (2002) 8 SCC 146; Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi [2019] 1 SCR 54 : (2019) 3 SCC 793; P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan [2022] 18 SCR 199 : (2022) 14 SCC 793; C.S. Venkatesh vs. A.S.C. Murthy [2020] 2 SCR 676 : (2020) 3 SCC 280; U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy [2022] 13 SCR 250 : (2023) 11 SCC 775; Mohinder Kaur v. Sant Paul Singh (2019) 9 SCC 358; Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C. 256; Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim [1959] 1 SCR 1309 : AIR 1959 SC 24; Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar [2024] 1 SCR 1165 : (2024) 4 SCC 318; Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros. [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 446 : (1992) 1 SCC 534 – referred to.
List of Acts Specific Relief Act, 1963.
List of Keywords Suit for specific performance; Agreement for sale; Maintainability of a suit; Jurisdictional fact; Time not the essence of the contract; Seller; Buyer; Readiness and willingness not proved; Balance sale consideration/price; Sale deed; Financial incapacity; Encumbrance certificate; Demand draft; Inconsistent clauses in an agreement; Discretionary relief of specific performance; Higher court; Appellate court.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3015 of 2013 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2011 of the High Court of Madras in AS No. 811 of 2008 With Civil Appeal No. 3016 of 2013 1102 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Rana Mukerjee, Rakesh Diwedi, Mrs. V. Mohana, Guru Krishna Kumar, Sr. Advs., B Ragunath, Mrs. NC Kavitha, Vijay Kumar, R Venkatraman, N Sridhar, Arunmozhi, S Padmanaban, Mrs. Bhavya Pandey, Gokul Athiya, Sriram P., E.R. Kumar, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Ms. Pratyusha Priyadarshini, Ms. Aadya Malik (for M/s. Parekh & Co.), Ms. Movita, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
The A ppeAls
1. The appellants1 in Civil Appeal No.3015 / 2013 were the defendants in a suit 2 for specific performance of an agreement for sale 3 instituted by the first respondent as the plaintiff, 4 in respect of land together with a tenanted building. 5 The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 17 th December, 2007. Upon a first appeal6 being carried under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 7 by the buyer before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, 8 the same succeeded vide judgment and decree dated 21 st October, 2011.9 The High Court reversed the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit and granted decree for specific performance. The sellers have taken exception to the first appellate judgment and decree in this appeal by special leave, granted on 5 th April, 2013.
2. Civil Appeal No.3016 / 2013 is also an appeal against the impugned judgment, special leave wherefor was also granted on 5 th April, 2013. 1 sellers, hereafter 2 O.S. 420 of 2006 3 Agreement, hereafter 4 buyer, hereafter 5 property, hereafter 6 A.S.811 of 2008 7 CPC, hereafter 8 High Court, hereafter 9 impugned judgment, hereafter [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1103R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. It is at the instance of a company10 who had purchased the property, forming the subject of the Agreement, from the sellers when the first appeal was pending before the High Court without any order restraining the sellers to alienate the same. Upon such purchase, the subsequent purchaser derived knowledge of pendency of the first appeal; thus, it applied for and was impleaded as the eight respondent therein.
R esume of fAcTs
3. Although the facts leading to institution of the suit by the buyer and the defence raised by the sellers are captured in the decisions of the Trial Court as well as the High Court, for the sake of completeness, we consider it appropriate to briefly refer to the same hereunder: a. The parties, on mutually agreed terms, executed the Agreement dated 20 th January, 2005 for sale of the property. Towards consideration, the buyer agreed to pay Rs. 2.3 crore to the sellers. Other noticeable features of the Agreement are: i. A sum of Rs. 10 lakh was paid by the buyer as an advance. ii. The buyer had to pay the balance sale consideration within four months from the date of the Agreement (the period ending on 19th May, 2005).
iii. On the date of the Agreement, the property was occupied by tenants and the sellers agreed that they will have the tenants vacate the property and deliver vacant possession thereof to the buyer at the time of sale.
iv. Time shall be of the essence.
b. The buyer started effecting payments in instalments. She paid Rs. 5 lakh, Rs. 4 lakh, Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh on 2 nd February, 24th February, 5th June, and 24th July, 2005, respectively, totalling to Rs. 15 lakh. Taking into consideration Rs.10 lakh paid in advance, the buyer paid in all Rs. 19 lakh prior to 19th May, 2005 and Rs. 6 lakh beyond that date.
