Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 753; [2024] 10 S.C.R. 493
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 3 Oct 2024
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 1404/2023
- Sections
- 2(12), 377, 2, 30, 497, 5, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10
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[2024] 10 S.C.R. 493 : 2024 INSC 753 Sukanya Shantha v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 1404 of 2023)
03 October 2024 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to caste-based discrimination in the prisons in the country.
Headnotes† Constitution of India – Arts.14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 – Prisons in India – Caste-based discrimination – Writ petition seeking directions for repeal of the offending provisions in State Prison Manuals – Petitioner’s case that various State Prison Manuals sanction unconstitutional practices, violative of Arts 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23; that caste-based discrimination continues to persist in the prisons with respect to division of manual labour; segregation of barracks; and provisions discriminate against prisoners belonging to denotified tribes and “habitual offenders”; that the Model Prison Manual, 2016 does not address the impugned provisions related to caste discrimination; and sought direction to the Home Departments of the States to clarify the definition of “Habitual Offenders” in their respective Prison Manuals so as to prevent its misuse against the denotified tribes in prisons:
Held: Impugned provisions are unconstitutional for being violative of Arts.14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 – In accordance with the instant judgment, all States and Union Territories to revise their Prison Manuals/Rules within the stipulated period; that Union government to make necessary changes, to address caste-based discrimination in the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023; that references to “habitual offenders” in the prison manuals/Model Prison Manual to be in accordance with the definition provided in the habitual offender legislation enacted by the respective State legislatures; that all other * Author 494 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports references or definitions of “habitual offenders” in the impugned prison manuals/rules unconstitutional; that the “caste” column and any references to caste in undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers inside the prisons to be deleted; that the Police to follow the guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar’s case and Amanatullah Khan’s case to ensure that members of Denotified Tribes are not subjected to arbitrary arrest; that this Court to take suo motu cognizance of the discrimination inside prisons; that all States and the Union government to file a compliance report on this judgment, on the first hearing of the suo motu petition; and that NALSA to file joint status report after compiling reports of inspection conducted by DLSAs and Board of Visitors and of SLSAs before this Court. [Paras 161-231] Prisons – Prison Manuals – Plea that Prison Manuals cast disparate burdens on prisoners based on their caste-identity, if violative of Art.14 – Caste, if an intelligible and rational principle of classification and has a rational nexus with the object of the classification:
Held: Caste can be an intelligible principle of classification as it has been used to create protective policies for the marginalized castes – Constitution recognises caste as a proscribed ground of discrimination u/Art.15(1), and envisions a society free from casteprejudices – However, caste cannot be a ground to discriminate against members of marginalized castes – Any use of caste as a basis for classification must withstand judicial scrutiny to ensure it does not perpetuate discrimination against the oppressed castes – While caste-based classifications are permissible under certain constitutional provisions, they are strictly regulated to ensure they serve the purpose of promoting equality and social justice – Classification of prisoners has been considered both from the point of view of security and discipline as well as reform and rehabilitation – However, there is no nexus between classifying prisoners based on caste and securing the objectives of security or reform – Limitations on inmates that are cruel, or irrelevant to rehabilitation are per se unreasonable, arbitrary and constitutionally suspect – Differentia between inmates that distinguishes on the basis of “habit”, “custom”, “superior mode of living”, and “natural tendency to escape”, is unconstitutionally vague and indeterminate – Objective of classification for labour for treatment and for conferment of entitlements such as [2024] 10 S.C.R. 495Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. remissions has to be maximisation of the reformatory potential of prisons – Such classification should be based solely on the correctional needs of the individual prisoner – Thus, Rules that discriminate among individual prisoners on the basis of their caste specifically or indirectly by referring to proxies of caste identity are violative of Art. 14 on account of invalid classification and subversion of substantive equality – Constitution of India – Arts.14, 15(1). [Paras 164-170, 196] Prisons – Prison Manuals – Plea that provisions thereunder, discriminate against marginalized castes and act to the advantage of certain castes, by assigning cleaning and sweeping work to marginalized castes, while allowing the high castes to do cooking, which is direct discrimination u/Art.15(1):
Held: Manuals/rules suffer from indirect discrimination by using broad terms which act to the disadvantage of the marginalized castes – Phrases such as “menial” jobs to be performed by castes “accustomed to perform such duties” may appear to be facially neutral, but refer to marginalized communities, given the history of systemic discrimination against them – Such indirect usages of phrases, which target the so-called ‘lower castes’, cannot be permitted in the constitutional framework – Phrases, carry an embedded bias that disadvantages marginalized communities by reinforcing historical patterns of labour based on caste – These provisions disproportionately harm marginalized castes, perpetuate caste-based labour divisions and reinforce social hierarchies – Manuals/rules are also based on and reinforce stereotypes against the marginalized castes as also denotified tribes – These stereotypes not only demean and stigmatize marginalized communities and denotified tribes but also serve to maintain and legitimize a social hierarchy that goes against the constitutional values of equality – Tendency to treat members of denotified tribes as habitual to crime or having bad character reinforces a stereotype, which excludes them from meaningful participation in social life – Discrimination against denotified tribes is prohibited under the ground of “caste” in Art. 15(1), as the colonial regime considered them as belonging to separate hereditary castes – Thus, the impugned provisions violative of Art. 15 – Constitution of India – Art.15. [Paras 171-175, 196] 496 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Prisons – Prison Manuals – Plea that provisions thereunder, “practice” of untouchability, division of work on the basis of caste, is a practice of untouchability prohibited under the Constitution:
Held: Prison manuals allot tasks of a barber to individuals from a certain caste, while sweeping work is allowed to Mehtar/Hari/ Chandal or similar castes – This is a caste-based delegation of work based on the perceptions of the caste system that certain castes are meant to do jobs of sweeping – Rule that a prisoner of a high caste be allowed to refuse the food cooked by other castes is a legal sanction by the State authorities to untouchability and the caste system – Provisions that “men of wandering tribes” or “criminal tribes” have a “strong natural tendency to escape” or are by “habit” accustomed to theft reflects a stereotype that has its basis in the colonial understanding of India’s caste system – These stereotypes not only criminalize entire communities but also reinforce castebased prejudices – They resemble a form of untouchability, as they assign certain negative traits to specific groups based on identity, perpetuating their marginalization and exclusion – Once labelled a criminal tribe, individuals from these communities faced systematic discrimination in employment, education, and social services – Provision that “non-habitual” prisoner is “by social status” and “habit of life accustomed to superior mode of living” is another caste-based construct – It is only an injustice but also reinforced existing power structures, ensuring that marginalized groups were trapped in cycles of poverty and discrimination, unable to transcend the stigmatization they faced – Thus, impugned provisions violative of Art.17 – Constitution of India – Art.17. [Paras 181, 183-184, 196] Prisons – Prison Manuals – Right to overcome caste prejudices u/Art.21 – Provisions under Prison Manuals, fostering the antiquated notions of fitness of a particular community for a certain designated job, reinforcing occupational immobility of prisoners belonging to certain castes, if violative of Art.21: Held: Art.21 provides for the right to overcome caste barriers as a part of the right to life of individuals from marginalized communities – Protection provided by Art.21 can be seen as a constitutional guarantee that individuals from marginalized communities should have the freedom to break free from these traditional social restrictions – It extends beyond mere survival to [2024] 10 S.C.R. 497Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. ensure that they can flourish in an environment of equality, respect, and dignity, without being subjected to caste-based discrimination which stifles their personal growth – When caste prejudices manifest in institutional settings, such as prisons, they create further restrictions on the personal development and reformation of individuals from marginalized communities – When Prison Manuals restrict the reformation of prisoners from marginalized communities, they violate their right to life – When prisoners from marginalized communities are subjected to discriminatory practices based on caste, their inherent dignity is violated – Thus, the impugned provisions violative of Art.21 – Constitution of India – Art.21. [Paras 185-188, 196] Prisons – Prison Manuals – Plea that provisions as regards caste-based division of labour/work, forced labour and violative of Art.23:
Held: Persons from specific communities performing honourable tasks, while those from marginalized communities are forced into undesirable work leads to unfair distribution of labour within the prison system – It perpetuates the idea that some individuals are inherently suited to low-status labour based solely on their birth, reinforcing deep-rooted caste inequalities – Imposing labour or work, which is considered impure or low-grade like cleaning latrines and sweeping work, upon members of marginalized communities amounts to forced labour u/Art.23 – Forced to undertake the menial tasks simply because of their caste background robs prisoners of the element of choice that other prisoners enjoy and constitutes form of coercion – Art.23 was incorporated to protect the members of oppressed castes from exploitative practices, where their labour is taken advantage of, and without any adequate return – However, prison rules, by exploiting labour of the oppressed castes, perpetuate the same injustice to guard against which Art.23 was inserted – Assigning labour based on caste background strips individuals of their liberty to engage in meaningful work, and denies them the opportunity to rise above the constraints imposed by their social identity – Thus, impugned provisions violative of Art.23 – Constitution of India – Art.23. [Paras 189, 191-196] Prisons – Prison Manuals – Plea as regards existing discrimination and continued targeting of the members of the Denotified Tribes, and classification of “habitual offender”: 498 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Held: Classification of “habitual offender” emerged prior to repeal of the Criminal Tribes Act – After repeal several States enacted new habitual offender laws in their jurisdictions – Most States adopted an identical definition of “habitual offenders”, referring to a person who has been sentenced on conviction for at least three occasion to “a substantive term of imprisonment” for any of more of the specified offences – However, in some States, they were used to refer to members belonging to criminal tribes/denotified tribes, and applying that logic, several Prison Manuals/Rules have also referred to “habitual offender” to mean members of Denotified Tribes or wandering tribes, which cannot be accepted – Whole community ought not to have either been declared criminal tribe in the past or habitual offender in the present – Classification of “habitual offender” has been used to target members of Denotified Tribes – State governments to reconsider the usage of various habitual offender laws-whether such laws are needed in a constitutional system – In the meantime, definition of “habitual offender” in the prison manuals/rules to be in accordance with the definition provided in the habitual offender legislation enacted by the respective State legislature, subject to any constitutional challenge against such legislation in the future – In case, there is no habitual offender legislation in State, references to habitual offenders directly or indirectly, struck down as unconstitutional – Union and State governments to make necessary changes in the prison manuals in line with this judgment. [Paras 213-219] Prisons – Prison reforms – Role of Legal Service Authorities in prisons:
Held: In order to ensure that the fundamental rights of prisoners are not violated, role of legal services authorities crucial – Right to free legal aid and inspection by Legal Services Authorities including by a Board of Visitors, essential ingredient. [Paras 220, 227] Prisons – Prison Manuals – History of “Caste” in Prison Manuals – Stated. [Paras 151-160] Constitution of India – Nature of:
Held : It is an emancipatory document – It provides equal citizenship to all citizens of India – Constitution is not just a legal document, but gave a dignified identity to all citizens of India – It eliminated the legality of caste-based discrimination, thereby raising the human dignity of the marginalised communities – Constitution mandates [2024] 10 S.C.R. 499Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. the replacement of fundamental wrongs with fundamental rights – Through its provisions, it displaced a centuries-old caste-based hierarchical social order that did not recognize the principle of individual equality – It negated the ideals of social hierarchy – Constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations of the millions of caste-oppressed communities, which hoped for a better future in independent India – Chapter on fundamental rights places the provisions on equality, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, affirmative action, abolition of untouchability, freedom of speech and expression, right to life, and prohibition of forced labour together – Constitution thus complements the basic principles of constitutionalism with provisions designed specifically to address India’s social problems – Constitution thus stands as a testament to the fight against historical injustices and for the establishment of an egalitarian social order – It aims to prevent caste-based discrimination – It empowers the State to enact appropriate legislation or take executive measures to tackle caste-based discrimination. [Paras 14, 15, 17, 23] Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Classification under – Constitutional standards:
Held : Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus with the object sought – Classification test cannot be merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion – Challenge u/Art.14 has to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an individual – In undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary, courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something which is excessive and disproportionate – In applying this constitutional standard, courts must identify the “real purpose” of the statute rather than the “ostensible purpose” presented by the State – Provision can be found manifestly arbitrary even if it does not make a classification – Different constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity of legislation as compared to subordinate legislation. [Paras 25, 34] Constitution of India – Art. 15 – Non-Discrimination under – Interpretation:
Held: Discrimination is against citizens on any of several grounds, including “caste” prohibited, because it has several 500 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports repercussions on human lives – Discrimination arises due to a feeling of superiority/inferiority, bias, contempt, or hatred against a person or a group – Discrimination also lowers the self-esteem of the person being discriminated against – It can lead to unfair denial of opportunities and constant violence against a set of people – Discrimination can also be done by continuously ridiculing or humiliating someone, who is on the weaker side of the social spectrum – Discrimination also includes stigmatizing the identity or existence of a marginalized social group – Certain anti-discrimination principles emerge u/Art.15(1) – Discrimination can be either direct or indirect, or both – Facially neutral laws may have an adverse impact on certain social groups, that are marginalized – Stereotypes can further discrimination against a marginalized social group – State is under a positive obligation to prevent discrimination against a marginalized social group – Discriminatory laws based on stereotypes and causing harm or disadvantage against a social group, directly or indirectly, are not permissible under the constitutional scheme – Courts are required to examine the claims of indirect discrimination and systemic discrimination. [Paras 35, 36, 48] Constitution of India – Art.17 – Ban on untouchability – Mandate of Art. 17:
Held: Art.17 provides that Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden – Constitution puts an end to the socially discriminatory practice of untouchability – Untouchability and caste discrimination led to severe social and economic disabilities and cultural and educational backwardness” of the untouchables – Enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability is a criminal offense as per the law – It is a provision that can be implemented both against the State and non-state actors such as the citizens – Moreover, the framers of the Constitution did not refer to any religion or community in the text of the provision – Injunction against untouchability u/Art.17 is further strengthened by taking away the subject-matter from State domain and placing it as an exclusive legislative head to Parliament – Art.17 enunciates that everyone is born equal – There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person – From time to time, to implement the mandate of Art.17, Parliament has enacted several legislations which aim to provide dignity to the affected individuals. [Paras 49-51, 54] [2024] 10 S.C.R. 501Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to live with dignity under: Held: Dignity forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution – Dignity is the core which unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence – Human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal – Human dignity is intrinsic to and inseparable from human existence – Implicit in this right u/Art.21 is the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – There also exists a close relationship between dignity and the quality of life – Dignity u/Art.21 is an integral aspect of life, which requires sustenance of one’s being to the fullest – Right to dignity encapsulates the right of every individual to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value – Nation must prioritize human dignity ensuring that every person, regardless of their background or identity, is able to live with respect, equality, and freedom – Thus, human dignity forms the bedrock of social justice and a just, compassionate society – Even prisoners are entitled to the right to dignity – Jurisprudence which emerges on the rights of prisoners u/Art.21 is that even the incarcerated have inherent dignity – They are to be treated humanely and without cruelty – Police officers and prison officials cannot take any disproportionate measures against prisoners – Prison system must be considerate of the physical and mental health of prisoners. [Paras 55-58, 67] Constitution of India – Art.23 – Prohibition of forced labour and human trafficking under – Scope:
Held: Scope of Art.23 is wide, as it has left the term “begar” undefined, and supplemented by the phrase ‘other similar forms’ of forced labour – Framers of the Constitution consciously left the terms undefined so that future interpretation is not restrictive – Intellectual background of Art.23 lies to facilitate the citizens in exercising their fundamental rights – Exploitative socio-economic practices can hinder the right to live a dignified life – Begar or bonded labour was entrenched in India’s social system, against which Art.23 makes a blow – Broad scope of Art.23 can be invoked to challenge practices where no wages are paid, non-payment of minimum wages takes place, social security measures for workers are not adopted, rehabilitation for bonded labour does not happen, and in similar unfair practices – State shall be held accountable even in cases where the violation of Art. 23 is done by private 502 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports entities or individuals – Art.23 can also be applied to situations inside prisons, if prisoners are subjected to degrading labour or other similar oppressive practices. [Paras 68, 69, 85] Constitution of India – Constitutional interpretation – Elucidated. [Paras 6-13] Constitution of India – Future of substantive equality and institutional discrimination – Caste Discrimination – Noneradication of the evil of caste discrimination, despite 75 years since independence:
Held: There is a need for a national vision for justice and equality, which involves all citizens – Real and quick steps needed to identify the instances of existing inequalities and injustices in the society – Compassionate approach needed – Institutional approach needed where people from marginalized communities could share their pain and anguish about their future collectively – There is a need to reflect and do away with institutional practices, which discriminate against citizens from marginalized communities or treat them without empathy – Identification of systemic discrimination in all spaces by observing patterns of exclusion needed. [Paras 228, 229] Criminal Tribes Act – Scope and object – Repeal of Criminal Tribes Act – Discussed. [Paras 97-113, 120-126] Model Prison Manual 2016 – Scope and object of:
Held: Model Prison Manual 2016 was prepared “to reflect the understanding behind constitutional provisions, Supreme Court directions on prison administration – It covers a range of aspects relating to prisons, including institutional framework, custodial management, medical care, education and training of prisoners, maintenance of prisoners, emergency situations, remission, parole, premature releases and inspection of prisons, among other things – Manual of 2016 also focuses on “prison computerization, special provisions for women prisoners, after care services, rights of prisoners sentenced to death, repatriation of prisoners from abroad, and on prison correctional staff” – New chapters on legal aid and inspection of prisons also incorporated. [Para 200] Model Prison Manual 2016 – Manual of 2016 – Certain ambiguities – Elucidation:
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 503Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Held: Manual 2016 suffers from several lacunae specifically as regards its classification of “habitual offenders” and caste based discrimination – Manual mandates the classification of undertrial prisoners in three categories, wherein habitual offenders are tagged along with “Gangsters, hired Assassins, dacoits, serial killers/rapists/violent robbers, drug offenders, communal fanatics and those highly prone to escapes/ previous escapees/attack on police and other dangerous offenders/including those prone to self-harm/posing threat to public order” – Habitual offenders are tagged in the same category in relation to classification of high risk offenders and for determination of the level of security for effective surveillance – Similarly, regarding the women prisoners, it has been provided that “Habitual offenders shall be separated from casual prisoners” and that “Habitual offenders, prostitutes and brothel keepers must also be confined separately” – Phrase “habitual offender” in several prison manuals refers to people from denotified or wandering tribes – Therefore, this definition cannot be left to be interpreted and applied “in accordance with the provisions of applicable law or rules” – Secondly, Manual does not explicitly prohibit physical caste-based segregation of prisoners, except in prisons for women – Third, the Manual does not prohibit division of work on the basis of caste, except in cooking – Manual 2016 should have taken into account such practices and provided specifically for their prohibition – Fourth, Manual does not refer to the provisions of the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013, which prohibit manual scavenging – Said Act has a binding effect even on prisons – Fifth, caste-based privileges provided to certain prisoners are not forbidden – No special treatment shall be given to any group of persons or individuals on the basis of caste in any scenario. [Paras 201-208] Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 – Scope and object of – Problematic provisions:
Held: Model Act is a comprehensive document which covers all relevant aspects of prison management-security, safety, scientific and technological interventions, segregation of prisoners, special provision for women inmates, taking appropriate action against criminal activities of prisoners in the prison, grant of parole and furlough to prisoners, their education, vocational training and skill development, etc – It is for the respective State Governments to make use of the guidance provided in the Act of 2023 and 504 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports enact a suitable legislation on Prisons in their jurisdictions for bringing improvement in prison management and administration of prisoners – Model Act does not contain reference to prohibition of caste-based discrimination – Provision to that effect should be inserted in the Model Act – It should ban segregation or division of work based on caste – Definition of “Habitual Offender” u/s. 2(12) that habitual Offender means a prisoner who is committed to prison repeatedly for a crime also problematic – Phrase “committed to prison repeatedly” vague and over-broad – It can be used to declare anyone as a habitual offender, even if they have not been convicted for a crime – Model Act also provides that “habitual offenders” may be housed in a high security prison – In addition thereto the Act creates a category of “recidivist”, which means “any prisoner who is convicted for a crime more than once” – “Habitual/recidivist prisoners” may be classified separately and segregated in prisons – Also, Chapter IX dealing with “Protection of Society from Criminal Activities of High-Risk Prisoners, Habitual Offenders and Hardened Criminals”, seems to be over-board. [Paras 209-212] Social Protection – Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Denotified Tribes – Prevention of discrimination and atrocities – Jurisprudence on social protection in Post- Independence India – Stated. [Paras 127-144] Suo motu – Suo motu cognizance – Initiation of suo motu cognizance of the discrimination inside prisons on the ground of caste, gender, disability – Case to be titled as In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India. [Para 231 (vi)] Case Law Cited Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 1 SCR 594 : (1993) 1 SCC 645; Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2015] 9 SCR 99 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; K Ranjitsinh v. Union of India [2024] 3 SCR 1320 : 2024 INSC 280; Common Cause v. Union of India [2018] 13 SCR 1204 : (2018) 4 SCALE 1; Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. [2018] 4 SCR 955 : (2018) 16 SCC 368; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : 1978 INSC 16; CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. 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State of Rajasthan [1983] 2 SCR 271 : (1983) 1 SCC 525; Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1983] 2 SCR 473 : (1983) 2 SCC 181; Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1984) 3 SCC 243; P. Sivaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 346 : (1988) 4 SCC 466 : State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat AIR 1998 SC 3164; Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Tamil Nadu [2012] 9 SCR 579 : (2013) 1 SCC 585; Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat [2020] 13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Krishna Balothia [1995] 1 SCR 897 : 1995 INSC 99; Murthy Match Works v. Asst Collector of Central Excise [1974] 3 SCR 121 : (1974) 4 SCC 428; Hiralal Mallick v. State of Bihar [1978] 1 SCR 301 : (1977) 4 SCC 44; Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid v. State Of Maharashtra [2012] 8 SCR 295 : 2012 INSC 357; Mohd. Hussain v. The State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi AIR 2012 SC 750; National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights v. Union of India [2016] 9 SCR 122 : AIR 2017 SC 132; Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 4 SCR 877 : 2018 INSC 248; Union of India v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 12 SCR 1125 : 2019 INSC 1102; Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayan [2021] 8 SCR 855 : 2021 INSC 701; Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2021] 3 SCR 470 : 2021 INSC 272; Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 4 SCR 709 : 2019 INSC 305; Amanatullah Khan v. The Commissioner of Police Delhi [2024] 5 SCR 927 : 2024 INSC 383; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2014] 8 SCR 128 : 2014 INSC 463; Mallada K. Sri Ram v. State of Telangana [2022] 3 SCR 5 : 2022 INSC 386 – referred to.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 507Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Books and Periodicals Cited Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1999), at pages 50, xii-xiii; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), p. xi; Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India, Oxford University Press (1989), 2018 Reprint, p. 185; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), p. xii; Granville Austin, Working A Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience, Oxford University Press (1999), p. 7; Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, Penguin Random House (2020), p. 167; Rahul Choragudi, et al, Caste Matters in Public Policy: Issues and Perspectives, Routledge (2024), Reprint, p. 2; Anurag Bhaskar, The Foresighted Ambedkar: Ideas that Shaped Indian Constitutional Discourse, Penguin (2024), pp. 68-87; Anurag Bhaskar, The Foresighted Ambedkar: Ideas That Shaped Indian Constitutional Discourse, Penguin (2024), pp. 176-191; B. Shiva Rao, Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol. 5, pp. 249-257; B.R. Ambedkar, “Evidence Before the Southborough Committee”, in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 256; B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 16;B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 54; B.R. Ambedkar, “Philosophy of Hinduism”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 3, pp. 25- 26; B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 86; B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 18; B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 14; Anastasia Pilavsky, “The ‘Criminal Tribe’ in India before the British”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 57, no. 2 (2015): 323–54, at p. 327; Anastasia Pilavsky, “The ‘Criminal Tribe’ in India before the British”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 57, no. 2 (2015): 323–54, at p.326; John Lewis Gillin, Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology, p. 110; John Lewis Gillin, Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology, Macmillan Company (1931), pp. 115-16, 122; B.R. Ambedkar, “Evidence Before the Southborough Committee (1919)”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 255; “Dr. Ambedkar at the Round Table Conferences”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 2, p. 504; B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and 508 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 47; Marc Galanter, “Law and Caste in Modern India”, Asian Survey (1963), Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 544–59, at p. 545; Marc Galanter, “Untouchability and the Law”, Economic and Political Weekly (1969), Vol. 4, No. 1/2, pp. 131– 170, at p. 131; Committee on Prison Discipline to the Governor General of India in Council, 1838, page 106; David Arnold and David Hardiman (eds.), Subaltern Studies VIII: Essays in Honour of Ranajit Guha, Oxford University Press (1994), pp. 148-187, at p. 172; Report of the Inspector of Prisons, Oudh, 1826, p. 33 as cited in David Arnold (1994), p. 172; David Arnold, “Labouring for the Raj: Convict Work Regimes in Colonial India, 1836–1939”, in Christian G Vito and Alex Lichtenstein (eds), Global Convict Labour, Brill (2015), pp. 199-221, at p. 209; Secretary, India, Home (Judicial), to Chief Secretary, Madras, 8 July 1871, Madras Judicial Proceedings, no. 98, 24 October 1871] – as cited in David Arnold (2015), p. 210; Report of The Group of Officers on Prison Administration, 1987, p. 156 (“RK Kapoor Committee”); Michael Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equality in American History, Oxford University Press (2007); Jamal Greene, How Rights Went Wrong: Why Our Obsession with Rights is Tearing America Apart, Mariner Books, 2022, p. 248; Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (translated by Myra Bergman Ramos), Penguin 2017, p. 24; Alan Paton, Cry, The Beloved Country, Vintage Books, 2002; Bell Hooks, Salvation: black people and love, Harper Perennial, 2001; pp. 214-15; Nusrat F. Jafri, This Land We Call Home: The Story of a Family, Caste, Conversions and Modern India, Penguin (2024), p. Xv – referred to. Lists of Websites The Criminal Tribes Enquiry Committee Report (1949-50), https:// ia802807.us.archive.org/11/items/dli.csl.944/944.pdf, p. 92; Model Prison Manual 2016, p. 4, https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/ files/PrisonManual2016.pdf; B.B. Pande, “Expanding Horizons of Criminal Procedure Law”, SCC Journal (2021), https://www. scconline.com/blog/post/2021/07/07/expanding-horizons-ofcriminal-procedure-law/; B.R. Ambedkar, “States and Minorities”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 393, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/Volume1.pdf – referred to. List of Acts Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual, 2022; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Model Prison Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Prisons in India, 2003; [2024] 10 S.C.R. 509Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. West Bengal Jail Code Rules, 1967; Thuggee Act (XXX of 1836); Dacoity Act (XXIV of 1843); Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976; Criminal Tribes Act 1871; Penal Code 1860; Criminal Tribes Settlement Act; Criminal Tribes Act 1911; Reformatory Schools Act, 1897; Criminal Tribes Act of 1924; Criminal Tribes Manual of Gwalior; Rewa Wandering Criminal Tribes Act, 1925; Criminal Tribes (Madras Repeal) Act, 1947; Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Prison Act 1984; Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual, 2022; West Bengal Jail Code Rules for Superintendence and Management of Jail in West Bengal, 1967; Madhya Pradesh Jail Manual, 1987; Andhra Pradesh Prison Rules, 1979; Odisha Model Jail Manual Rules for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in Odisha, 2020; Kerala Prison Rules 1958; Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983; Rules for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in the Bombay State, 1954; Karnataka Prisons and Correctional Services Manual-2021; Rajasthan Prisons Rules, 2022; Prison Manual 2021 for the Superintendence and Management of the Jails in Himachal Pradesh; Madras Jail Manual, 1899; Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual, 1941; Rajasthan Prison Rules 1951; Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023; Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Tamil Nadu Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1948 (previously Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act 1948); Madhya Bharat Vagrants, Habitual Offenders and Criminals (Restrictions and Settlement) Act, 1952; Orissa Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1952; Uttar Pradesh Habitual Offenders Act, 1952; Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act, 1953; Jammu and Kashmir Habitual Offenders (Control and Reform) Act, 1956; Bombay Habitual Offenders Act, 1959; Gujarat Habitual Offenders Act, 1959; Kerala Habitual Offenders Act, 1960; Karnataka Habitual Offenders Act, 1961; Andhra Pradesh Habitual Offenders Act, 1962; Himachal Pradesh Habitual Offenders Act, 1969; Goa, Daman and Diu Habitual Offenders Act, 1976; Tamil Nadu Habitual Offenders Act, 1948.
