Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf v. M/S Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 949; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 984
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Ought Not to Have Been Entertained By the Wakf Tribunal, Justice Was Dismissed By the Executing Court. High Court, Justice As Held in Rashid Wali Beg Case. the Wakf (Amendment) Act, Justice 2013 (Amendment Act 27 of 2013 ) – Eff
- Decided
- 20 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6933/2023
- Sections
- 47, 9, 83, 85, 110A, 110F, 6, 21, 24(2), 83(1), 6(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 984 : 2023 INSC 949
CASE DETAILS
MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF
v.
M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6933 of 2023)
OCTOBER 20, 2023
[M. M. SUNDRESH AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Objection raised by the respondents that the suit filed by the appellant as decreed, ought not to have been entertained by the Wakf Tribunal, was dismissed by the Executing Court. High Court, whether justified in reversing the decision of the Executing Court by placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Gobindram case, the basis whereof has been removed after the amendment made by the Act 27 of 2013, as held in Rashid Wali Beg case.
The Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Amendment Act 27 of 2013 ) – Effect of removal of the basis of the judgment – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.47 – Suit filed by the appellant-owner of the suit property before the Wakf Tribunal for ejectment and recovery of possession was decreed – Respondents filed revision petition, dismissed – Appellant filed execution petition – After four years, respondents raised plea with respect to the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal – Application filed u/s.47 dismissed by Executing Court – High Court reversed the said decision by placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through LRs. v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [2010] 10 SCR 945 – Plea of the appellant that the said decision has been explained by this Court in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari and Others [2021] 13 SCR 1 and by the amendment brought in under the Act 27 of 2013, the basis of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram has been removed: Held: This Court in Rashid Wali Beg took note of the earlier decision rendered in Ramesh Gobindram and held that after the amendment made by the Act 27 of 2013, the basis of the said decision was correctly removed – It was further held that there are sufficient provisions even otherwise to maintain a suit for eviction over a Wakf property – Wakf Tribunal has got sufficient jurisdiction to try every suit pertaining to either Wakf or a Wakf property, notwithstanding the nature of relief concerned, except as mandated under the statute – High Court while passing the impugned order, unfortunately did not have the benefit of the decision rendered in Rashid Wali Beg – Even otherwise, as per the amendment by way of the Act 27 of 2013, the jurisdiction now lies with the Wakf Tribunal – An adjudicating forum being a product of a procedural right has to come under retrospective operation when an amendment is introduced to cure a defect which paved the way for a decision of the Court in holding otherwise – Protracted proceedings have helped respondents to be in possession for over two decades, notwithstanding the expiry of the lease way back in 1999 – The Act 27 of 2013 is a procedural amendment and therefore, has to be applied retrospectively in the context of change of forum and jurisdictional provisions – The decision in Rashid Wali Beg agreeed with – The amendment has been brought forth in order to get over the interpretation given in Ramesh Gobindram – Impugned order set aside while that of the Executing Court is restored – Waqf Act, 1995 – Practice and Procedure. [Paras 28-30, 32] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.47 r/w Or.XXI – Execution proceedings – Question involving jurisdiction – Availability of opportunity to raise said plea at an earlier point of time – Conduct of party significant:
Held: An Executing Court is enjoined with the duty to give effect to the decree – Any interference, including on a question involving jurisdiction, should be undertaken very sparsely as a matter of exception – The onus lies heavily on the judgment-debtor to convince the Court that a decree is inexecutable – The conduct of a party assumes significance – If a party is likely to have an undue advantage, despite the availability of an opportunity to raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction at an earlier point of time, it should not be permitted to do so during the execution proceedings – Further, a plaintiff shall not be made to suffer by the passive act of the defendant in submitting to the jurisdiction – One has to see the consequence while taking note of the huge pendency of the cases before various Courts in the country – There is no gainsaying that but for the adverse decree suffered, a MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM
BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS.
