The State of Chattisgarh & Anr v. Aman Kumar Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 189; [2023] 2 S.C.R. 134
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Dipankar Datta Constitution of India – Art.226 – Prevention of Corruption Act, Justice 1988 – Ss.13(1)(B)
- Decided
- 1 Mar 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 646/2023
- Sections
- 482, 120, 13(1), 120B, 211, 13(2), 13, 2, 173(2), 156
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR.
v.
AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 646-648 of 2023)
MARCH 01, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.] Constitution of India – Art.226 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(1)(b), (2) – FIR registered against one ‘AS’ and his wife ‘YS’ – FIR quashed by High Court – Justification of – Held: In the present case, FIR does make out a case of cognizable offence having been committed by ‘AS’ and ‘YS’ – Power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases – Whenever its powers are invoked either u/Art.226 or s.482, CrPC for quashing an FIR/complaint, the Courts would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein – An FIR can be registered merely on suspicion thus, the High Court ought to have realized that the FIR which according to it was based on “probabilities” ought not to have been interdicted – An FIR based on “probability” of a crime having been committed is of a higher degree as compared to the one lodged on a “mere suspicion” that a crime has been committed – Extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice – High Court erred in quashing the FIR – Impugned judgment set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.120-B.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Disproportionate assets case – FIR registered against one ‘AS’ and his wife ‘YS’, public servants – Political vendetta alleged against ‘AS’, who was the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister in the previous regime – Held: Allegations levelled were vague and general – Mala fide motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved – However, if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives – [2023] 2 S.C.R. 134 A B C D E F G H No cogent grounds for quashing the FIR in the present case even on the ground of mala fide.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Quashing of FIR – Approach of High Courts – Held: Considerations that apply to quashing of FIRs pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence – In cases under the P.C. Act, the proper course for the high courts would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Disproportionate assets case – Importance of preliminary enquiry – Discussed.
Criminal Law – Inept drafting of FIR – Effect of – Discussed. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 The complaint lodged with the Chief Minister does specifically allege that although AS came from a very humble background, as evident from his Annual Property Return filed at the time of joining IRS, “he has managed to amass disproportionate assets of more than 2500 crores contrary to his legal sources of income”. One could view it as a tall claim, which is thoroughly unsubstantiated. However, it cannot be wished away because of the revelations of the preliminary inquiry which led to registration of the FIR and have formed part thereof. Although it is true that it is for the prosecution to build up a case that AS, as a public servant, amassed such wealth or even wealth of any lesser value that is disproportionate to his known sources of income, and which could not satisfactorily be accounted for by him, while it files the police report, it does not seem to be a requirement of law when the FIR was registered on 25th February, 2020 that facts and figures with exactitude need to form part of a first information report. It is found on perusal of the FIR that although not specifically mentioned, 2004 to 2018 is the “check period” during which AS and YS have acquired property disproportionate to their known sources of income. There are certain calculations projecting the quantum of money that both AS and YS received towards salaries, interest and value for properties sold. It is true that the FIR could have been drafted better. Since a first THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
A B C D E F G H 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
information report is the starting point for a long drawn investigative process and such an investigation could be scuttled by an accused taking advantage of inept drafting of such report, this is an area where all the more care and dexterity is called for to prevent many a thing. However, nothing significant turns on the inept drafting of the FIR in this case since it does make out a case of cognizable offence having been committed by AS and YS. Indeed, if at all there are miscalculations arising out of arithmetical errors or misdescription of properties not belonging to AS and YS, they were/are free to point it out while joining the investigation. It is also open to them to point out to the investigating officer that there has been absolutely no suppression or non-disclosure of 31 properties/assets and also that no activity amounting to ‘criminal misconduct’ had been committed by them. However, they chose to challenge the FIR on the specious ground that the same did not disclose a cognizable offence. [Paras 54- 56][155-D-H; 156-G-H; 157-A-B] 1.2 While deciding the challenge to the FIR, the High Court – unwittingly, did not bear in mind the note of caution in Bhajan Lal to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; further that, the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint; and also that, the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. Whenever its powers are invoked either under Article 226 of the Constitution or section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing a first information report/complaint, the courts would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Thus, it being the settled principle of law that when an investigation is yet to start, there should be no scrutiny to what extent the allegations in a first information report are probable, reliable or genuine and also that a first information report can be registered merely on suspicion, the High Court ought to have realized that the FIR which, according to it, was based on “probabilities” ought not to have been interdicted. Viewed through the prism of gravity of allegations, a first information report based on “probability” of A B C D E F G H a crime having been committed would obviously be of a higher degree as compared to a first information report lodged on a “mere suspicion” that a crime has been committed. The High Court failed to bear in mind these principles and precisely did what it was not supposed to do at this stage. No reason to invalidate the FIR for alleged breach of the CBI Circular. The High Court was not justified in its interference with the investigative process and committed an error of law in quashing the FIR on the grounds it did. [Paras 58, 59, 61 and 65][157-E-F, G-H; 158-E-H; 159-H] State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri (1996)