List of Keywords Caste-based discrimination; Prisons; State Prison Manuals; Division of manual labour; Segregation of barracks; Discrimination against prisoners belonging to denotified tribes and habitual offenders; Model Prison Manual, 2016; Discrimination in kitchens; Habitual Offenders; Denotified tribes in prisons; Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023; Caste column; Caste in 510 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers; Guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar’s case and Amanatullah Khan’s case; Marginalized castes; High castes; Direct discrimination; Untouchability; Caste prejudices; Caste based division of labour/work; Intelligible and rational principle of classification; Rational nexus; Rehabilitation; Segregating prisoners; Social hierarchy; Non-habitual prisoner; Occupational immobility of prisoners; Restriction on labour; Discrimination and continued targeting of members of Denotified Tribes; Classification of habitual offender; Role of Legal Service Authorities in Prisons; Right to free legal aid; Non-Discrimination u/Art.15; Ban on untouchability in Art. 17; Right to live with dignity; Prohibition of forced labour and human trafficking; Criminal Tribes Act; Repeal of Criminal Tribes Act; Prevention of discrimination and atrocities; Jurisprudence on social protection in Post-Independence India; Manual Scavengers; Prison management; Women inmates; Habitual/recidivist prisoners; Substantive equality and institutional discrimination; Suo motu cognizance; In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India.
Case Arising From CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 1404 of 2023 (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
Appearances for Parties Dr. S. Muralidhar, Sr. Adv., Prasanna S., Ms. Disha Wadekar, Ms. Apoorva Singh, M. A. Karthik, Maitreya Subramaniam, Ms. Pallak Bhagat, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Tapesh Kumar Singh, Sr. AAG, Mani Munjal, Ashok Panigrahi, B.K. Satija, Rajat Nair, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Pradeep Misra, Daleep Dhyani, Ms. Aarohi Bhalla, Himanshu Chakravarty, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Subhasish Mohanty, Vishnu Sharma, Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Pawan Kishore Singh, Dipankar Singh, Dr. Ravindra Chingale, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, D.L. Chidananda, Ishan Roy Chowdhury, Anuj Saxena, Durgesh Ramchandra Gupta, Anuj Ruhela, Shubham Sagar, Mrs. Payal Gaikwad, Prakash Sharma, Pratham Arora, Ms. Prerna Singh, Guntur Pramod Kumar, Keshav Singh, Sabarish Subramanian, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 511Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI Contents* I. The Writ Petition.............................................................. 4 II. Submissions...................................................................... 4 III. Constitutional Interpretation.............................................. 6 IV. The Constitution of Emancipation, Equality, and Dignity.... 9 V. The Contours of Article 14................................................. 17 VI. Non-Discrimination under Article 15.................................. 23 VII. The Ban on Untouchability in Article 17............................ 33 VIII. Article 21: Of Life and Dignity........................................... 38 IX. Article 23: Prohibition of Forced Labour and Human Trafficking.......................................................................... 45 X. A History of Discrimination in the Pre-Colonial Era......... 57 XI. The Colonial Suppression of Marginalized Castes and Tribes.............................................................................. 60 i. Criminal Tribes Acts.................................................... 61 ii. Caste Discrimination in Colonial India...................... 70 iii. Repeal of Criminal Tribes Act.................................... 74 XII. Jurisprudence on Social Protection in Post-Independence India.................................................................................. 77 XIII. Impugned Provisions........................................................ 88 XIV. Prison Manuals and the Legacy of Discrimination........... 105 XV. Model Prison Manual 2016: Whether Adequate?............ 125 XVI. Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023........ 132 XVII. The Continued Targeting of Denotified Tribes.................. 134 XVIII. The Role of Legal Service Authorities in Prisons............. 138 XIX. The Future of Substantive Equality & Institutional Discrimination.................................................................... 144 XX. Conclusion and Directions............................................... 146 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
512 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports I. The Writ Petition
1. The petitioner, Sukanya Shantha, a journalist, wrote an article “From Segregation to Labour, Manu’s Caste Law Governs the Indian Prison System”, which was published on 10 December 2020. The article highlighted caste-based discrimination in the prisons in the country. The petitioner has sought directions for repeal of the offending provisions in State prison manuals. By an order dated 10 July 2024, judgment was reserved. We have heard a broad diversity of viewpoints from across India. Besides counsel for the petitioner and the intervenor, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) of India appeared for the Union of India. The States of Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Orissa, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu appeared through counsel.
II. Submissions
2. Dr. S. Muralidhar, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner highlighted the issue of caste-based discrimination in the prisons in India. It was argued that various State prison manuals sanction blatantly unconstitutional practices, which are violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution of India. Ms. Disha Wadekar referred to a chart of provisions from different State prison manuals/ rules to highlight various forms of discrimination in the prisons. She highlighted that caste-based discrimination continues to persist in the prisons in the country with respect to: (i) The division of manual labour; (ii) Segregation of barracks; and (iii) Provisions that discriminate against prisoners belonging to Denotified tribes and “habitual offenders”. She further argued that the Model Prison Manual, 2016 does not address the impugned provisions related to caste discrimination inside prisons other than the discrimination in kitchens, and that it is not “model” when it comes to addressing caste discrimination. In the written submissions, the petitioner’s side has further submitted that the Home Departments of the Respondent States may also be directed to clarify the definition of “Habitual Offenders” in their respective prison manuals so as to prevent its misuse against the denotified tribes in prisons.
3. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Learned ASG, submitted a written note arguing that the Ministry of Home Affairs prepared the Model Prison Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Prisons in India, 2003 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 513Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. and The Model Prison Manual, 2016, and circulated it to all States and Union Territories (UTs) in May 2016 explicitly prohibiting caste and religion based discrimination practices. She also referred to the Advisory dated 26 February 2024 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, through the Deputy Secretary (PR & ATC) to the Principal Secretary (Home/Jails) of all states and UTs and the DG/IG Prisons of all States and UTs to ensure that the State Prison Manual/Prison Act should not contain any discriminatory provisions. She further argued that “prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions and other institutions of a like nature, and persons detained therein” as a subject fall under the domain of the States under Entry 4, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
4. Ms. Ashtha Sharma, counsel for the State of West Bengal, stated that the discrimination on the basis of caste/creed/ religion as envisaged in the provisions of West Bengal Jail Code Rules, 1967 (Rules No. 741, 793, 860 and 1117) are not in force/ practice within the Correctional Homes of West Bengal since long, and that a proposal for deletion/ alteration/ amendment of the four Rules has been already sent to the appropriate authority. Mr. Anuj Saxena, counsel for the intervenor, has prayed for deletion of “caste” column and any references to caste in undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers. III. Constitutional Interpretation
5. As we deal with the present petition, we must refer to the values of the Constitution and the interpretation we must adopt. After all, the impugned provisions of the various prison manuals, highlighted in this petition, demonstrate that the values of the Constitution are at stake.
6. The Constitution reflects the vision of its founders to give India a collective future based on the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The Constitution mandates a more just and inclusive society, where every citizen has the opportunity to thrive. It envisages that the values embedded in its provisions are not just aspirations but lived realities. Any interpretation of the Constitution must be reflective of the blueprint laid down by its founders. The Constitution is – as Granville Austin put it— a “social document” and a “modernizing force”, with its provisions embodying “humanitarian sentiments”.1 1 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1999), at pages 50, xii-xiii 514 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7. The interpretation of the Constitution is not static. It has evolved with time to give recognition to a broader spectrum of rights to the citizens, as well as to impose additional safeguards against excesses of the State or even private entities, as the case may be. Over the last seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has recognized new rights such as the right to education,2 the right to privacy,3 and the right against the adverse impact of climate change,4 among others. These rights, though not explicitly mentioned in the original text, have been interpreted as inherent to the broader principle of the right to life which the Constitution enshrines. The Constitution must serve as a robust framework for safeguarding the rights of citizens and maintaining the delicate balance between authority and individual freedom.
8. The Constitution recognizes the dignity and individual autonomy inherent in all citizens and their right to life and personal liberty. Liberty and autonomy advance the cause of human dignity.5 Individual autonomy is the ability to make decisions on matters that impact one’s life.6 When individuals are granted the freedom to make choices about their own lives, they are empowered to take control of their destinies, and express their identities, in the “pursuit of happiness” 7 without undue interference. This freedom fosters a sense of self-worth and respect, thereby recognizing individual dignity. By safeguarding these principles, we ensure that the intrinsic worth of every human being is recognized and upheld. The right to life cannot be restricted except through a law which is “substantively and procedurally fair, just and reasonable”. 8
9. Our interpretation of the Constitution must fill the silences in its text. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated every situation that might arise in the future. They also intentionally 2 Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 3 Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 4 K Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 280 5 Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCALE 1 6 Justice (Retd.) K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017); Common Cause v. Union of India (2018). 7 American Declaration of Independence, original transcript available at https://www.archives.gov/ founding-docs/declaration-transcript 8 Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018) 16 SCC 368 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 515Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. left certain decisions to the discretion of future generations. However, the choices we make today must align with the broader constitutional framework and values. In filling the gaps, whenever they arise, our interpretation must enhance the foundational values of the Constitution such as equality, dignity, liberty, federalism and institutional accountability. Our interpretation must adhere to the postulate that “civil and political rights and socio-economic rights do not exist in a state of antagonism.” 9 Our analysis must be based on a holistic reading of the provisions of the Constitution. 10
10. The Constitution envisages that courts act as institutions which discharge the responsibility of protecting constitutionally entrenched rights. Courts are neutral institutions, whose primary function is to apply the law fairly and consistently. Transparency in processes also enhances public confidence in the system. 11 In their role as neutral institutions, courts also act as a check on the other branches of government, ensuring that their actions conform to constitutional and legal standards.
11. The Constitution mandates that laws enacted in the colonial era should align with its provisions. 12 Constitutional interpretation emphasizes the “need to reverse the philosophy of the colonial regime, which was founded on the subordination of the individual to the state”.13 The “assumptions which lay at the foundation of colonial rule have undergone a fundamental transformation for a nation of individuals governed by the Constitution”. 14 By recognizing the injustices in the colonial and pre-colonial era, “we can certainly set the course for the future”.15 “In the transformation of society” against colonial and pre-colonial ideology, the Constitution “seeks to assure the values of a just, humane and compassionate existence to all her citizens”. 16 9 Justice (Retd.) K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 INSC 16 11 CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, 2019 (16) SCALE 40 12 Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution provides: “All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.” 13 Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India [2018] 4 SCR 1 14 Ibid 15 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, 2018 INSC 790 [Justice Chandrachud] 16 Ibid 516 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
12. Criminal laws of the colonial era continue to impact the postcolonial world. As a scholar noted, “while the pre-determined and codified nature of the diverse criminal justice rules provided the moral superiority and political legitimacy to colonial rule, the Imperial power was safeguarded by their coercive content, particularly in procedural matters.” 17 Criminal laws in modern times thus, as “the strongest expression of the State’s power” must “ensure that they do not deny equality before the law and the equal protection of laws”. 18 Criminal laws must not endorse colonial or pre-colonial philosophy.
13. In a post-constitutional society, “the law must take affirmative steps to achieve equal protection of law to all its citizens”. 19 Any discussion on the Constitution must therefore take a conscious view of the lived realities of citizens. It requires evaluating how constitutional provisions translate into meaningful outcomes in their lives. We must discuss this aspect of the Indian Constitution further, before we examine the impugned provisions.
IV. The Constitution of Emancipation, Equality, and Dignity
14. The Constitution of India is an emancipatory document. It provides equal citizenship to all citizens of India. The Constitution is not just a legal document, but in India’s social structure, it is a quantum leap. In one stroke, it gave a dignified identity to all citizens of India. On 26 January 1950, the Constitution eliminated the legality of caste-based discrimination, thereby raising the human dignity of our marginalised communities.
