Association of Vasanth Apartments’ Owners v. V. Gopinath & Ors
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 123; [2023] 9 S.C.R. 1019
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha Tamil Nadu Town & Country Planning Act, Justice 000 Sq. Meter Or More Should Be Reserved As Open Space For
- Decided
- 13 Feb 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1890/2010
- Sections
- 39, 17, 49, 122, 9C, 20, 17(2), 20(1), 39(1), 124, 36, 2(36)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal 1890-91 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 13, 2023
[K. M. JOSEPH AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.] Tamil Nadu Town & Country Planning Act, 1971 – s.39 – Development Control Rules – Rule 19 – Regulation 29(6) – Chennai Metropolitan Area – Appellants were owners of certain apartments situated in a complex which consisted of 12 blocks – Total area of the layout was more than 10,000 sq. metres – Portion of land was earmarked in terms of Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules (DCR) as Open Space Regulation Area (OSR) – Said rule mandates that 10% of the area of any developmental plan having area 10,000 sq. meter or more should be reserved as open space for communal and recreational use and that such open space area must be transferred to the local authority free of cost through a registered gift deed – Gift deed was executed in favour of Chennai Municipal Development Authority – However, despite lapse of 12 years of the gift, the OSR area had not been developed into a park – Writ Petition filed by apartment owners challenging the vires of the rule 19 of DCR – Single Judge of High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the appellant association to maintain the open space area as a park with recreational facilities in accordance with the ‘DCR’ – Division Bench set aside the judgment passed by the Single Judge and upheld the validity of the said rule – On appeal, held: It cannot be said that the impugned rule violates Art.14 on the score that it is discriminatory – In a challenge to a provision based on discrimination under Art.14, the burden is on the applicant to lay clear foundation in pleadings and further to discharge the burden by making good the case and the court will not lightly enter a finding of discrimination – Town planning being a complex subject involving various inputs and value judgments which are intended to ensure the orderly, visionary and planned development, they require greater deference from courts – When the layout is above 10,000 square meters, reservation of 10% for recreational purposes has to be made [2023] 9 S.C.R. 1019 : 2023 INSC 123 A B C D E F G H 1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
– The developer must also transfer such reserved space in favour of the local authority, free of cost, through a registered gift deed allowing the local authority to maintain the open space area – The challenge to the Rule, on the basis of Article 300A and, indeed, Art.14 as well by Association of Vasanth Apartment Owners Association must fail, as it cannot even be their case that their right in property was deprived – The appellants never had any proprietary right in the property to allege deprivation of the same – Even if the Rule is found bad, there can be no question of voiding the gift at the appellant’s instance – No merit in the contention that Rule 19 of the DCR or the regulation which is impugned is in anyway ultra vires of the provision of the Act – It cannot be accepted, in the context of the Act of the Rules/ Regulations, that, in such a large project, when the layout is more than 10,000 square metres, executing a gift deed, which would ensure compliance, would fall foul of the requirement of either Article 14 or Article 300A of the Constitution – The developer/owner, remained only a trustee even without a gift – The provision for setting apart 10 per cent, is invulnerable – The area will even without a gift remain out of bounds for the project proponent/owner – The OSR, being an inviolable requirement, the additional requirement, meant and understood as a measure to ensure compliance and prevent misuse and or disuse, must not be understood as deprivation – The gift will not convert the Local Body into an absolute owner – Instead, in place of the original owner, continuing as a trustee, the Local Authority becomes the trustee – The purpose and the nature of the obligation will remain and haunt both the Local Body as also the original owner – The Rule/Regulation at any rate also, is a law which sanctions deprivation even assuming there is deprivation – However, in substance, the Rule/Regulation cannot be understood as deprivation under Art.300A – The areas covered by the OSR cannot be diverted for any other purpose – The respondents are dutybound to ensure that the area set apart as OSR is stringently utilised only for the purpose in the Rule/Regulation – No area meant for OSR shall be utilised as dumping yards or any other purpose other than as OSR.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 14, 19(1)(f), 19(5), 31 & 300A and Seventh Schedule, List III, Entry 42 – Doctrine of Eminent Domain – Right To Property – Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property – Held: Stipulating the conditions that a person who seeks A B C D E F G H to develop his property in a sprawling and ever-growing urban metropolis which is sought to be regulated by a law relating to a town planning cannot be viewed as acquisition of land within the meaning of Entry 42 in List III – A case of compulsory acquisition would be without there being any volition or consent of a person. Words and Phrase – word ‘communal’ – Meaning.
Disposing of the Appeals and Writ Petition, the Court HELD: 1. This Court must proceed on the basis that Regulation 29(6) holds good. This means that when the layout is above 10,000 square meters, reservation of 10 per cent for recreational purposes has to be made. Regulation 29(6)(a) stipulates that the land for the communal and recreational purposes, is to be restricted to the ground level and in a shape and location to be specified by the Authority. It is also to be reserved free from any construction. Therefore, the reservation, which is mandated in terms of Regulation 29(6)(a), and which cannot be a subject matter of a claim for compensation under Section 39 of the Act, is to become the subject matter of the gift deed. The execution of the gift deed, if it is understood as merely as an insurmountable obstacle for an unscrupulous developer to get around the laudable mandate to preserve the requisite area as open space, cannot be rendered vulnerable. Even if, no gifts were to be executed, the property covered by the open space requirement, would be put beyond the domain and control of the developer. Future generations of successors-in-interest or anyone, who claims under him, will be effectively prevented from setting up any claim over the area. Viewed in this perspective and understanding the gift as not conferring ownership of the area comprised in the open space, the impugned provisions would pass muster. It would prevent any kind of abuse. It is clear that the Regulation, properly understood, prescribe for the open space and merely provides for the facilitation and preservation of the open space. [Para 122][1129-F-H; 1130-A-C]
2. Stipulating the conditions that a person who seeks to develop his property in a sprawling and ever-growing urban metropolis which is sought to be regulated by a law relating to a town planning cannot be viewed as acquisition of land within the ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
meaning of Entry 42 in List III. Acquisition of land involves, no doubt, compulsory divesting of the rights of a person in his property. The impugned provision does not represent a case of compulsory acquisition of land. A case of compulsory acquisition would be without there being any volition or consent of a person. The State purports to divest his rights in property and vest the rights with the State. The impugned provision does not appear to be a case of such acquisition as is contemplated in a law which is made with reference to Entry 42 in List III. [Para 137 & 148][1139-D-E; 1143-D]
3. The very goal of town planning requires nothing less.
Once the goal of executing the gift and the results it produces in law, are appreciated in the above manner, the apprehensions and the contentions of the appellant/petitioner lose their sheen. One is unable to accept, in the context of the Act of the Rules/ Regulations, that, in such a large project, when the layout is more than 10,000 square metres, executing a gift deed, which would ensure compliance, would fall foul of the requirement of either Article 14 or Article 300A. The developer/owner, remained only a trustee even without a gift. The provision for setting apart 10 per cent, is invulnerable. The area will even without a gift remain out of bounds for the project proponent/owner. The OSR, being an inviolable requirement, the additional requirement, meant and understood as a measure to ensure compliance and prevent misuse and or disuse, must not be understood as deprivation. The gift will not convert the Local Body into an absolute owner. Instead, in place of the original owner, continuing as a trustee, the Local Authority becomes the trustee. The purpose and the nature of the obligation will remain and haunt both the Local Body as also the original owner. The Rule/Regulation at any rate also, is a law which sanctions deprivation even assuming there is deprivation. However, in substance, the Rule/Regulation cannot be understood as deprivation under Article 300A. [Para 154][1148- F-H; 1149-A-B]
4. Rule 19(b)(vi) to 19(2)(b)(vi) contemplate that the space so required is to be transferred to the authority or local body designated by the authority free of cost through a deed. It is further provided that the local body may provide the residents A B C D E F G H association or flat owners association for maintaining such reserved space as park. Significantly, in the case of a site having an extent between 3,000 to 10,000 square metres, the Rule declares that public access to the area as earmarked will not be insisted upon. When it comes to the extent of the site with which this Court is concerned, viz, where the extent of site exceeds 10,000 square metres, the requirement in the Rule, viz., is common to 10 per cent of area excluding road had to be transferred by a gift is insisted upon. It is provided that it is obligatory to transfer the reserved 10 percent of the site area. No charges can be accepted in the case of new development or re-developments. In the case of Rule 19(b)(II)(vi) in the case of site having extent between 3,000 square metres to 10,000 square metres, the CMDA or the local body may permit the residents association or flat owners association for maintaining the reserved space as parks. In the case of site having extent of above 10,000 square metres under the column ‘reservation’, it is not provided that the flat owners or residents association may be permitted to maintain the reserved park. [Para 163][1154-G-H; 1155-A-D]
5. The impression which gathers on reading the contents of reservation to be made in respect of site having an extent between 3,000 to 10,000 square metres is that the reserved area is to be maintained as a park. When it comes to the site having more than 10,000 square meters, the provision that public access for area shall not be insisted upon is not to be found. This means that when it comes to the layout which in the wisdom and the policy of the Rule Maker, which has been made after the process undergone under the Act, and apparently, after hearing objections, if any, and with the approval of the government that, were a large chunk of land be developed for group development, as defined, and certain percentage, which in these cases is 10 per cent or 1/ 10th of the total layout excluding roads is to be set apart as the OSR area. The word park is not in any way inconsistent with recreational purpose. It does not require much imagination to conclude that in an urban area and with a site being in excess of 10,000 square metres (nearly two and a half acres) where group development takes place, there would be a large number of people who would occupy the said area. Group development can ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
be substantially conflated with flats and apartments comprised in two or more blocks or buildings as required to satisfy the requirement of group development under Rule 19(b)(II). A large number of people would occupy the said land. This is understandable having regard to the size of the layout and the definition of group building. Planned development, particularly, when it is informed by deep vision about the future does call for an expansive approach. [Para 165][1165-E-H; 1166-A-B]
6. The word ‘communal’ must be understood as where the layout exceeds 10000 sq.meters entitling members of the general public also to avail the benefit of the OSR area. Once, the word ‘communal’ is so understood it further fortifies the conclusion that there would be no infraction of Article 300A or Article 14 as understanding the execution of the gift deed as obligating the donee only to act as a trustee to ensure the fulfilment of the sublime goal of the law and since the owner/developer would not have a right to exclude others or to claim exclusive right to possession which would be incongruous to recognising the right of the members of the general public to access to the OSR area. The Rule / Regulation can withstand the challenge based on Article 300A on the basis that properly appreciated the “so called compelled gift” would be valid. Even proceeding on the basis that a challenge to Rule 19(b) would imply a challenge to the Explanation as well, on the reasoning which has appealed to this Court, namely, about the nature of the right under the Gift Deed as also finding that the word ‘communal’ is intended to reach the benefit of the OSR area to the members of the public as well, there would be no merit in the contention. [Para 177][1163-A-D] Indian Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala Temple- IN RE) v. State of Kerala and others (2019) 11 SCC 1 :
[2018] 9 SCR 561; K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and another (1973)
4 SCC 225 - followed.
A B C D E F G H Global Energy Ltd. and another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2009) 15 SCC 570 : [2009] 9 SCR 22; T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 534; Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705: [2007] 6 SCR 799; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 807; Pt. Chet Ram Vashist (dead) by Lrs. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1995) 1 SCC 47 : [1994] 5 Suppl.
SCR 180; Pune Municipal Corporation and Another v.
Promoters and Builders Association and Another (2004)
10 SCC 796 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207; State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas and Others (1969) 1 SCC 509 : [1969] 3 SCR 341; Narayanrao Jagobaji Gowande Public Trust v. State of Maharashtra and others (2016) 4 SCC 443; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1982) 1 SCC 39 : [1982] 1 SCR 1137 Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar and others [1955] 2 SCR 603; Virender Gaur and Others v. State of Haryana and Others (1995) 2 SCC 577 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717 : [1975] 1 SCR 173 - relied on.
Yogendra Pal and Others v. Municipality, Bathinda and Another (1994) 5 SCC 709 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 693;
State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517 : [2006] 3 SCR 396; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and other (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797;
Nareshbhai Bhagubhai and others v. Union of India and others (2019) 15 SCC 1 : [2019] 10 SCR 88;
Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613; SahuMadho Das and others v. Pandit Mukand Ram and another [1955] 2 SCR 22; Rajendra ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Shankar Shukla and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2015) 10 SCC 400 : [2015] 11 SCR 723; B.K.
Ravichandra and others v. Union of India and others 2020 SCCONLINE SC 950; Lalaram and others v.
Jaipur Development Authority and another (2016) 11 SCC 31 : [2015] 14 SCR 403; State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Lakhwinder Kumar and others (2013) 6 SCC 333 :
[2013] 2 SCR 1070; Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Promoters and Builders Association and another (2004) 10 SCC 796 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207;
Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others (1991) 4 SCC 54 : [1991] 3 SCR 102; Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and others v. State of Haryana (1979) 2 SCC 196 : [1979] 1 SCR 1070; State of Maharashtra and another v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and others (1986) 2 SCC 516 : [1986] 1 SCR 707; R.K. Mittal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2012)
2 SCC 232 : [2011] 15 SCR 877; New Delhi Municipal Council and others v. Tanvi Trading and Credit Private Limited and others (2008) 8 SCC 765 : [2008] 12 SCR 867; Union of India and Another v. Cynamide India Limited and Another (1987) 2 SCC 720 : [1987] 2 SCR 841; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and another v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav and another (1988) 2 SCC 351 : [1988] 3 SCR 62; Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others (2000) 3 SCC 40 : [2000] 1 SCR 1054; Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat (1981) 3 SCC 508 : [1982] 1 SCR 81; Deputy Commissioner and Collector v. Durga Nath Sarma AIR 1968 SC 394 : [1968] 1 SCR 561;
Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013) 1 SCC 353 :
[2012] 13 SCR 29; Bhimandas Ambwani (Dead)
through LRs v. Delhi Power Company Ltd. 2013 14 SCC 195 : [2013] 1 SCR 996; Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka and others (1988) 3 SCC 263: [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 348; Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others v.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others (2013) 1 SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 ;
A B C D E F G H BhimandasAmbwani (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Delhi Power Company Limited (2013) 14 SCC 195 : [2013] 1 SCR 996; P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition and another [1965] 1 SCR 614; Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India Ltd. and another [1967] 1 SCR 255; Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat and others (1986) 1 SCC 581 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 1025; Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation and others (2008) 12 SCC 401 : [2008] 7 SCR 564; Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation and others (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9 SCR 373; Rajiv Sarin and another v. State of Uttarakhand others (2011) 8 SCC 708 : [2011] 9 SCR 1012; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991) Suppl.1 SCC 600 : [1990] 1 Suppl.
SCR 142; Taherakhatoon (D) By LRs. v. Salambin Mohammad1 (1999) 2 SCC 635:[1999] 1 SCR 901 referred to.
M. Krishnasamy v. Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Chennai-8 (2013) 1 CTC 80 - referred to.
James Patrick Nollan v. Calefornia Coastal Commission 483 US 825, 97 L Ed 2d 677; Florance Dolan v. City of Tigard 512 US 374; Agins v. City of Tiburon 447 US 255 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reality Company 272 US 365; Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.
v. Chevron U.S.A.INC. 544 US 528, 161 L.Ed.2d 876;
Village of Euclid, Ohio Et Al v. Ambler Reality Company 272 US 365 (1926); Coy A.Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District 133 S.Ct. 2586 - referred to.