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
judgment-debtor would not have ventured to raise such a plea – It is clearly a case of an afterthought to suit his convenience – He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate – Though this Court is conscious about the earlier precedents dealing with the stage at which such a plea can be raised, much water has flown under the bridge in terms of the ground reality – Approbate and Reprobate. [Paras 14, 15] Practice and Procedure – Jurisdiction – Lack of jurisdiction to a forum vis-à-vis a case where two or more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and liabilities of the parties: Held: There is a subtle difference when dealing with a case involving coram non-judice – The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum may differ from a case where two or more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and liabilities of the parties – To make the position clear, one has to see as to whether there is any change in the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the other – In a case involving same rights and liabilities but the question is only with respect to the forum being judicial or quasi-judicial, the issue of jurisdiction would pale into insignificance when it is sought to be raised as a last straw at a very belated stage – Therefore, when the process becomes the same for both parties who undertake the said route willingly, the question of jurisdiction cannot be put against each other after it has attained finality, unless it is demonstrated that the rights of the party who suffered the decree are obliterated. [Para 16] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.9 – Duty of the Court in confirming its own jurisdiction – Discussed – Maxims – “actus curiae neminem gravabit”.
Practice and Procedure – Specialized forum under a statute, exclusion of a civil court:
Held: When a specialized forum is made available under a statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute which would otherwise not be amenable before the said forum – Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the mechanism provided thereunder – The provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to through such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil court whose jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred – As a principle of law, the powers of the civil court, being plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who contends that it lacks jurisdiction – However, this does not take away the duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction, more so when a specialized forum has come into being as a creature of a statute. [Para 26]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, [1968] 3 SCR 662 – followed.
Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari and Others (2022) 4 SCC 414 : [2021] 13 SCR 1; Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25; New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult, (1975) 2 SCC 840 : [1976] 2 SCR 266; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another (1994) 4 SCC 602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360; Neena Aneja and Another v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 161; Vankamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma (1997) 5 SCC 460 : [1997] 3 SCR 530; Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (1996) 6 SCC 342 : [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 768; Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, (2010) 6 SCC 193 : [2010] 5 SCR 990; Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (2022) 12 SCC 455 – relied on.
Faseela M. v. Munnerul Islam Madrasa Committee and Another, (2014) 16 SCC 38 : [2014] 4 SCR 613; Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through LRs. v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726 : [2010] 10 SCR 945; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1; M. Hariharasudhan v. R. Karmegam (2019) 10 SCC 94: [2019] 13 SCR 442 – referred to.
General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16 – referred to.
Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd., (1911) 12 CLR 398; Zhang v. Zemin (2010) 79 NSWLR 513; Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford [1859] 6 C.B. (NS) 336 – referred to.
MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM
BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS.
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6933 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2021 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRP No. 1264 of 2021. Appearances:
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Advs., Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Ms. Niti Richhariya, Meeran Maqbool, Advs. for the Appellant.
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., B. Shravanth Shanker, Ms. Prerna Robin, Rahul Jajoo, Devadipta Das, K. Parameshwar, Ms. Arti Gupta, Ms. Kanti, Chinmay Kalgaonkar, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. A legal journey adopted by the appellant with periodical stoppages orchestrated in the process at behest of respondent no(s). 1 and 2 brought the lis back to the place where it started, forcing it to undertake a fresh guard by the impugned order.
3. This case is a classic example of the unfortunate situation taken note of and lamented by Right Honorable Sir James Colvilbe in General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16, “These proceedings certainly illustrate what was said by Mr. Doyne, and what has been often stated before, that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a Decree…” The situation not only continues but has become more prevalent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4. The appellant being the undisputed owner of the suit property executed a registered lease deed in favour of respondent no. 2. Respondent no. 1 concern is being represented by a person who is the son of the individual (since deceased) who represented respondent no. 2. The period of lease was for 33 years. The suit premises was sublet without permission by respondent no(s). 1 and 2.
5. After the expiry of the lease by efflux of time, the appellant issued a legal notice requiring respondent no. 2 to hand over the vacant possession. A reply was given stating that the possession having been handed over only on 25.11.1966, the lease subsists till 24.11.1999. On receipt of the said replynotice by respondent no. 2 dated 05.06.1999, a second notice was issued by the appellant to which a different response came; that the said registered lease was extended orally for another 33 years. A reference was also made to the arbitration clause available under the original lease deed.
