P. V. Nidhish & Ors. v. Kerala State Wakf Board & Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 452; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 547
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Dipankar Datta Wakf Act, Justice 1995 – S.52a Added By 2013 Amendment – Penal Provision – Operation Of
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 309/2023
- Sections
- 52A, 3, 472, 482, 13, 106, 54, 1, 52A(1), 56, 2, 20
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
P. V. NIDHISH & ORS.
v.
KERALA STATE WAKF BOARD & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 309 of 2023)
APRIL 28, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.] Wakf Act, 1995 – s.52A added by 2013 amendment – Penal provision – Operation of, if retrospective – Held: No – Giving effect to a penal statute so as to cover past acts is a proscribed action in law – Therefore, s.52A cannot cover cases where leases of wakf properties had expired in the past and where the tenant or lessee was in physical possession and facing civil proceedings for eviction at the time the amendment of 2013 came into force – Interpretation of Statutes.
Wakf Act, 1995 – s.3(ee) added by 2013 amendment – “Encroacher” – Interpretation – Appellants were holding the premises and civil proceedings for their eviction were pending when the amendment came into force – In view of the dispute over the termination of their tenancy, appellants if became “encroachers” after the amendment became effective – Held: No – The expiry of leases, or other arrangements, by efflux of time or their valid terminations, in the past, cannot be construed to mean that such lessees become “encroachers” – Nor would past tenants whose possession is disputed, and eviction proceedings pending against them before a court, fit that description u/s.3(ee) – The consequences of such an interpretation would be too startling; even before an adjudication of the validity of termination (of leases, for instance), tenants holding over would be exposed to prosecution – There is no allusion to “continuing offence” or any expression suggesting that such a term (mentioned in s.472, CrPC) would be attracted to actions which commenced in the past, i.e., before the amendment of 2013 came into force – To hold otherwise, would be depriving the appellants of their rights u/Article 20(1) which cannot be countenanced – Impugned judgment set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.472, 482 – Constitution of India – Article 21. [2023] 4 S.C.R. 547 A B C D E F G H 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Words & Phrases – “Whoever alienates or purchases or takes possession of” in s.52A, Wakf Act – Discussed – Wakf Act, 1995 – s.52A.
Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 In the present case, it is undeniable that the appellant came into possession even before the wakf was created; before even the Wakf Act, 1954 was enacted (although the precise date is unclear and could be a matter of dispute). It is, however, sufficient to notice that in an interpleader suit, the appellants were permitted to pay rents to the third defendant in the suit. They were holding the premises when the amendment came into force; indeed, a proceeding purporting to evict them was unsuccessfully initiated before the amendment. Another one was commenced and was pending after it came into force. In these circumstances, could it be said that the dispute over the termination of their tenancy, resulted in their becoming “encroachers” after the amendment became effective? [Para 21][562-C-E] 1.2 The expiry of leases, or other arrangements, by efflux of time or their valid terminations, in the past, cannot be construed to mean that such lessees become “encroachers”. Nor would past tenants whose possession is disputed, and eviction proceedings pending against them before a court, fit that description under Section 3 (ee). The consequences of such an interpretation would be too startling; even before an adjudication of the validity of termination (of leases, for instance), tenants holding over would be exposed to prosecution. There is no allusion to “continuing offence” or any expression suggesting that such a term (mentioned in Section 472 Cr. PC) would be attracted to actions which commenced in the past, i.e., before the amendment of 2013 came into force. To hold otherwise, this court would be resorting to an interpretation that directly deprives the appellants of their rights under Article 20(1) - a consequence that cannot be countenanced. The plain text of that provision forbids such an interpretation, and the authorities on that aspect clearly indicate that giving effect to a penal statute so as to cover past acts is a proscribed action in law. Therefore, the expression A B C D E F G H “Whoever alienates or purchases or takes possession of”, which is the opening phrase of Section 52A, cannot be read or construed to include possession taken in the past, which resulted in continued possession, when the provision was enacted. Section 52A cannot cover cases where leases of wakf properties had expired in the past and where the tenant or lessee was, at the time the amendment of 2013 came into force, in physical possession and facing civil proceedings for eviction. It is a matter of record that the Kerala High Court quashed the order of the CEO of the respondent allowing a revision petition and setting aside the eviction of the tenant. The High Court set aside the finding that the tenant was an encroacher. The entire matter was remitted for fresh consideration, by the Wakf Tribunal. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained; it is set aside. [Paras 22-24][562-F-H; 563-A-C, F] Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [1953] SCR 1188 – followed.
Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through L.Rs. v Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [2010] 10 SCR 945; T. Barai v.
Henry Ah Hoe [1983] 1 SCR 905 – relied on.
Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Ajay Agarwal [2010] 3 SCR 70; Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; Kanaiyalal Chandulal Monim v. Indumati T. Potdar and Another [1958] 1 SCR 1394 – referred to.