1 SCC 542 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 812 – relied on.
1.3 In the writ petitions filed by AS and YS, the pleadings are insufficient to return a finding that the FIR is an outcome of mala fide. No doubt, certain allegations are levelled against the Government and the Chief Minister; however, such allegations are vague and general in nature. Mala fide motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved. However, no foundation in that behalf has been laid and naturally so, the High Court even did not examine whether exception could have been taken to the FIR on the ground of mala fide. Neither the head of the political executive (the incumbent Chief Minister) nor that of the administrative executive (the Chief Secretary) was personally arrayed as a party to any of the proceedings. The person against whom mala fide or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party respondent to the proceedings eo nomine and that in his/her absence no inquiry into the allegations can be made. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. Whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fide would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fide be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/ complaint. If criminal prosecution is based upon adequate THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
A B C D E F G H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. [Paras 71][161-A-G] State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992) 1 Supp SCC 222 :
[1991] 2 SCR 1 – relied on.
1.4 The first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the P.C. Act and to embark upon an investigation. Having regard to what has been observed in paragraph 49 and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the high courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the high courts to follow, in cases under the P.C. Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation. There are no cogent grounds for quashing the FIR in the present case even on the ground of mala fide. The impugned judgment and order is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. [Paras 74-76][162-D-H; 163-A, C-D] A B C D E F G H Lalita Kumari v. Govt. Of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713 – followed.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992) 1 Supp.
SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; CBI & Ors. v.
Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485 – relied on.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 324 : [2011] 4 SCR 1176; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @ T.H.
Vijayalakshmi & Anr. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 923; R.
P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 388; Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1999) 3 SCC 259 : [1999] 1 SCR 1012 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2003] 3 SCR 485 relied on Para 16 [2011] 4 SCR 1176 referred to Para 19 [1960] 3 SCR 388 referred to Para 25 [1960] 3 SCR 388 referred to Para 25 [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 relied on Para 26 [1999] 1 SCR 1012 referred to Para 51 [2013] 14 SCR 713 followed Para 51 [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 812 relied on Para 59 [1991] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 72 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 646-648 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2022 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR Nos. 88, 154 and 206 of 2020. With Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2023.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR
SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC
A B C D E F G H 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
Sanjay R. Hegde, Kapil Sibal, Mahesh Jethmalani, Sr. Advs., Arun Kumar Jaiswal, Pranjal Kishore , Gautam Narayan, Sanjeevi Seshadri, Apoorv Kurup, Ojaswa Pathak, Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Ms. Shweta Bhardwaj, Ms. Aparna Arun, Ravi Sharma, Anjani Kumar Rai, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
Leave granted.