15. Describing the vision of the framers, constitutional historian Granville Austin stated:
“India’s founding fathers and mothers established in the Constitution both the nation’s ideals and the institutions and processes for achieving them. The ideals were national unity and integrity and a democratic and equitable society. The new society was to be achieved through a socialeconomic revolution pursued with a democratic spirit 17 B.B. Pande, “Expanding Horizons of Criminal Procedure Law”, SCC Journal (2021), https://www. scconline.com/blog/post/2021/07/07/expanding-horizons-of-criminal-procedure-law/ 18 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, 2018 INSC 790 [Justice Chandrachud] 19 Ibid [2024] 10 S.C.R. 517Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. using constitutional, democratic institutions. I later came to think of unity, social revolution, and democracy as three strands of a seamless web. The founders believed that none of these goals was to be pursued, nor could any be achieved, separately. They were mutually dependent and had to be sought together.”20 Marc Galanter noted in this regard:
“Independent India embraced equality as a cardinal value against a background of elaborate, valued and clearly perceived inequalities. Her constitutional policies to offset these proceeded from an awareness of the entrenched and cumulative nature of group inequalities.” 21 The Constitution mandates the replacement of fundamental wrongs with fundamental rights. 22 Through its provisions, it displaced a centuries-old caste-based hierarchical social order “that did not recognize the principle of individual equality”. 23 It negated the ideals of social hierarchy. The Constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations of the millions of caste-oppressed communities, which hoped for a better future in independent India. To summarize, the “Constitution, by its very existence, was a social revolutionary statement.”24
16. Some of the speeches in the Constituent Assembly give expression to this vision. On behalf of the Adivasi community, Jaipal Singh Munda shared the following sentiments and expectations from the Constitution:
“Mr. Chairman, Sir, I rise to speak on behalf of millions of unknown hordes-yet very important-of unrecognised warriors of freedom, the original people of India who have variously been known as backward tribes, primitive tribes, criminal tribes and everything else, Sir, I am proud to be a Jungli, that is the name by which we are known in my part of the country... Sir, if there is any group of Indian people 20 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), p. xi 21 Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India, Oxford University Press (1989), 2018 Reprint, p. 185 22 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), p. xii 23 Granville Austin, Working A Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience, Oxford University Press (1999), p. 7 24 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), p. xii 518 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that has been shabbily treated it is my people. They have been disgracefully treated, neglected for the last 6,000 years… You cannot teach democracy to the tribal people; you have to learn democratic ways from them. They are the most democratic people on earth… We want to be treated like every other Indian.”25 H.J. Khandekar, a leader from the Dalit community, raised the plight of the so-called “criminal tribes”:
“We have been given according to this Constitution freedom of speech and freedom of movement and so on. But there is no freedom of movement for one crore of unfortunate people in this country. That is, the Criminal Tribes. Nothing is said about them in this Constitution. Will the Government repeal the Criminal Tribes Act and give every freedom to the Criminal Tribes?” 26 Dakshayani Velayudhan, the lone Dalit woman in the Constituent Assembly, noted:
“The working of the Constitution will depend upon how the people will conduct themselves in the future, not on the actual execution of the law. So I hope that in course of time there will not be such a community known as Untouchables and that our delegates abroad will not have to hang their heads in shame if somebody raises such a question in an organisation of international nature.”27 Dr Ambedkar, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, remarked in his last address to the Constituent Assembly:
“On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How 25 Constituent Assembly Debates (19 December 1946)
26 Constituent Assembly Debates (21 November 1949)
27 Constituent Assembly Debates (29 November 1948)
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 519Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up.”28 The vision laid down by Dr. Ambedkar, Jaipal Singh Munda, H.J. Khandekar, and Dakshayani Velayudhan, among others, emphasizes that there shall be no discrimination in the country. The Constitution envisions a society where there is no room for anyone to feel superior to another citizen.
17. The chapter on fundamental rights places the provisions on equality, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, affirmative action, abolition of untouchability, freedom of speech and expression, right to life, and prohibition of forced labour together. This has been done for a special reason. The framers of the Constitution conceptualized that without the provisions on the prohibition of discrimination, abolition of untouchability, and prohibition on forced labour, the imagination of broader rights such as equality before law, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to life would remain incomplete. The Constitution thus complements the basic principles of constitutionalism with provisions designed specifically to address India’s social problems.
18. This underlying philosophy of the Constitution has been highlighted by this Court in several judgments. Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, in his opinion in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 29 held that the objective of various provisions of the Constitution is to build “a welfare State and an egalitarian social order in our country”, and “to bring about a socio-economic transformation based on principles of social justice”. Referring to Part III of the Constitution, the judgment stated that the founders were “anxious that it should be a society where the citizen will enjoy the various freedoms and such rights as are the basic elements of those freedoms without which there can be no dignity of individual”.
28 Constituent Assembly Debates (25 November 1949)
29 [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 520 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
19. Justice Krishna Iyer in his concurring opinion in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas30 called the Constitution “a great social document, almost revolutionary in its aim of transforming a medieval, hierarchical society into a modern, egalitarian democracy”. In Indian Medical Association v. Union of India,31 the Court held that “various aspects of social justice, and an egalitarian social order, were also inscribed, not as exceptions to the formal content of equality but as intrinsic, vital and necessary components of the basic equality code itself”.
20. This Court held in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India32 that the “vision of the founding fathers was enriched by the histories of suffering of those who suffered oppression and a violation of dignity both here and elsewhere”. One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) authored the plurality opinion, holding that the interpretation of the Constitution must keep evolving to facilitate justice for the citizens.
21. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, 33 the Court while dealing with the validity of a colonial provision (Section 377 of the Penal Code), held that the Constitution envisages that “every person enjoys equal rights which enable him/her to grow and realize his/her potential as an individual”. 34 The Court also acknowledged that “throughout history, socio-cultural revolts, anti-discrimination assertions, movements, literature and leaders have worked at socializing people away from supremacist thought and towards an egalitarian existence.” 35 In that backdrop, the Indian Constitution “was an attempt to reverse the socializing of prejudice, discrimination, and power hegemony in a disjointed society”. 36
22. The Court, in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala,37 described the anti-caste vision of the Constitution. One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) wrote a concurring opinion, noting that: 30 [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310 31 [2011] 6 SCR 599 : (2011) 6 SCALE 86 32 [2015] 9 SCR 99 : (2017) 10 SCC 1 33 [2018] 7 SCR 379 : 2018 INSC 790 34 Ibid [Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Khanwilkar] 35 Ibid [Justice Chandrachud] 36 Ibid 37 [2018] 9 SCR 561 : (2019) 11 SCC 1 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 521Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. “Besides the struggle for independence from the British rule, there was another struggle going on since centuries and which still continues. That struggle has been for social emancipation. It has been the struggle for the replacement of an unequal social order. It has been a fight for undoing historical injustices and for righting fundamental wrongs with fundamental rights. The Constitution of India is the end product of both these struggles. It is the foundational document, which in text and spirit, aims at social transformation, namely, the creation and preservation of an equal social order. The Constitution represents the aspirations of those, who were denied the basic ingredients of a dignified existence. It contains a vision of social justice and lays down a roadmap for successive governments to achieve that vision. The document sets out a moral trajectory, which citizens must pursue for the realisation of the values of liberty, equality, fraternity and justice. It is an assurance to the marginalised to be able to rise to the challenges of human existence...”
The Court emphasized the need to scrutinize social practices to keep them in consonance with the egalitarian values of the Constitution: “The Constitution embodies a vision of social transformation. It represents a break from history marked by the indignation and discrimination attached to certain identities and serves as a bridge to a vision of a just and equal citizenship. In a deeply divided society marked by intermixing identities such as religion, race, caste, sex and personal characteristics as the sites of discrimination and oppression, the Constitution marks a perception of a new social order. This social order places the dignity of every individual at the heart of its endeavours… Existing structures of social discrimination must be evaluated through the prism of constitutional morality. The effect and endeavour is to produce a society marked by compassion for every individual.”
(emphasis added)
23. The Constitution thus stands as a testament to the fight against historical injustices and for the establishment of an egalitarian 522 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports social order. It aims to prevent caste-based discrimination. This commitment is not limited to preventing discriminatory actions by the State alone. It extends to the actions of citizens and private entities as well. It empowers the State to enact appropriate legislation or take executive measures to tackle caste-based discrimination. At the same time, it mandates the decision-makers to take every step to end discrimination in Indian society. The pervasive influence of caste necessitates continuous efforts to ensure equality and justice for all citizens. The manifestations of caste are too numerous to exhaustively enumerate. 38 They can manifest in various forms and across different sectors of society, from education and employment to social interactions and access to resources. As has been observed: “Continued to be attributed typically to the rural hinterlands and assumed to be limited only to the discussions on reservation policy and electoral politics, caste has mutated and diversified during the past three decades. Today, its presence is visible in urban housing, its markets and businesses, higher educational institutions, and public sector offices as well as the private sector working spaces, which were projected to be secular and privilege class over caste, and the various socio-economic and political institutions that interface with everyday lived experiences.” 39 The fight against caste-based discrimination is not a battle that can be won overnight; it requires sustained effort, dedication, and the willingness to confront and challenge societal norms that perpetuate inequality. When faced with practices of caste-based discrimination, this Court must take an active stand. In entertaining the current petition, this Court is making its contribution to the ongoing struggle to dismantle caste-based discrimination.
24. Based on this constitutional philosophy, we shall now refer to constitutional provisions under which the impugned provisions have been challenged.
38 Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, Penguin Random House (2020), p. 167 39 Rahul Choragudi, et al, Caste Matters in Public Policy: Issues and Perspectives, Routledge (2024), Reprint, p. 2 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 523Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. V. The Contours of Article 14
25. Article 14 guarantees that the “State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” Equality is a crucial aspect of the constitutional vision. Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, this Court laid down the standard to test the validity of laws against Article
14. In a Constitution Bench decision in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 40 Justice B.K. Mukherjea articulated that a classification under Article 14 “should never be arbitrary”. It was held that such classification must always “rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made”. If a classification is “made without any substantial basis”, it should be “regarded as invalid”. The principle of classification was reiterated in a subsequent Constitution Bench decision in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara. 41
26. Later, a seven-judge Bench decision in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar42 solidified the requirement of the twin test under Article 14. Speaking for the Court, Justice S.R. Das held: “In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia, which is the basis of the classification, and the object of the act are distinct things, and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while the Article forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, 40 [1950] SCR 869
41 1951 SCR 682
42 [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1 524 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained..”
27. Adding to the above principles, Justice S.R. Das, in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, 43 held that the classification “may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like”, but it needs to have a reasonable nexus with the object of the statute. It was held that “Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure”. Furthermore, the Court “may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation”. The Court further reiterated that:
“A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination…”
28. Subsequently, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 44 a Constitution Bench of this Court added a crucial principle of nonarbitrariness to the discourse of equality under Article 14. The Court was adjudicating the validity of an administrative order. The Court held that:
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14…”
43 [1959] SCR 279 44 [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 525Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors.
29. The principle of non-arbitrariness and reasonableness was then emphasized in the seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.45 It was held:
“Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.”
30. To test the validity of laws, the twin test of intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus held ground. Whether the test of arbitrariness is a valid principle under Article 14 led to a conflicting set of decisions.46 In Shayara Bano v. Union of India,47 in testing the validity of Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 which validates the triple talaq, Justice R.F. Nariman endorsed the test of manifest arbitrariness. It was held:
“The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article
14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/ or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”
45 [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248 46 The conflicting judgments have been summarized in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 47 [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 526 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
31. A formalistic understanding of the classification test was then critiqued by this Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.48 The Court was dealing with a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Act, 1860, to the extent that it criminalized consensual sexual conduct between adults. In his concurring opinion, one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) held:
“Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of a classification on which a law is based advances the cause of legal formalism. The problem with the classification test is that what constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced to a mere formula: the quest for an intelligible differentia and the rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In doing so, the test of classification risks elevating form over substance. The danger inherent in legal formalism lies in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide the process of judging constitutional rights. Legal formalism buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful statement of values—of the substance of equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. To reduce it to a formal exercise of classification may miss the true value of equality as a safeguard against arbitrariness in State action. As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved towards recognising the substantive content of liberty and equality, the core of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of classification. Article 14 has a substantive content on which, together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of human endeavour and in every facet of human existence.”
The judges declared that Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary. The doctrine of manifest arbitrariness was also adopted in the Constitution Bench decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.49 48 [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1
49 (2019) 3 SCC 39
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 527Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors.
32. Referring to the decisions in Shayara Bano, Navtej Johar, and Joseph Shine, a Constitution Bench in Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) v. Union of India50 summarized the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness in the following words:
“Courts while testing the validity of a law on the ground of manifest arbitrariness have to determine if the statute is capricious, irrational and without adequate determining principle, or something which is excessive and disproportionate. This Court has applied the standard of “manifest arbitrariness” in the following manner:
a. A provision lacks an “adequate determining principle” if the purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values. In applying this standard, Courts must make a distinction between the “ostensible purpose”, that is, the purpose which is claimed by the State and the “real purpose”, the purpose identified by Courts based on the available material such as a reading of the provision; and b. A provision is manifestly arbitrary even if the provision does not make a classification.”
The Constitution Bench further elucidated the standards of manifest arbitrariness to test the validity of a plenary legislation with those of subordinate legislation:
“The above discussion shows that manifest arbitrariness of a subordinate legislation has to be primarily tested visa-vis its conformity with the parent statute. Therefore, in situations where a subordinate legislation is challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness, this Court will proceed to determine whether the delegate has failed “to take into account very vital facts which either expressly or by necessary implication are required to be taken into consideration by the statute or, say, the Constitution.” In contrast, application of manifest arbitrariness to a plenary legislation passed by a competent legislation requires 50 [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024 INSC 113 528 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the Court to adopt a different standard because it carries greater immunity than a subordinate legislation. We concur with Shayara Bano (supra) that a legislative action can also be tested for being manifestly arbitrary. However, we wish to clarify that there is, and ought to be, a distinction between plenary legislation and subordinate legislation when they are challenged for being manifestly arbitrary.”
