Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 436; [2023] 3 S.C.R. 826
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Krishna Murari, Justice C.T. Ravikumar Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice 1973 – S.167(2) – Right of Default Bail – A Chargesheet, Justice If Filed, Justice Would Not Extinguish the Right to Default Bail U/S.167(2)
- Decided
- 26 Apr 2023
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 60/2023
- Sections
- 167(2), 167, 173(8), 120, 420, 13(1), 309(2), 309, 61, 344, 173, 154
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A B C D E F G H 826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
RITU CHHABARIA
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 60 of 2023)
APRIL 26, 2023
[KRISHNA MURARI AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.167(2) – Right of default bail – A chargesheet, if can be filed in piecemeal without first completing the investigation and whether the filing of such chargesheet extinguishes the right of an accused for grant of default bail – Held: No – Without completing the investigation of a case, a chargesheet or prosecution complaint cannot be filed by an investigating agency only to deprive an arrested accused of his right to default bail u/s.167(2) – Such a chargesheet, if filed, would not extinguish the right to default bail u/s.167(2) – In such cases, Trial Court cannot continue to remand an arrested person beyond the maximum stipulated time without offering the arrested person default bail – Right of default bail u/s.167(2) is not merely a statutory right, but a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 – Constitution of India – Article 21.
Constitution of India – Art.32 – Writ petition – Maintainability of – Held: Constitution entrusted the Supreme Court with the most important task of protecting civil liberties of individuals, and the society at large – Article 32 falls within Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights and thus, the right to invoke Article 32 is a fundamental right in itself – The relief of statutory bail u/s.167(2), Cr.PC is a fundamental right directly flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution – Thus, violation of such a right directly attracts consideration u/Article 32 – In the present case, preliminary objection raised by respondent regarding the maintainability of the writ petition is rejected – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.167(2).
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.167(2) – History of the provision of default bail – Law Commission Reports, recommendations – Discussed – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – s.167.
[2023] 3 S.C.R. 826 A B C D E F G H Disposing of the writ petition, the Court HELD: 1.1 The relief of statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC is a fundamental right directly flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the violation of such a right directly attracts consideration under Article 32 of the Constitution. The preliminary objections raised by the respondent regarding the maintainability of this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution stand rejected. [Para 14][834-B-C] 1.2 Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC was enacted to ensure that the investigating agency completes the investigation within the prescribed time limit, failing which no accused could be detained if they are willing to avail bail. [Para 21][839-A-B] Law Commission of India Report No. 14, Vol.-I (1958);
Law Commission Report No. 41 (September,1969), Para.
14.19 – referred to.
M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2021) 2 SCC 485; Satendar Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr. (2021) 10 SCC 773 – relied on.
1.3 The right of statutory bail, however, is extinguished, if the charge sheet is filed within the stipulated period. The question of resorting to a supplementary chargesheet u/s 173(8) of the Cr.PC only arises after the main chargesheet has been filed, and as such, a supplementary chargesheet, wherein it is explicitly stated that the investigation is still pending, cannot under any circumstance, be used to scuttle the right of default bail, for then, the entire purpose of default bail is defeated, and the filing of a chargesheet or a supplementary chargesheet becomes a mere formality, and a tool, to ensue that the right of default bail is scuttled. First investigation is to be completed, and only then can a chargesheet or a complaint be filed within the stipulated period, and failure to do so would trigger the statutory right of default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.PC. [Paras 24 and 25][840- G-H; 841-A-B] Union of India v. Thamisharasi & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 190 : [1995] 3 SCR 905; Ashok Munilal Jain & Anr.
RITU CHHABARIA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2018) 16 SCC 158 – relied on.