2. These 5 (five) appeals are at the instance of, inter alia, the State of Chhattisgarh (hereafter ‘the State’, for short) and Sri Uchit Sharma (hereafter ‘US’, for short). The appellants call in question a common judgment and order dated 10th January, 2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur, whereby 3 (three) writ petitions [WPCR 88 of 2020, WPCR 154 of 2020 and WPCR 206 of 2020] were disposed of. WPCR 88 of 2020, presented by Sri Aman Singh (hereafter ‘AS’, for short), was allowed by quashing FIR No. 9/2020 dated 25th February, 2020 (hereafter ‘the FIR”, for short) under section 13(1)(b) and (2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter ‘P.C. Act”, for short) read with section 120B, Indian Penal Code (hereafter ‘IPC”, for short), registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau of the State. WPCR 154 of 2020, instituted by the wife of AS, Smt. Yasmin Singh (hereafter ‘YS’, for short), was partly allowed. The spouses were the joint petitioners in WPCR 206 of 2020, which was also allowed.
3. A complaint dated 11th October, 2019 was lodged by US in the office of the Chief Minister of the State. It was alleged therein that AS [an Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officer and the former Principal Secretary to the erstwhile Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh], his wife YS, [former consultant to the Govt. of Chhattisgarh, who had worked on contract as the Director, Communication and Capacity Development Unit (CCDU), Department of Public Health Engineering, Govt. of Chhattisgarh from 14th November, 2005 to 31st March, 2015, and as Director, ICE & Capacity Building, Dept. of Panchayat & Rural Development, Govt. of Chhattisgarh from 1st April, 2015 to 10th December, 2018] and his family were involved in corruption and money laundering, and that he also held assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income.
A B C D E F G H
4. Upon the complaint being received, the Chief Minister by a handwritten order directed the Chief Secretary of the State to have the complaint enquired into by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW). Although, the date “14th OCT, 2019” appears just above the handwritten order of the Chief Minister, it is not too clear whether he made such order on 14th October, 2019 or on 15th October, 2019.
5. Be that as it may, vide a forwarding letter dated 21st October, 2019, the complaint was forwarded by the General Administration Department of the State (hereafter ‘GAD’, for short) to the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau (hereafter ‘ACB/ EOW’, for short) for the purpose of conducting inquiry into the allegations leveled therein. Acting in furtherance of the said letter dated 21st October, 2019, the ACB/EOW registered a preliminary inquiry bearing no. P.E.35/2019.
6. Prior to these developments, YS had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court by instituting a writ petition [W.P. (S)6521/2019], essentially questioning a departmental inquiry initiated against her. She had prayed for quashing and/or setting aside of an order dated 10th May, 2019 whereby the GAD had instituted an inquiry against her. Such inquiry appears to have been initiated on the basis of a complaint dated 12th April, 2019 lodged by one Vikas Tiwari (spokesperson of the Chhattisgarh unit of the Indian National Congress party). With the initiation of P.E.35/ 2019, in terms of the letter dated 21st October, 2019, YS filed an interim application (I.A.04/2020) seeking a stay thereof. By an order dated 16th January, 2020, the High Court directed the State not to take any steps to her prejudice pursuant to the letter dated 21st October, 2019. The order of 16th January, 2020 refers to, inter alia, an earlier order dated 21st October, 2019 which, however, is not on record.
7. The letter dated 21st October, 2019 of the GAD, referred to above, was also challenged by AS by instituting a writ petition [WPCR 88/2020] before the High Court on 29th January, 2020. In such writ petition, AS urged the court to pass an order for production of the entire records pertaining to the letter dated 21st October, 2019 for its perusal, for quashing the said letter as well as any consequential step/action taken by the State including P.E.No.35/2019.
8. During the pendency of WPCR 88/2020, the FIR was registered against AS and YS.
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
9. Within a few days of registration of the FIR, on 28th February, 2020 to be precise, AS applied for an amendment of WPCR 88/2020 seeking to mount a challenge to the FIR. He had also applied for interim relief for stay of effect/operation of the FIR.
10. YS too, on 2nd March, 2020, instituted WPCR 154/2020 seeking an order, inter alia, for quashing of the FIR.
11. By an order dated 28th February, 2020, the High Court allowed the application for amendment and also directed that no coercive steps be taken against AS till the next date of hearing.