33. The Court recently in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh51 dealt with whether sub-classification among the Scheduled Castes is permissible under Article 14. The seven-judge bench reiterated that the State is allowed to classify in a manner that is not discriminatory. The Court summarized the twin-test of classification as follows:
“The Constitution permits valid classification if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from others left out of the group. The phrase “intelligible differentia” means difference capable of being understood. The difference is capable of being understood when there is a yardstick to differentiate the class included and others excluded from the group. In the absence of the yardstick, the differentiation would be without a basis and hence, unreasonable. The basis of classification must be deducible from the provisions of the statute; surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge. In making the classification, the State is free to recognize degrees of harm. Though the classification need not be mathematical in precision, there must be some difference between the persons grouped and the persons left out, and the difference must be real and pertinent. The classification is unreasonable if there is “little or no difference”. Second, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law, that is, the basis of classification must have a nexus with the object of the classification.”
34. The constitutional standards laid down by the Court under Article 14 can be summarized as follows. First, the Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus
51 2024 INSC 652
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 529Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. with the object sought. Second, the classification test cannot be merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion. A challenge under Article 14 has to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an individual. Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary, i.e. courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something which is excessive and disproportionate. In applying this constitutional standard, courts must identify the “real purpose” of the statute rather than the “ostensible purpose” presented by the State, as summarized in ADR. Fourth, a provision can be found manifestly arbitrary even if it does not make a classification. Fifth, different constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity of legislation as compared to subordinate legislation.
VI. Non-Discrimination under Article 15
35. Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 15 provide that:
“Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.—
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.”
Article 15(1) imposes an enforceable obligation on the State to not discriminate against citizens on any of several grounds, including “caste”. If the State itself discriminates against a citizen under any of the mentioned grounds, then it is discrimination of the highest form. After all, the State is expected to prevent discrimination, not 530 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports perpetuate it. That is why our Constitution prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen. Besides, Article 15(2) was adopted to specifically prohibit the discrimination faced by certain marginalized communities in accessing public services and resources. Historically, the so-called untouchable community was not allowed to use public resources such as water tanks and wells. This provision has a unique imprint of Dr Ambedkar, as he consistently advocated for such a provision for decades.52 Not only does Article 15(2) prohibit the State from discriminating, it also restricts the citizens or private entities from discriminating against other citizens on the grounds mentioned therein.
36. Discrimination is prohibited, because it has several repercussions on human lives. Discrimination arises due to a feeling of superiority/ inferiority, bias, contempt, or hatred against a person or a group. In history, such feelings have led to the genocide of certain communities. Discrimination also lowers the self-esteem of the person being discriminated against. It can lead to unfair denial of opportunities and constant violence against a set of people. Discrimination can also be done by continuously ridiculing or humiliating someone, who is on the weaker side of the social spectrum. It can cause trauma to a person with which they may be affected their entire life. Discrimination also includes stigmatizing the identity or existence of a marginalized social group. Discrimination can also happen based on certain stereotypes against a marginalized group. As a society that divided people into a hierarchy, we must remain conscious of the forms and kinds of discrimination against marginalized groups. Discriminatory laws enacted before the Constitution of India came into force need to be scrutinized and done away with.
37. In India, there have been several instances of laws being enacted based on certain stereotypes against certain groups of people. Our citizens have brought challenges before the constitutional courts against the validity of such laws. In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India,53 the validity of Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 was challenged. The provision prohibited the employment of women and men under the age of 25 years in premises where liquor or other intoxicating drugs were consumed by the public. In adjudicating the 52 Anurag Bhaskar, The Foresighted Ambedkar: Ideas that Shaped Indian Constitutional Discourse, Penguin (2024), pp. 68-87.
53 [2007] 12 SCR 991 : (2008) 3 SCC 1 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 531Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. case, this Court applied the principle that “[l]egislation should not be only assessed on its proposed aims but rather on the implications and the effects”. It struck down the provision, holding that it “suffers from incurable fixations of stereotype morality and conception of sexual role.” It was held that “[n]o law in its ultimate effect should end up perpetuating the oppression of women”.
38. In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 54 this Court recognised hijras, eunuchs, apart from binary gender, as “third gender” and extended the protection of Articles 15 and 16 to them. It was held that discrimination on the ground of “sex” under Articles 15 and 16 includes “discrimination on the ground of gender identity”. The Court declared that the expression “sex” used in Articles 15 and 16 “is not just limited to the biological sex of male or female, but intended to include people who consider themselves to be neither male or female.” This Court concluded that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity includes any discrimination, exclusion, restriction or preference, which has the effect of nullifying or transposing equality by the law or the equal protection of laws guaranteed under our Constitution”.
39. However, the judgment of a two-judge bench in Rajbala v. State of Haryana55 rejected a challenge founded on the claim of discriminatory impact. A state legislation introduced conditions to contest panchayati elections, as a result of which, a significant section of Scheduled Castes was debarred from contesting elections. The Bench held that a statute cannot be held unconstitutional on the ground that it is “arbitrary”. The Court held, “If it is constitutionally permissible to debar certain classes of people from seeking to occupy the constitutional offices, numerical dimension of such classes, in our opinion should make no difference for determining whether prescription of such disqualification is constitutionally permissible unless the prescription is of such nature as would frustrate the constitutional scheme by resulting in a situation where holding of elections to these various bodies becomes completely impossible”. However, this reasoning prima facie is contrary to the decisions in Shayara Bano, Navtej Singh Johar, and Joseph Shine, which upheld manifest arbitrariness as a ground to strike down a law. At the same time, the impact of 54 [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 438 55 [2015] 12 SCR 1106 : 2015 INSC 912 532 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the law on the Scheduled Caste population is an example of “indirect discrimination”, a constitutional test which has been applied by the Court in subsequent decisions.
40. In Karma Dorjee v. Union of India,56 the Court emphasized that “[t]he Governments, both at the centre and the states have a nonnegotiable obligation to take positive steps to give effect to India’s commitment to racial equality”. The Court was hearing a public interest petition seeking guidelines to be set down to curb acts of discrimination against persons from the north-eastern states. It directed the Union Government to take “proactive steps to monitor the redressal of issues pertaining to racial discrimination faced by citizens of the nation drawn from the north-east”.
41. A Constitution Bench in Navtej Singh Johar57 gave a broader interpretation to Article 15, while striking down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as it decriminalizes homosexual intercourse amongst consenting adults, on the ground that it was discriminatory. In a concurring opinion written by one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud), it was held that discrimination, whether direct or indirect, “founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex” is prohibited by Article 15. The Court held, “If certain characteristics grounded in stereotypes, are to be associated with entire classes of people constituted as groups by any of the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1), that cannot establish a permissible reason to discriminate.” It was further held that a provision challenged as being ultra vires the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds only of sex under Article 15(1) “is to be assessed not by the objects of the State in enacting it, but by the effect that the provision has on affected individuals and on their fundamental rights”. The Court discussed the principle that even if the law or action by the State is facially neutral, it “may have a disproportionate impact upon a particular class”. Though facially neutral, the effect of Section 377 was seen to target members of the LGBTQIA+ community.
42. Another Constitution Bench in Joseph Shine58 struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which related to adultery. It was held 56 [2016] 9 SCR 968 : (2017) 1 SCC 799 57 [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1
58 (2019) 3 SCC 39
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 533Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. that the premise of “Section 497 is a gender stereotype that the infidelity of men is normal, but that of a woman is impermissible”, and hence, it violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15. The provision, the Court held, “builds on existing gender stereotypes and bias and further perpetuates them”, by giving “legal recognition to socially discriminatory and gender-based norms”. The Court held that a “provision of law must not be viewed as operating in isolation from the social, political, historical and cultural contexts in which it operates”.
43. In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala59 , this Court dealt with the validity of a rule excluding menstruating women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entry in a temple in Kerala, based upon a custom. In his concurring opinion, Justice Nariman held that the said rule is hit by Article 15(1), as it “discriminates against women on the basis of their sex only”. One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) who was also a part of the judgment held, “Exclusion of women between the age groups of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity”.
44. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya,60 a two-judge Bench upheld the claims of women engaged on Short Service Commissions in the Army to seek parity with their male counterparts in obtaining Permanent Commissions. It was held that “Arguments founded on the physical strengths and weaknesses of men and women and on assumptions about women in the social context of marriage and family do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers.” The Court gave several directions to the Union Government to grant Permanent Commission to women officers in the Army and consequential benefits.
45. The issue of Permanent Commissions to women officers once again came before the Court in Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India.61 The petitioners challenged the evaluation criteria applied by the Army as unjust and arbitrary as “the women officers who are in the age group of 40-50 years of age are being required to conform to the 59 [2018] 9 SCR 561 : 2018 INSC 908 60 [2020] 3 SCR 833 : 2020 INSC 198 61 [2021] 4 SCR 633 : (2021) 15 SCC 125 534 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports medical standards that a male officer would have to conform to at the age of 25 to 30 years, among other factors”. In deciding the case, the Court discussed the principles of substantive equality, indirect discrimination, and anti-stereotyping under Articles 14 and 15(1). The Court defined indirect discrimination as follows:
“We must clarify here that the use of the term ‘indirect discrimination’ is not to refer to discrimination which is remote, but is, instead, as real as any other form of discrimination. Indirect discrimination is caused by facially neutral criteria by not taking into consideration the underlying effects of a provision, practice or a criterion.” The Court distinguished between direct and indirect discrimination in the following formulation:
“… as long as a court’s focus is on the mental state underlying the impugned action that is allegedly discriminatory, we are in the territory of direct discrimination. However, when the focus switches to the effects of the concerned action, we enter the territory of indirect discrimination. An enquiry as to indirect discrimination looks, not at the form of the impugned conduct, but at its consequences. In a case of direct discrimination, the judicial enquiry is confined to the act or conduct at issue, abstracted from the social setting or background fact-situation in which the act or conduct takes place. In indirect discrimination, on the other hand, the subject matter of the enquiry is the institutional or societal framework within which the impugned conduct occurs. The doctrine seeks to broaden the scope of antidiscrimination law to equip the law to remedy patterns of discrimination that are not as easily discernible.”
The Court however held that “[i]n order to conceptualize substantive equality, it would be apposite to conduct a systemic analysis of discrimination that combines tools of direct and indirect discrimination”, and not just the claim of either of the two. To evaluate the claim of discrimination, the Court laid down the following test: “A particular discriminatory practice or provision might often be insufficient to expose the entire gamut of discrimination that a particular structure may perpetuate. Exclusive reliance on tools of direct or indirect discrimination may [2024] 10 S.C.R. 535Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. also not effectively account for patterns arising out of multiple axles of discrimination. Therefore, a systemic view of discrimination, in perceiving discriminatory disadvantage as a continuum, would account for not just unjust action but also inaction. Structures, in the form of organizations or otherwise, would be probed for the systems or cultures they produce that influence day-today interaction and decision-making. The duty of constitutional courts, when confronted with such a scheme of things, would not just be to strike down the discriminatory practices and compensate for the harm hitherto arising out of them; but also structure adequate reliefs and remedies that facilitate social redistribution by providing for positive entitlements that aim to negate the scope of future harm… Therefore, an analysis of discrimination, with a view towards its systemic manifestations (direct and indirect), would be best suited for achieving our constitutional vision of equality and antidiscrimination. Systemic discrimination on account of gender at the workplace would then encapsulate the patriarchal disadvantage that permeates all aspects of her being from the outset, including reproduction, sexuality and private choices which operate within an unjust structure.” Applying the above principles, the Court concluded that the process adopted by the Army to grant Permanent Commissions to women officers “did not redress the harms of gendered discrimination that were identified by this Court in Babita Puniya”. The Court found the evaluation process to be an instance of “indirect discrimination” and “systemic discrimination”, which “disproportionately affects women”. “This discrimination”, it was held, “has caused an economic and psychological harm and an affront to their dignity”.
46. The petitioner in Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India (P) Ltd,62 was aggrieved by the manner in which persons with disabilities have been portrayed in a movie and approached the Court seeking directions for the inclusion of an expert on disability within the Central Board of Film Certification and its advisory panel constituted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Cinematograph Act, among other reliefs. 62 [2024] 7 SCR 246 : 2024 INSC 465 536 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports This Court recapitulated “the impact of stereotypes on discrimination and the enjoyment of fundamental rights”. It reiterated that the antidiscrimination code under Article 15 prevents stereotyping. Regarding the safeguards against stereotyping of persons with disabilities, the Court held:
“… language that disparages persons with disabilities, marginalises them further and supplements the disabling barriers in their social participation, without the redeeming quality of the overall message of such portrayal must be approached with caution. Such representation is problematic not because it offends subjective feelings but rather, because it impairs the objective societal treatment of the affected groups by society. We believe that representation of persons with disabilities must regard the objective social context of their representation and not marginalise persons with disability…”
47. The jurisprudence evolved by this Court shows that discriminatory laws have no place in our democracy. Discriminatory laws based on stereotypes against a social group were stuck down in judgments like Anuj Garg, Navtej Johar, Joseph Shine, and Indian Young Lawyers Association. Through judgments like NALSA and Babita Puniya, this Court recognized the dignity and aspirations of social groups which have traditionally faced exclusion from equal rights. This Court recognized indirect discrimination and systemic discrimination in Lt. Col. Nitisha, emphasized the responsibility of the State to curb discrimination in Karma Dorjee, and provided safeguards against discriminatory stereotypes in Nipun Malhotra.
48. Based on the analysis of the judgments, certain anti-discrimination principles emerge under Article 15(1). First, discrimination can be either direct or indirect, or both. Second, facially neutral laws may have an adverse impact on certain social groups, that are marginalized. Third, stereotypes can further discrimination against a marginalized social group. Fourth, the State is under a positive obligation to prevent discrimination against a marginalized social group. Fifth, discriminatory laws based on stereotypes and causing harm or disadvantage against a social group, directly or indirectly, are not permissible under the constitutional scheme. Sixth, courts are required to examine the claims of indirect discrimination and [2024] 10 S.C.R. 537Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. systemic discrimination; and seventh, the test to examine indirect discrimination and systemic discrimination has been laid down in judgments of the Court such as Lt. Col. Nitisha.