Norman Printing Bureau v. PS Mamman Haji Wakf Trust 2013 (4) KLT 606 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2010] 3 SCR 70 referred to Para 11 [2015] 5 SCR 435 referred to Para 11 [2010] 10 SCR 945 referred to Para 14 [1953] SCR 1188 followed Para 18 [1983] 1 SCR 905 relied on Para 19 [1958] 1 SCR 1394 referred to Para 20 P. V. NIDHISH & ORS. v. KERALA STATE WAKF BOARD &
ANR.
A B C D E F G H 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
309 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.03.2016 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLMC No. 5072 of 2015.
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Raghenth Basant, Senthil Jagadeesan, Manu Krishnan, Ms. Roopali Lakhotia, Advs. for the Appellants. Haris Beeran, Mustaq Salim, Azhar Asees, Sayid Marzook Bafaki, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The present appeal1 was heard finally, with the consent of counsel for parties. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment of the Kerala High Court2 rejecting their petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereafter “Cr. PC”). They had, through those proceedings, sought a direction to quash a criminal complaint instituted against them.
2. The appellants urge that one P.M. Mammu Haji leased two shop rooms (numbered as municipal numbers VII/214 and VII/215hereafter “the premises”), long ago (in 1916), before the coming into force of the Wakf Act. “Norman Printing Bureau” (hereafter “the Bureau”) was a concern of Achuthan Nair; it was functioning in the premises. A partnership firm was later created, with one P.V. Sami as a partner. The firm continued all these years and continues now. The Bureau publishes ‘Norman Almanac’ containing astronomical data used in astrology.
3. The respondents allege that P.M. Mammu Haji created a wakf in 1951. After his death, a suit was filed by his legal heirs (O.S. No. 130/ 1965 before the Sub Court, Calicut) to remove the trustee. There was an existing dispute even between the legal heirs of Mammu Haji whether there was a Wakf or a trust. In that suit, the court found that Mammu Haji created a private Trust; it removed the existing trustee. In between, 1 Crl. A. No. 309/2023.
2 Dated 03.03.2016 in Crl. MC No. 5072/2015.
A B C D E F G H the rent for the premises was increased, and a Rent Enhancement Deed was executed between the parties, on 15.09.1973. The appellants noticed uncertainty on account of lack of clarity about ownership of the premises and filed an interpleader suit on 30.03.1998 before the Munsiff court, Kozhikode. That suit was transferred to the file of the District Judge (OS 147/2001)where the court decreed the suit and directed the appellants to pay rent to the third defendant.
4. The CEO of the Board initiated several proceedings against the appellants for eviction. The first attempt, in 2004, resulted in an order3 of the Wakf Board to the effect that the appellants were not in unauthorized occupation and could be evicted after issuing notice under provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Another proceeding (OS 13/ 2006) was filed before the Wakf Tribunal against the appellant firm’s manager, for its eviction. This was decreed; but in revision proceedings4, the Kerala High Court ruled that the Wakf Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and the appellants could be evicted only through a civil proceeding before a competent civil court.
5. A civil suit (O.S. No. 22/2012) claimed relief against an order of injunction restraining reconstruction and structural alterations by the appellant; the injunction was issued by the CEO of the trust/wakf. The appellants preferredthe suit and contended that the two, i.e.,wakf and trust could not co-exist because awakf creates a dedication in favour of God while a trust vests the property in the hands of the trustees. The appellants preferred an application alleging that the suit was not maintainable, as a preliminary issue. The tribunal found in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, upon which the appellant approached the Kerala High Court5. A Division Bench of thecourt held6 the suit maintainable before the tribunal. However, on the question of the plaintiff’s competence to seek injunction (before the tribunal)regarding specific tenanted properties, thecourt observed, “on behalf of the Wakf, against the defendant is a matter which will have to be independently considered and decided”as it was a “vexed” question of fact and law which could not be decided in a proceeding under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 dated 16.05.2005 4 CRP No. 106/2008, decided on 14.10.2008.
5 in CRP (Wakf) No. 375/2012.
6 By order dated 05.08.2013, also reported as Norman Printing Bureau v PS Mamman Haji Wakf Trust 2013 (4) KLT 606.
P. V. NIDHISH & ORS. v. KERALA STATE WAKF BOARD & ANR. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] A B C D E F G H 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
6. During the pendency of the suit, the Wakf Act, 1995, was amended, with effect from 01.11.2013. Two new provisions were added. One was the definition of “encroacher” [Section 3 (ee)]: “‘encroacher’ means any person or institution, public or private, occupying wakf property, in whole or part, without the authority of law and includes a person whose tenancy, lease or licence has expired or has been terminated by mutawalli or the Board.”