Case Law Reference [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 180 relied on Para 12 [2006] 3 SCR 396 referred to Para 18 [1970] 3 SCR 530 referred to Para 18 ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
[1973] 3 SCR 39 referred to Para 18 [2011] 13 SCR 636 followed Para 18 [2017] 9 SCR 797 referred to Para 19 [2018] 9 SCR 561 referred to Para 19 [2019] 10 SCR 88 referred to Para 19 [1955] 1 SCR 613 referred to Para 19 [1955] 2 SCR 22 relied on Para 19 [2015] 11 SCR 723 referred to Para 19 [2015] 14 SCR 403 referred to Para 19 [1955] 2 SCR 603 referred to Para 21 [2013] 2 SCR 1070 referred to Para 21 [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207 relied on Para 22 [1991] 3 SCR 102 referred to Para 22 [2011] 13 SCR 636 referred to Para 22 [1986] 1 SCR 707 referred to Para 24 [2011] 15 SCR 877 referred to Para 25 [2008] 12 SCR 867 referred to Para 25 [1987] 2 SCR 841 referred to Para36 [1988] 3 SCR 62 referred to Para 52 [2000] 1 SCR 1054 referred to Para 53 [2018] 9 SCR 561 followed Para 55 [1982] 1 SCR 81 referred to Para 65 [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 534 relied on Para 75 [2007] 6 SCR 799 relied on Para 76 [1968] 1 SCR 561 referred to Para 81 [2012] 13 SCR 29 referred to Para 82 [2013] 1 SCR 996 referred to Para 83 A B C D E F G H [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 348 referred to Para 84 [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 807 relied on Para 85 [2012] 13 SCR 29 referred to Para 90 [1969] 3 SCR 341 referred to Para 93 [1965] 1 SCR 614 referred to Para 95 [1967] 1 SCR 255 referred to Para 95 [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 1025 referred to Para 98 (1973) 4 SCC 225 followed Para 99 [2008] 7 SCR 564 referred to Para 101 (2016) 4 SCC 443 referred to Para 102 [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 693 referred to Para 103 [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78 relied on Para 104 [2016] 9 SCR 373 referred to Para 110 [2011] 9 SCR 1012 referred to Para 111 [1982] 1 SCR 1137 relied on Para 140 [1975] 1 SCR 173 relied on Para 155 [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142 referred to Para 156 [1999] 1 SCR 901 referred to Para 178 CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.1890-1891 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2007 of the High Court of Madras in WA Nos.478 and 1026 of 2007.
With Civil Appeal Nos.7334 of 2013, 7847-7848 of 2013 And Writ Petition (Civil) No.591 of 2015.
Amit Anand Tiwari, AAG, Ms. V. Mohana, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, JayanthMuth Raj, Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Advs., N. Subramaniyan, Ms. Neha Rathi, Ashwin Kumar DS, D. L. Chidananda, Ms. Aditi Dani, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Jatin Bhardwaj, N. Subramaniyan, K. S. Suresh, Ajay ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Aggarwal, Ms. Aditi Gupta, R. Nedumaran, B. Balaji, Prabhu Ramasubramanian, Ms. Malavika Jayanth, P. V. Dinesh, M. Yogesh Kanna, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms. Devyani Gupta, Ms. Preeti Singh, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Sanjeev Kumar Mahara, D. Kumanan, Raghav Gupta, Vinodh Kanna B., T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Civil Appeal Nos. 1890-91 of 2010 is connected with the other cases. We are disposing of the Appeals and the Writ Petition filed under Article 32, having generated certain common issues by the following common Judgment.
INDEX*
ABOUT THE CASES AND THE PARTIES .................. 3
The case of Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners ................................................................................. 3 The case of Keyaram Hotels Pvt. Ltd. ........................... 8 CREDAI; Writ Petition No. 591/15 under Article 32 ........................................................................... 19 SUBMISSIONS OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONER ... 22
SUBMISSIONS OF SHRI N. SUBRAMANIYAN,
ADVOCATE IN C.A. 7334 OF 2013 [KEYARAM HOTELS P. LIMITED] .................................................. 25
SUBMISSIONS OF MS. V. MOHANA, SENIOR
ADVOCATE ON BEHALF OF THE WRIT
PETITOINERIN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 591
OF 2015. ............................................................................. 29 SUBMISSIONS OF SHRI AMIT ANAND TIWARI;
ADDITIONAL A.G. ON BEHALF OF STATE OF
*Pagination in the Index is as per the Original Judgment. A B C D E F G H TAMIL NADU AND ‘CMDA’........................................ 35
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY SRI JAYANTH
MUTHRAJ, SENIOR ADVOCATE RESPONDENTS
NOS. 1 AND 2 IN C.A. NO. 1890 OF 2010. ................ 44
SUBMISSIONS BY SHRI K.S. SURESH, ADVOCATE
IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.7848 OF 2013 ......................... 46
ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 47
THE GIFT DEED IN VASANTH APARTMENTS
CASE .................................................................................. 82
WHETHER THE IMPUGNED RULE VIOLATES
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION? IS IT DISCRIMINATORY? ................................................ 86 IS THE IMPUGNED RULE/ REGULATION ULTRA VIRES? .............................................................................. 91
THE IMPACT OF SECTIONS 36 AND 37 ................. 95
IS THE IMPUGNED RULE/REGULATION BAD
FOR THE REASON THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO
THE MANDATE OF SECTION 39 OF THE
ACT? ............................................................................... 100
THE IMPACT OF SECTIONS 48 TO 55 ................. 108
THE RIGHTS REGIME ............................................... 114
DOWN MEMORY LANE ............................................ 134
PT. CHET RAM VASHIST (DEAD) BY LRS.
V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI ... 134
T. VIJAYALAKSHMI AND OTHERS V. TOWN
PLANNING MEMBER AND ANOTHER ........... 137
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
ANOTHERV. PROMOTERS AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER .........................138
TUKARAM KANA JOSHI AND OTHERS V.
MAHARASHTRA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND OTHERS ..........................140
JILUBHAI NANBHAI KHACHAR AND OTHERS
V. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER ..........142
STATE OF GUJARAT V. SHANTILAL MANGALDAS
AND OTHERS ..........................................................142
NARAYANRAO JAGOBAJI GOWANDE PUBLIC
TRUST V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND
OTHERS .....................................................................148
YOGENDRA PAL AND OTHERS V. MUNICIPALITY,
BATHINDA AND ANOTHER ................................151
VIRENDER GAUR AND OTHERS V. STATE OF
HARYANA AND OTHERS .....................................154
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES .............................176
ENTRY 42 OF LIST III OF THE SEVENTH
SCHEDULE ....................................................................191
THE UPSHOT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION ......242
ABOUT THE CASES AND THE PARTIES
The case of Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners
2. Civil Appeal Nos. 1890-91 of 2010 is directed against the judgment dated 19.10.2007 rendered by a division bench of the High Court. Writ Appeal No. 478 of 2007 and Writ Appeal No. 1026 of 2007 were appeals generated by the judgment which was rendered by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition No. 4766 of 2007 dated 20.02.2007. By the same the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners who are the appellants before us. It was inter alia A B C D E F G H their case that they were owners of certain apartments situated in a complex which consisted of 12 blocks. The total area of the layout was more than 10,000 sq. metres. A portion of the land was earmarked in terms of Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘DCR’) as Open Space Regulation area (hereinafter referred to as ‘OSR’). A gift deed was executed in favour of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority on 18.02.1994. However, despite the lapse of 12 years of the gift, the OSR area had not been developed into a park. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing the appellant association to maintain the open space area as a park with recreational facilities in accordance with the ‘DCR’. It was also made clear that it is always open to the respondents to take action in accordance with law if there is any violation. It was found to be the duty of the respondents to maintain such open areas as parks and on there being afailure on their part, the association of the residents should be welcomed to do the same subject to the rules.Writ Appeal no. 478 of 2007 was filed by one Shri Gopinath and others. They were persons who were living in the neighbourhood.Writ Appeal no. 1026 of 2007 was filed by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Chennai and the Member Secretary of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CMDA’). It was by the judgment impugned in Civil Appeal Nos. 1890-91 of 2010, the division bench allowed the Writ Appeals and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We notice the following findings and relief granted: - “17. When the land has been assigned in the year 1994 in favour of the CMDA by way of the Gift Deed, neither the CMDA nor the Corporation of Chennai have taken any step to make use of the land for the interest of public. It is clear from the report filed by the Advocate-Commissioner and the photographs filed before us and the other materials available on record that in the OSR area, there is a katcha road, which is said to have been laid by the Corporation in the year 2003. Probably because of this katcha road and the usage of the same as road by all the residents in the locality, the occupants of the Vasanth Apartments might have felt disturbance, which would have prompted them to make a representation to the Corporation to develop a park in the said area or in the alternative to permit them to develop and maintain a park for their recreational purpose besides illegally constructing a compound wall, separating the petrol bunk and the compound wall ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
for about a length of 30 feet separating the unbridged 11 feet wide open canal upto ground level, so as to close the way once and for all. At this juncture, it is to be pointed out that the Vasanth Apartments is divided by a compound wallfrom this area and it is It also not made clear by the Vasanth Apartments Owners Association that the said land, which was gifted to the CMDA, is part of their lay out.”
“18. It has also been alleged that under similar circumstances, the CMDA has permitted all the residents associations in Velachery to maintain the open spaces as recreational parks in the nearby area viz. K.G. Apartments, Sai Sarovar etc. Each case has to be viewed and decided on its own merits and since in the case on hand, in the interest of thousands of general public residing in and around the area, the authorities have taken a wise decision to lay a road to have easy and immediate access to the 100 ft. road, the same cannot be found fault with.”
“19. Further more, it has been brought to our notice that with a view to form connecting road to 100 feet bye-pass road, the Chennai Corporation has already addressed the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to transfer and convey the land belonging to Arulmigu Dhandeeswarar Temple, Velachery, Chennai in favour of the Corporation and also obtained the said land to form the connecting road from Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department.”
“20. Thus, though belatedly, now the CMDA and the Corporation of Chennai are taking all efforts to lay a pucca road in the OSR area for the convenience of nearly one lakh people in the area including the residents of Vasanth Apartments. In this city, illfamous for its bumper to bumper traffic and the related hazards faced by the road users day in and day out, any such step taken by the civic authorities to ease such bottleneck traffic congestions should be appreciated and welcomed without allowing anybody to put spokes in the wheel of development, as /3 has been attempted on the part of the Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners in the case on hand.
For all the above reasons, since it has been found that the writ petitioner has no right or interest, whatsoever, in the OSR land, A B C D E F G H and the prayer in the writ petition itself is misconceived, both these writ appeals are allowed, thus setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.2 of 2007 in W.A.No.1026 of 2007 is closed.”
3. C.A. No. 7847-48 of 2013 arising out of SLP (C)No. 25709- 25710 of 2011 is again filed by the Association of Vasanth Apartments’Owners i.e., the appellants in C.A. No. 1890-91 of 2010. This is a separate litigation though having a bearing on the issue. In this appeal, Writ Petition No. 23397 of 2007 came to be filed by the appellant Association challenging the vires of Rule 19 of the ‘DCR’ under which a gift had to be executed in respect of the land comprised in 10% as we shall see in greater detail. The Writ Petition, came to be dismissed by the division bench by its judgment dated 06.03.2008 and it upheld the validity of the rule. C.A. No. 7847 of 2013 is filed against the same. A review filed turned unsuccessful. The order in the review has led to the appeal, C.A. No. 7848 of 2013.
The case of Keyaram Hotels Pvt. Ltd.
4. Writ Petition no. 11934 of 1995 brings in the next appeal which is C.A. No. 7334 of 2013. The above writ petition was filed by M/s. Keyaram Hotel Pvt. Ltd. The challenge in the said writ petition was to the very same rule.
5. The case set up in short is as follows. The petitioners are the owners of about 62 grounds. It applied for the sanction of a building plan in the year 1975 for the construction of a hotel. There is reference to an earlier writ petition and contempt proceeding. Suffice it to notice, that planning permission was granted after a delay of 12 years on 08.09.1992. It is their case that it was faced with certain difficulties in the construction. A revised plan was submitted and building permission was sought for on 17.08.1994 for the construction of a hotel and hotel annexe building etc. which consisted of a basement, ground floor and three further floors. By letter dated 13.09.1994 issued by the second respondent thepetitioner was to gift the open space reserved area to the Commissioner Corporation of Madras. We may notice further that the third respondent sent communication on 01.12.1994. It is stated inter alia that the structure which existed within the OSR area should be demolished after due sanction and that the OSR land should be free from any structure and be fenced by providing separate entrance from the road side. There is no mention ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
about the gift deed. The petitioner sought a month’s time to comply with the conditions in letter dated 01.12.1994. However, the respondent insisted on compliance with the requirement of executing a gift deed. In the writ petition, an interim Order dated 13.03.1996 was passed directing permission after recording undertaking by petitioner to execute gift deed without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner. Petitioner executed gift deed on 22.05.1996. Petitioner’s revised plan was approved as a group development on 24.04.1999. The grounds urged against the rule appear to be as follows:
1. The rule is an illegal infraction of the petitioner’s right to hold and enjoy the property.
2. The rule is contrary to the Act and derogatory to the interest of the land owners.
3. The stipulation is violative of the civil right vested in every owner of the property to hold his land and the right to safeguard public interest cannot be stretched to create a right and title in favour of a local body in the manner contemplated by the respondents 1 and 2. It could only impose a condition to keep such land as open for being used by the user of such building for their communal or recreational purpose.
4. The provision for open space with respect to a special building is for the communal and recreational purposes of the people who shared their accommodation in the said building or otherwise lawfully use the same. It is not intended to take away the proprietary right of the owners. The expression of willingness by the petitioner to provide the stipulated open space reserved for communal and recreational use of the occupiers will satisfy the public interest and object of the legislation. Petitioners undertake to keep 10% of the area to be developed excluding roads as open space for communal and recreational purpose.
5. The further condition imposed by the 3rd respondent to provide exclusive frontage for the said open space area opening into the main road is unconscionable in law and contrary to the spirit of the Act. Such stipulation is in terrorum.
A B C D E F G H The relief sought is to declare Rule 19(b)(I)(v) of the DCR void.That apart sanction is sought without insisting on the rule.
6. We may notice the relevant contents of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent State. The case set up inter alia is that the CMDA had carried out necessary survey and prepared the master plan which lays down policies and programmes which are necessary to regulate the growth of the area and also to ensure its economic viability, social stability and sound management for the present and the foreseeable future and orderly development required the same. The DCR was an integral part of the master plan. Any person wanting to develop a property within the Metropolitan area must apply for permission and the CMDA is empowered to enforce such conditions and restrictions as was necessary under the rules. It is in public interest. If the ownership of the open OSR area were to be allowed to vest with the original land owner, then the concerned owner would have a chance to convert the same for construction, the area specially reserved as open space, for communal recreation by suppressing the said fact after passage of time. Hence, it is necessary that the open space area should be vested with the civil authorities who are responsible for maintenance of parks and play fields in the sites. The open space reservation is provided to create lung space in the city and to have sufficient open space for the use of society.