12. On 15th April, 2020, WPCR 206/2020 was jointly instituted by AS and YS seeking appropriate order for listing of WPCR 88/2020 and WPCR 154/2020 for final hearing immediately upon resumption of normal functioning of the Court (which was then curtailed due to the pandemic caused by Covid-19) and also for an order declaring the action of the ACB/EOW in directing HDFC Bank Ltd., respondent no.5, to put a hold on the funds in the salary account of AS, as void and illegal.
13. We need not at this stage refer in detail to the intervening events of issuance of notice to AS to join the investigation as well as interim orders passed on the writ petitions from time to time. Suffice it to note, in an order dated 6th September, 2021, the High Court observed that there was a dispute with regard to the income of AS and YS and the ACB/EOW was called upon to produce the case diary as well as figures in tabulated form showing income and expenditure for perusal by the Court whether there is disproportionate income or not.
14. Faced with such an order, the State filed an application seeking exemption to produce the case diary and the figures in tabulated form as well as applied for vacation of an earlier order dated 28th February, 2020 whereby the ACB/EOW was restrained from taking coercive steps against AS. The fate of these applications does not clearly appear from the records. However, for the reasons recorded in the impugned judgment and order dated 10th January, 2022, the High Court while allowing WPCR 88/2020 quashed the FIR. In view of the FIR having been quashed, the High Court held that relief sought by YS in WPCR 154/ 2020 in relation to the FIR had lost its significance. However, the Court rejected the prayer of YS to prosecute US, the original complainant and J.P. Kujur, the Investigation Officer, under section 211, IPC. WPCR 154/2020, thus, stood partly allowed. Insofar as WPCR 206/2020 is concerned, the Court A B C D E F G H made the following directions in paragraph 70:
“70. Since this Court while hearing WPCR No. 88 of 2020 has already quashed the FIR bearing No. 09/2020 registered against the petitioners at Police Station- EOW/ACB, District- Raipur (C.G.), therefore, the relief sought in this petition has lost its significance and the bank account No. 50100 28338 9868 of petitioner No. 1 shall inoperative (sic) after quashing the FIR in WPCR No. 88 of 2020, therefore, no further direction is required to be passed.”
15. Since, the High Court has quashed the FIR and we are called upon to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment, we propose to refer to the material portions of the FIR after noting the rival contentions.
16. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeals preferred by the State, contended that the High Court committed gross error of law in quashing the FIR by transgressing the legal bounds for quashing a first information report. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in CBI & Ors. Vs. Tapan Kumar Singh1, he contended that a first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported; what is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide the basis for the police to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At the stage of registration of a first information report, the police officer on the basis of the information given has to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect on the basis of the information received that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and investigate, without it being necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information.
17. According to Mr. Sibal, when a first information report could be lodged on the basis of suspicion, the High Court in the present case erred in law in quashing the FIR on the ground that it was based on “probabilities”. Criticizing the impugned judgment as wanting in appreciation of the aforesaid basic principle, he urged that the High Court overstepped its limits.
1 (2003) 6 SCC 175
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
18. Mr. Sibal also contended that in the present case, AS challenged the FIR a few days after the same was registered on 25th February, 2020 and obtained an order from the High Court to the effect that no coercive steps be taken against him. Armed with such an order, AS did not join the investigation despite a notice having been issued. There was no order staying the investigation. Even if the investigation had proceeded, there was no imminent fear of arrest. If indeed, AS and YS do have papers and documents to satisfactorily account for the pecuniary resources and property and that they do not possess assets disproportionate to their known sources of income, such papers and documents could have been produced before the Investigating Officer thereby enabling him to hold that there is no substance in the complaint lodged by US, and then to file an appropriate closure report before the concerned court to be considered in accordance with Law. However, the Investigating Officer could not proceed with the investigation effectively and meaningfully in view of the restraining orders passed by the High Court resulting in the investigative process being aborted.
19. Our attention was next invited by Mr. Sibal to the decisions of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Naresh & Ors.2 and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.3, in support of the contention that when an investigation by the police is in progress, the courts should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR; on the contrary, the police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It was also contended that if after investigation the Investigating Officer does not find any substance in the complaint/ first information report, he is obliged to file appropriate closure report before the concerned court for its due consideration in accordance with law; however, it would be premature to pronounce any conclusion that the first information report does not disclose any cognizable offence based on hazy facts.