VII. The Ban on Untouchability in Article 17
49. Article 17 of the Constitution provides that: ““Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.” This provision has a special place in the Constitution. It puts an end to the socially discriminatory practice of “untouchability”.
50. Dr Ambedkar described the impact of “untouchability” as follows: “The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well-being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights… The untouchable is not even a citizen.”63 Untouchability and caste discrimination led to “severe social and economic disabilities and cultural and educational backwardness” of the untouchables. 64 Throughout history, “the oppressive nature of the caste structure has denied to those disadvantaged castes the fundamentals of human dignity, human self-respect and even some of the attributes of the human personality”. 65 As a system, it enforced “disabilities, restrictions, conditions and prohibitions on Dalits for access to and the use of places of public resort, public means, roads, temples, water sources, tanks, bathing ghats, etc., entry into educational institutions or pursuits of avocation or profession which are open to all and by reason of birth they suffer from social stigma.” 66 Article 17 is a constitutional sanction against discrimination. It “strikes at caste-based practices built on superstitions and beliefs that have no rationale or logic.”67 63 B.R. Ambedkar, “Evidence Before the Southborough Committee”, in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 256 64 Soosai v. Union of India, 1985 Supp SCC 590 65 Ibid 66 State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale (1995) Supp 4 SCC 469 67 Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2016) 2 SCC 725 538 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
51. Article 17 has several components. 68 It abolishes the practice of “untouchability”. At the same time, it prohibits “its practice in any form”. Furthermore, “enforcement of any disability” arising out of “Untouchability” is a criminal offense as per the “law”. The meaning of “law” is any legislation enacted to tackle any practice or disability arising out of “untouchability”. 69 It is a provision that can be implemented both against the State and non-state actors such as the citizens. 70 Moreover, the framers of the Constitution did not refer to any religion or community in the text of the provision.71 “The injunction against untouchability under Article 17” is further “strengthened by taking away the subject-matter from State domain and placing it as an exclusive legislative head to Parliament.” 72
52. In his concurring opinion in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale,73 Justice K. Ramaswamy discussed the basis of Article 17. “The thrust of Article 17”, it was held, “is to liberate the society from blind and ritualistic adherence and traditional beliefs which lost all legal or moral base”. Furthermore, Article 17 “seeks to establish a new ideal for society — equality to the Dalits, on a par with general public”, which would give them “a sense of being a participant in the mainstream of national life”. 74
53. The constitutional vision behind Article 17 and its impact was extensively discussed in the concurring opinion authored by one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala. 75 It was held that Article 17 was made a part of fundamental rights to fulfil the constitutional mandate of equality: “Article 17 is the constitutional promise of equality and justice to those who have remained at the lowest rung of a traditional belief system founded in graded inequality… It has been placed on a constitutional pedestal of enforceable 68 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1 [Justice Chandrachud] 69 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 70 Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1 71 Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1 [Dissenting opinion of Justice Ravindra Bhat on behalf of Chief Justice Lalit and himself] 72 Ibid 73 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 284 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1762 74 1994 SCC (Cri) 1762 75 [2018] 9 SCR 561 : (2019) 11 SCC 1 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 539Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. fundamental rights, beyond being only a directive principle, for two reasons. First, “untouchability” is violative of the basic rights of socially backward individuals and their dignity. Second, the Framers believed that the abolition of “untouchability” is a constitutional imperative to establish an equal social order. Its presence together and on an equal footing with other fundamental rights, was designed to “give vulnerable people the power to achieve collective good”. Article 17 is a reflection of the transformative ideal of the Constitution, which gives expression to the aspirations of socially disempowered individuals and communities, and provides a moral framework for radical social transformation.”
The judgment stated that “untouchability” is “a symptom” of the “caste system” and the interconnected notions of “purity and pollution”, which are rejected by Article 17. It was noted:
“While the top of the caste pyramid is considered pure and enjoys entitlements, the bottom is considered polluted and has no entitlements. Ideas of “purity and pollution” are used to justify this distinction which is self-perpetuality. The [so-called] upper castes perform rituals that, they believe, assert and maintain their purity over lower castes. Rules of purity and pollution are used to reinforce caste hierarchies. The notion of “purity and pollution” influences who people associate with, and how they treat and are treated by other people.”
Article 17 rejects such notions of purity and pollution. It strikes at the heart of the caste system, which manifests in discriminatory practices based on the notions of purity and pollution. It was further held: “The incorporation of Article 17 into the Constitution is symbolic of valuing the centuries’ old struggle of social reformers and revolutionaries. It is a move by the Constitution makers to find catharsis in the face of historic horrors. It is an attempt to make reparations to those, whose identity was subjugated by society. Article 17 is a revolt against social norms, which subjugated individuals into stigmatised hierarchies. By abolishing “untouchability”, Article 17 protects them from a repetition of history in 540 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a free nation. The background of Article 17 thus lies in protecting the dignity of those who have been victims of discrimination, prejudice and social exclusion. Article 17 must be construed from the perspective of its position as a powerful guarantee to preserve human dignity and against the stigmatization and exclusion of individuals and groups on the basis of social hierarchism.”
The concurring opinion examined the Constituent Assembly Debates to conclude that the framers deliberately left the term “untouchability” in Article 17 undefined, as they wanted to give the provision a broad scope:
“The Constitution has carefully eschewed a definition of “untouchability”. The draftspersons realised that even a broadly couched definition may be restrictive.
A definition would become restrictive if the words used or the instances depicted are not adequate to cover the manifold complexities of our social life through which prejudice and discrimination is manifest. Hence, even though the attention of the Framers was drawn to the fact that “untouchability” is not a practice referable only to the lowest in the caste ordering but also was practised against women (and in the absence of a definition, the prohibition would cover all its forms), the expression was designedly left undefined… The Constitution as a constantly evolving instrument has to be flexible to reach out to injustice based on untouchability, in any of its forms or manifestations. Article 17 is a powerful guarantee against exclusion. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, it cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution.”
Article 17 was interpreted broadly to declare that the practice of excluding menstruating women from visiting the temple is based on the notions of purity and pollution, which arise from the caste system, and the practice was thus unconstitutional.
54. Article 17 enunciates that everyone is born equal. There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person. By way of Article 17, our Constitution strengthens the [2024] 10 S.C.R. 541Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. equality of status of every citizen. From time to time, to implement the mandate of Article 17, Parliament has enacted several legislations such as the Untouchability (Offenses) Act, 1955 (later renamed as Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955), Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter “PoA Act”), Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993, and Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013. This Court, in a number of cases, has upheld the validity of these laws. 76 It has held that offences enumerated under PoA Act “arise out of the practice of ‘untouchability’.” 77 The Court also held that the practice of “manual scavenging” prohibited under the 2013 Act is “squarely rooted in the concept of the caste-system and untouchability.” 78 The laws enacted under Article 17 aim to provide dignity to the affected individuals.
VIII. Article 21: Of Life and Dignity
55. Article 21 provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”. In a number of judgments, the Court has expanded the meaning of “life”. It has been held that the right to life enshrined in Article 21 “cannot be restricted to mere animal existence” and “means something much more than just physical survival”. 79 It includes the right to live with dignity. 80 In fact, dignity forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.81 The “references” to dignity are “found in the guarantee against arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21).” 82 Thus, dignity is the “core” which “unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity 76 State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia (1995) 3 SCC 221; State of Maharashtra v. Union of India; Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (2020) 4 SCC 727 77 State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia (1995) 3 SCC 221 78 Safai Karamchari Andalon v. Union of India [2014] 4 SCR 197; See also Balram Singh v. Union of India,
2023 INSC 950
79 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 80 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 81 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 82 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Privacy-9J.) 542 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of existence”. 83 In that sense, human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal. 84
56. The Court has authoritatively ruled, “[t]o live is to live with dignity”. 85 Human dignity is intrinsic to and inseparable from human existence.86 Implicit in this right under Article 21 is “the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”. 87 There also exists “a close relationship between dignity and the quality of life”.88 Dignity of human existence is fully realized only when one leads a quality life. 89
57. Dignity under Article 21 is an integral aspect of life, which requires sustenance of one’s being to the fullest.90 One can truly embrace their identity, whether on the basis of caste, race, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, only if they are given dignity. An individual’s dignity is fundamental to their sense of self and autonomy. Thus, the right to dignity “encapsulates the right of every individual to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value”. 91 Above all, “there is a growing recognition that the true measure of development of a nation is not economic growth; it is human dignity.”92 A nation must prioritize human dignity—ensuring that every person, regardless of their background or identity, is able to live with respect, equality, and freedom. Thus, human dignity forms the bedrock of social justice and a just, compassionate society.
58. The right to live with dignity extends even to the incarcerated. Not providing dignity to prisoners is a relic of the colonizers and precolonial mechanisms, where oppressive systems were designed to dehumanize and degrade those under the control of the State. Authoritarian regimes of the pre-constitutional era saw prisons not only as places of confinement but as tools of domination. This Court, focusing on the changed legal framework brought out by the 83 Ibid 84 Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761 85 Ibid 86 M. Nagaraj v. Union of India [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 87 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 88 Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1 [Justice Chandrachud] 89 Ibid 90 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 91 X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 9 SCC 433 92 National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 543Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Constitution, has recognized that even prisoners are entitled to the right to dignity.
59. A Constitution bench of this Court in Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration93 took serious note of the treatment meted out to undertrials, convicts, and those awaiting the death penalty. Justice Krishna Iyer, in his opinion, expounded: “The humane thread of jail jurisprudence that runs right through is that no prison authority enjoys amnesty for unconstitutionality, and forced farewell to fundamental rights is an institutional outrage in our system where stone walls and iron bars shall bow before the rule of law.” He emphasized the need to re-look at the prison conditions:
“A prison is a sound-proof planet, walled from view and visits regulated, and so, rights of prisoners are hardly visible, checking is more difficult and the official position of the repository of power inspires little credibility where the victims can be political protesters, unpopular figures, minority champions or artless folk who might fail to propitiate arrogant power of minor minions.”
Justice Krishna Iyer advocated for a humane system within prisons: “In every country, this transformation from cruelty to compassion within jails has found resistance from the echelons and the Great Divide between pre-and-post Constitution penology has yet to get into the metabolism of the Prison Services. And so, on the national agenda of prison reform is on-going education for prison staff, humanisation of the profession and recognition of the human rights of the human beings in their keep.”
The Court admonished the usage of iron fetters and held that the practice of solitary confinement and cellular segregation as inhuman and irrational:
“I hold that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like whipping, must vanish. Civilised consciousness is hostile to torture within the walled campus. We hold that solitary confinement, cellular segregation and marginally modified 93 [1979] 1 SCR 392 : (1978) 4 SCC 494 544 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports editions of the same process are inhuman and irrational. More dangerous are these expedients when imposed by the unturned and untrained power of a jail superior who has, as part of his professional equipment, no course in human psychology, stressology or physiology, who has to depend on no medical or psychiatric examination prior to infliction of irons or solitary, who has no obligation to hear the victim before harming him, whose “reasons” are in English on the history-tickets and therefore unknowable and in the Journal to which the prisoner has no access… The law is not abracadabra but at once pragmatic and astute and does not surrender its power before scary exaggerations of security by prison bosses... Social justice cannot sleep if the Constitution hangs limp where its consumers most need its humanism.”
60. In Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail, 94 this Court upheld the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of prisoners against the undue harshness of prison practices. Justice Krishna Iyer observed: “a prison system may make rational distinctions in making assignments to inmates of vocational, educational and work opportunities available, but is constitutionally impermissible to do so without a functional classification system. The mere fact that a prisoner is poor or rich, high-born or illbred, is certainly irrational as a differentia in a ‘secular, socialist republic’... The reason is, prisoners retain all rights enjoyed by free citizens except those lost necessarily as an incident of confinement. Moreover, the rights enjoyed by prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21, though limited, are not static and will rise to human heights when challenging situations arise.”
61. In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration,95 this Court emphasized that a person in prison does not cease to be a human being or lose all human rights, and that it is the duty of the State to take care of justifiable needs and requests. It was held that “in the eye of law, prisoners are persons, not animals”, and that courts must “punish 94 [1979] 1 SCR 512 : (1978) 4 SCC 104
95 (1980) 3 SCC 488
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 545Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. the deviant ‘guardians’ of the prison system where they go berserk and defile the dignity of the human inmate”. Speaking for the Court, Justice Krishna Iyer held:
“Prison houses are part of Indian earth and the Indian Constitution cannot be held at bay by jail officials “dressed in a little, brief authority”, when Part III is invoked by a convict. For when a prisoner is traumatized, the Constitution suffers a shock… Whether inside prison or outside, a person shall not be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save by methods “right, just and fair”… Prisoners are peculiarly and doubly handicapped. For one thing, most prisoners belong to the weaker segment, in poverty, literacy, social station and the like. Secondly, the prison house is a walled-off world which is incommunicado for the human world, with the result that the bonded inmates are invisible, their voices inaudible, their injustices unheeded. So it is imperative, as implicit in Article 21, that life or liberty, shall not be kept in suspended animation or congealed into animal existence without the freshening flow of fair procedure.”
The Court also noted down various injustices which may be committed against a prisoner:
“Inflictions may take many protean forms, apart from physical assaults. Pushing the prisoner into a solitary cell, denial of a necessary amenity, and, more dreadful sometimes, transfer to a distant prison where visits or society of friends or relations may be snapped, allotment of degrading labour, assigning him to a desperate or tough gang and the like, may be punitive in effect. Every such affliction or abridgment is an infraction of liberty or life in its wider sense and cannot be sustained unless Article 21 is satisfied.”