7. A counter affidavit was filed by the Chief Planner of the CMDA and the stand taken was to seek support under Section 17 of the Act read with Section 49. The impugned Rule has been also referred to. As regards the facts, it is stated as follows: - “Para 5. petitioner submitted the application on 17 .08.1994 for planning Permission for the proposed construction of Hotel Complex consisting of group of two massive blocks of Basement plus ground plus three floors building and four small buildings at D.No.l& 2, Harrington road, Chetput, Madras - 31 in R.S.No.355 of Nungambakkam Village. The total floor area of the Hotel Buildings is about 13,300 M2. The extent of the site is about 10692 M2. In the plan submitted by the petitioner there are certain existing structures also, which are to be demolished for the construction of the proposed hotel buildings consisting of basement plus ground plus three floors, after demolishing the existing structures. In the plan submitted by the petitioner he has also shown the area to be reserved and handed over as open space reservation. As the ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
proposal of the petitioner consists of group of two blocks of basement plus ground plus three floors buildings in a site of an extent of more than 10,000 M2, the same was examined by this respondent under Development Control Rules 19 (b) (II) (1) to (V) and (VI) - C related to group development. While the Development Control rule l9(b)(II) (1) to (v) deals with the open spaces to be left around the buildings, distance to be maintained between the buildings etc, the rule 19(b)(II) (VI-C) prescribes as following:
“C) SITE EXTENT above 10,000 m2 10 percent of the area excluding roads shall be reserved and this space shall be transferred to the authority or to the local body designated by it, free of cost, through a deed. It is obligatory to reserve the 10 percent of the site area and no charges can be accepted in lieu, m case of new developments or redevelopments”
The second respondent examined the planning permission application of the petitioner and having satisfied with the plans with reference to the Development Control Rules and in View of the fact that the petitioner already earmarked 1070 m2 being the 10 % open Space Reservation area in the plan, sent a letter in No.82/17789/94, dated 13.09.1194 stipulating certain conditions and requesting, the petitioner to, i) pay the following charges a) Development charges: Rs. 82,000/b) Security Deposit for the building: Rs. 8, 00, 000/ii) hand over the 10% Open Space Reservation Area reserved and shown in the plan to the third respondent through a registered gift deed.
The petitioner has not paid the security Deposit, but however obtained a direction from this Hon’ble Court to accept the Bank Guarantee towards the security Deposit and furnished the same to the second respondent along with his consent letter dated 28.02.1995 accepting the conditions stipulated in letter No. 82/ 17789 /94, dated 13.09.1994. In the said letter dated 13.09.1994 A B C D E F G H of the second respondent, one of the condition is that the petitioner should hand over the 10% Open Space Reservation Area to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, free of cost, through a· registered gift deed, which is a lawful condition under Development Control Rule 19 (b)(II) (VI - C). It is respectfully denied that the petitioner has not made any representation to relax the condition of gifting of the Open Space Reservation Area and the same was never under the consideration of the second respondent.”
“Para 7. It is submitted that the second respondent has requested the petitioner to transfer the 10% Open Space Reservation Area free of cost, through a registered gift deed in favour of the third respondent as per the provisions of Development Control Rules 19 (b) (II) (VI - C), under group development regulations and not as contended by the petitioner under rule 19 (b) (I) (V), which related to special Buildings. The Development Control Rule 19
(b) (II) (VI - C) is as follows:
“C) SITE EXTENT above 10,000 m2 10 percent. of the area excluding roads shall be reserved and this space shall be transferred to the authority or to the local body designated by it, free of cost, through a deed. It is obligatory to reserve the 10 percent of the site area and no charges can be accepted in lieu, in case of new developments or redevelopments”
Explanation: -
(3) The land so reserved shall be free from any construction by the owner or promoter or developer. The land for communal and recreational purposes shall be restricted at ground level in a shape and location to be specified by the MMDA”
The Development Control Rule is the integral part of the Master Plan and was framed under section 17 of the Town and Country Planning Act. The second respondent exercised the power vested in it, since the total extent of the petitioner’s site is more than 10,000 m2, the insisting of the requirements of reservation of 10 % Open Space Reservation Area and consequent direction to the petitioner to hand over the same to the third respondent through a registered gift deed as per Development Control Rules 19(b)(II) (VI- C) is well within the jurisdiction of the second respondent.” ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
“Para 8. The petitioner is challenging the concept of reserving the 10 % area for open space and recreational purposes. This is a statutory requirement under Development Control Rule 19 (b) (ii) (vi - c) for all the proposals of group development, where the extent of the site is more than 10,000 m2. Further the city is fastly developing and individual houses are being demolished and multi family apartments are constructed in the same site where there was only one family residing therein earlier. The intense vertical developments make the city more dense demanding more water, pollution free air, noise free atmosphere etc. The city is already over congested and therefore more open spaces have to be created wherever new developments or redevelopment takes place. The open spaces so created serve as long space to the city benefiting the community at large. The open space enable to make the environment clean and provide fresh air, besides facilitating the ground water recharge in a city where water scarcity is a perennial problem.”
“Para 9. The petitioner has also questioned the transfer of open space reservation in favour of the Madras Corporation. It is submitted that in practice, the developers take up the development of properties and construct the buildings providing necessary open spaces as per Development Control Rules. After completion of the construction they sell out the building in portions to various persons and later the open space reserved become no man’s land without any care for its maintenance. If the ownership of the open space reservation for communal and recreational purpose, suppressing the facts later, after passage of time. Therefore, it is essential that the ownership of the open Space Reservation area should be vested with the civic authority, which is responsible for the maintenance of the parks and play fields in the city. The civic authority is maintaining many parks and play grounds such as Elliot’s Beach Garden, Anna Nagar, Thiru Vi Ka park etc. Which are maintained very well. It is also therefore essential that the open Space Reservation Area should be located in a location shape and size which is accessible from the public road not only to the Civic Authority but also to the general public without any restriction. Therefore, transferring the OSR area to the Civic body will not amount to talking away the rights of the property owner and it is intended for the benefit of the community at large.”
A B C D E F G H “Para 10. In the case of the petitioner, it is submitted that the 10 % Open Space Reservation Area is very close to his hotel buildings. Therefore, if the ownership were to be vested with the petitioner, it is most likely to be misused by the petitioner for Hotel related activities, rather than allowing it to the use of general public. It is also likely that over a period of the time the OSR area would be misused for commercial purposes by the petitioner under the guise of improving it.
The petitioner has also expressed that the maintenance of the 10 % Open Space Reservation Area will be done by him. It is submitted that the entrusting the maintenance of the Open Space Reservation area is at the discretion of the second and third respondents. The development Control Rule 19 (a) (II) (Vii) prescribes as follows:
“ The authority reserves the right to enforce the maintenance of such reserved land by the owner to the satisfaction of the Authority or order the owner to transfer the land to the authority or local body designated by it, free of cost, through a deed, to the Authority or the local body designated by the authority as case may be, reserve the right to dedicate on entrusting the maintenance work to institution / individual o merits of the case.
It is submitted that as per the provisions of the Development Control Rule 19 (b) (II) (Vii) this second respondent reserves the right to decide on entrusting the maintenance of OSR area to the petitioner. It become the bounden duty of the state Government to safeguard the interest of the public at large and the state government have the statutory power and have approved the development control rules as an integral part of the master plan for the benefit of the public and to enforce it accordingly. Therefore, the reservation of 10% OSR area in a statutory requirement. Under the above said circumstances the petitioner is not deprived of their right of enjoyment of the properly by implementing of the rules framed under the Town and Country Planning Act. The writ petition is devoid of merits and the same has to be dismissed in limini.
Therefore, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass an order by dismissing the writ petition and thus render justice”.
(Emphasis supplied)
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
8. The Corporation of Madras also filed a counter affidavit. Therein it was inter alia stated that the OSR land should have access from a public street as per which the development authority directed the petitioner to execute the gift deed to the Corporation as it had to be used for communal and recreation purpose. In the reply affidavit, the petitioner took the stand that the impugned rule does not fall under Section 17. The OSR under the Act is only an amenity for the benefit of the property owner. The rule was projected as an executive order falling beyond the Act. Any misuse could be dealt with under the law.
CREDAI; Writ Petition No. 591/15 under Article 32
9. The last of the litigation with which we are concerned is Writ Petition no. 591 of 2015. This is a writ petition sought to be maintained under Article 32. The writ petition has been filed by an association which the petitioner describes as the Confederation of the Real Estates Developers Association of India (CREDAI).
10. This petition is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It is filed by a Federation of registered Association claiming to be an Apex body of the organised union and state real estate developers, builders across India. In the Additional affidavit filed, it is contended that the total number of members of Petitioner is 350 and that of Chennai Chapter is 163 members. The relief sought in the writ petition is as follows:
“(a) allow the present writ petition and issue a writ of Certiorari quashing Regulation 29(7)(a) (at pg.221 Vol. 2) as well as Annexure XX (at pgs.293-294 Vol. 2) of the Development Regulations for Chennai Metropolitan Area issued by the Respondent No.2 as being ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner; and”
11. However, in the additional affidavit filed on 8.12.2021, we may notice paragraph 4.
“4. That, in so far as challenge to Regulation 29(7)(a) in the present writ petition is concerned, the petitioner is restricting its challenge only to the latter part of the provision i.e., the requirement to transfer free of cost through a registered gift deed, 10% area reserved for recreational purposes only and not the space set apart for roads.”
A B C D E F G H
12. We may notice the grounds taken in the writ petition. It is contended that by the impugned regulations there is expropriation of the private property of the petitioner’s members Association. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Chet Ram Vashist (Dead) by LRs v. Municipal corporation of Delhi1. Support is drawn from Article 300A. It is sought to be contended that allowing use of the OSR Area amounts to a blatant exercise of the power of eminent domain. Transfer of property of the petitioner is sought to be achieved through the impugned regulation. In fact, in ground (i), it is submitted that expropriation of land is possible at best by way of plenary legislation and the impugned regulation not being such a legislation, it is vulnerable. The impugned regulation is contrary to the Act. The Act regulates the land use. The authorities under the Act cannot change the user of a land. In other words, the point is that allowing use of area meant for recreational purpose by the members of the general public is expropriatory and contrary to the Act. It is also contended that the impugned regulation is unreasonable and disproportionate.
13. We have heard Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants in C.A. No. 7847 of 2013. We also heard Shri N Subramaniyan, learned counsel on behalf of M/s. Keyaram Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (C.A. No. 7334 of 2013). We further heard Smt. V. Mohana learned senior counsel on behalf of the writ petitioner (writ petition no. 591 of 2015). We also heard the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants in C.A. No. 1890-91 of 2010. We further heard the learned counsel Shri K.S. Suresh on behalf of Association of Vasanth Apartments’ Owners which has in C.A. No. 7848 of 2013 challenged the judgment rejecting the review petition filed in the writ petition unsuccessfully challenging the rule.
14. We heard Shri Sanjay R. Hegde learned senior counsel on behalf of the corporation of Chennai and heard Shri Amit Anand Tiwari, AAG on behalf of the Government of Tamil Nâdu and also the CMDA. We finally heard Shri JayanthMuth Raj, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants in Writ Appeal no. 478 of 2007 who are the persons residing in the area and whose writ appeal stood allowed by the High Court.
SUBMISSIONS OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONER
15. In Civil Appeal Nos. 7847 of 2013, Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan would contend that a compelled gift attracted the
1 (1995) 1 SCC 47
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
wrath of Article 300A of the Constitution. There was clearly deprivation of property. It was without the authority of law. It was without the authority of law because ‘DCR’ was not statutory in nature, having been made by the CMDA without any provision enabling it to make statutory rules. The power to make rules was vested with the State Government under Section 122 of the Tamil Nadu Town & Country Planning Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Section 9C relied upon by the respondents did not clothe the authority with power to make rules. Equally,Section 17 would not come to the aid of the respondents. Therefore, the rule was not law within the meaning of Article 300A. There is no law made by the competent legislature empowering deprivation of the property of the appellants.
16. Even a law made by the legislature could not result in the deprivation of property in the manner which is purported to be achieved through what is described as a rule which in fact is not a statutory rule. It is his contention that the survey of the Act would reveal that wherever the land is reserved, the lawgiver has contemplated that the land should be acquired. The concept of acquisition is traced to Entry 42 of List III of Part VII of the Constitution. In other words, unless land is acquired under the relevant law which undoubtedly involves payment of compensation there would be no justification in law to compel a person topart with his property by what is described as a compelled gift. There is no compensation payable under the gift admittedly. Therefore, this amounts to the execution of the gift which is a direct result of the rule which so mandated the execution of the gift. It is clearly expropriatory. The law at any rate, it is contended that is, the impugned rule, is palpably and manifestly arbitrary. Similar arguments have, no doubt, been addressed by the other learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of both the appellants and the writ petitioner.There are various other ancillary submissions which had been taken up.
17. There is also a further case that the rule falls foul of Article 14 for another reason. It is complained that the rule produces classification which is not permitted under Article 14. In other words, it is pointed out that for layout upto 3,000 sq. metres, there is no requirement to execute a gift. In respect of layout which is in excess of 3,000 sq. metres and which is less than 10,000 sq. metres, there is no such requirement and in place of a gift, it is open to the proponent of the project to give the equivalent value. It is without any rational basis, and therefore,attracting A B C D E F G H the vice of class legislation or unreasonable classification resulting in equals being treated differently, that in respect of projects involving more than 10,000 square metres, the builder is bound to execute a gift in favour of the authority.
SUBMISSIONS OF SHRI N. SUBRAMANIYAN,
ADVOCATE IN C.A. 7334 OF 2013 [KEYARAM HOTELS P. LIMITED]
18. In this case, the appellant is the owner and continues to be the owner of the layout area. The gift was effected as per an undertaking given to the High Court but subject to the Writ Petition. Secondly, there is no laches or delay. Immediately as the condition was sought to be imposed, the Writ Petition was filed in the year 1995. At best, Rule 19 can be only a Statutory Order/Notification/ Guideline and it cannot be considered more than a Subordinate Legislation. Relying on the principles laid down for impugning Subordinate Legislation in State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy2, it is contended that the Rule, Rule 19(b)(2)(vi)(c) violates Sections 36 to 39. Harmoniously reading Section 17 and Section 20 and Sections 36 to 39 of the Act, would establish that the reserved lands (made for open spaces) under Section 17(2)(k) and Section 20(1)(k), should be acquired within three years, failing which, the lands shall get reverted to the owner. In the case of regulating the use of lands, such as putting restrictions on the use of land under Section 17(2)(l) and Section 20(1)(n), within the planning area, do not call for compensation. Section 17(2)(b), as also Sections 21(1)(k) and (n) relating to detailed development plans, are the only provisions dealing with the open spaces. Proviso to Section 39(1) require the respondents to pay compensation for all items, except the matters that fall under Section 17(2)(l) and Section 20(n), again, both of which are regulatory. Sections 48, 49 and 52 to 54 are projected to contend that the object of the Act is to regulate the development and not to deprive land. Sections 52 to 54 also mandate, payment of compensation. Exceptions to the ’Pay compensation’ principle, involve cases, where there is no mandate to reserve land for public purposes. There is no power, as claimed under Sections 9C, 17, 20 and 35 or Section 124, to make the impugned Rule. It is further contended that the impugned Rule contravenes and is inconsistent with the Sections 6(2), 12 and 18 of the Tamil Nadu Apartment Ownership Act, 1994 and, hence, is void. The appellant, having developed two blocks,
2 (2006) 4 SCC 517
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
the developed building comes under the said 1994 Act. It applies to apartments constructed prior to its commencement. The impugned Rule, being inconsistent with Sections 6(2), 12, 18, 25 and 26 of the Act had become inoperative. The impugned Rule is alleged to be violative of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and hence, void, in view of Article 254(2) of the Constitution. It is sought to be contended that since Entry 42 of the Concurrent List provides for acquisition and requisition, any State Legislature, seeking to put in place, a law to acquire lands with lesser compensation, it would be impermissible. It would be discriminatory. The Act took care to incorporate Land Acquisition Act by reference under Section 36 of the Act. This meant that depravation of property, without compensation, was not contemplated. Sections 36 and 37 are invoked. Even the State Legislature has no power to seek transfer of lands to the State free-of-cost. Even a single owner could construct a luxury independent bungalow with 3000 square meters and he will not be required to spare any land to society whereas 184 owners who constructed 184 flats with each family having 59.7 square meters would have to spare 10 per cent of their land free-of-cost. This is unconscionable. No civilised society would expect or require or steal someone’s property for their betterment and the Rule of Equality requires the beneficiary to share the costs. Appellants rely on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India3, Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and others4, K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka5. The appellant would pray that the Rule be declared null and void and it be declared that the ownership of the OSR lands revert back to the appellants.