20. Mr. Sibal, thus, prayed that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court be set aside and investigation into the FIR be permitted to be taken to its logical conclusion.
21. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel for the other appellant, i.e., US, contended that the High Court clearly applied a wrong test while quashing the FIR. According to him, the test of a prima-facie
2 (2011) 4 SCC 324
3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 A B C D E F G H or probable case is only required to be shown at the time of framing of charge; however, for an investigation to proceed on the basis of a first information report, all that is required to be shown is that the contents of the complaint/first information report, when taken at face value, make out an offence.
22. It was further contended by Mr. Hegde that the High Court conducted a mini-trial while arriving at a conclusion that no offence against AS and YS has been made out in the FIR which, this Court has repeatedly held, cannot be conducted in proceedings for quashing of a first information report. At the stage of considering a prayer for quashing of first information report, the probable defence of the accused cannot be considered.
23. Inviting our attention to the interim order dated 6th September, 2021 passed by the High Court, Mr. Hegde contended that such an exercise could not have been undertaken by the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
24. Referring to the decision of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. Vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @ T.H. Vijayalakshmi & Anr.4, Mr. Hegde submitted that a similar exercise that was undertaken by the relevant high court was held to be impermissible by this Court.
25. The decisions of this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab5 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.6 were next cited for highlighting the categories of cases where inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised by the high courts to quash proceedings; however, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case presented before the High Court by AS and YS, Mr. Hegde contended that the court ought to have declined interference.
26. Mr. Hegde further relied on the decision of this Court in Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)]7 for the proposition that if the factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with 4 (2021) SCC OnLine SC 923
5 (1960) 3 SCR 388
6 1992 SUPP. (1) SCC 335
7 (1999) 3 SCC 259
THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
details. According to him, quashing of a first information report is a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases such as, the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. The FIR, in the present case, does contain definite particulars making out the offences complained of. That apart, the preliminary inquiry carried out before registration of the FIR has revealed disproportionate assets to the tune of 20% of the income of AS; hence, it was not an appropriate case where the power to quash the FIR should have been exercised.
27. While concluding, Mr. Hegde submitted that the High Court having travelled beyond the well-settled parameters of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the impugned judgment and order merits to be set aside.
28. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel appearing for AS and YS, opposed the appeals. Reiterating the contentions that found favour with the High Court, he contended that the High Court rightly concluded that investigation of the FIR, which did not prima facie disclose commission of any cognizable offence by either AS or YS, would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law and compelling AS and YS to join the investigation would amount to undue and unnecessary harassment.
29. By referring to the facts preceding registration of the FIR, Mr. Jethmalani sought to impress us that ever since the political dispensation underwent a change in the State of Chhattisgarh, AS and YS have been the target of the new dispensation. Misusing the police machinery, no stone has been left unturned to falsely implicate AS and YS. Initially a departmental inquiry was initiated against YS vide an order dated 10th May, 2019 and no sooner had the High Court by an order dated 21st October, 2019 granted interim protection to YS, further action was taken to initiate a preliminary inquiry against AS and YS on 11th November, 2009. That apart, quite mischievously, the FIR was suddenly registered during the pendency of WPCR 88/2020 to render the same infructuous.
30. It was thereafter contended by Mr. Jethmalani that a bare perusal of the FIR would reveal non-disclosure of the ‘check period’ which is a sine qua non in a case of disproportionate assets. Further, the FIR did not disclose the basic ingredients of establishing an offence under section 13(1)(b) read with section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. The FIR A B C D E F G H also did not disclose the extent of alleged investment either in figures or in percentage.
31. Referring to the decision in T.H. Vijayalakshmi (supra), it was Mr. Jethmalani’s endeavor to show that the investigating agency in that case had set out/specified the extent of disproportionality in a tabular form, in rupees and percentage, in the first information report therein. The High Court, therefore, was not in error when it required the State to produce the case diary as well as figures in tabulated form showing income and expenditure for perusal by the Court by its interim order dated 6th September, 2021.