1.4 Without completing the investigation of a case, a chargesheet or prosecution complaint cannot be filed by an investigating agency only to deprive an arrested accused of his right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC. Such a chargesheet, if filed by an investigating authority without first completing the investigation, would not extinguish the right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. The trial court, in such cases, cannot continue to remand an arrested person beyond the maximum stipulated time without offering the arrested person default bail. [Para 32][842-E-G] 1.5 In the instant case, during the pendency of the investigation, supplementary chargesheets were filed by the Investigation Agency just before the expiry of 60 days, with the purpose of scuttling the right to default bail accrued in favour the accused. This factual position was missed by the trial court, and instead of offering default bail to the accused, the trial court mechanically accepted the incomplete chargesheets filed by the Investigating Agency, and further continued the remand of the accused beyond the maximum period specified. The Investigating Agency and the trial court, thus, failed to observe the mandate of law, and acted in a manner which was manifestly arbitrary and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the accused. The interim order of bail passed in favor of the accused is made absolute. [Paras 33 and 35][843-A-C; 843-F] K. S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors. (2017)
10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; K. K Kochunni, Moopil Nayar v. State of Madras & Ors. [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 316 – followed.
State of West Bengal v. Salap Service Station & Ors.
(1994) 3 Supp SCC 318; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2016) 4 SCC 160 : [2016] 1 SCR 194; Ram Narain Popli v. CBI (2003) 3 SCC 641 :
[2003] 1 SCR 119; Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI (2007)
1 SCC 70 : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 40 – distinguished.
A B C D E F G H State Of Bihar & Others v. J.A.C Saldanha & Ors. (1980)
1 SCC 554 : [1980] 2 SCR 16 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [1980] 2 SCR 16 referred to Para 8 (II)
[2017] 10 SCR 569 followed Para 12 [1959] 2 Supp SCR 316 followed Para 13 [1995] 3 SCR 905 relied on Para 25 [2016] 1 SCR 194 distinguished Para 30 [2003] 1 SCR 119 distinguished Para 30 [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 40 distinguished Para 30 CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 60 of 2023.
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India Dr. Sujay Kantawala, Santosh Sachin, Advs. for the Petitioner. K M Nataraj, ASG, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Vatsal Joshi, Vinayak Sharma, B K Satija, Pratyush Shrivastava, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA MURARI, J.
1. The present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the writ petitioner herein seeking the release of her husband on default bail. The writ petition also raises an issue of grave importance of personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
FACTS
2. Briefly, the facts relevant to the present writ petition are that an FIR was lodged under Section 120(B) read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) along with Sections 7,12 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the writ petitioner’s husband was not named. RITU CHHABARIA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
3. Subsequently, two supplementary chargesheets were filed, wherein the writ petitioner’s husband (hereinafter referred to as “accused”) was made a prosecution witness in the supplementary chargesheet dated 26.05.2020. Multiple other supplementary chargesheets were later filed, and the accused was not named in any of the said chargesheets.
4. The investigation was then transferred to another investigating officer, and the accused was then arrested by CBI and was remanded to custody on 28.04.2022. Multiple other supplementary chargesheets were then filed, wherein the accused herein was named as a suspect, and the remand of the accused under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.PC’) was renewed and was continued from time to time, and he was never released on default bail.
5. Subsequently, vide I.A No. 37424/2023, the petitioner sought to incorporate additional grounds and prayers for seeking bail in the writ petition, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 20.02.2023, and interim bail was granted.
6. It is against this continuation of custody, and the scuttling of relief of default bail, the petitioner herein has filed the present writ. Every Supplementary chargesheet filed, as per the writ petitioner herein, is an attempt to ensure that her husband is not released on default bail.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that: I. The Respondent has admitted in writing in the supplementary chargesheet that the investigation is still pending, and in light of the same the trial court ought not to have issued process and remanded the petitioner’s husband under Section 309 Cr.PC.
II. The accused’s fundamental rights are in prejudice due to continued custody on grounds of investigation not being completed. It was argued that the provisions of the CrPC do not empower continued remand to custody beyond 60 days if the investigation is still in progress. For this, the learned counsel relied on the judgment in the case of M. Ravindran Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence.1
1 (2021) 2 SCC 485
A B C D E F G H
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that:
I. The present writ is not maintainable, and for the grant of bail, the accused herein should have either approached the High Court against the order of the Magistrate refusing default bail or filed a Special Leave Petition against the said order invoking provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
II. The contention of the petitioner that the accused is not named in the FIR is not a relevant submission, as the FIR is not a complete document, and is only the first step to set the criminal procedure in motion. To support the contention, learned counsel relied on the case of State Of Bihar & Others Vs. J.A.C Saldanha & Ors.2 III. The supplementary chargesheet filed on 25.06.2022 is a complete document in respect to the offence committed by the persons arraigned in the said supplementary chargesheet, therefore no right to default bail has been accrued in favor of the petitioner’s husband.