SUBMISSIONS OF MS. V. MOHANA, SENIOR
ADVOCATE ON BEHALF OF THE WRIT PETITOINER
IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 591 OF 2015.
19. The objections to the challenge to the Regulation on the ground that the Rule/Regulation had continued on the Rule Book for long, cannot, by itself, be a ground to repel the challenge. [See ShayaraBano v. Union of India and others6 and Indian Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala Temple-IN RE) v. State of Kerala and others7]. Doctrine
3 (1970) 1 SCC 248
4 (1973) 1 SCC 500
5 (2011) 9 SCC 1
6 (2017) 9 SCC 1
7 (2019) 11 SCC 1
A B C D E F G H of Laches and Delay cannot become a constitutional limitation on court’s power. Expropriation of property can only be done by plenary legislation, i.e., by Parliament or by State Legislature. Rule, made under the Rulemaking power cannot empower the deprivation of any substantive right, which include property. An expropriatory law must, at any rate, be construed strictly and must not be brought to life in the absence of specific express provisions [See Nareshbhai Bhagubhai and others v. Union of India and others8]. The State is blowing hot and cold in regard to power to make Regulations. Reference is made to Sections 47 and 55 to contend that the bar on compensation will not apply in case of deprivation of property. Neither the provisions of the master plan nor provision relating to control of development, authorised deprivation of property without payment of compensation. The present is a case of no compensation and not nil compensation. The decision in K.T. Plantations Limited v. State of Karnataka9, is relied upon. The laudable object cannot legitimise the violation of the Fundamental Right or Constitutional Guarantee. It is pointed out that in Ground-K of the Writ Petition, it is contented that arbitrary restrictions on the petitioner to use his property through Executive action, attracted Article 14. It is further pointed out that Fundamental Right violation is projected in Grounds-L, M and N. Equally, Article 300A and Article 14 forms the subject matter of Grounds-C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J, it is submitted. It is contended that the repeal of the Regulation, which is impugned, by the Rules of 2019, would not save the Regulation from the vice of invalidity. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay10. The impugned Regulations would constitute law for the purpose of Article 13 in this regard. The declaration of the Regulation falling foul of Fundamental Rights, would have the effect of rendering such law void ab initio. Reliance is placed on the 2019 Rules and the repealing and saving provision [Rule 74(3)]. It is contended, in short, that the rights and obligations, apart from the express savings under the 2019 Rules, would remain intact. With reference to Sections 49 and 50 of the Act, it is contended that permissions under the Development Regulations of 2008 would continue to be governed by the Regulations. Thus, repeal does not render the present Writ Petition academic or infructuous. The fact that the petitioner is an Association of real estate developers cannot detract from the matter being justiciable and a Constitutional Court should
8 (2019) 15 SCC 1
9 (2011) 9 SCC 1
10 (1955) 1 SCR 613
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
not countenance technical pleas, when Fundamental Rights are at stake. When otherwise, considering the importance of this matter, bearing in mind the interplay between the Fundamental Rights and Article 300A, this Court, despite any delay, should consider the challenge. Petitioner is restricting the challenge to Regulation 29(7)(a) only to the latter part, viz., the requirement to transfer free-of-cost, the 10 per cent area reserved for recreational purposes. Section 20(1)(d), employing the word ‘otherwise’, cannot encompass a gift. A gift would be without compensation, which would be contrary to the provisions of the Act. Sections 36 to 39 make it clear that whenever an acquisition was contemplated, it was deemed to be a public purpose and payment of compensation has been provided for. If gift is comprehended in Section 20(1)(d), it would be in conflict with Section 39. Earmarking or reserving an area, may not constitute an injury. But the compulsory gifting of the same, without any compensation, coupled with changing of the character of the property from private to public, reaches an injury. The person must be compensated. Reliance is placed on SahuMadho Das and others v. Pandit Mukand Ram and another11 and Rajendra Shankar Shukla and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others12. Reliance is placed in M. Krishnasamy v. Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Chennai-813 to contend that a Single Judge of the Madras High Court doubted the very demand for conveying of OSR land. Regulatory law, depriving a person of property, must be strictly construed. In this regard reliance is placed on B.K. Ravichandra and others v. Union of India and others14. Section 124, under which Regulations can be made, cannot empower any Authority to create or takeaway or deprive a person of their property, by a manner, not provided for under the Act [See Indian Young Lawyers Association and others (Sabarimala Temple-In Re.)15]. The Regulation represents the case of action in excess of power. The lands, which have been transferred, are not being used for the purpose of open space. They are being used as dump yard or other use. The valuable easementry rights or lung space of the residents are lost. The frontage of the property and its aesthetic appearance is affected. The rights of the members of the petitioners’Association under Article 19(1)(g)
11 (1955) 2 SCR 22
12 (2015) 10 SCC 400
13 (2013) 1 CTC 80
14 2020 SCCONLINE SC 950
15 (2019) 11 SCC 1
A B C D E F G H is violated. In answer to the contention of the respondent, that wherever compensation is compulsorily payable, the Constitution itself has made provision as is clear from Article 30(1A) it is sought to be rebuffed. It is pointed out that Article 30(1A) is only an additional protection. Compensation must be paid, when property is deprived for a public purpose. Reliance is placed on decisions of this Court, including the decision of this Court in Lalaram and others v. Jaipur Development Authority and another16. The Court is requested to mould the relief appropriately so that the lands so transferred in favour of the Authority may be reverted to the persons directly benefiting therefrom, i.e., the Residents’ Welfare Associations or the residual owners of the developed areas. It is further prayed that the Court may fix a time limit, within which, interested parties to whom the land is to be reverted may apply for seeking such reversion. No other developments/redevelopments should be made on such lands except in accordance with law.
20. Shri Sanjay Hedge, learned Senior Counsel, for the Corporation of Chennai, supported the judgments. He contended that the impugned provision promoted a salutary goal. He highlighted the public interest involved.
SUBMISSIONS OF SHRI AMIT ANAND TIWARI;
ADDITIONAL A.G. ON BEHALF OF STATE OF TAMIL
NADU AND ‘CMDA’.
21. Section 124 of the Act confers powers to make the Regulations. Reliance is placed on Section 9C(ii) to empower CMDA to prepare the master plan or any detailed development plan. Reliance is also placed on Section 17. The DCR and the Regulations are part of the master plan. Section 2(36) defines ‘public purpose’ as ‘any purpose which is useful to the public or any class or section of the public’. Reserving any site, plot for communal/recreational purposes in layout plan, is public purpose. Section 47 is relied upon to contend that the DCR is statutory in nature. Equally, Sections 17, 18 and 20 are invoked along with Section 124, to contend that the DCR is statutory. Section 2(15) of the Act includes master plan. Sections 105 and 111 give an overriding effect to the Act. All the Rules and Regulations, which will include the master plan, are to prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent with the same contained in any other law, inter alia. Further, it is contended that the DCR and the Regulations have been subsumed under the Tamil Nadu Combined
16 (2016) 11 SCC 31
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Development and Building Rules, 2019. Rule 74(3) of the 2019 Rules, is relied upon to contend that it creates a legal fiction that anything done under the Rules/Regulations, is deemed to have been done under the 2019 Regulations. Reliance is placed on Judgment in Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar and others17. The word ‘including’ extends and enlarges the scope of the Clause [See State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Lakhwinder Kumar and others18]. If challenge to the Rules/ Regulations succeeds, it will also render the sanction of the development plans, illegal, which will necessitate petitioners applying afresh under the 2019 Rules, whereunder also, the prescription of 10 per cent land being gifted, exists.
22. It is further contended that the Rules/Regulations, being part of the master plan, are statutory and being framed under the Statute, they operate as law under Article 300A. Reliance is placed on Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Promoters and Builders Association and another19. Reliance placed by appellants on Pt. Chet Ram Vashist (Dead) by Lrs. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi20, is alleged to be misplaced. In the said case, there is no provision in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, under which, the Corporation could pass a Resolution to ask the appellant therein to transfer property free of cost. It is further contended that the Court may bear in mind that the Act replaced the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1920, which was based on the British Town and Country Planning and Housing Act, 1909. From the Statements of Objects and Reasons, it is contended that the Act was based on the Model Town and Country Planning Bill, which was prepared by the Ministry of Health and Housing of the Government of India after a comprehensive study of various Town Planning Enactments in the western countries. The regional concept in the Maharashtra Town and Country Planning Act, 1966 also made its presence felt. The Act is designed to serve legitimate state interest of planned development down to the regional limit.Crowded urban areas, create adverse living conditions. The reservation of open space for parks and playgrounds is universally recognised. The decision of this Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others21, is relied
17(1955) 2 SCR 603
18 (2013) 6 SCC 333)
19(2004) 10 SCC 796
20(1995) 1 SCC 47
21 (1991) 4 SCC 54
A B C D E F G H upon. It is contended that the Act requires only the simple laying of Rules and Regulations under Section 123 of the Act. The laying of the Rules, which is not mandatory, if not followed, will not affect the validity of the Rules/Regulations. The terms of Section 123(2) are relied upon to contend that the Rules will come into effect even before they are placed before the Legislative Assembly and any modification made by the Assembly, will apply only from the date it is carried out. Reliance is placed on Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and others v. State of Haryana22. It is further contended that acquisition under Chapter IV of the Act is not required in the facts. The area is not reserved in the master plan nor was any Notice published under Section 26 or 27. Acceptance of appellant’s contention would involve the need to compulsorily acquire all the reserved lands including areas such as setback areas, open spaces and other reserved area.Such interpretation would also render the provisions of Chapter VI, in particular Section 55, otiose. Chapter IV apply to areas reserved and notified in the master plan itself or to an area in excess of 10 per cent for proposed developed area of 3000 and above square meters or where area reserved is sought to be utilised for purpose not being communal or recreational, or areas, for which, there are other exceptions in the impugned Rules/Regulations. Section 20(1)(d) stipulates that a detailed development plan may propose or provide for acquisition by purchase, exchange or otherwise, of any land. The words ‘or otherwise’ include a transfer of 10 per cent of the land by way of a gift. It is further contended that there is no constitutional obligation to pay compensation. The Act contemplates divestment of property without compensation as is evident from Sections 31 and 55 read with Sections 17 and 20. It is a settled position of law that Article 300A does not involve or compel payment of compensation. Support is drawn from Judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another. v. State of Karnataka23:
“183. Payment of compensation amount is a constitutional requirement under Article 30(1-A) and under the second proviso to Article 31-A(1), unlike Article 300-A. After the Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300-A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just
22 (1979) 2 SCC 196
23 (2011) 9 SCC 1
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
compensation when a person is deprived of his property, but the question is whether a person is entitled to get compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of his property.
xxx xxx xxx
192. At this stage, we may clarify that there is a difference between “no” compensation and “nil” compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that “no compensation shall be paid”. However, there could be a law awarding “nil” compensation in cases where the State undertakes to discharge the liabilities charged on the property under acquisition and onus is on the Government to establish validity of such law. In the latter case, the Court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind the above parameters. xxx xxx xxx
205. Plea of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, proportionality, etc. always raises an element of subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a statute or a statutory provision, especially when the right to property is no more a fundamental right. Otherwise the court will be substituting its wisdom to that of the legislature, which is impermissible in our constitutional democracy.”
23. It is contended that nil compensation, as contemplated in paragraph 192, is applicable as a State undertakes to discharge liability for providing spaces for requirement for recreational and communal use, which is a public purpose. The area taken under the gift deed from the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 7334 of 2012 has been developed as a walkers’ park and used by the public. It is contended that town planning legislation has been viewed differently as it served a legitimate State interest. Even in the United States, where the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contemplates compensation for taking, for public use, private property, courts have upheld validity of zoning regulations which substantially limit the rights of the owners to develop land. Compensation has been refused. Reliance is placed on Agins v. City of Tiburon24. In India, there is no constitutional guarantee for payment of compensation especially when they are required to serve a legitimate public purpose. The gift of property, apart from serving the larger interest of the community, would also be conducive to the interests of the appellants. 24 447 US 255 (1980)
A B C D E F G H Refuting the contention of the appellants that the land which is transferred can be used only by the members of the society and not by the members of the general public, it is pointed out that since reservation is for communal and recreational purposes, the word ‘communal purpose’ must be understood to mean that it is meant for community at large. In the case of proposed development area being 3000 square meters – 10000 square meters, ‘public access is specifically excluded, as the Rules/ Regulations provide that public access to area earmarked for transfer to Authority, will not be insisted upon’.
24. There is no violation of Article 14. Classification based on size of plot has a clear nexus with the object, viz., planned development. Reliance is placed on Judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra and another v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and others25. As far as Civil Appeal No(s). 1890-1891 of 2010 is concerned, the complaint of the appellants that the land transferred under the gift was being made use of as a road, which is impermissible, it is contended that it is misleading. It is the case of the respondent that the 10 per centland transferred, already had a kachha road on the said land and it was being used by the public. The appellants tried to prevent the use of the road. The High Court considered the Report of the Court Commissioner and concluded that furbishing of the road served a larger public interest and provided better connectivity to a larger population. Alternatively, assuming communal purpose, would not include construction of roads on OSR land, in the facts of the case, appeal is made that this Court may not interfere in the Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 136.
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY SRI JAYANTH MUTHRAJ,
SENIOR ADVOCATE RESPONDENTS NOS. 1 AND 2 IN
C.A. NO. 1890 OF 2010.
25. The developers had transferred, in the interest of public, 1100 square meters of land, to the Authority for roads, parks and other open spaces by the gift deed dated 18.02.1994. In the year 2003, the Corporation of Chennai laid metal road, which provided a direct and short link to the Velacherry 100 feet bypass road to enable thousands of general public to have easy access and movements. The appellant-association has no locus as it is neither the owner of the property nor has any usage right been assigned to it. The CMDA is the absolute owner of the gifted property. The public road was laid as per the terms of the gift. The
25 (1986) 2 SCC 516
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
property is used for communal purpose. The word ‘communal’ means public. He relies on the definition of the word ‘communal’ in the International Websters Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language Encyclopaedic Edition (2004 Edition) to mean ‘common; public; belonging to a community’. He also would contend that the DCR was prepared in accordance with Section 17 read with Section 9C, Section 20(1)(d) and Section 20(1)(k) and Section 35 with Section 124. Rules and Regulations are authorised. He relies on the Judgement of this Court in R.K. Mittal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others26 and New Delhi Municipal Council and others v. Tanvi Trading and Credit Private Limited and others27. The impugned Rule is not an expropriatory action. It is only regulatory. The Rule is informed by intelligible differentia having a nexus with the object. The challenge is academic as the DCR is already repealed by the Regulation made on 02.09.2008. There is latches in filing the Writ Petition after 13 years of the execution of the gift deed. Even assuming the Rule is bad, the gift deed is beyond challenge. The appellants having maintained Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4766 of 2007, based on the gift deed, cannot challenge the validity of the gift deed in the subsequent Writ Petition. Estoppel and constructive res judicata are principles which are enlisted in support.