62. The Court in Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev v. State of Rajasthan96 reiterated that the infliction of physical torture on the undertrial prisoner 96 [1981] 1 SCR 995 : (1981) 1 SCC 503 546 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports is a violation of Article 21. It was held that “the State must re-educate the constabulary out of their sadistic arts and inculcate a respect for the human person — a process which must begin more by example than by precept if the lower rungs are really to emulate”. The Court ruled that if any escort policemen are found guilty of misconduct, the authorities must not allow a sense of police solidarity or internal camaraderie to shield the wrongdoing. There is no greater harm to our constitutional values than a State official acting recklessly and violating fundamental rights. The Court expressed hope that the root causes enabling police brutality will be addressed by the government with the seriousness it deserves. The Court posed the question: “Who will police the police?”
63. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,97 the Court struck down a rule which regulated the right of a detenu to have interviews with a legal adviser of his choice as violative of Articles 14 and 21. The Court held that “as part of the right to live with human dignity” and “as a necessary component of the right to life”, a detenu “would be entitled to have interviews with the members of his family and friends” and “to have interview with his legal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail”. Such appointment, it was held, “should be given by the Superintendent without any avoidable delay.” Correspondingly, when Sheela Barse, 98 a freelance journalist, sought permission to interview prisoners, this Court held that the press and citizens are entitled to interview prisoners in order to ensure the availability of their rights under Article 21, subject to reasonable restrictions. It was noted, “Prison administrators have the human tendency of attempting to cover up their lapses and so shun disclosure thereof… Interviews become necessary as otherwise the correct information may not be collected but such access has got to be controlled and regulated.”
64. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, 99 this Court emphasized “great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life”. 97 [1981] 2 SCR 516 : (1981) 1 SCC 608 98 Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1987) 4 SCC 373 99 [1993] 2 SCR 581 : (1993) 2 SCC 746 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 547Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. While confinement inherently restricts a person’s liberty, the limited freedom they retain becomes all the more valuable. The State has a strict duty of care in such situations, without exception. This Court declared that if a person in police custody is deprived of life, except according to the procedure established by law, the wrongdoer is held accountable, and the State is ultimately responsible.
65. This Court laid down guidelines on arrest and detention in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,100 while highlighting the constitutional violations caused due to custodial violence and deaths in police lockups. It noted, “If the functionaries of the Government become lawbreakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchism”. In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, 101 it was noted that a person in custody has “his basic human rights” and human dignity, and that the police officers cannot treat him in an inhuman manner. It was held that even “any treatment meted out to an accused while he is in custody which causes humiliation and mental trauma corrodes the concept of human dignity”.
66. In Shabnam v. Union of India,102 this Court elucidated the principle that human dignity should be preserved even when a prisoner is sentenced to death. The Court held, “the process/procedure from confirmation of death sentence by the highest court till the execution of the said sentence, the convict is to be treated with human dignity to the extent which is reasonable and permissible in law”. Similarly, in ‘X’ v. State of Maharashtra, 103 the Court while holding that “post conviction severe mental illness will be a mitigating factor” in commuting the death sentence, emphasized that the “right to dignity of an accused does not dry out with the Judges’ ink, rather, it subsists well beyond the prison gates and operates until his last breath”.
67. Thus, the jurisprudence which emerges on the rights of prisoners under Article 21 is that even the incarcerated have inherent dignity. They are to be treated in a humanely and without cruelty. Police 100 [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 284 : (1997) 1 SCC 416 101 [2012] 8 SCR 651 : (2012) 8 SCC 1 102 [2015] 8 SCR 289 : (2015) 6 SCC 702 103 [2019] 6 SCR 1 : (2019) 7 SCC 1 548 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports officers and prison officials cannot take any disproportionate measures against prisoners. The prison system must be considerate of the physical and mental health of prisoners. For instance, if a prisoner suffers from a disability, adequate steps have to be taken to ensure their dignity and to offer support.
IX. Article 23: Prohibition of Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
68. Article 23 provides that:
“Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.—
(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.”
Article 23(1) provides an enforceable fundamental right against social and economic exploitation. It aims to prohibit human trafficking, “begar”, and “other similar forms of forced labour”. Like Articles 15(2) and 17, it is enforceable both against the State and non-state actors. At the same time, the scope of the provision is wide, as it has left the term “begar” undefined, and supplemented by the phrase “other similar forms of forced labour”. The “other similar forms” can be many. The framers of the Constitution consciously left the terms undefined so that future interpretation is not restrictive.
69. Interestingly, the foundations of Article 23 were laid even prior to the discussions in the Constituent Assembly. In his work titled “States and Minorities” (1947),104 Dr Ambedkar conceptualized the interlinkages between one’s economic condition and their ability to exercise fundamental rights. He wrote, “The fear of starvation, the 104 B.R. Ambedkar, “States and Minorities”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 393, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/Volume1.pdf [See Article II, Section I, Clause 9]. [2024] 10 S.C.R. 549Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. fear of losing a house, the fear of losing savings if any, the fear of being compelled to take children away from school, the fear of having to be a burden on public charity, the fear of having to be burned or buried at public cost are factors too strong to permit a man to stand out for his Fundamental Rights.” 105 In his view, “The unemployed are thus compelled to relinquish their Fundamental Rights for the sake of securing the privilege to work and to subsist.” 106 Dr. Ambedkar proposed that the rights of individuals should be protected from exploitation by adopting a favourable constitutional framework. 107 The intellectual background of Article 23 lies in what Dr Ambedkar was explaining – to facilitate the citizens in exercising their fundamental rights. 108 Exploitative socio-economic practices can hinder the right to live a dignified life.
70. In adopting Article 23(1) in the Constitution, the framers were conscious of oppressive practices such as Slavery in the United States as well as domestic practices of exploiting labour of the Bahujan castes and poor sections of society.109 Several members of the Constituent Assembly, who came from the Scheduled Caste communities expressed their support for Article 23, as they believed that such a provision would prevent economic exploitation of their community. V.I. Muniswamy Pillai stated, “If there is any labour required for common purposes in the village, this most unfortunate fellow, the Harijan [Scheduled Caste], is always caught hold of to do all menial and inferior service.” 110 By the provision, he was confident that the country would be “elevating a community that has been outside the pale of society”. S. Nagappa gave examples of how “begar” was imposed on the Scheduled Castes:
“Sir, whenever cattle die; the owner of the cattle wants these poor Harijans to come and remove the dead cattle, remove the skins, tan them and make chappals and supply them free of cost. For this, what do they get?
105 Ibid, pp. 409-410 106 Ibid, p. 410 107 Ibid 108 Anurag Bhaskar, The Foresighted Ambedkar: Ideas That Shaped Indian Constitutional Discourse, Penguin (2024), pp. 176-191.
109 B. Shiva Rao, Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol. 5, pp. 249-257. 110 Constituent Assembly Debates (8 November 1948)
550 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Some food during festival days. Often, Sir, this forced labour is practised even by the government. For instance, if there is any murder, after the postmortem, the police force these people to remove the dead body and look to the other funeral processes. I am glad that hereafter this sort of forced labour will have no place. Then, Sir, this is practised in zamindaries also. For instance, if there is a marriage in the zamindar’s family, he will ask these poor people, especially the Harijans, to come and white wash his whole house, for which they will be given nothing except food for the day… … whenever the big zamindar’s lands are to be ploughed, immediately he will send word for these poor people, the Harijans, the previous day, and say: “All your services are confiscated for the whole of tomorrow; you will have to work throughout the day and night. No one should go to any other work.” In return, the zamindar will give one morsel of food to these poor fellows. Sir, this sort of forced labour is in practice in the 20th century in our so called civilised country.” 111 (emphasis added)
71. Another member from the Scheduled Caste community, H.J. Khandekar, expressed his happiness “to see in the Constitution that begar and forced labour are abolished and the curse on untouchables from whom the begar and forced labour were taken has gone”. 112 Raj Bahadur also gave examples how “begar” was practiced:
“I know how some of the Princes have indulged in their pomp and luxury, in their reckless life, at the expense of the ordinary man, how they have used the down-trodden labourers and dumb ignorant people for the sake of their pleasure. I know for instance how for duck shooting a very large number of people are roped in forcibly to stand all day long in mud and slush during cold chilly wintry days. I know how for the sake of their game and people have 111 Constituent Assembly Debates (3 December 1948)
112 Constituent Assembly Debates (21 November 1949)
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 551Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. been roped in large numbers for beating the lion so that the Princes may shoot it. I have also seen how poor people are employed for domestic and other kinds of labour, no matter whether they are ailing or some members of their family are ill. These people are paid nothing or paid very little for the labour extorted from them.”
He stated that Article 23 will free “downtrodden millions” from the handcuffs of exploitation. T.T. Krishnamachari said that “some form of forced labour does exist in practically all parts of India, call it ‘begar’ or anything like that and in my part of the country, the tenant often times is more or less a helot attached to the land and he has certain rights and those are contingent on his continuing to be a slave.”
72. While the framers did not define the term “begar”, they largely referred to those practices, where the workers were either unpaid or paid very little for their jobs. “Begar” or bonded labour was entrenched in India’s social system, against which Article 23 makes a blow. Over the years, this Court has taken a strict view against bonded labour in existence in society.
73. The Court in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India113 considered the scope of the terms “begar” and “forced labour” under Article 23(1). The Court entertained a letter as a writ petition, which sought compliance with the provisions of labour laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work of projects connected with the Asian Games. The petitioner contended that the labourers were also not paid their minimum daily wages, and were not provided with proper living conditions. The Court observed that the issue related to a “breach of a fundamental right” under Article 23.
74. The judgment noted that the framers of the Constitution adopted Article 23 to put an enforceable obligation on the State to end bonded labour, which was “the relic of feudal exploitative society” and “incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order”. It was further stated that the term “begar” is of Indian origin, referring loosely to “labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it”. The judgment held that the phrase “forced labour” is of wide amplitude and would cover instances “where 113 [1983] 1 SCR 456 : (1982) 3 SCC 235 552 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage”. “Forced labour” may manifest in many forms. It was held that labour provided as a result of any kind of force or compulsion would be counted as “forced labour” under Article 23(1). It was held:
“What Article 23 prohibits is “forced labour” that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide and “force” which would make such labour or service “forced labour” may arise in several ways. It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as “force” and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such “force”, it would be “forced labour”. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of helplessness and despair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than the minimum wage. He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him would be clearly “forced labour”. It was held that non-payment of minimum wage to workmen in the Asian Games project was a violation of their fundamental right under Article 23. The judgment also laid down an important constitutional principle that when fundamental rights such as under Articles 17 or 23 are violated by private individuals, then “it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take necessary steps for the purpose of [2024] 10 S.C.R. 553Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. interdicting such violation and ensuring observance of the fundamental right by the private individual who is transgressing the same”.
75. The interpretation of Article 23 laid down in PUDR was relied upon in a subsequent decision in Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan. 114 A writ petition was filed seeking payment of minimum wages to women workers belonging to Scheduled Castes, who were engaged in a construction project of the Rajasthan government, under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. It was argued by the State government that the construction project was a famine relief work, and payment of minimum wages in such projects was exempted by the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption Act from Labour Law) Act, 1964. The Court declared the Exemption Act, in so far as it excluded the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 to workmen employed on famine relief work and permitted the payment of less than the minimum wage to such workmen as violative of Article 23. It was held:
“The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons and extract labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage. No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions. The State cannot under the guise of helping these affected persons extract work of utility and value from them without paying them the minimum wage.”
Justice Pathak wrote a concurring opinion, holding the Exemption Act to be violative of Article 14. The Court directed the State government to pay the arrears of the difference between the minimum wage and the actual wage paid to the construction workers.
76. It was pointed out to this Court in Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State of Jammu & Kashmir115 that a large number of migrant workmen from different States working on a hydro-electric project were denied the benefit of labour laws and were exploited by 114 [1983] 2 SCR 271 : (1983) 1 SCC 525 115 [1983] 2 SCR 473 : (1983) 2 SCC 181 554 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the contractors. This Court directed the Union government to ensure that its senior officers carry out thorough inspections of the project at regular intervals to verify whether the labour laws are being properly followed, particularly concerning workmen employed, either directly or indirectly, by the contractors or sub-contractors.
77. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, 116 the petitioner had highlighted the issue of bonded labourers in stone quarries of Faridabad district and and their inhuman living conditions. Referring to the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976, the judgment discussed the meaning of “bonded labour”. According to the Act, a bonded labourer is someone who has incurred or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt. 117 A bonded debt refers to an advance received or presumed to have been received by a bonded labourer under or in pursuance of the bonded labour system. 118 The inference of this definition, according to the State government, was that bonded labourers must first prove that they are providing forced labour in consideration of an advance or other economic consideration received by them. The Court rejected this reasoning, stating that it would be “cruel to insist” that a bonded labourer “should have to go through a formal process of trial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence.” It was further observed that “a bonded labourer can never stand up to the rigidity and formalism of the legal process due to his poverty, illiteracy and social and economic backwardness and if such a procedure were required to be followed, the State Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book”. The Court also noted that statistically, “most of bonded labourers are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes”.
78. The judgment held that whenever a labourer is made to provide forced labour, the presumption would be that it is consideration of an advance or other economic consideration received by him, and he is thus a bonded labourer. This presumption may, however, be rebutted by the employer or the State Government by providing satisfactory material. The Court reiterated the constitutional obligation of the 116 [1984] 2 SCR 67 : (1984) 3 SCC 161 117 Section 2(f), Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 118 Section 2(d), Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 555Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. Union government and the State government to ensure observance of various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen. The State government was directed “to take up the work of identification of bonded labour as one of their top priority tasks and to map out areas of concentration of bonded labour”. The concurring opinion regarded Article 23 as “a vital constituent of the Fundamental Rights”.