ISSUES
9. In light of the abovementioned arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, the following three issues arise for our consideration:- I. Can a chargesheet or a prosecution complaint be filed in piecemeal without first completing the investigation of the case?
II. Whether the filing of such a chargesheet without completing the investigation will extinguish the right of an accused for grant of default bail?
III. Whether the remand of an accused can be continued by the trial court during the pendency of investigation beyond the stipulated time as prescribed by the CrPC?
2 (1980) 1 SCC 554.
RITU CHHABARIA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[KRISHNA MURARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
10. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent stating that the present writ is not maintainable before this court on grounds that no relief at such an early stage of the investigation can be granted.
11. We have considered the preliminary objection, however, we are not inclined to concur with the same. It must be remembered that our Constitution has entrusted the Supreme Court with the most important task of protecting civil liberties of individuals, and the society at large. These civil liberties, which manifest themselves in the form of fundamental rights, are what allow the people of this country to effectively negotiate with the state and maintain the parity in power in the social contract between the people and the state. If this Court refuses to exercise its jurisdiction on technicalities in cases of violations of fundamental rights, it will lead to a ripple effect that will result in a dysfunctional social contract, wherein the people of this country would become subject to an arbitrary and unfettered tyranny of the state.
12. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. The said Article reads as under:- “32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”
A B C D E F G H Article 32 falls within Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights and thus the right to invoke Article 32 is a fundamental right in itself, that exists to protect and safeguard the other fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. We may usefully refer to the following observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court made in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. vs. Union Of India & Ors.3 :- “A constitutional democracy can survive when citizens have an undiluted assurance that the Rule of Law will protect their rights and liberties against any invasion by the State and that judicial remedies would be available to ask searching questions and expect answers when a citizen has been deprived of these, most precious rights.”
13. Further, another Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.K Kochunni, Moopil Nayar vs. State of Madras & Ors.4 as early as 1959, has observed that the Court must exercise its jurisdiction in matters where there is an abuse of fundamental rights. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being extracted hereunder: “Further, even if the existence of other adequate legal remedy may be taken into consideration by the High Court in deciding whether It should issue any of the prerogative writs on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, as to which we say nothing now - this Court cannot, on a similarground, decline to entertain a petition under Article 32, for the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part I of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed right. It has accordingly been held by this Court in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950 SCC 436 1950 SCR 594] that under the Constitution this Court is constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking the protection of this Court against infringement of such rights, although such applications are made to this Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. The mere existence of an adequate alternative legal
3 (2017) 10 SCC 1
4 1959 Supp (2) SCR 316 RITU CHHABARIA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[KRISHNA MURARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
remedy cannot per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Article 32, if the existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or threatened, of such right is alleged and is prima facie established on the petition.”
14. It is also pertinent to note that the relief of statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC, in our opinion, is a fundamental right directly flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the violation of such a right, as mentioned above, directly attracts consideration under Article 32 of the Constitution. In such circumstance, we are not inclined to agree with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondent regarding the maintainability of this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and the said objection, therefore, stands rejected.
ANALYSIS
15. Before we deal with the issues framed, we find it pertinent to mention that in the present case, this Court is not dealing with the merits of the case and as such is not inclined to make any observations regarding the same. Every court, when invoked to exercise its powers, must be mindful of the relief sought, and must act as a forum confined to such relief. In the present case at hand, this Court is not a court of appeal, but a court of writ, and therefore is inclined to limit its jurisdiction only to the personal liberty of the writ petitioner’s husband and the impugned points of law.
16. For the purpose of deciding the issues framed by us, we deem it appropriate to trace the history of the provision of default bail, and the reasons which led the legislature to incorporate the existing provisions in the new statute. Under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which was the Act that governed criminal procedure before the enactment of CrPC presently in force, an accused, either under judicial or police custody, could be remanded only for a maximum period of 15 days. For a ready reference Section 167 of the 1898 Code is being reproduced herein:- “Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twentyfour hours. - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by A B C D E F G H Section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.
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