SUBMISSIONS BY SHRI K.S. SURESH, ADVOCATE IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7848 OF 2013
26. Shri K.S. Suresh, learned counsel appearing in C.A. No. 7848 of 2013, (the appeal by Vasanth Apartment Owners Association challenges the order in the review petition) would submit that there is no power to compel gift of land which is not required, reserved or designated. He refers to Section 36 and would contend that there is no power beyond the same to demand the transfer of land. The rule providing for a compelled gift is not within the objects, provisions and policies of the Act. One of the zones reserved is for open space and recreational use. Sections 36 and 37 only provide for acquisition of land in such zones. Legislative policy is not to acquire land without paying fair market value. Planning permission cannot result in deprivation of property. The DCR are not the rules made under the Act. The authority is competent only to make regulation under Section 124. In the absence of express power to demand a gift, there cannot be an implied power. The Act is regulatory and not a
26 (2012) 2 SCC 232
27 (2008) 8 SCC 765
A B C D E F G H taxing legislation. The appellants are entitled to restitution. Otherwise, he adopts the arguments of the Shri Gopal Sankarnarayanan made in C.A. No. 7847 of 2013. He would also in his rejoinder submission point out that support cannot be derived from Section 17 having regard to Section 12. He would reiterate the argument that the State Government also has no power relying on the judgment reported in (2003) 5 SCC
622. He would contend that the words in Section 122(1) empowering making rules ‘for carrying out the purposes of the act’ is unbridled and it must be understood as meant for regulating the use of land.
ANALYSIS
27. We have noticed the facts in the case of Vasanth Apartments and in the case of Keyaram Hotels. In the case of Vasanth Apartments, the land which was gifted by the owner in compliance with the impugned rule has been sought to be made use as a road. In the case of Keyaram Hotels the pertinent point which must be noticed is that the OSR area is not sought to be so maintained as road but access to the public by having an entrance to the area through a public road is sought to be projected as being contrary to the very concept of OSR meant for communal purpose, if the word ‘communal’ is to be understood as being confined to benefit the interest of the community which in the context of the case is the community of persons who patronise the hotel and who used the facilities provided in the hotel and its premises.
28. Whether impugned rule is statutory or it has statutory underpinning? Whether it is law?
The argument of the appellants appears to be, that the impugned rule is not a statutory rule. Instead, the further case is that the impugned rule is not a rule made under Section 122 of the Act. Section 123 contemplates placing of rules made under Section 122 before the legislative assembly. The said procedure has not been followed as regards the impugned rule. Therefore, it is not open to the respondents to claim that the impugned rule is a statutory rule. It is nothing but an executive fiat. If it is merely executive in nature, then it is not open to the respondents to direct the owners to execute a gift deed of valuable property, and thus, deprive the owners of the rights over their property.
29. The argument, on the other hand, of the respondents is that the DCR of which the impugned rule, is apart of the Master Plan and there is statutory authority in regard to the making of a Master Plan ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
located in Section 17 of the Act. In other words, the argument of the respondents is that the court,when it approaches the issue raised in this case, cannot have a pedantic view and understand a Master Plan as one which is limited or confined to mere drawings. The Master Plan as contemplated in the Act in regard to a Metropolitan Authority like the CMDA must be viewed on a larger canvass. The plan was put in place for catering to the needs of an ever-growing Metropolis.Various restrictions necessarily have to be put in place to provide for an orderly development of such a sprawling urban area. The larger public interest of the entirety of the residents of such an area had to be envisaged and it is in this regard that the concept of OSR must be viewed. The Master Plan goes to meticulous details about what is permitted and what is not.
30. A perusal of the writ petition No.23397 of 2007 being the petition filed by the Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners wherein Rule 19 has been challenged, reveals the following pleading: It is specifically stated that Rule 19 of the DCR which forms part of the Master Plan prepared under Section 17 of the Act mandates reservation of 10% as open space for open and recreational facilities when the area exceeds 10000 sq. meters. The gift in the case was executed in the year 1994 (16.02.1994). It is further contended that under the rule the second respondent was to maintain it either on their own or through the local body. The second respondent is the authority. Thereafter since the second respondent has not developed OSR area as park, petitioner wanted to maintain the OSR as Park. Reference is made to Writ Petition No. 4766 of 2007 and the developments including the order passed by the learned single judge and also writ appeal (writ appeal no. 478 of 2007) wherein an interim order was passed. Thus, the writ petition is filed in the year 2007. Now let us look at the grounds urged:
(1) Rule 19(b) of the DCR is beyond the rule making power conferred on the first respondent. The Act does not empower the first respondent (the State of Tamil Nadu) to make the DCR. Section 36 contemplates acquisition where land is reserved for open space. Therefore, the rule is ultra vires.
(2) There is an absolute right to enjoy the property. This is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution. A B C D E F G H Unless there is acquisition and payment of due compensation, Article 300A is violated.Therefore, the rule is unconstitutional.
(3) The rule empowers the Authority to maintain the OSR area themselves or through others without permitting ownersto themselves to do so. The respondents have no right to possess and manage the same. Therefore, the impugned rule authorising the second respondent to maintain and manage the OSR area is unconstitutional.
(4) The DCR not having been placed before the legislative assembly, it has no force of law.
(5) The impugned rule without any guideline enables exercise of arbitrary power.
(6) There is no power with first respondent State to usurp the lands free of cost, and that too selectively, under the guise of regulating the development of the area.
The prayer is to declare Rule 19 (b) of the DCR relating to group development in so far as it mandates the transfer of 10% area of the layout of any developmental plan having area 10,000 sq. meter or more reserved as open space for communal and recreational purposes to the second respondent or the local body designated by it, free of cost through a registered deed and empowering the second respondent or any authority other than the association of resident owners to maintain the said OSR area of the respective layout, and the gift deed executed and registered as Document No.262 dated 18.02.94 in the office of the 4th respondent pursuant to the impugned rule are unconstitutional and null and void and consequently direct the 3rd respondent to enter in their records the members of the petitioner Association as Owners of the said OSR area and pass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice.
31. Before we deal with the issue we must bear in mind as to what is law. Article 13 of the Constitution reads as follows: - “Article 13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. — (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, —
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.
[(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.]”
32. Existing law has been defined in Article 366. It reads as follows:- “Article 366. (10) “existing law” means any law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation;”
33. Law in force is an expression found in Article 372 of the Constitution. It reads as follows: - “Article 372. — The expression “law in force” in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.”
34. Section 3(29) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines Indian Law as:
(29) “Indian law” shall mean any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, rule, order, bye-law or other instrument which before the commencement of the Constitution, had the force of law in any Province of India or part thereof, or thereafter has the force of A B C D E F G H law in any Part A State or Part C State or Part thereof, but does not include any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council, rule or other instrument made under such Act;
35. In Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edition, it is profitable to notice the following discussion:
Law as the dictate of reason: natural law The idea that in reality law consist of rules in accordance with reason and nature has formed the basis of a variety of natural law theories ranging from classical times to present day(q). The central notion is that there exist objective moral principles which depend on the essential nature of the universe and which can be discovered by natural reason, and that ordinary human law is only truly law in so far as it conforms to these principles. These principles of justice and morality constitute the natural law, which is valid of necessity, because the rules for human conduct are logically connected with truths concerning human nature.
Law as the command of the sovereign: imperative law Diametrically opposed to the theory of natural law is the positivist, or imperative, theory of law (j). This theory distinguishes the question whether a rule is a legal rule from the question whether it is a just rule (k), and seeks to define law, not by reference to its content but according to the formal criteria which differentiate legal rules from other rules such as those of morals, etiquette, and so on.
Xxx xxx xxx According to Austin, whose version of the theory will be considered here, positive law has three characteristic features. It is a type of command, it is laid down by a political sovereign and it is enforceable by sanction.
Xxx xxx xxx We must now distinguish commands which are laws from commands which are not. Imagine a state governed by an absolute ruler R. Here the law is what R command. But is the converse true? Are all R’s commands law?
Xxx xxx xxx ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Now if particular commands can qualify as laws, how can we distinguish laws from commands which are not? Everyday life is sprinkled with examples of people giving commands to others: masters give orders to servants, teachers to pupils, parents to children and so forth.
Xxx xxx xxx Such criticism overlook the importance of Austin’s second requirement: for to qualify as law a command must have been given by a political superior, or sovereign.
Xxx xxx xxx To define law as a command can mislead us in several ways. First, though this may be a not in appropriate way of describing certain portions of law such as the criminal law, the greater part of a legal system consists of laws which neither command nor forbid things to be come, but which empower people by certain means to achieve certain results: e.g., laws giving citizens the right to vote, laws conferring on lease-holders the right to buy the reversion, laws concerning the sale of property and the making of wills: indeed the bulk of law of contract and of property consists of such power-conferring rules. At this point the theory could be saved by arguing that a rule conferring a right on one person is really an indirect command addressed to another: a law empowering the citizen to vote is really an order to the returning officer to register the vote.
Xxx xxx xxx Thirdly, “command” conjures of the picture of an order given by one particular commander on one particular occasion to one particular recipient. Laws differ in that they can and do continue in existence long after the extinction of the actual law-giver (r). Xxx xxx xxx But whether we define law as a command or a rule, we must still distinguish commands (or rules) which are law from those which are not. For Austin, as we saw, a command can only be law if it emanates from a sovereign. This raises the question how far there can exist laws other than those made by the sovereign. Obviously in a complex modern state it would be impossible for a sovereign A B C D E F G H to enact every legal rule: much law-making will in fact be done by subordinates to whom legislative powers have been delegated. A good deal of English law consists of such delegated legislation, e.g., regulation made by Ministers under Acts of Parliament. Here Austin finds no problem, since he sees no difficulty in the notion of a sovereign conferring law-making powers on others (u).
36. The distinguishing feature of law has been the subject matter of considerable debate and we may only for the purpose of these cases note that one of the essential features which mark out law from an executive order is that ‘law’ has general application. In other words, law sets out principles and rules which apply to all of those who would be within its purview otherwise. A law is not to be viewed as particularised decisions of the executive. Law is generally to have operation in the future. This court speaking through O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. held in Union of India and Another v. Cynamide India Limited and Another.28: “5. The second observation we wish to make is, legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing — there are several instances of the legislature requiring the subordinate legislating authority to give public notice and a public hearing before say, for example, levying a municipal rate — in which case the substantial non-observance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may have the effect of invalidating the subordinate legislation…”.
“7. The third observation we wish to make is, price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative activity than any other. It is true that, with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line between legislation and administration to vanish into an illusion. Administrative, quasi-judicial decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, conversely, legislative activity tends to fade into and present an appearance of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity. Any attempt to draw a distinct line between legislative and administrative functions, it has been said, is “difficult in theory and impossible in practice”. Though difficult, it is necessary that the line must sometimes be drawn as different
28(1987) 2 SCC 720
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
legal rights and consequences may ensue. The distinction between the two has usually been expressed as “one between the general and the particular”. “A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases; an administrative act is the making and issue of a specific direction or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy”. “Legislation is the process of formulating a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases and usually operating in future; administration is the process of performing particular acts, of issuing particular orders or of making decisions which apply general rules to particular cases.” It has also been said: “Rulemaking is normally directed toward the formulation of requirements having a general application to all members of a broadly identifiable class” while, “an adjudication, on the other hand, applies to specific individuals or situations”. But, this is only a broad distinction, not necessarily always true. Administration and administrative adjudication may also be of general application and there may be legislation of particular application only. That is not ruled out. Again, adjudication determines past and present facts and declares rights and liabilities while legislation indicates the future course of action. Adjudication is determinative of the past and the present while legislation is indicative of the future. The object of the rule, the reach of its application, the rights and obligations arising out of it, its intended effect on past, present and future events, its form, the manner of its promulgation are some factors which may help in drawing the line between legislative and non-legislative acts.”
37. Paton in his work on Jurisprudence says this about the law. “Law may shortly be described in terms of a legal order tacitly or formally accepted by a community. It consists of the body of rules which are seen to operate as binding rules in that community, backed by some mechanism accepted by the community by means of which sufficient compliance with the rules may be secured to enable the system or set of rules to continue to be seen as binding in nature. A mature system of law normally sets up that type of legal order known as the State, but we cannot say a priori that without the State no law can exist.”
38. In the DCR the preamble recites that Section 9 (c) of the Act prescribes that the Authority is to carry out a survey of the Chennai A B C D E F G H Metropolitan Area and prepare a Master Plan referred to in Section 17. It is further stated that having carried out necessary surveys and studies, the Master Plan prepared in 1975 stood approved by government on 04.12.1976. The DCR inter alia provides as follows:
No development as defined in the Act is permissible without written permission. It provides for the manner of obtaining permission. Rule 3 proclaimed that no development shall be in contravention of the DCR. Site approval is made mandatory. The land use classification was put into place. The DCR divided land use in terms of 9 separate zones which included primary residential zone, mixed residential zone, institutional use zone, open space and recreational use zone etc. There were detailed restrictions put in place qua the zones in regard to what activities were permitted as also what were prohibited. Part III commencing with Rule 17 was captured under the Caption ‘General Provisions’. It is under this chapter that Rule 19 made its appearance. Rule 19 dealt with Layout and sub division. It inter alia provided for passage, streets and roads and cul-de-sacs and it is thereunder that in respect of reservation of land for communal and recreational purpose in a layout or sub division that the DCR contemplated inter alia the impugned provisions. Rule 20 provided for parking. Rule 21 dealt with architectural control. Rule 22 provided for preservation of buildings of historical or architectural interest. Rule 23 dealt with tree preservation. Rule 24 dealt with advertisement control. Rule 25 provided for Airport zone and Microwave Zone. In fact, Rule 26 may be noticed at this stage in full.
“26. These rules to prevail :- (a) In the application of these rules if there is conflict between the requirements under these rules and the requirements under any other Act or rules or by laws in force the requirements under these rules and the provisions of Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, Tamil Nadu Distrit Municipal Act or Panchayat Act or any other law relating to the local authority for the time being in force or any rule, by law or regulation made under the said act or laws, such provisions which are contrary to these rules shall stand suspended. (b) The notifications made under the Municipal and Panchayat Acts and the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 (Tamil Nadu Act III of 1939) as regards setting of the ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Industrial and Residential area in the Chennai Metropolitan Area will cease to operate from the date of commencement of these rules. 27.”
Rule 27 dealt with identification of boundaries. Rule 28 provided for delegation of power. Rule 29 made contravention of the rules punishable with fine.