c. The sellers vide letter dated 23rd February, 2006 cancelled the Agreement and returned the sum of Rs. 25 lakh claiming that 10 subsequent purchaser, hereafter 1104 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the said period of 4 (four) months had expired and that the buyer had not shown interest to complete the deal. However, the buyer vide reply letter dated 24th February, 2006 refuted the contents of the letter and emphasized that the sellers were bound to have the property vacated and the sale deed had to be executed only after all the tenants had vacated the property. It is noted that the last of the tenants vacated the property on 2 nd February, 2006.
d. The sellers vide letter dated 2 nd March, 2006 asserted that the buyer has no right to claim purchase of the property as the Agreement had already been cancelled. The sellers reiterated that time is not the essence of the contract; the said period of 4 (four) months had expired; the fact of vacation of property by tenants was duly conveyed to the buyer multiple times; and despite multiple requests, the buyer did not come forward to execute the sale deed. For these reasons, the Agreement was cancelled vide letter dated 23 rd February, 2006 and the pay order of Rs. 25 lakh was returned.
e. Despite the letter dated 23 rd February, 2006 whereby the sellers cancelled the Agreement (reiterated vide letter dated 2 nd March, 2006), the sellers vide a telegram dated 11th March, 2006 again expressed interest to sell the property and conveyed that they were ready to sell it; consequently, the buyer was called upon to complete the sale before 24 th March, 2006.
f. The buyer, claiming that she was out of station, sent a letter on 18 th March, 2006. She asserted that as per the Agreement, she had four months’ time from the date of vacating of the property by all the tenants. A request was made calling upon the sellers to bring the original documents and ‘encumbrance certificate for 30 years’ to enable her advocate prepare the sale deed. g. The sellers then sent a letter dated 23rd March, 2006 asserting therein that the period of four months is to be counted from the date of the Agreement, and the demand for encumbrance certificate was not tenable as the buyer had already obtained encumbrance certificate from the sellers prior to entering into the Agreement and had also assured that she herself would verify the said certificate from the date of Agreement till date of sale. The sellers further stated that irrespective of the above, they have [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1105R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. applied for encumbrance certificate and requested the buyer to execute the sale deed within a week from receipt of encumbrance certificate, failing which, the Agreement would stand cancelled. h. On 25 th March, 2006, the sellers called upon the buyer to pay the sale consideration of Rs. 2.3 crore within 7 (seven) days. The buyer responded vide reply notice dated 29th March, 2006 and enclosed with it a draft sale deed and also demanded the sellers to hand over the encumbrance certificate.
i. The sellers responded vide letter dated 6 th April, 2006 and reiterated that photostat copies of the title deeds and encumbrance certificate up to the date of Agreement was already furnished to, and verified by the buyer before entering into the Agreement and that although it was not possible for them to deliver the original documents, they were ready to let the buyer verify the original documents. They also made a request to the buyer to pay the sale consideration within 5 (five) days from receipt of the letter.
j. The sellers had not handed over the “original parent documents” for perusal of the buyer; hence, the buyer directly spoke to one of the sellers (the fourth defendant) asking him to bring the “original parent documents” for inspection. The buyer also sent a notice dated 22 nd April, 2006 to the counsel of the sellers requesting him to advise the sellers to bring the documents for the buyer’s verification.
k. Vide letter dated 26th April 2006, the sellers deplored the buyer’s dilatory tactic of conjuring new demands at the eleventh hour. Despite this, the sellers said, that they attempted their best to satisfy the buyer’s demand and offered the buyer the chance to inspect the original parent documents (vide letter dated 6 th April,2006), which offer the buyer showed no interest in availing. In view of the buyer’s failure to perform her part of the bargain despite multiple opportunities being given, the sellers declared that the Agreement finally stood cancelled,.
l. Thereafter, vide letter dated 10 th August, 2006, the buyer called upon the sellers to collect the pay order dated 11 th February, 2006 for Rs. 25 lakh from the buyer’s office, but the sellers did not collect the same. The buyer then enclosed the pay order with her letter dated 10 th August, 2006 and sent it to the sellers who, 1106 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports vide letter dated 14 th August, 2006 replied that the Agreement had already been cancelled and that the buyer, who earlier was not ready and willing, is now trying to grab the property as the value of the property has gone up multiple times.
4. It is in this factual background that litigation between the buyer and the seller commenced with institution of the suit by the buyer before the Court of the District Judge of Coimbatore. The suit was later transferred by the District Judge to the Court of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court I).11 Based on the averments in the plaint, which refer to more or less what we have narrated above in paragraph 3, relief was claimed in the following terms: a. To pass a decree for specific performance of the Agreement dated 20 th January, 2005 or in the alternate a decree for refund of advance amount of Rs. 25 lakh with 18% interest p.a. from the date of Agreement till realization.
b. For permanent injunction restraining the sellers from alienating or encumbering the property.
c. To direct the sellers to pay the costs of the suit.
d. Any other relief that the court deems fit.