79. Pursuant to this Court’s decision in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 135 bonded labourers were released from bondage in stone quarries of Faridabad district, under the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. However, they were not rehabilitated even after a lapse of several months. This inaction of the State government was brought before this Court in Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 119 The Court directed the State government to provide rehabilitative assistance to these 135 freed bonded labourers within one month. It noted with compassion, “They have waited too long; they cannot wait any longer”. This Court also directed the State government to ascertain within its territory whether there were any more bonded labourers or not, by applying the principle laid down in Bandhua Mukti Morcha. It was reiterated, “Whenever it is found that any workman is forced to provide labour for no remuneration or nominal remuneration, the presumption would be that he is a bonded labourer unless the employer or the State Government is in a position to prove otherwise by rebutting such presumption.”
80. The issue of bonded labourers in stone quarries in several districts of Andhra Pradesh was highlighted before this Court in P. Sivaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 120 The Court emphasized on “effective rehabilitation” of bonded labourers. It was stated, “Uprooted from one place of bonded labour conditions the persons are likely to be subjected to the same mischief at another place”. The Court appealed for “requisite social consciousness”, where it is “the obligation of every citizen to cooperate” to bring an end to bonded labour.
81. In State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat,121 a three-judge Bench dealt with the question whether prisoners, who are required to
119 (1984) 3 SCC 243
120 [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 346 : (1988) 4 SCC 466
121 AIR 1998 SC 3164
556 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports do labour as part of their punishment should be paid minimum wages for such work. This Court held that jail authorities are “enjoined by law to impose hard labour” on convicted prisoners who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, irrespective of “whether he consents to do it or not”. However, undertrials, detainees with simple imprisonment, or even detenus who are kept in jails as preventive measures cannot be “asked to do manual work during their prison term.” Justice KT Thomas, speaking for the Court, held that “a directive from the court under the authority of law to subject a convicted person (who was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment) to compulsory manual labour gets legal protection under the exemption provided in Clause (2) of Article 23 of the Constitution, as it “serves a public purpose” of reforming the convict and rehabilitating them in future with savings earned from such labour. The Court held that a prisoner “should be paid equitable wages for the work done by them”. It directed the State to fix the quantum of equitable wages payable to prisoners, which would be calculated after deducting the expenses incurred for food and clothes of the prisoners from the minimum wage rates.
82. However, in his concurring opinion, Justice D.P. Wadhwa differed with Justice Thomas’ invocation of Article 23. According to him, “there will be no violation of Article 23 if prisoners doing hard labour when sentenced to rigorous imprisonment are not paid wages”. He, however, observed that the State is free to enact legislation for granting wages to prisoners subject to hard labour under courts’ orders, for their beneficial purpose or otherwise. Justice M.M. Punchhi, in his concurrence with Justice Thomas, made no comment on the application of Article 23.
The inference of this judgment, however, is not that imposing mandatory labour on convicts is entirely immune from the operation of Article 23. Reading Article 23 with Article 21 and the decision in Sunil Batra (II), 122 a convict cannot be subjected to “allotment of degrading labour”.
83. In Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Tamil Nadu,123 when the issue of bonded labourers and their exploitation was again brought to the notice of this Court, a two-judge Bench issued a fresh set of 122 [1980] 2 SCR 557 : 1979 INSC 271 123 [2012] 9 SCR 579 : (2013) 1 SCC 585 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 557Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. directives to the State. Among other directions the bench directed proper and effective implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, the Workmens’ Compensation Act, the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, and the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act.
84. A three-judge Bench of this Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat124 adjudicated a challenge to two notifications issued by the Gujarat government under section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, during the COVID19 pandemic. These notifications exempted factories from observing some of the obligations which employers have to fulfil towards the workmen employed by them. According to the notifications, among other provisions, all factories registered under the Act were exempted “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest, etc. for adult workers”. One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) authored the judgment, declaring that the notifications issued by the government during the pandemic were ultra vires and against the fundamental rights of labourers. The Court stated that “[t]o a worker who has faced the brunt of the pandemic and is currently laboring in a workplace without the luxury of physical distancing, economic dignity based on the rights available under the statute is the least that this Court can ensure them.” It was held that “[t]he notifications, in denying humane working conditions and overtime wages provided by law, are an affront to the workers’ right to life and rights against forced labour that are secured by Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution.”
85. What emerges from the above discussion is that the broad scope of Article 23 can be invoked to challenge practices where no wages are paid, non-payment of minimum wages takes place, social security measures for workers are not adopted, rehabilitation for bonded labour does not happen, and in similar unfair practices. The State shall be held accountable even in cases where the violation of fundamental rights such as Article 23 is done by private entities or individuals. Article 23 can also be applied to situations inside prisons, if the prisoners are subjected to degrading labour or other similar oppressive practices.
86. Having analysed the philosophy of the Constitution and the principles under Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23, we must now reflect on the 124 [2020] 13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459 558 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports patterns of discrimination against the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Denotified Tribes. This exercise is necessary to examine and understand the systemic discrimination based on caste against these communities, of which the impugned provisions are an instance. The counsel for the petitioner has argued that the impugned provisions are an example of State-sanctioned caste-based discrimination. Analysing the systemic discrimination not only requires looking at the colonial era, but also the pre-colonial era. Doing so will present before us the exact patterns of discrimination against Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Denotified Tribes over the course of history, which the Constitution seeks to remedy.
X. A History of Discrimination in the Pre-Colonial Era
87. The history of India has witnessed centuries of discrimination towards the oppressed castes. Violence, discrimination, oppression, hatred, contempt, and humiliation, towards these communities were the norm. The caste system entrenched these social injustices deeply within society, creating an environment where the principles of natural justice were blatantly disregarded. In this hierarchical system, neutrality was virtually non-existent, and there was an inherent and pervasive bias against those belonging to the oppressed castes. This bias manifested in numerous ways, including exclusion from social, economic, and political opportunities. The caste system ensured that the oppressed castes remained marginalized and deprived of their basic rights and dignity.
88. The foundational principle of equality for all individuals was absent in the social framework defined by caste. The caste system operated as a mechanism that thrived on the labour of Bahujan communities, ultimately eroding their identity. In other words, the story of the caste system is, therefore, a story of enduring injustice. It is a narrative of how millions of Indians, relegated to the bottom of the social ladder, faced relentless discrimination and exploitation. The lower castes were systematically denied access to education, land and employment, further entrenching their disadvantaged position in society.
89. The caste system led to harrowing practices of discrimination and subjugation, rooted in the notions of purity and pollution, where some communities were deemed impure, and their presence was considered contaminated. The penal sanctions and discriminatory [2024] 10 S.C.R. 559Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. practices under the caste system have been well-documented in several scholarly works. Dr. Ambedkar referred to this as the “law of caste” in his writings.125
90. The caste system was based on four varnas or groupings. Dr. Ambedkar described the caste system in the following words: “One striking feature of the caste system is that the different castes do not stand as an horizontal series all on the same plane. It is a system in which the different castes are placed in a vertical series one above the other… the Brahmin is placed at the first in rank. Below him is the Kshatriya. Below Kshatriya is the Vaishya. Below Vaishya is the Shudra and Below Shudra is the Ati-Shudra (the Untouchables). This system of rank and gradation is, simply another way of enunciating the principle of inequality…. This inequality in status is not merely the inequality that one sees in the warrant of precedence prescribed for a ceremonial gathering at a King’s Court. It is a permanent social relationship among the classes to be observed— to be enforced—at all times in all places and for all purposes….”126 In his classic “Annihilation of Caste”, Dr. Ambedkar stated that: “the Varnavyavastha is like a leaky pot or like a man running at the nose. It is incapable of sustaining itself by its own virtue and has an inherent tendency to degenerate into a caste system unless there is a legal sanction behind it which can be enforced against every one transgressing his Varna.”127 Castes were considered “self-enclosed units”, 128 which could not be changed. That is, was assigned to individuals at birth, with each caste linked to a specific profession, and all castes organized into a hierarchical structure.
125 B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 16; B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 54.
126 B.R. Ambedkar, “Philosophy of Hinduism”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 3, pp. 25-26.
127 B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 128 B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 18 560 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
91. Dr Ambedkar also theorized that an essential aspect of the caste system was the control over the sexuality of women. In “Castes in India”, he stated: “Sati, enforced widowhood and girl marriage are customs that were primarily intended to solve the problem of the surplus man and surplus woman in a caste and to maintain its endogamy. Strict endogamy could not be preserved without these customs, while caste without endogamy is a fake.”129
92. Scholars have also stated that “the idea of criminal tribe” 130 existed even before the British colonisers. Anthropologist Anastasia Piliavsky noted, “while colonial uses of the stereotype add up to a lurid history of violence against people branded as congenital criminals in colonial law, the stereotype itself has a history stretching back far beyond British colonialism.” 131
93. The caste system permeated itself in several ways. First, it was based on a hierarchy of four caste-based groupings, where the Shudras occupied the lowest level. Second, the castes outside these four groupings were treated as “untouchables”. Third, the caste system controlled the sexuality or agency of women to maintain the sanctity of caste. Fourth, the caste structure considered certain castes and tribal communities as professional criminals. Fifth, penal sanctions were imposed on those who violated the “law of caste”.
94. The rules of caste continued in medieval history. The law of caste manifested in several ways– with each manifestation causing a form of violence against the oppressed communities.
XI. The Colonial Suppression of Marginalized Castes and Tribes
95. The colonial history indicates that the British reproduced the systems of social hierarchy in their legal framework. Following several revolts from indigenous communities in India, in particular their participation in the 1857 revolt, the British focused on restricting their activities. The British increased surveillance upon them by the Thuggee Act (XXX of 1836) and Dacoity Act (XXIV of 1843).
129 B.R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India”, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 14 130 Anastasia Pilavsky, “The ‘Criminal Tribe’ in India before the British”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 57, no. 2 (2015): 323–54, at p. 327 131 Ibid, p. 325 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 561Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors.
96. Reference must be drawn to the statement of J. F. Stephen, legal member of the Viceroy’s Council, who in the early 1870s, stated: “The caste system is India’s distinguishing trait. By virtue of this system, merchants are constituted in a caste, a family of carpenters will remain a family of carpenters for a whole century from now, or five centuries from now, if it survives that long. Let us bear that in mind and grasp quickly what we mean here by professional criminals. We are dealing here with a tribe whose ancestors have been criminals since the very dawn of time, whose members are sworn by the laws of their caste to commit crime... for it is his vocation, his caste, I would go to the extent of saying his faith, to commit crimes (from Fourcade 2003: 146).” 132 These caste-based stereotypes were given the form of the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871.
i. Criminal Tribes Acts
97. The legislation of 1871 empowered the government to declare any community as “criminal tribe”.133 The Act provided for the “registration, surveillance and control” of “criminal tribes” and “eunuchs”. The major part of the Act operated in the North-Western province, Punjab and Oudh.134 The Act allowed the local government, with due permission of the Governor General in Council, to designate any “tribe, gang or class of persons” as “criminal tribes” if they were deemed to be “addicted to systematic commission of non-bailable offences”. 135 The local government needed to give a comprehensive report to the Governor General giving reasons for declaring any tribe as criminal and also provide a manner in which these tribes would earn their livelihood. 136
98. The Act authorized the local government to term a “wandering tribe” having no fixed place of residence as criminals, except in cases 132 Anastasia Pilavsky, “The ‘Criminal Tribe’ in India before the British”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 57, no. 2 (2015): 323–54, at p.326 133 Section 2, Criminal Tribes Act 1871.
134 Section 1, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
135 Section 2, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
136 Section 3, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
562 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports where they can identify a “lawful occupation” of the tribe. 137 The government was allowed to settle such tribes in a specified place. 138 Subsequently, with the authorization of the Governor General, the local government will publish the declaration of criminal tribes in the local gazette in form of a notification.139 Such notification acted as conclusive proof of the applicability of the provisions of the Act on the tribe and debarred any judicial review irrespective of any procedural non-compliance. 140
99. Members of the designated criminal tribes were required to mark their presence in a register made by the magistrate, failing which they were subjected to penalties in accordance with the provision of the Indian Penal Code. 141 Such a register was kept in the custody of the District Superintendent of Police. 142 A person aggrieved by any entry in the register could request alteration by filing a complaint before the Magistrate, who had the final say. 143 The designated criminal tribes were forced to either settle or move to another place chosen by the local government, 144 or could be moved to any reformatory settlement. 145 Headmen, village-watchmen and landowners or occupiers of the village were informed about the designated criminal tribes. 146 They were subjected to frequent checks, and their movements were closely monitored. 147 The local government could restrict their movement within a territorial limit. 148 The designated criminal tribes required permission to move from one place to another.149 They were mandated to carry “passes” which had permission to move to another specified place. 150 The Act allowed 137 Section 4, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
138 Section 4, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
139 Section 5, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
140 Section 6, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
141 Section 9, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
142 Section 10, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
143 Section 12, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
144 Sections 13, 14, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
145 Section 17, Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
146 Section 18(ii), Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
147 Section 18 (viii), Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
148 Section 18 (iv), Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
149 Section 18(v), Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
150 Section 18(v), Criminal Tribes Act, 1871.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 563Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. the government to employ the individuals from designated criminal tribes “placed in a reformatory settlement”.151
100. The Act included provisions for punitive measures against members of the criminal tribes, including rigorous imprisonment extending from six months (in first breach) to one year (in second breach), whipping, or fine, if they were found violating the Act’s provisions. 152 It gave extensive powers to any police officer, or village watchman to arrest without warrant a person of a designated criminal tribe, if they move beyond any prescribed limits of residence without a pass. 153 The Act mandated “every village-headman and village-watchman”, and “every owner or occupied of land” to inform the police about the absence of a person from a designated criminal tribe or the arrival in the village of such persons “who may reasonably be suspected of belonging” to a criminal tribe. 154
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