39. Section 9(c) must be read along with Section 17 of the Act. Section 9 (c)(ii) declares that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made under the Act, the functions of the Authority is to inter alia prepare a Master Plan referred to under sub-Section (2) of Section 17. Section 17 deals with Master Plans. Section 17 contemplates that the Local Planning Authority (which is mentioned under Section 4(b) of the Act) shall within such time as may be prescribed and after consulting the Regional Planning Authority (see Section 4(a) of the Act) and the Local Authority, prepare and submit to the Government, a Plan called the Master Plan. Section 17(2) reads as follows:
“(2) The master plan may purpose or provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: -
(a) the manner in which the land in the planning area shall be used;
(b) the allotment or reservation of land for residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes and for parks, play-fields and open spaces;
(c) the allotment and reservation of land for public buildings, institutions and for civic amenities;
(d) the making of provision for national highways, arterial roads, ring roads, major streets, lines of communication including railways, airports and canals;
(e) the traffic and transportation pattern and traffic circulation pattern;
(f) the major road and street improvements;
(g) the areas reserved for future development, expansion and for new housing;
(h) the provision for the improvement of areas of bad layout or obsolete development and slum areas and for relocation of population;
(i) the amenities, services and utilities;
A B C D E F G H
(j) the provision for detailed development of specific areas for housing, shopping, industries and civic amenities and educational and cultural facilities;
(k) the control of architectural features, elevation and frontage of buildings and structures;
(l) the provision for regulating the zone, the location, height, number of storeyes and size of buildings and other structures, the size of the yards and other open spaces and the use of buildings, structures and land;
(m) the stages by which the master plan shall be carried out; and (n) such other matters as may be prescribed.”
40. The Act as noted contemplates preparation of detailed development plan also. Section 24 of the Act contemplates that as soon as may be after the Master Plan inter alia has been submitted to the Government, the Government may not later than the time prescribed direct the appropriate Planning Authority to make such modification in the Master Plan inter alia. Thereupon, the modified Plan has to be resubmitted to the Government. Thereupon, the Government may give the consent for publication of the notice under Section 26 of the preparation of the Master Plan inter alia. Moving on to Section 26, it contemplates publication in the Gazette, of the notice of the preparation of the Master Plan inter alia. The notice must indicate the place or places where the copies may be inspected. More importantly, objections and suggestions in writing are to be invited within such period as is specified in the said notice. The period shall not be less than two months from the publication of the notice. Section 26 (2) contemplates that a reasonable opportunity of being heard must be provided to any person including representative of the Government Authority, who have made any objection. The Planning Authority can make amendments based on the objections and with the amendments, if any, carried out, the Plan is again submitted to the Government. Section 28 contemplates approval by the Government after consulting the Director of Town and Country Planning of the Plan submitted under Section 26(2). The approval may be with or without modification. Again, it is open to the Government to return the Plan, to modify the plan, or to prepare a fresh Plan in accordance with such directions as the Government may issue in this behalf and resubmitted to the Government for approval. The approval which is granted under Section 28 by the Government to a Master Plan inter alia is to be published by the Government in the gazette and leading ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
newspapers. The notification must indicate the place and time at which the Plan shall be open to inspection to the public. The Plan shall come into operation from the date of publication in the Tamil Nâdu Government Gazette. Section 32 of the Act provides for variation, revocation and modification of regional plans, Master Plan and the new development plan, at any time, by a subsequent plan prepared and approved under the Act.
41. Even according to the petitioner in Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners, the DCR is a part of the Master Plan. This is precisely the argument of the respondent as well. We are in agreement with the stand taken by the petitioner and the respondent. The DCR is a part of the Master Plan. The process involved in the making of the Master Plan points to active participation of all stakeholders. The plan which is apparently tentatively prepared must first receive approval from the Government before the notice of its preparation is published. It is upon such notice being published, objections are also invited. It is open to the Planning Authority to amend the Plan, paying heed to the objections found to be with merit. Again, the matter goes to the Government. Government has the power again to return it. Government as well may approve the Plan. As we have already found Master Plan cannot be conflated with a set of drawings or maps. It must, in the context of law in question, be extended to encompass within its embrace rules by which alone the Plan can become workable and the sublime goal of the lawgiver attained. The Master Plan accompanied with the DCR were to hold sway. It was to have general application. It was intended to bind everyone. It created rights and liabilities. It was not intended for any particular person. It was to operate in the future. It carried with it the attributes of law. The Government all throughout plays the pivotal and leading role and it is only with the imprimatur of approval by the Government that the Plan read with the Rules assumed force. Government undoubtedly had power to make rules under Section 122 of the Act. We would therefore hold that the DCR which held the field till 2008 when Regulations were enacted had the force of law.
42. It is profitable for us at this juncture to look at what a learned single judge had to say regarding the history of the ‘DCR’ and the regulation. Justice V. Ramasubramanian, while judge of the High court, has rendered judgment reported in M. Krishnasamy V. The Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and Another29. It was rendered on 25.09.2012. The petitioner therein
29 2013 1 CTC 80
A B C D E F G H challenged a communication by the member secretary of the authority rejecting the request to waive open space reservation charges for the grant of planning permission. The amount of OSR charge demanded was Rs.58,50,000. It was the contention of the petitioner therein that the charges could be levied only if land of an extent equivalent to 10% of the total area was not reserved for open space and conveyed to the local body. It was his case that his predecessor in title had already earmarked 10% of the total area and handed it over to the Corporation of Chennai. A draft deed of conveyance was also submitted by his predecessor which could not be executed on account of the lethargy on the part of the corporation but possession was taken in 1976. The learned single judge went on to find as a matter of fact that though a gift deed as such was not executed, the land was in public domain for the past 36 years and no one except the local body would lay a claim on the said land. The Court held;
“Para 12. Though in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, the first respondent has claimed that OSR land was neither gifted nor handed over to the Corporation, the same appears to be an incorrect statement. The Corporation has categorically confirmed that the land of the extent of 6 grounds 170 sq. ft., had been handed over by the original owner. This is also corroborated by (i) a letter of the Assistant Engineer of the Corporation of Chennai dated 29.1.1976 and (ii) the handing over-taking over certificate dated 11.2.1976 signed by an Officer of the Deputy Collector’s office and the Corporation of Chennai. The fact that the said land has been developed into a park and that it is now maintained by the Corporation of Chennai, is beyond any pale of doubt. But it is equally true that no deed of conveyance/gift was executed and registered by the original promoter in favour of the Corporation. Nevertheless, the land is in public domain for the past 36 years and no one except the local body, can today lay a claim on the said land of the extent of 6 grounds and 170 sq. ft. Therefore, on the first question, it has to be held that OSR land has already been handed over to the local body.”
43. Thereafter it is interesting that the learned Single Judge holds as follows: - “Para 13. Incidentally it must be pointed out that in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi {1995 (1) SCC 47}, the Supreme Court held that the effect of reserving any site for ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
open space, park etc., in a layout is that the owner ceases to be a legal owner of the land in dispute and that he would hold the said land for the benefit of the society or the public in general. It was further held in the said decision that the entitlement of the Corporation or the local body to demand the transfer of the land to them, is not made out from the provisions of any Act or on any principle of law. The Court pointed out that the Corporation may get a right as custodian of public interest to manage it in the interest of the society in general. However, the right to manage as a local body, was held by the Supreme Court in the said decision, to be not the same thing as to claim transfer of the property to itself. The decision in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist, was followed in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd {MANU/SC/7706/2007 : 2007 (8) SCC 705}. Again in Babulal Badriprasad Varma vs. Surat Municipal Corporation {MANU/ SC/7606/2008 : 2008 (12) SCC 401}, the Supreme Court pointed out that a statute of town planning ex facie is not a statute for acquisition of a property. The Court further observed that every step taken by the State does not involve application of the Doctrine of Eminent Domain.”
Para 16.At this juncture, a small prelude is necessary, to understand how the liability to earmark open space for public and recreational purposes, in a land developed into a layout and how the liability to pay OSR charges, came into existence. Hence it is presented as follows: -
(i) Section 9C, Chapter II-A of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 22 of 1974) prescribed that the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority shall carry out a survey of Madras Metropolitan area and prepare a Master Plan as referred to in Section 17.
(ii) Accordingly, MMDA carried out necessary surveys and studies and prepared the First Master Plan for the Chennai Metropolitan Area in 1975. The Government approved the same in G.O.Ms. No. 2395, Rural Development and Local Administration dated 4.12.1976.
(iii) The First Master Plan covered an extent of approximately 1170 sq. kms. It included within the City of Chennai, a part of Ambattur Taluk, Tambaram Taluk, Tiruvallur Taluk, Chengalpet Taluk, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Ponneri Taluk and Poonamallee Taluk.
A B C D E F G H
(iv) Under the said Plan, all lands in the Metropolitan Area were categorised into 10 zones such as Primary Residential Use Zone, Mixed Residential Use Zone, Commercial Use Zone, Light Industrial Use Zone, General Industrial Use Zone, Special and Hazardous Industrial Use Zone, Institutional Use Zone, Open Space and Recreational Use Zone, Agricultural Use Zone and Non-Urban Use Zone.
(v) Along with the First Master Plan, a set of rules known as Development Control Rules were issued by the Government.
These rules dealt with (i) permission for development (ii) use zones and (iii) general provisions.
(vi) Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules, which comes under Part III, under the heading “General Provisions” deals with layout and subdivision.
(vii) The liability to reserve a portion of the site in a layout as open space, arose out of Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules, till these rules were in operation.
Para 17. Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules contains a Table which prescribes the minimum width of the streets and roads in different types of layouts. Just below the Table under Rule 19, there is a Note. The said Note contains 3 prescriptions. The third prescription in the said Note contains a Table indicating the extent of land to be reserved for communal and recreational purposes in a layout or subdivision for residential, commercial, industrial or combination of such uses.
Para 21. It may be of interest to note that at the time when the First Master Plan was conceived in 1975, the concept of “Group Development” or “Flats”, had not gained momentum in the City of Chennai. Therefore, the Development Control Rules did not contain specific provisions to regulate the same. But when developers started promoting flats, the issue was taken up by the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority with the Government, in a letter dated 22.3.1981. On the basis of the said letter of the Member Secretary and the recommendations of the Technical Committee of MMDA and the response of the public to the proposed amendment to the Rules, the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 940, Housing and Urban Development, dated 8.10.1982, approving the Draft Rules for incorporation in the ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Development Control Rules with certain modifications. They were issued by the Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section 32 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
Para 22. By the Amendment so made to the Development Control Rules, sub-rules (b) & (c) were inserted under Rule 19. While sub-rule (b) dealt with “Special Buildings”, sub-rule (c) dealt with “Set Back” for residential and commercial. Under Clause (v) of sub-rule (c) of Rule 19, the extent of land to be reserved for Community Recreational Purposes, was indicated in a tabular column. It reads as follows:
Para 23. But in so far as “Group Development/Flats” are concerned, the open space to be reserved for Community Recreational Purposes was indicated in a separate Table in the same Government Order G.O. Ms. No. 940, dated 08.10.1982, as follows:
A B C D E F G H Para 24. Rule 19(a) & (b) was amended further by G.O.Ms. No. 35, Housing and Urban Development, dated 9.1.1989. But the Amendments introduced by the said Government Order covered only layouts of the extent between 3,000 sq.meters and 10,000 sq.meters. In other words, layouts of larger extents above 10,000 sq.meters, were not covered by the said Amendment.
Para 25. There appears to be a subsequent amendment. Though the year of such amendment is not clear, the Development Control Rules hosted in the Internet by the CMDA, as amended upto September 2004, contains two Tables, one in respect of normal buildings under Rule 19(a) and another in respect of “Special Buildings and Group Developments” under Rule 19(b). The Table under Rule 19(a) is as follows:
Para 26. The Table under Rule 19(b) in respect of Special Buildings, is as follows:
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Para 27. After a spurt in developmental activities, the CMDA felt a need for a Second Master Plan for the Chennai Metropolitan Area. Therefore, a Draft Second Master Plan 2011 was prepared and submitted to the Government and the Government gave its consent to it under G.O.Ms. No. 59, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 30.6.1995. After public consultation, it was submitted to the Government in December 1995 for approval. But approval could not be granted on account of an interim prohibitory order granted by this Court in a Writ Petition. Though the Writ Petition W.P. No. 14819 of 1995 was eventually dismissed on 10.7.2001, the Government returned the Draft Second Master Plan to the CMDA for suitable modifications. This was under G.O.Ms. No. 408, dated 5.10.2001.
Para 28. Thereafter, a revised Draft Second Master Plan with the year 2026 as the horizon year, was prepared and submitted to the Government in December 2005. The Government again returned it under G.O.Ms. No. 331, H & UD Department, dated 5.12.2006, with a direction to incorporate certain developments in the field and to submit a fresh proposal for consent. This was done in February 2007 and the Government gave its consent on 30.3.2007.
Para 29. Thereafter, copies of the Draft Second Master Plan were made available to the public and also hosted in the official website of the First Respondent. Subsequently public consultations were A B C D E F G H conducted in April and July 2007 and a two-day workshop was also held in August 2007. Thereafter, the draft was finalised and submitted to the Government. Finally, the Second Master Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area was approved by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms. No. 190, Housing and Urban Development, dated 2.9.2008 and it was notified in the Gazette on the same day. As part of the Second Master Plan, a set of Regulations known as “Development Regulations” were issued and they came into force on 2.9.2008.
Para 30. Regulation 26 of the Development Regulations 2008, contains stipulations regarding “Special Buildings”. A Special Building is defined in Regulation 2(40) to mean (i) a residential or commercial building with more than two floors, or (ii) a residential building with more than 6 dwelling units or (iii) a commercial building exceeding a floor area of 300 sq.meters.”
44. After referring to Rule 27 dealing with group developments and Rule 29 which dealing with layout and sub division regulations and finding it to correspond to Rule 19 of the DCR and further noticing Rule 27 in greater detail, the learned Single Judge then proceeds to hold further as follows: - “Para 34. A careful survey of (i) the provisions that existed from 1975 till 2008 under the First Master Plan and the Development Control Rules, and (ii) the provisions that exist with effect from 2008 under the Second Master Plan and the Development Regulations, would show that layouts had always been classified into 3 categories. They are, (i) those whose total land extent is upto 3,000 sq.meters, (ii) those whose total land extent is between 3,000 sq.meters and 10,000 sq.meters, and (iii) those whose total land extent is above 10,000 sq.meters.
Para 35. Consistently, the Development Control Rules which were in force till 2008 and the Development Regulations which are in force from 2008, have exempted layouts whose total extent of land is upto 3,000 sq.meters, from the obligation to reserve any open space. Similarly, the Rules have consistently given two options, either to hand over 10% of the area excluding roads or to pay the market value of equivalent land, in so far as layouts whose total extent of land is between 3,000 sq.meters and 10,000 sq.meters.
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
Para 36. But, in respect of layouts whose total extent of land is above 10,000 sq.meters, the Rules have always insisted upon handing over of Open Space Reservation land to the extent of 10% of the total area. In respect of layouts whose total extent is above 10,000 sq.meters, it was made clear by the successive Government Orders that no charges in lieu of 10% of the area can be accepted. This is borne out by—
(1) G.O.Ms. No. 743, Housing and Urban Development, dated 10.5.1979,
(2) G.O.Ms. No. 940, Housing and Urban Development, dated 8.10.1982,
(3) the Development Control Rules as of September, 2004 (hosted in the official website) and the Table contained therein under Rules 19(a) & 19(b), and
(4) Regulation 29 and Annexure XX under the Development Regulations of the year 2008.”
