Yogesh Upadhyay and Anr. v. Atlanta Limited
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 150; [2023] 2 S.C.R. 511
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Justice Sanjay Kumar Negotiable Instruments Act, Justice 1881 – Ss.138, Justice 142(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice If It Is Found Expedient for the Ends of Justice – in the Present Case, Justice Maharashtra) Pertain to the Same
- Decided
- 21 Feb 2023
- Case number
- TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 526/2022
- Sections
- 406, 142(1), 138, 142(2), 142
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
A B C D E F G H 511[2023] 2 S.C.R. 511
YOGESH UPADHYAY AND ANR.
v.
ATLANTA LIMITED
(Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 526-527 of 2022)
FEBRUARY 21, 2023
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.406 – Transfer of criminal cases – Power of Supreme Court – Held: Notwithstanding the non-obstante clause in s.142(1), the power of Supreme Court to transfer criminal cases u/s.406, Cr.P.C. remains intact in relation to offences u/s.138, if it is found expedient for the ends of justice – In the present case, as the six complaint cases filed by the respondent (four before the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi and two before the Courts at Nagpur, Maharashtra) pertain to the same transaction, it would be advisable to have a common adjudication to obviate the possibility of contradictory findings being rendered in connection therewith by different Courts – Cases pending before the Courts at Nagpur, Maharashtra transferred to the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi – Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 – ss. 142(2), 142- A.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142(2)(a) – Held: s.142(2)(a) vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for an offence u/s.138 in the Court where the cheque is delivered for collection, i.e., through an account in the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account – Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Words & Phrases – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.142(2) – ‘shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction……’ – Discussed.
Allowing the transfer petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 Perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons in Amendment Act 26 of 2015 makes it amply clear that insertion of Sections 142(2) and 142-A in the Act of 1881 was a direct consequence of the judgment of this Court in Dashrath A B C D E F G H 512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
Rupsingh Rathod. Therefore, the use of the phrase: ‘shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction……’in Section 142(2) of the Act 1881 is contextual to the ratio laid down in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod to the contrary, whereby territorial jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 vested in the Court having jurisdiction over the drawee bank and not the complainant’s bank where he had presented the cheque. Section 142(2) now makes it clear that the jurisdiction to try such an offence would vest only in the Court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank where the cheque was delivered for collection, through the account of the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The newly inserted Section 142-A further clarifies this position by validating the transfer of pending cases to the Courts conferred with such jurisdiction after the amendment. [Para 11][516-E-H] Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129: [2014] 11 SCR 921;
Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh (2016) 2 SCC 75 : [2015] 14 SCR 153 – relied on.
1.2 Institution of the first two complaint cases before the Courts at Nagpur is in keeping with the legal position obtaining now. The non obstante clause was there in the original Section 142 itself and was not introduced by way of the amendments in the year 2015, along with Section 142(2). The said clause merely has reference to the manner in which cognizance is to be taken in offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, as a departure has to be made from the usual procedure inasmuch as prosecution for the said offence stands postponed despite commission of the offence being complete upon dishonour of the cheque and it must necessarily be in terms of the procedure prescribed. The clause, therefore, has to be read and understood in the context and for the purpose it is used and it does not lend itself to the interpretation that Section 406 Cr.P.C. would stand excluded vis- à-vis offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The power of this Court to transfer pending criminal proceedings under Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not stand abrogated thereby in respect of offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. It may be noted A B C D E F G H that this Court exercised power under Section 406 Cr.P.C. in relation to offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 even during the time the original Section 142 held the field. We, therefore, hold that, notwithstanding the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the Act of 1881, the power of this Court to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. remains intact in relation to offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, if it is found expedient for the ends of justice. In the case on hand, as the six complaint cases pertain to the same transaction, it would be advisable to have a common adjudication to obviate the possibility of contradictory findings being rendered in connection therewith by different Courts. As four of the six cases have been filed by the respondent company before the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi and only two such cases are pending before the Courts at Nagpur, Maharashtra, it would be convenient and in the interest of all concerned, including the parties and their witnesses, that the cases be transferred to the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi. [Paras 13, 14][517-C-H; 518-A] K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another (1999) 7 SCC 510 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 271;
A.E. Premanand vs. Escorts Finance Ltd. & Others (2004) 13 SCC 527 – relied on.
Case Law Reference [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 271 relied on Para 6 [2014] 11 SCR 921 relied on Paras 7, 11, 12 [2015] 14 SCR 153 relied on Para 12 (2004) 13 SCC 527 relied on Para 13 CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos.526-527 of 2022.
Transfer Petition Under Section 406 of the code of Criminal procedure seeking transfer of Case No.SCC/25668/2019 and Case No.SCC/26875/2019.
Rajmangal Kumar, Satyendra Kumar, Ms. Preeja Nair, Ali Mushtaq Navazish, Rajeev Singh, Advs. for the Petitioners. Chirag M. Shroff, Adv. for the Respondent.
YOGESH UPADHYAY AND ANR.v. ATLANTA LIMITED A B C D E F G H 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KUMAR, J.
1. By way of these transfer petitions filed under Section 406 Cr.P.C., Yogesh Upadhyay and his proprietary concern, M/s. Shakti Buildcon, seek transfer of SCC Nos.25668/2019 and 26875/2019, both titled ‘Atlanta Limited Vs. M/s Shakti Buildcon & Anr.’, pending before the learned 22nd Jt. Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, and the learned 20th Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, respectively, to the South West District Courts, Dwarka, New Delhi, to be tried along with Complaint Case Nos. 42489/2019, 1464/2020, 7596/2020 and 4094/2020, all titled ‘Atlanta Limited Vs. Yogesh Upadhyay’. These six complaint cases were filed against the petitioners by Atlanta Limited, the respondent herein, under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [for short, ‘the Act of 1881’].
2. The six cheques, which are the subject-matter of these complaint cases, were issued by the petitioners in connection with purchase of a NAWA-make crusher plant from the respondent company for a sum of `.1,88,80,000/-, under Agreement dated 04.06.2019. This sale consideration was to be paid in seven installments by way of cheques. The first cheque issued by the petitioners for a sum of `.11,80,000/- was duly honoured upon presentation by the respondent company. The remaining six cheques, however, were dishonoured on the strength of ‘Stop payment’ instructions. The first two cheques that came to be dishonoured were presented by the respondent company through its bank at Nagpur, Maharashtra. The first two complaint cases were accordingly filed before the Courts at Nagpur, Maharashtra. The remaining four cheques were thereafter presented by the respondent company through its bank at New Delhi and in consequence, those complaint cases were filed before the Dwarka Courts, New Delhi.
3. Mr. Rajmangal Kumar, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, would contend that as all the cheques relate to the same transaction, it would be proper and appropriate that the cases pertaining to their dishonour are tried and decided together. He would rely on case law to support his contention.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Chirag M. Shroff, learned counsel for the respondent company, would contend that Section 142 of the Act of 1881 would override Section 406 Cr.P.C., in view of the non obstante A B C D E F G H clause therein, and that the two cases filed at Nagpur, Maharashtra, therefore cannot be transferred. Further, he would assert that Section 142(2) of the Act of 1881 confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Courts at Nagpur in so far as the first two complaint cases are concerned. He would also place reliance on case law.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.