6. The appellant promptly filed a suit in O.S. No. 132 of 1999 before the Wakf Tribunal seeking a decree for ejectment and recovery of possession, along with arrears of rent and damages. After a prolonged litigation and delaying tactics employed at the hands of respondent no(s). 1 and 2, a decree was passed at last on 13.11.2002. The suit was dismissed against defendant no(s). 3, 4, 5, and 7, while defendant no. 6 was set ex-parte. No plea with respect to the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal was raised, while the aborted attempt to raise a defense of oral lease was rightly repelled.
7. Not being satisfied with the decree passed, respondents no(s). 1 and 2 filed a revision petition before the High Court being C.R.P. No. 5863 of 2002. It was dismissed inter alia holding that there is no legal basis to continue in occupation after the expiry of the lease.
8. The dilatory tactics adopted by respondent no(s). 1 and 2 continued even thereafter, to the extent that the appellant had to file an execution petition in E.P. No. 29 of 2014 on 18.10.2014. Even during the execution proceedings, respondent no. 2 did not raise the plea of maintainability of the suit. However, after four years during which time also the Court was successfully prevented through a series of applications/objections, obviously at the instance of the respondents, an additional counter was filed raising MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
the plea that the suit as laid and decreed ought not to have been entertained in view of the dictum rendered by this Court in Faseela M. v. Munnerul Islam Madrasa Committee and Another, (2014) 16 SCC 38 which in turn relied upon the decision rendered in Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through LRs. v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, (2010) 8 SCC 726. The objection raised was not found to be tenable by the Executing Court by dismissing the application filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). On a revision, the High Court of Telangana reversed the decision of the Executing Court by placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra). The said order passed is under challenge in this appeal.
SUBMISSIONS
9. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, fervently submitted that there was absolutely no objection raised by the contesting respondents till the stage of the execution petition. The decision rendered in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra) has been considered and explained by this Court in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 414. Such an exercise was also undertaken by this Court even on the earlier occasions. By the amendment brought in under the Act 27 of 2013, the basis of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra) has been removed. Even assuming that the impugned order is correct, the resultant situation would be that the appellant will have to file a suit before the Wakf Tribunal once again.
10. Supplementing the said submission, Shri K. Parameshwar, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 8, the Wakf Board, submitted that even prior to the decision rendered in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra), there was ample jurisdiction to try all suits pertaining to a Wakf and Wakf property, a fact correctly taken note of in Rashid Wali Beg (Supra). Section 83 read with Section 85 of the Wakf Act, 1995 being distinct and independent provisions clothed the Wakf Tribunal with adequate jurisdiction.
11. Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that a plea of nullity can be taken at any stage. As held in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra), Sections 6 and 7 of the Act 43 of 1995 do not confer the requisite jurisdiction on the Wakf Tribunal in deciding an issue qua an eviction of an individual from a Wakf property. As the impugned order was passed noting the dictum laid by this Court in Ramesh Gobindram (Supra), there is no need for interference.
12. In support of the rival contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions:
Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through LRs v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 Punjab Wakf Board v. Pritpal Singh & Anr., (2013) SCC Online SC 1345 : Civil Appeal No.8194 of 2013 Faseela M. v. Muneerul Islam Madrasa Committee and Another,
(2014) 16 SCC 38
Punjab Wakf Board v. Sham Singh Harike & and Another, (2019)
4 SCC 698
Telangana State Wakf Board & Anr. V. Mohamed Muzafar, (2021)
9 SCC 179
Kiran Devi v. Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board and Others, (2021)
15 SCC 15
Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 414 Kiran Singh and Others. v. Chaman Paswan and Others, 1955
(1) SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340
Chandrika Misir and Another v. Bhaiya Lal, (1973) 2 SCC 474 Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through His LRs, (1990) 1 SCC 193 Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) through LRs. v. Jasjit Singh and Others, (1993) 2 SCC 507 Sarwan Kumar and Another v. Madan Lal Aggarwal, (2003) 4
SCC 147
Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. and Another, (2004) 3 SCC Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (HZL) v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.,
(2019) 17 SCC
MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
P.V Nidhish & Ors. v. Kerala State Wakf Board & Anr., (2023) SCC OnLine SC 519 : 2023 (7) SCALE 130.
13. Before dwelling into the merits of this case, we shall first go into the issues of law governing the submissions made.