The “Board” was defined as follows: [Section 3 (c)]:
“c) “Board” means a Board of Waqf established under subsection (1), or as the case may be, under sub-section (2) of section 13 and shall include a common Waqf Board established under section 106"
Some of the new provisions, inter alia, inserted by the amendment- including Section 52A and Section 54, read as follows: “52A. (1) Whoever alienates or purchases or takes possession of, in any manner whatsoever, either permanently or temporarily, any movable or immovable property being a waqf property, without prior sanction of the Board, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years:
Provided that the waqf property so alienated shall without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, be vested in the Board without any compensation therefor.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 any offence punishable under this section shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
(3) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section except on a complaint made by the Board or any officer duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf.
(4) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this section.
************** ************* A B C D E F G H
54. Removal of encroachment from waqf property.—(1)
Whenever the Chief Executive Officer considers whether on receiving any complaint or on his own motion that there has been an encroachment on any land, building, space or other property which is 1 [waqf] property and, which has been registered as such under this Act, he shall cause to be served upon the encroacher a notice specifying the particulars of the encroachment and calling upon him to show cause before a date to be specified in such notice, as to why an order requiring him to remove the encroachment before the date so specified should not be made and shall also send a copy of such notice to the concerned mutawalli.
(2) The notice referred to in sub-section (1) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) If, after considering the objections, received during the period specified in the notice, and after conducting an inquiry in such manner as may be prescribed, the Chief Executive Officer is satisfied that the property in question is waqf property and that there has been an encroachment on any suchwaqf property, he may, make an application to the Tribunal for grant of order of eviction for removing] such encroachment and deliver possession of the land, building, space or other property encroached upon to the mutawalli of the waqf.
(4) The Tribunal, upon receipt of such application from the Chief Executive Officer, for reasons to be recorded therein, make an order of eviction directing that the waqf property shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the waqf property:
Provided that the Tribunal may before making an order of eviction, give an opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the application for eviction has been made by the Chief Executive Officer.
(5) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within forty-five days from the date of affixture of P. V. NIDHISH & ORS. v. KERALA STATE WAKF BOARD & ANR. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] A B C D E F G H 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
the order under sub-section (2), the Chief Executive Officer or any other person duly authorised by him in this behalf may evict that person from, and take possession of, the waqf property.”
7. The amendment, to the Wakf Act, in 2013, came into effect by virtue of Section 1 (2) [“It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint”] on 01.11.2013. As mentioned earlier, as on that date, the civil proceedings initiated for eviction of the appellants were pending. While so, a criminal complaint7 was filed before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (“JMFC”) Kozhikode, alleging that the appellants were encroachers and seeking their prosecution under Section 52A. The appellants alleged that they continued to pay the rent, in accordance with the decree of the District Judge, in their interpleader suit, i.e., CS 147/2001. The appellants preferred a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. PC before the Kerala High Court alleging that they could not be treated as “encroachers” and were lawful occupants, whose eviction was sought, in civil proceedings, and seeking quashing of those proceedings. By the impugned order, the High Court rejected the petition.
8. In the impugned order, the High Court, after extracting the definition of “encroacher” and noticing Section 52A, held: “4. When the tenancy has been terminated by the Board in this particular case, the petitioners have become ‘encroacher’ within the meaning of Section 3(ee) of the Act. In such case, the offence under Section 52A(1) can be attracted, if its ingredients are proved. As per Section 52A (3) of the Act, no court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section except on a complaint made by the Board or any officer duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf. Therefore, this is not a matter wherein an investigation by the police is called for. Cognizance can be taken only on a complaint by the Board or any officer duly authorised by the State Government in that behalf. Here, a complaint has been filed by the Kerala State Wakf Board represented by its authorised officer. Presently, there is absolutely nothing to have a premature termination of the prosecution proceedings against the petitioners.”
7 ST No. 369/2015 dated 08.05.2013 A B C D E F G H II
9. Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel argued that it is a fundamentalprinciple of criminal jurisprudence that penal provisions cannot be applied with retrospective effect. The newly inserted provision, i.e., Section 52A makes “taking possession of waqf properties”a punishable offence. However, in this case, possession was taken in 1916, i.e., concededly much before the enactment of the Wakf Act and the amendment. Accordingly, the newly inserted provision would not apply to the facts of this case.
10. It was argued that Parliament never intended that those who held properties under prior leases and arrangements, upon their expiry, were to be treated as “encroachers”. Learned counsel contended that aside from the fact that the amendment cannot be construed as operating retrospectively, the respondents cannot validly contend that those who were in possession and occupation of the premises, as tenants for a century became encroachers, upon enactment of the 2013 Act. Counsel pointed out that the provision which enables the Wakf Board to deal with encroachers, is Section 54; it provides for eviction. No proceedings were taken out against the appellants, who were straightaway sought to be dealt with as encroachers and prosecuted. Learned counsel relied upon Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India and submitted that the appellants’ conduct cannot be treated as an offence, even if Section 52A were to be applicable. To uphold the respondent’s move would directly violate the appellants’ rights under Article 20 (1).
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