5. The sellers in their written statement refuted all the contentions raised in the plaint and pleaded that the buyer was never ready and willing to purchase the property and alleged that the buyer filed the suit with the intention to take benefit of the increase in price of the property by projecting a theory that time is not of the essence.
VeRdicTs of The TRiAl couRT And The high couRT
6. The Trial Court framed and answered the issues as follows: 6.1 Whether the agreement for sale dated 20th January, 2005, is true, valid and legally enforceable? Answered in the affirmative. 6.2 Whether as per the agreement for sale, the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed? Answered in the negative.
11 Trial Court, hereafter [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1107R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. 6.3 Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree directing the defendants to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed? Answered in the negative.
6.4 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternative relief of refund of Rs.25,00,000 with 18% interest p.a. from the defendants? Answered in the negative.
7. As has been noticed above, the fortune of the parties changed before the Trial Court and the High Court. High Court, in appeal, decreed the suit of the buyer. High Court observed that time was not of essence as the sellers had received payments, without protest, even after the final date fixed for the performance of the Agreement. After analysing the documents on record, the High Court observed that the buyer was ready and willing and found no reason which disentitled her from the discretionary relief of specific performance. ARgumenTs
8. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the sellers, argued that the impugned judgment is completely flawed and hence, the appeal deserves interference.
8.1. Firstly, Mr. Dwivedi contended that the terms of the Agreement clearly provided that leaving aside the sum paid as advance, the time period for making payment of the balance sale consideration would be four months commencing from the date of such Agreement, i.e., 20 th January, 2005. Admittedly, the buyer did not make the payment as agreed by and between the parties and time being the essence of the contract, the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit (although on the point of time being the essence of the contract, it had held otherwise).
8.2. Secondly, Mr. Dwivedi invited our attention to the letter dated 23 rd February, 2006 sent by the sellers to the buyer whereby the sellers cancelled the Agreement and refunded the advance amount. The relevant part of the said letter is reproduced below: “…….You failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the period of 4 months and get the sale deed executed.”
In reply to the above, the buyer sent a letter dated 24 th February, 2006 to the sellers. Nowhere in this reply letter did the buyer 1108 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports expressly mention that the period of four months is to be counted from the date of vacation of the property by the tenants. Hence, the assertion that the period of four months was to be counted from the date of vacation is merely an afterthought.
8.3. Thirdly, Mr. Dwivedi asserted that vide telegram dated 11 th March, 2006, the sellers gave one last opportunity to the buyer to pay the balance amount and register the sale deed before 24 th March, 2006. It has come on record that the buyer, despite being present in Coimbatore, falsely represented in her reply dated 18 th March, 2006 that she was out of station and, hence, was disabled to respond immediately. The conduct of the buyer, therefore, does not inspire confidence and certainly such conduct was sufficient to deny her equitable relief.
8.4. Fourthly, Mr. Dwivedi contended that the buyer was never ready and willing to perform her part of the bargain and hence she was not entitled to the relief of specific performance. To show the reluctance of the buyer to go ahead with the transaction, various communications by and between the parties were referred to. The reply dated 24th February, 2006 was first referred wherefrom it would be evident that the buyer was aware of the fact of vacation of the property by the last remaining tenant. Vide telegram dated 11th March, 2006, the sellers called upon the buyer to hand over the pay order and gave time till 24th March, 2006 to pay the balance sale amount and register the sale deed. Despite this, the buyer did not initiate any positive action as evidence of her readiness and willingness. Again, vide letter dated 23 rd March, 2006, the sellers informed the buyer that they had applied for the encumbrance certificate, even though provision of such certificate was not a term of the Agreement. The sellers again called upon the buyer to execute the sale deed within 7 (seven) days from the date of receipt of the certificate. Even then, the buyer did not take steps to complete the sale. The sellers sent the encumbrance certificate as requested vide letter dated 06 th April, 2006, and asked the buyer to execute the sale deed within 5 (five) days; however, even then, the buyer did not do the needful. Ultimately, having no other option, the sellers finally had to cancel the Agreement vide letter dated 26 th April, 2006. Thereafter, the buyer maintained silence for four months. There is no reasonable justification for such silence. [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1109R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr.