EXECUTING COURT CANNOT GO BEYOND THE DECREE
14. The legal principle that an Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree stands fortified, subject to the rigor of Section 47 read with Order XXI of the Code. As a matter of course, an Executing Court is enjoined with the duty to give effect to the decree. Any interference, including on a question involving jurisdiction, should be undertaken very sparsely as a matter of exception. The onus lies heavily on the judgment-debtor to convince the Court that a decree is inexecutable. When an exercise is likely to involve a factual adjudication, it should better be avoided.
15. The conduct of a party assumes significance. If a party is likely to have an undue advantage, despite the availability of an opportunity to raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction at an earlier point of time, it should not be permitted to do so during the execution proceedings. In other words, a plaintiff shall not be made to suffer by the passive act of the defendant in submitting to the jurisdiction. One has to see the consequence while taking note of the huge pendency of the cases before various Courts in the country. There is no gainsaying that but for the adverse decree suffered, a judgmentdebtor would not have ventured to raise such a plea. It is clearly a case of an afterthought to suit his convenience. He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Though we are conscious about the earlier precedents dealing with the stage at which such a plea can be raised, much water has flown under the bridge in terms of the ground reality. Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25, “Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.
27. We would like to quote the following judgments for better appreciation and understanding of the said principle:
27.1.Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, 1956 SCR 451 : AIR 1956 SC 593] : (AIR pp. 601-02, para 23) “23. But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as the proceedings in OS. No. 92 of 1938-39 are relied on as barring the plea that the decree and sale in OS. No. 100 of 1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate. It is immaterial that the present appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)], and in particular, the observations of Scrutton, LJ., at p. 611 were quoted in support of this position. There, the facts were that an agent delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree. Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred. The ground of the decision is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief. The principle was thus stated by Bankes, L.J. : (Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , KB p. 611)
‘… Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as a misdelivery. To do so would be to approbate and reprobate the same act.’ The observations of Scrutton, L.J. on which the appellants rely are as follows : (Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)], KB pp. 611-12)
‘… A plaintiff is not permitted to “approbate and reprobate”. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election — namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument : Ker v. Wauchope [(1819) 1 Bligh PC 1 at p. 21 : 4 ER 1 at p. 8] : Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby [1908 AC 224 at p. 232 (PC)] . The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.’ It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot “approbate and reprobate” is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. XIII, p. 464, para 512:
‘On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it.’ 27.2.State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu [(2014) 15 SCC 144] : (SCC pp. 153-54, paras 22-23 & 25-26)
“22. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216].)
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329]). In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [(1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has observed as under : (R.N. Gosain case [(1992) 4 SCC 683] , SCC pp. 687-88, para 10)
‘10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that ‘a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage’.’ ***
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] , made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”
27.3.Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] : (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 15-16)
“I. Approbate and reprobate
15. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot-blow cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [1956 SCR 451 : AIR 1956 SC 593], CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [ AIR 1965 SC 1216], Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 706], Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD [(2011) 5 SCC 270 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712], Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 420 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 685] and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 587 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 416].
16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. There is a subtle difference when we deal with a case involving coram non-judice. The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum may differ from a case where two or more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear, one has to see as to whether there is any change in the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the other. As an example, we can take the case of eviction of a tenant. If he is to be evicted only under the Rent Control Act which extends a certain right to the tenant, who cannot be evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained therein, a common law remedy cannot be invoked by way of a suit as against a proceeding before the Rent Controller. In that view of the matter, certainly the question of prejudice would arise. However, in a case involving same rights and liabilities but the question is only with respect to the forum being judicial or quasi-judicial, the issue of jurisdiction would pale into insignificance when it is sought to be raised as a last straw at a very belated stage. Therefore, when the process becomes the same for both parties who undertake the said route willingly, the question of jurisdiction cannot be put against each other after it has attained finality, unless it is demonstrated that the rights of the party who suffered the decree are obliterated.