32. Mr. Jethmalani further urged that no material being there to justify registration of the FIR is borne out from the fact that the State had applied for exemption from complying with the High Court’s order dated 6th September, 2021.
33. It was next argued by Mr. Jethmalani that a first information report based on sheer conjectural possibility of finding some more assets in future is wholly impermissible. Law, according to him, is well settled that a mere mention of the possibility will not entitle the ACB/EOW of the State to lodge a first information report and conduct investigation. Unless the first information report discloses cognizable offence, such report based on possibilities would become a tool of witch hunting and consequently harassment, which would be a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also argued that there is a casual allegation of a criminal conspiracy between AS and YS without there being a whisper about its basic elements.
34. Mr. Jethmalani further contended that even if it is assumed that 2004 to 2018 is the check period, it is clear that a fishing inquiry is intended by the State and its officers with a view to scandalize AS and YS.
35. It was also the contention of Mr. Jethmalani that there has been no disproportionality at all, which would warrant an investigation even into the allegations leveled by US in the complaint, or for that matter, the FIR, and the High Court was right in its interference to prevent abuse of the process of law.
36. The contention of the respondents that the High Court had applied a ‘non-existent legal test’ was refuted by terming it as entirely misleading. Passages from the impugned judgment were referred to, to THE STATE OF CHATTISGARH & ANR. v. AMAN KUMAR SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] A B C D E F G H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
show how the High Court was right in returning the finding that the FIR did not disclose any offence rendering it liable to interdiction.
37. While concluding, Mr. Jethmalani contended that there was no material to justify registration of the FIR and that there being no ‘legitimate prosecution’, the same has rightly been quashed and set aside by the impugned judgment; hence, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
38. The High Court did not in the impugned judgment assign mala fide as a ground for quashing the FIR. In course of hearing before us, Mr. Jethmalani attempted to build up a case of mala fide by referring to how the incumbent Chief Minister perceived AS to be a ‘super CM’ and also that AS has become the victim of political vendetta, being caught in the crossfire between the incumbent Chief Minister and the former Chief Minister. Reference was made to clause (7) of paragraph 102 of the decision in Bhajan Lal (supra), where it was held that a first information report could be quashed by the high courts “where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge”.
39. In his rejoinder, Mr. Hegde canvassed that there are no pleadings to this effect in the writ petition filed before the High Court and, therefore, a new case ought not to be allowed to be set up de hors the pleadings. The immediate reaction of Mr. Jethmalani was that the writ petitions are replete with allegations of mala fide, which form the plinth for registration of the FIR as well as the departmental inquiry against YS.
40. Before reserving judgment, we had permitted Mr. Jethmalani to file short written notes of arguments within a week together with a few other relevant documents which he intended to file though not part of the pleadings before the High Court or this Court.
41. The written notes together with documents annexed thereto marked as annexures R/1A to R/1K have been considered.
42. In Part 1 of the written notes, reference has been made to Circular No. 29/2020 of the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereafter ‘CBI’, for short) providing the methodology for registering first information reports in cases of disproportionate assets and for conducting investigation. The contention advanced is that the FIR, in the present A B C D E F G H case, does not conform to the guidelines laid down by the CBI in Circular No. 29/2020 (hereafter ‘CBI Circular’, for short). Part II centers around the contention that the FIR contains several statements styled as facts, which were false to the knowledge of the ACB/EOW of the State. The third and final part is dedicated to “fabrications and manipulations” in the FIR which were the result of political vendetta against AS, who was the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister in the previous regime.
43. We ought to place on record that little over a week of reserving judgment, on 20th January, 2023 to be precise, Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel mentioned the criminal appeals and prayed for recall of the order reserving judgment on the ground that an application for directions was in the process of being filed by AS and YS and that the same ought to be considered before the judgment on these appeals is pronounced. Orally, we permitted the application to be filed for being taken into consideration at an appropriate time.
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