We are fortified in our conclusion that the Rule in question was statutory in nature. Section 123 (2) contemplates that every rule made under the Act is to be laid as soon as may be on the table of the Legislative Assembly and it inter alia enables the Assembly to modify the rule and if the Assembly decides that the rule should not be made or give it a modified operation or no effect, then such a decision of the Assembly will prevail. It is to be noticed that this is after providing that unless otherwise expressed, the rules come into force on the day on which they are published in the Gazette. This shows that the rule has life without reference to the Legislative Assembly. It is undoubtedly true that Section 122 speaks of the power of the Government to make rules. While it is true that the Master Plan is to be prepared by the CMDA and the rules would form part of the Master Plan, the scheme of the rules would show that it is only with the approval of the Government that the rules along with the Master Plan come into force. We have already noticed the effect of Section 32 as indeed it was considered by the learned Single Judge in the judgment we have referred to.
THE GIFT DEED IN VASANTH APARTMENTS CASE
45. The complaint about there being no rationale in allowing a developer who develops a layout which is between 3000 sq.m. and 10000 A B C D E F G H sq.m. to pay the equivalent is to be found both in the circumstance that it is permitted only when there is a physical complaint and also it is obvious that the local Authority would be expected to plough back the money equivalent into making available alternate facility by way of OSR in such cases.
46. It is necessary to notice the relevant facts in the case relating to Vasanth Apartments in greater detail. The writ petition filed by the Association of Vasanth Owners is in the year 2007. The Vasanth Apartments is located at 100 feet bye-pass road, Velacherry. The apartments were promoted as group developments in terms of approval granted by the CMDA on 16.05.1997. The Apartments consist of 12 blocks, out of which 11 blocks consist of 4 storeys and house about 180 dwellings.The total area of the layout is more than 10,000 sq. mtr. 10% of the total area consisting of 1164 sq. mtr. was reserved for use as OSR. A gift was executed on 10.02.1994 under the DCR. The CMDA was either to maintain the OSR area on its own or to permit the appellant Association to maintain the same. 180 families residing in the campus do not have any park and any recreational facility despite the OSR. Thereafter, there is reference to attempts being made by some persons to encroach on the said OSR area for some other purposes. Several loads of earth was dumped in the OSR area. The case on the other hand of the respondents as can be seen from the writ appeal is that at the time of construction, the land owners earmarked the portion of the land, that is, 11836 sq. feet, as open space regulation (OSR area) for road and park and gifted the same as per the gift deed.The second respondent Corporation has formed road in that land during the year 2003 itself and was maintaining the same. It is their case that the appellant Association was blocking the said road. The said road is a shortest link from West Vellachery to East Vellachery - Vijay Nagar and this road gives access to Venkateshwara Nagar, MGR Nagar and Devikarumariamman Nagar etc., where one lakh people are living in Vellachery.
47. Now, it is necessary to notice the actual terms of the gift deed which was executed on 18th February, 1994. The relevant terms read as follows: - “ GIFT DEED This indenture made on this 18th day of February 1994.
between ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
1. Shri K.S. Dasarathan, Hindu, aged about 48 years.
2. Smt. D. Inbanayagi, Hindu, aged about 40 years, wife of Shri K.S.Dasarathan.
both residing at 84, Dr. Natesan Road, Mylapore, Madras-4.
3. Shri G.T. Murugesan, Hindu, aged about 45 years.
4. Smt. M. Jayalakshmi, Hindu, aged about 40 years, wife of Shri G.T.Murugesan.
both residing at No.35, Nainar Nadar Road, Mylapore, Madras- 4.
All represented by their Power Agent Shri M.S. Rajamanickam, son of ShriM. Sivagnanam, aged about 42 years, residing at 75, C.P. Ramasamy Road, Alwarpet, Madras, hereinafter called “THE DONOR” of the one part;
and The Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, represented by itsMember Secretary, having their office at No.8, Gandhi Irwin Road,”Thalamuthu Natarajan Building”, Egmore, Madras, hereinafter called”THE DONEE” on the other part;
WHEREAS the “DONOR” is well sufficiently entitled, free from allencumbrances, the piece of lands for roads and parks hereunderdescribed and intended to be hereby granted conveyed and assigned.
WHEREAS the DONOR is the absolute GPA holder of the property bearing S.No.379/1 (Part) and 380 / 4 (part) of Velacherry Village andsubmitted a proposal for development of the land in the above S.Nos. for residential purposes.To comply with the rules and regulations prevailingnow, the DONOR in the interest of public has agreed to transfer the roadsand parkand other open space hereunder described through a gift deedin favour of DONEE and DONEE has agreed to accept the same.
Now this indenture witnesseth that the DONOR doth hereby give,grant, convey and assign in the interest of public unto the DONEE whohereby accepts the same all that lands for roads, parks and other openspace situated in S.Nos.379 / 1, (part) and A B C D E F G H 380 / 4 (part) which is for the use of the public comprised in layout sketch enclosed, within registration subdistrictof Madras South and registration district of Madras Central and more particularly described in the schedule hereunder written and the DONOR doth hereby covenant with the DONEE that the DONOR now does have good right to grant, convey and assign the lands of roads/parkshere by granted conveyed and assigned upto the “DONEE” with themanner aforesaid and that the “DONEE” shall and may at all timeshereafter peacefully and quietly possess and enjoy the said lands ofroads/parks free from all encumbrances whatsoever without any lawfuleviction, interruption, claim, whatsoever, from or by the “DONOR” or any person claiming under or interest for him and further that the “DONOR”and all person having lawfully or equitably claiming any rights onroads/parks or interest with the said premises or any part thereof from under or interest for the “DONOR” or from or under any of his ancestors shall and will from time to time and at all times hereafter at the request of and cost of the “DONOR” do execute and register or cause to be done executed and registered all such acts, deeds and things whatsoever forfurther and more perfectly assuring the said lands or roads and parksevery part thereof unto the “DONEE” in the manner aforesaid or as shallor may be reasonably required.
THE SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY
All that piece and parcel of lands measuring 1100 square metersreserved for parks/open spaces and marked in colour of the layout sketchenclosed herein situated in S.No.379/1 (part) and 380/4 (part) of Velacherry Village, Saidapet Taluk, Madras and within the subregistration District of Madras South and Registration District of Madras Central.
The value of property Rs.1,99,000/-.”
WHETHER THE IMPUGNED RULE VIOLATES
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION? IS IT DISCRIMINATORY?
48. As far as this ground is concerned, we do not find any reference to this line of argument before the High Court. In the writ petition filed by the Vasanth Apartments (writ petition no. 23397 of 2007) the only ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
feeble reference, if at all we can understand the same to be one, is ground (F) where what is contended is that the CMDA had no power under the Constitution to usurp the lands of citizens free of cost, that too selectively, under the guise of regulating the development of the area. In the written submissions, no doubt we may notice the following: - “(v) Further, if a plot measuring 200m x 55m abutting a road of wide 1O m and above if developed by seeking a single approval, it would attract the impugned rule of gifting 10% area whereas if it is divided into 4 pieces of 50 m* 55 m and sold to 4 individuals and then developed by the 4 persons, for the same development, then the impugned rule will not be attracted. Therefore, the impugned rule mandating the transfer of OSR area free of cost has no rational basis and hence arbitrary.
(vi) Further, if an open space is required for public purpose, then every public would be enjoying the same. The state may tax the public based on wealth but can not tax only a person who is proposing to develop an area of 10,000 sqm. Therefore, the classification has neither any intelligible differentia nor has rational nexus with the object of town Planning. Therefore, the impugned rule is discriminatory and hence violative of Art.14 of Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Court Supreme Court in Yogendra Pal & others Vs. Municiplaity, Bhatinda, reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court 2550 [relevant para-9] has held that the statutory provisions U/S 192(1)(c) of the Punjab Municipal Act’1911 and U/S 203(1)(c) of Haryana Municipal Act’1973 enabling the State to seek transfer of land to the extent of 25% of the private land free of cost while developing a building scheme as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while upholding the said provisions as not violative of Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(2) (the then existing provisions) of Constitution of India but held the said provisions as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, due to the aforesaid reasons, the mandate under the impugned rule to transfer the OSR area free of cost is without any basis and hence arbitrary and unreasonable and discriminatory and hence violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India.”
49. In the review petition (filed as review application no. 69 of 2008) also there is no contention seeking to ventilate the complaint that A B C D E F G H the impugned rule falls foul of Article 14 on the basis that it is discriminatory.
50. We are concerned in this case with the provision which provides for town planning. In regard to such law, a certain measure of free play is to be given to the planning authority bearing in mind that it is urban planning what is involved. In regard to the grant of development permit up to 3000 sq. mtr., the rules do not contemplate any requirement in the matter of OSR. It is a matter which goes to the wisdom and clearly falls within the realm of policy. In other words, having regard to the size of the development contemplated, the authority has not found it fit to provide for reservation under the head open space. It cannot be described as being bereft of any rationale that upon the minimum threshold of 3,000 sq. mtr. being breached and the layout being between 3,000 sq. mtr. and 10,000 sq. mtr., 10% of the area excluding roads is to be maintained as open space. In other words, 10% of area would have to be reserved for communal and recreational facilities. It is no doubt true that that in cases falling in the said category namely group developments which comprise of an area in excess of 3,000 sq. mtr. and up to 10,000 sq. mtr., it is open to the project proponent to pay the market value equal to the land on the basis of valuation as provided therein. However, it is only if on account of the physical constraints it is not possible to provide open space, that payment is contemplated. Another noteworthy feature is that in cases where the land is between 3,000 sq. mtr. and 10,000 sq. mtr. public access for the area as earmarked shall not be insisted upon. It is when it comes to a case where if the area goes above 10,000 sq. mtrs., that it becomes obligatory to reserve 10% of the area excluding road and the OSR reserved is to be transferred by way of gift deed.
51. We are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that the impugned rule violates Article 14 on the score that it is discriminatory. In a challenge to a provision based on discrimination under Article 14, the burden is on the applicant to lay clear foundation in pleadings and further to discharge the burden by making good the case and the court will not lightly enter a finding of discrimination. Town planning being a complex subject involving various inputs and value judgements which are intended to ensure the orderly, visionary and planned development, they require greater deference from courts.
IS THE IMPUGNED RULE/ REGULATION ULTRA VIRES?
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
52. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioner that the impugned provisions represent a case of they being ultra vires. In General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and another v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav and another30, this Court was considering the validity of Rule 5C of the Cantonment Funds Servants Rules, 1937. It was contended that it was contrary to Section 280(2)(c) of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The argument was accepted. The argument of the appellant, that in view of the provision in the Parent Act that Rules, when published, would have effect as if they were enacted in the Act, was repelled. We notice only the following discussion:
“14. This contention is unsound. It is well settled that rules framed under the provisions of a statute form part of the statute. In other words, rules have statutory force. But before a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority framing the rule. If either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void. The position remains the same even though sub-section (2) of Section 281 of the Act has specifically provided that after the rules are framed and published they shall have effect as if enacted in the Act.”
53. In Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others31, the Parent Act conferred power on the Delegate from the Government, to make Rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act, a familiar legislative device. The contention taken was that the Rule in question revealed the Delegate surpassing its authority. We notice the following discussion:
“8. … Tea estates are excluded from the provisions of the Act by Section 5. “Tea estate” is defined in the interpretation clause of the Act to mean an area under tea plantation and includes within the definition “such other area necessary for purposes subservient to a tea plantation as may be prescribed”. Rule 3 defines what areas shall be treated as subservient to a tea plantation. The amendment made vide notification dated 4-4-1986 places an embargo on the right to transfer such subservient land though
30 (1988) 2 SCC 351
31 (2000) 3 SCC 40
A B C D E F G H exempted from the operation of the Act. Clearly the impugned proviso is beyond the rule-making power of the State Government as conferred by the Act. It is well settled that the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative functions which consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. What is permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative functions, or, what is fictionally called, a power to fill up the details. [See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, (7th Edn., 1999, at pp. 689-90).]
9. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC 187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569 : AIR 1990 SC 334] this Court has held:
“(A) delegated legislation or a subordinate legislation must conform exactly to the power granted.”
(SCC p. 222, para 62)
“Rules, whether made under the Constitution or a statute, must be intra vires the parent law under which power has been delegated.”
10. In General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Dr Subhash Chandra Yadav [(1988) 2 SCC 351 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 542 :
(1988) 7 ATC 296 : AIR 1988 SC 876] it has been held: (SCC p. 357, para 14)
“[B]efore a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority framing the rule. If either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void.”
54. Finally, we may notice Global Energy Ltd. and another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission32. This Court laid down as follows:
“25. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the rule-making power “for carrying out the purpose of the Act” is a general delegation. Such a general delegation may not be held to be laying
32 (2009) 15 SCC 570
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of such a provision alone, the regulation-making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act.
26. We may, in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. [(2000) 3 SCC 40] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC p. 47, para 14)
“14. We are also of the opinion that a delegated power to legislate by making rules ‘for carrying out the purposes of the Act’ is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act itself.”
[See also State of Kerala v. Unni [(2007) 2 SCC 365] (SCC paras 32 to 37) and A.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission v. R.V.K. Energy (P) Ltd. [(2008) 17 SCC 769 : (2008) 9 Scale 529] ]
55. The case law is relied upon to contend that the impugned provisions, in the cases before us, purport to achieve, what is not contemplated by the Act. In other words, the Act does not contemplate the execution of the gift deed. It becomes impermissible for the Delegate of the Law Giver to make subordinate legislation to provide so. We may only finally notice the recent Judgment of this Court in Indian Young Lawyers Association and others (Sabarimala Temple-In Re.) v. State of Kerala and others33, where this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principles. (See paragraphs 137 to 140 and paragraph 373).
THE IMPACT OF SECTIONS 36 AND 37
56. The appellants/petitioner would argue that Sections 36 and 37 contemplate acquisition of the lands which are reserved. This means that there cannot be a gift deed, as contemplated in the impugned Rules/ Regulations.
57. We are afraid that though at first blush, the argument may appear to be attractive, it cannot pass muster on a deeper scrutiny. What Section 36 provides is, for power to acquire land, under the Land Acquisition Act. It goes on to provide that any land required, reserved or designated in a regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan, is
33 (2019) 11 SCC 1
A B C D E F G H deemed to be land needed for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. What is more, such land can be acquired under the said law, as modified in the Act. It is thereafter that Section 37 contemplates that upon publication of the notice in a Government Gazette of the preparation of the plan that any land is required, reserved or designated in such plan, the appropriate Planning Authority, which includes, no doubt, the CMDA, can do two things: (1) It may enter into an agreement for the acquisition by purchase of any land. It is apparently land, which is covered by Section 36, which means land which is required, reserved or designated in a master plan, inter alia. (2) The Planning Authority may apply to the Government for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 37(2) goes on to provide that if an application is received and if the Government is satisfied that the land is needed for the public purpose, the Government may make a declaration in the manner provided in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. It will be noticed that what is contemplated under Sections 36 and 37 is that it is in regard to any land, which is required, reserved or designated in a plan that the question of acquiring such a land arises. In other words, if the property is needed under the plan and it is shown as required, reserved or designated, as such, in the plan, then, it is open to the Authority acting in coordination with the Government to acquire such land so that the lofty goal of planned and orderly development, contemplated in the plan, is achieved. In this connection, it is relevant to notice that Section 37 kicks in immediately upon the publication of a notice for the preparation of the plan. The notice is published under Section 26 or Section 27. Such notice is published after the consent of the Government is received under Section 25. It is next relevant to notice Section 38. Section 38 allows the period of three years from the date of publication of the notice under Section 26 or Section 27 for the Government to publish the declaration contemplated under Section 37, which, no doubt, amounts to a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 38 provides that if the declaration is not made under Section 37 of the Act, the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation. The time limit of three years, not being observed for acquiring the land by way of purchase, also has the same result, viz., the land, which in the plan, is shown as reserved, allotted or designated, shall be freed from such reservation, allotment or designation.