CHANGE OF FORUM
17. We shall now come to the issue of retrospective application and change of forum. As discussed, when a statute is amended on an issue pertaining to a forum for adjudication, it being procedural takes effect retrospectively. A party to a lis does not have any vested right of forum as against action. In the absence of any substantive right being subsumed by a particular forum, one has to give retrospective application. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult, (1975) 2 SCC 840, “5. On the plain language of Sections 110A and 110F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. The expressions “arising out of an accident” occurring in sub-section (1) and “over the area in which the accident occurred”, mentioned in sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. But the provision of limitation of 60 days contained in sub-section (3) created an obstacle in the straight application of the well-established principle of law. If the accident had occurred within 60 days prior to the constitution of the tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) was not an impediment. An application to the tribunal could be said to be the only remedy. If such an application, due to one reason or the other, could not be made within 60 days then the tribunal had the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) of Section 110A on its face was attracted. This difficulty of limitation led most of the High Courts to fall back upon the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the tribunal would be able to condone the delay under the proviso to sub-section (3), and led others to say that the tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and the remedy of going to the civil court in such a situation was not barred under Section 110F of the Act. While taking the latter view the High Court failed to notice that primarily the law engrafted in Sections 110A and 110F was a law relating to the change of forum.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (1994) 4 SCC 602, “26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Neena Aneja and Another v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 161,
“58. SEBI argued before this Court that a change of the forum for trial was a matter of mere procedure and would, therefore, be retrospective, MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
there being no express or implied intent either in the 2002 and 2014 Amendments that the amendments were intended to be of prospective effect. J.S. Khehar, J. speaking for the two-Judge Bench of this Court adverted to the decisions inter alia in New India Assurance [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840], Ramesh Kumar Soni [Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., (2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340] and Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087], and observed in that context : (Classic Credit case [SEBI v. Classic Credit Ltd., (2018) 13 SCC 1 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 431], SCC pp. 67-68, para 49)
“49. … In our considered view, the legal position expounded by this Court in a large number of judgments including New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840]; SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal [(2010) 3 SCC 765 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 491] and Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P. [(2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340] , is clear and unambiguous, namely, that procedural amendments are presumed to be retrospective in nature, unless the amending statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise. And also, that generally change of “forum” of trial is procedural, and normally following the above proposition, it is presumed to be retrospective in nature unless the amending statute provides otherwise. This determination emerges from the decision of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [(1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087];
Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar [(1995) 4 SCC 392 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 728] and Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand [(2013) 15 SCC 460 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 489], as well as, a number of further judgments noted above.”
59. The above observations indicate the clear view of this Court that:
59.1. In the absence of a contrary intent express or implied, procedural amendments are presumed to be retrospective.
59.2. A change in the forum of a trial is a procedural matter.
59.3. Since a change of forum is procedural, a statute which brings about the change is presumed to be retrospective in the absence of a contrary intent.
××××× C.23. Conclusion on the position of law
72. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and retrospectivity—a clear position of law has emerged : a change in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute. This position emerges from the decisions in New India Assurance [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840], Maria Cristina [Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92], Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087], Ramesh Kumar Soni [Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., (2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340] and Sudhir G. Angur [Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev, (2006) 1 SCC 141]. More recently, this position has been noted in a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India [(2021) 5 SCC 1 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 50]. However, there was a deviation by a two- Judge Bench decision of this Court in Dhadi Sahu [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257], which overlooked the decision of a larger three-Judge Bench in New India Assurance [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840] and of a coordinate two-Judge Bench in Maria Cristina [Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92]. The decision in Dhadi Sahu [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257] propounded a position that : (Dhadi Sahu case [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257] , SCC p. 262, para 21)
“21. … no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings MUMTAZ YARUD DOWLA WAKF v. M/S BADAM BALAKRISHNA HOTEL PVT. LTD. & ORS. [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal.”
(emphasis supplied)
In taking this view, the two-Judge Bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi Sahu [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257] failed to consider that the saving of pending proceedings in Mohd. Idris [Mohd. Idris v. Sat Narain, (1966) 3 SCR 15 : AIR 1966 SC 1499] and Manujendra Dutt [Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury, (1967) 1 SCR 475 : AIR 1967 SC 1419] was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being impacted by the repealing Acts therein, and not because a right to forum is accrued once proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257] , to hold that a litigant has a crystallised right to a forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested rights (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights envisaged under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute.”
COURT MUST SATISFY ITSELF AS TO THE EXISTENCE
OF JURISDICTION
Section 9 of the Code “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.—The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
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