8.5. Fifthly, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the buyer has nowhere pleaded that she had purchased the stamp papers for execution of the sale deed. This further suggests that the buyer was not ready and willing to perform her part of the obligations under the Agreement.
8.6. Sixthly, Mr. Dwivedi argued that the buyer had taken prevaricating stands and, therefore, is not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance. He drew our attention to the letter dated 24 th February, 2006 wherein the buyer stated:
“It appears that only few days ago, the tenant has vacated and the portion is kept under lock and key.”
This shows that the buyer was aware of the fact of vacation of the property by the last tenant days prior to 24th February, 2006. However, in her letter dated 18 th March, 2006, she stated that: “You have vacated all the tenants only on 02.02.2006 and it has been officially intimated to me only on 04.03.2006 by your letter dated 02.03.2006”.
To show the alleged wrongful conduct of the buyer, our attention was drawn to another instance. In her reply dated 18 th March 2006 to the telegram, the buyer stated:
“…………………I am in receipt of your telegram dated 11.03.2006 which has been received by my office and due to my non-availability in the town I could not take immediate action in this……………….”
However, when the buyer was confronted with Exs. B1 and B2 being news items appearing in Tamil dailies dated 15 th March and 16 th March, 2006 (wherein the buyer was seen receiving an award at Coimbatore), she admitted that between 11 th March and 18 th March, 2006 she was coming to and going out of Coimbatore. This fact was neither mentioned in her plaint nor in her sworn affidavit before the High Court. Having come with unclean hands by suppressing such material facts, the buyer disentitled herself to the relief of specific performance.
8.7. Seventhly, Mr. Dwivedi urged that the Agreement having stood cancelled at the instance of the sellers, not once but twice, it was necessary for the buyer to seek declaration that the cancellation 1110 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports was bad and not operative and binding qua her and in the absence of such a prayer, the suit itself was not maintainable in law. However, Mr. Dwivedi fairly pointed out that no such point having been raised by the sellers in their written statement, the Trial Court did not frame an issue on such aspect. Nevertheless, it was argued that this was a substantial point of law concerning the Court’s very jurisdiction, which ought to weigh in the mind of the Court while considering whether, at all, the relief of specific performance could be granted in favour of the buyer on the face of her omission/neglect to claim appropriate relief.
8.8. Eighthly, while inviting our attention to several documents on record, more particularly the cross-examination of the buyer wherein she admitted that she did not have enough money in either of her bank accounts to pay the balance sale price and asserted that she had the money in cash, Mr. Dwivedi contended that the buyer did not have the capacity to go ahead with the sale transaction.
8.9. Ninthly, it was the submission of Mr. Dwivedi that the property was sold by the sellers to the subsequent purchaser after stay, prayed in connection with the first appeal of the buyer, was refused by the High Court. A property which was being sold for Rs.2.3 crore had fetched a price of Rs.8 crore and that relief of specific performance being an equitable relief, the facts and circumstances were not such so as to decree the suit of the buyer particularly having regard to her conduct.
8.10. Finally, Mr. Dwivedi appealed that it was a fit and proper case where the impugned judgment of the High Court ought to be reversed and that of the Trial Court restored.
9. Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned senior counsel for the subsequent purchaser adopted the submissions of Mr. Dwivedi and submitted that that the conduct of the buyer disentitles her from claiming the relief of specific performance; therefore, the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit. That apart, the subsequent purchaser being a bona fide purchaser of the property for value, this Court may not disturb the status quo.
10. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned senior counsel for the buyer, argued that the view taken by the High Court is correct, well-reasoned, not perverse and a plausible view; hence, it does not warrant interference. [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1111R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr.
10.1. First, Mr. Kumar contended that both the Trial Court and High Court have concurrently found that time is not the essence of the contract. While inviting our attention to several documents on record, Mr. Kumar contended that the following conduct of the sellers itself evinced that for them, time was not of the essence: i. the sellers received payments on 5th June 2004 and 24th July 2005, which is after the final date that they say was fixed for performance of the Agreement, i.e. 19th May 2005; ii. even though they purportedly cancelled the Agreement vide telegram dated 11 th March 2006, in their subsequent letters dated 23 rd March 2006, 24th March 2006 and 6 th April 2006, they have given extensions to the buyer in a piecemeal manner;
iii. and the sale deed could not have been executed by the sellers unless they evicted all tenants. Since such eviction is an uncertain event, time could not have been of the essence.