58. We are, in these cases, dealing with the reservation of land by a person, who applies for development of the land and, more specifically, ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
for the purpose of group development. The person, who applies, becomes obliged under Rule 19(b) to reserve 10 per cent of his land excluding roads, for communal and recreational purposes. This is a reservation to be made by a person applying for planning permission on the basis of the extent of the layout. It is, no doubt, premised on the land being in excess of a certain threshold becoming subject matter of the planning permission. The land so reserved is to be freed from any construction by the owner/ promoter/developer. The land for communal and recreational purposes, is to be restricted at ground level in a shape and location to be specified by the CMDA (See Clause (3) of the Explanation in Rules.). Therefore, the exact land to be reserved under the impugned Rule, will vary from case to case. It is not to be confused with the areas required, reserved or designated in the plan. In fact, in Annexure XX, which is the subject matter of the 2008 Regulations, the specific requirement in regard to the place where the OSR is to be located is indicated as the place where the property abuts a public road.
59. From the Preamble to the DCR, it would appear that the first master plan was prepared in 1975 for the Chennai Metropolitan Area and the Government approved it on 04.12.1976. As found by V. Ramasubramanium, J. in the Judgment, which we have elaborately referred to, the DCR came to be issued along with the first master plan. Thereafter, as noticed by him, to deal with group development or flats, the issue was taken up by the CMDA by letter dated 22.03.1981, Government issued GoMS dated 08.10.1982. The learned Judge has found that the Government exercised power under Section 32 of the Act. What we are indicating is that the reservation of the land for communal or recreational purposes in individual cases, on the basis of applications made by persons, is not to be conflated with the land which is declared as required, reserved or designated in the master plan, inter alia, which latter categories alone are the subject matter of Sections 36 and 37 of the Act.
IS THE IMPUGNED RULE/REGULATION BAD FOR
THE REASON THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO THE
MANDATE OF SECTION 39 OF THE ACT?
60. Section 39 of the Act, reads as follows:
“39. Right to compensation. - (1) Any person whose property is injuriously affected by virtue of any of the provisions contained in any regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan or a A B C D E F G H new town development plan made under this Act shall, if he prefers a claim for the purpose to the Tribunal with such particulars and within such period as may be prescribed, be entitled to obtain compensation in respect thereof as determined by the Tribunal: Provided that property shall not be deemed to be injuriously affected by reason of any of the provisions inserted in any development plan which impose any condition or restriction in regard to any of the matters specified in clause (f) of sub-section (2) of section 15, or in clauses (k) and (l) of sub-section (2) of section 17 or in clauses (m) and (n) of sub-section (1) of section 20, as the case may be.
(2) If, at any time after the day on which any regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan, or a new town development plan has come into force, such plan is varied, or revoked, any person who has incurred any expenditure for the purpose of complying with such plan, shall, if he prefers a claim for the purpose to the Tribunal with such particulars and within such time as may be prescribed, be entitled to obtain compensation in respect thereof as determined by the Tribunal, if by reason only of the variation or revocation of such plan, such expenditure has ceased to be in any way beneficial to him.”
61. What Section 39 contemplates is the following:
A person must be injuriously affected on account of any of the provisions contained in a regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan or a new town development plan, under the Act. Should this occur, the affected party becomes entitled to move the Tribunal and seek compensation, which is to be determined by the Tribunal. The proviso to Section 39(1), however, declares that property shall not be deemed to be injuriously affected on account of any development plan, which may impose certain conditions, which are specified in Section 15(2)(f), Section 17(2)(k) and (l) or in Section 20(1)(m) and (n).
62. ‘Development plan’ is defined in Section 2(15) as follows: “(15) “development plan” means a plan for the development or re-development or improvement of the area within the jurisdiction of a planning authority and includes a regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan and a new town development plan prepared under the Act.”
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
63. Therefore, a development plan would embrace a master plan. The effect of the proviso is that, in respect of the matters contained in the proviso, the law declares that there would not be a claim for compensation on the basis that the property of a person is injuriously affected as a result of the contents of the development plan in relation to matters specified in the proviso. The word ‘injuriously affected’ would apparently mean that a person has land, which is adversely affected as a result of the coming into operation of the development plan. Section 15(2)(f) deals with demarcation of objects and buildings of archaeological or historical interests or of natural beauty or actually used for religious purposes or as regarded by the public with veneration. Similarly, Section 17(2)(k) deals with control of architectural features, elevation and frontage of buildings and structures. Section 17(2)(l), which is also referred to in the proviso, deals with matters relating to zonal regulations, location, the height, the number of storeys, size of buildings and other structures, the size of the yards and other open spaces and the use of buildings, structures and land. If anyone is otherwise injuriously affected as a result of any of these aspects provided for in a master plan under Section 17, he cannot make a complaint of it under Section 39 and claim compensation for it. The master plan provides for zones, nine in number. One of the zones is open space zone. Open space requirements are separately stipulated in respect of other zones. Similarly, Section 20, which deals with the contents of the detailed development plan, in sub-Section (1)(m), deals essentially with buildings of archaeological and historical interests, inter alia. Section 20(1)(n) of the Act reads as follows: “20(1)(n) the imposition of conditions and restrictions in regard to the character, density, architectural features and height of buildings, the building or control lines for roads, railway lines and power supply lines and the purposes to which buildings or specified areas may or may not be appropriated and the provision and maintenance of sufficient open spaces about buildings;”
64. A perusal of Section 39 would clearly reveal that a right to compensation is conferred on any person whose property is ‘injuriously affected’ by any of the provisions contained in the master plan. A person seeking to develop his land and if he falls within the ambit of rule/regulation in question cannot be described as a person whose property is injuriously affected by the provisions of the master plan inter alia. The very language used in Section 39 appears to be incongruous with the raising of any such claim.It is not as if the parties have in this case raised any such A B C D E F G H claim.The contention taken in the case of M/s. Keyaram Hotels is that Section 39 provides for compensation to persons who are affected in the manner provided in the said provision. The provision actually deals with cases of a person having property, who, with the making of a master plan, inter alia, becomes injuriously affected. The words ‘injuriously affected’ would bear meaning if expounded with reference to a person who has a property and that property becomes injuriously affected by virtue of the provision of any master plan. Take for instance, the land of a person is found to fall in a zone which is earmarked in the primary residential use zone. The provision in the DCR which forms part of the plan inter alia provides that all uses not specifically permitted under subrule (a) and (b) will stand prohibited in the zone. The proviso is only to be understood as qualifying the ambit of the main provision which itself must be understood has application in cases where a person is injuriously affected by the provision of a master plan interalia.
65. We are reinforced in our view that the contention of the appellants is misplaced with reference to the concept of ‘injuriously affected’ finding expression in Section 39, having regard to the decision by this Court in Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat34. This was also a case relating to town planning.It arose under the Bombay Town Planning Act. We may only refer to paragraph 10 which reads as follows:
“10. Section 69 states that the owner of any property or right which is injuriously affected by the making of a town planning scheme shall be entitled to obtain compensation from the local authority or from any person benefited or partly from the local authority and partly from such person as the Town Planning Officer may in each case determine. It seems obvious that the property or right which is injuriously affected by the making of a town planning scheme is a property or right other than that acquired for the purposes of the scheme. The property or right affected remains with the owner who is entitled to compensation for such injurious affection. When under the Act a plot of land is taken for the purposes of a town planning scheme, it cannot be suggested that that land itself is injuriously affected; such a view is unsupportable both as a matter of language and having regard to the scheme of the Act. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that clause (xiii) would cover the case of the appellant if only we read a few words
34 (1981) 3 SCC 508
ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
in that clause and that we should do so to avoid injustice being done to the appellant and the owners of land similarly situated. That we are afraid is not possible. We find no compelling reason for restructuring the clause, and taking acquisition of land to mean “injurious affection” of the land acquired would be inconsistent with the entire scheme of the Act. We may refer to clause “fourthly” of Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which requires the court to take into consideration in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under that Act, the damage sustained by the “person interested” “by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property”. The expression “person interested” as defined in Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act means all persons calming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under that Act. It is made clear in clause “fourthly” that the damage is for injurious affection of some property other than the land acquired. The sense in which the expression “injurious affection” is used in Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is the generally accepted meaning of that expression and we find nothing in the Act concerned in this case that suggests that it should be construed differently.”
66. The case of a person developing land being subjected to the requirement of leaving 10 percent of the property in a situation where more than nearly 2 and a half acres is being developed in an urban metropolis as space for communal and recreational purposes cannot be said to be a person ‘injuriously affected’ within the meaning of Section 39.
THE IMPACT OF SECTIONS 48 TO 55
67. The contention is taken that Sections 48 and 49 do not authorise or enable deprivation of a person’s property sought to be developed free of cost.Equally, it is contended that Sections 52 to 54 obligate the state to acquire lands even if permission for development is rejected or if any of the conditions for any permission is objected or even if any modifications of already given permission is not acceptable to the owner. It is also contended that Sections 52 to 54 patently provide for compensation. Therefore, the impugned rule which provides for a compelled gift involving transfer of right to property free of cost is ultravires. It is the further contention that the legislature took extraordinary care to ensure that a A B C D E F G H landowner is not affected or injured even slightly because of the planning law. The exceptions from obligation to pay compensation are provided in Sections 17(2)(k) and (l) which relate to the use of land and do not provide for reserving any land for public purpose.
68. Section 47 of the Act comes under Chapter VI which deals with control of development and use of land. It declares that afterthe coming into operation of any development plan in any area, any person, other than the government or local authority, cannot use or cause to be used any land otherwise in accordance with the development plan.This would mean that once a development plan which includesa master plan comes into operation which happens on the approval of the government being published under Section 30 of the Act in the Gazette,Development activities must be carried on only in accordance with the terms of the master plan. Section 48 is intended to place restrictions on buildings and land when a notice in the Gazette is published under Section 26, inter alia. With the publication of the notice which is a prelude to the coming into operation of the plan under Section 30, Section 48 prohibits the erection of any building or other work or other excavationas enumerated therein except with a written permission of the planning authority and subject to such conditions. Section 49 provides for application for such permission when notice of preparation of a master plan, interalia, is published under Section 26 of the Act inviting the restrictions contemplated in Section 48. It is dealing with such a situation, namely, when the master plan, inter alia, has not come into operation and only a notice is published under Section 26, inter alia, that Section 49(2) provides for three matters which are to guide the planning authority in deciding whether permission should be granted or not. They are as follows: i. The purpose.
ii.The suitability of the place for such purpose.
iii. The future development and maintenance of the planning area.
69. Section 50 provides that the permission granted under Section 49 is to remain in force for a period of three years from the date of permission. It can be extended but subject to a maximum period of three years.Section 52 provides for an obligation to acquire land or building. It operates in the following circumstances. A land may be required or reserved or designated in any development plan which includes master plan. A person must be interested in the land or building which is so ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
required, reserved or designated in such plan. He must have made an application seeking permission.The application must have been either refused or granted, subject to conditions. For the section to operate the following further conditions must exist. The refusal to grant permission should result in the land or building becoming incapable of reasonably beneficial use in the condition in which the land is.This means that as a result of the land or building being required, reserved or designated in the plan, the person interested in the land or building is unable to use the land for which he could have used, but for the requirement, reservation or designation in the plan, and it has resulted in the rejection of his application for permission to develop the property. Then the law has given the person so aggrieved to serve a notice described as the ‘acquisition notice’ calling upon the government to acquire his interest in the land or building. The same would be the position if permission is granted but subject to the conditions which render the land incapable of beneficial use. Section 53 deals with refusal of permission or grant of permission subject to conditions in certain other cases. Infact, the proviso in Section 53 declares that no compensation can be claimed under the main provision if the refusal or grant of permission subject to conditions is based on any provision of any development plan. Section 54 deals with cases of permission which is granted for any development under the Act being revoked or modified.Section 54(2) contemplates compensation for the expenditure which is incurred for carrying out the development based on the grant of permission which was rendered abortive by the revocation.Section 55 declares that nothing in the Act confers any right to obtain compensation in respect of development made by a person after a notice in the Gazette is published under Section 26, inter alia, without obtaining the permission as required under Section 49. Sub-section 2 of Section 55 reads as follows: - “(2). Whether any property is alleged to be injuriously affected by reason of any of the provisions contained in any development plan, no compensation shall be paid in respect thereof, if or in so far as the provisions are such as would have been enforceable without any compensation under any law, rule or regulation or bye-law at the time in force.”
70. We are unable to find merit in the contention that Rule 19 of the DCR or the regulation which is impugned is in anyway ultravires of the provision of the Act and the arguments suggestive of the same are repelled.
A B C D E F G H
71. Even though the appellant’s (M/s. Keyaram Hotels Pvt.Ltd.) attempt to invite us to pronounce on the validity of the impugned rule on the score that it contravened the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Apartment Ownership Act, 1994 which got presidential assent on 06.04.1995 and came to be notified on 24.04.1995, we do not think that the appellant should be permitted to test the validity of the impugned rule on a ground which was not raised before the High Court.It is true that the gift deed was executed on 22.05.1996. But this was not a ground which was urged before the court and we do not intend to explore the contention in this proceeding.
72. We have found that the impugned rule/ regulation cannot be said to be ultra vires the parent act. This is after finding that the rule has statutory force.
THE RIGHTS REGIME
73. It is necessary to deal with a right, a person has, as an owner of a property. In Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edition, we note the following:
“Secondly, the owner normally has a right to use and enjoy the thing owned: right to manage it, i.e., the right to decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income from it. Whereas the right to possess is a right in the strict sense, these rights are in fact liberties: the owner has a liberty to use the thing, i.e., he is under no duty not to use it, in contrast with others who are under a duty not to use or interfere with it.”
74. We may however notice the following:
“This does not mean, however, that an owner whose property is unencumbered has completely unlimited rights. To describe someone as an absolute owner of property is to say two things; it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable, and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. We have seen that the rights of ownership may be limited by the adverse dominant rights of an encumbrancer or by the rights of the possessor (who is in fact one very special type of an encumbrancer). They may also be limited by special provisions of law such as Town & Country planning law, which regulates for social purposes the use which an owner may make office land. But in addition to being restricted by such specific provisions of ASSOCIATION OF VASANTH APARTMENTS’ OWNERS v.
V. GOPINATH & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] A B C D E F G H 1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 9 S.C.R.
public law, and owner’s rights are restricted by a whole variety of provisions of the ordinary law, according to which various harmful and dangerous types of conduct qualify as criminal or tortious; the fact that I am the owner of a knife will not entitle me to use it to kill Smith. We may say that an owner is free to use and dispose of his property as he pleases, except in so far as he does not infringe his duties to specific encumbrancers, his duties under special regulations concerning the use of property (f) and his general duties under the general law of the land (f).”
(Emphasis supplied)
75. In T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member,35 this Court while dealing with a case arising under the Town Planning Law had this to say:
“13. Town Planning legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation.
15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away.It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of legitimate expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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