10.2. Secondly, Mr. Kumar submitted that the sellers have delineated a conduct full of blemishes, elaborated below, which disentitles them from discretionary relief of specific performance: i. vide their letter dated 23 rd February 2006, sellers purportedly cancelled the Agreement, then taking a volte face, vide letter dated 11 th March 2006, the sellers conveyed that they were ready to sell the property;
ii. the sellers never furnished the original title deeds for inspection by the buyer;
iii. though the sellers returned the pay order of Rs. 25 lakh vide letter dated 11 th February 2006, it was sent to a wrong address;
iv. and the sellers never obtained and produced any document from their bank, viz. M/s Vijaya Bank, showing the status of the pay order issued by the buyer, even though the same could have been obtained by them and this they did deliberately, so that the court can conclude that either the buyer has encashed the same or that the buyer never returned the same to sellers.
1112 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Mr. Kumar cited the decision of this Court in Ferrodous Estates (P) Ltd v P. Gopirathnam12 and relied on the following paragraph: “54. ...As has been found earlier in this judgment, the Sellers were held to have taken up dishonest pleas and also held to have been in breach of a solemn agreement in which they were to obtain the Urban Land Ceiling permission which, if not obtained, would, under the agreement itself, not stand in the way of the specific performance of the agreement between the parties. He who asks for equity must do equity.
Given the conduct of the defendants in this case, as contrasted with the conduct of the appellant who is ready and willing throughout to perform its part of the bargain. We think this is a fit case in which the Division Bench judgment should be set aside.
As a result, the decree passed by the Single Judge is restored. Since the appellant itself offered a sum of Rs. 1.25 crores to the Division Bench, it must be made to pay this amount to the respondents within a period of eight weeks from the date of this judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.3. Thirdly, Mr. Kumar asserted that the buyer was always ready and willing to perform her part of the bargain. In fact, the buyer’s obligation to pay the balance consideration was to be fulfilled only after the sellers had performed their part of the bargain, which was to be ready to hand over the vacant possession of the property by evicting the tenants. Hence, without first performing their reciprocal promises, the sellers could not have called upon the buyer to pay the balance sale consideration. On the contrary, it was the sellers who were not ready to perform their part. Vide letter dated 22nd April 2006, the buyer demanded the sellers to produce the original title deeds which was refused by the sellers vide their letter dated 26 th April 2006. Even though there was no express condition in the Agreement for production of original title deeds, but such condition is implied in the Agreement. Hence, without 12 [2020] 13 SCR 673 : 2020 SCC Online 825 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1113R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. the sellers having first complied with their promise, they could not have called upon the buyer to perform her part and later claim that the buyer was not ready and willing.
10.4. Taking the above into consideration, Mr. Kumar submitted, that the High Court has rightly granted the discretionary relief of specific performance in favour of the buyer.
QuesTion
11. The sole question that we are tasked to decide is, whether the impugned judgment of the High Court warrants any interdiction in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.
J udiciAl pRecedenTs
12. Before embarking on the aforesaid task, it would only be just and proper to remind ourselves of certain well-settled principles that have evolved through judicial precedents laid down by this Court on certain points which invariably arise in specific performance suits and which are relevant for the purpose of a decision on these appeals. On whether time is the essence Of the cOntract :
13. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani13 surveyed previous decisions on the question as to whether or not time is the essence of the contract in transactions of sale of immovable properties and appears to have made a slight departure from earlier principles by ruling as under:
“25. From an analysis of the above case-law it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are:
1. from the express terms of the contract;
2. from the nature of the property; and
3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.”
13 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 798 : (1993) 1 SCC 519 1114 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
14. An instructive discussion is found in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi14 of how the principle of time not being the essence of the contract in transactions relating to sale of immovable properties took shape and how with changing times, the outlook of the courts in pleas claiming specific performance should be. We consider it appropriate to reproduce the same hereunder:
“36. The principle that time is not of the essence of contracts relating to immovable properties took shape in an era when market values of immovable properties were stable and did not undergo any marked change even over a few years (followed mechanically, even when value ceased to be stable)…..This principle made sense during the first half of the twentieth century, when there was comparatively very little inflation, in India. The third quarter of the twentieth century saw a very slow but steady increase in prices. But a drastic change occurred from the beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century. There has been a galloping inflation and prices of immovable properties have increased steeply, by leaps and bounds. Market values of properties are no longer stable or steady. We can take judicial notice of the comparative purchase power of a rupee in the year 1975 and now, as also the steep increase in the value of the immovable properties between then and now. It is no exaggeration to say that properties in cities, worth a lakh or so in or about 1975 to 1980, may cost a crore or more now.
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