Yashpal Jain v. Sushila Devi & Others
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 948; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 948
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat
- Decided
- 20 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4296/2023
- Sections
- 2, 137, 89, 75, 89(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 948 : 2023 INSC 948
CASE DETAILS
YASHPAL JAIN
v.
SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 4296 of 2023)
OCTOBER 20, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the impugned order passed quashing the order dated 13.12.2012 rendered in Civil Revision by the High Court whereby the order dated 09.05.2012 passed by trial court allowing the impleadment application filed by the appellant had been rejected, to be sustained or set aside; whether any further directions require to be issued for concluding the proceedings in a time bound manner on account of the suit pending for trial for past 41 years?
Suit – Suit was instituted by the original plaintiff in 1982 to declare the sale deed executed by first defendant in favour of defendants No.4 to 32 in respect of the suit properties, to be null and void and for a decree of possession of the suit properties – Proceedings protracted from 1982 till her demise in 2007 whereafter, several orders were passed by the courts below, both in original jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction – Impugned order resulted in rejection of the application filed by the appellant to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – On facts, respondents herein themselves having filed an application in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005 for bringing the present appellant as the plaintiff’s legal representative in the aforesaid writ petition and prosecuted the same, reflects that they were in the acquaintance of the fact of the present appellant being the legal representative of deceased plaintiff but yet are attempting to contend that ‘MKJ’ is to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff – Further, the defendants cannot be heard to contend that appellant herein had filed two affidavits (Annexure P-5 and Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted ‘MKJ’ as the legal representative of deceased plaintiff and as such he cannot turn around to assert himself to be the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff, as the affidavits filed by the appellant does not even remotely suggest or indicate that he had admitted ‘MKJ’ being the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff – On the other hand, said affidavits clearly indicate that he had only affirmed and reiterated the fact that he is a signatory to the Will and nothing more or nothing less – Furthermore, ‘MKJ’ himself had filed an application, accompanied by affidavit before the Revisional Court in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010, stating that he would not press the application filed by him for substitution – This was sufficient for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant or in other words, it should have sustained the order of trial court and ordered for appellant being brought on record as legal representative of deceased plaintiff – Impugned order set aside – Order dated 09.05.2012 passed by the Trial Court as affirmed in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 vide order dated 13.12.2012, affirmed – Further directions issued – Judicial Delay . [Paras 12, 14-16] Directions by Supreme Court – Judicial Delay – Certain litigations initiated more than 50 years back still pending – Data from National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), three oldest civil and criminal cases noted – Factors behind Judicial Delays, enumerated – Steps taken to curb Judicial delay, historical outlook – Reasons for delay in civil trial – Discussed – Case Flow Management System Rules – Chief Justices of High Courts where said Rules are yet to be framed, requested to take immediate steps to formulate such rules – State-wise pendency of cases before the respective High Courts and overall Civil Courts as on 16.10.2023; stage-wise pendency also stated – Requests made to the Chief Justices of the High Courts – Directions issued to the trial courts to ensure that speedy justice is delivered – Further directions for implementation of the said directions to be issued from time to time, if necessary – Secretary General to circulate the copy of this judgment to the Registrar General of all the High Courts for being placed before the respective Chief Justices for consideration and suitable steps being taken. [Paras 18, 19, 21-26, 27-31, 33, 34] YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
All India Judges Association v. Union of India [2002] 2 SCR 712 : (2002) 4 SCC 247; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Another AIR (1977) 4 SCC 467; Kailash v. Nanku [2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4 SCC 480; Serum Advocates Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs Union of India, [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 : AIR 2005 SC 3353; Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chhabra (2022) SCC OnLine SC 613; Salem Bar Association v. Union of India [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 353 : AIR 2003 SC 189 – referred to.
Shoraj Singh v. Charan Singh (2018) SCC OnLine All 6613; M.
Mahalingam v. Shashikala ILR Karnataka 4055 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4296 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2019 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in WPMS No. 144 of 2013.
Appearances:
Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Sr. Adv., Anurag Kashyap, Mrs. Mona K. Rajvanshi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Sushil Kumar Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
PREFACE
1. Even after 41 years, the parties to this lis are still groping in the dark and litigating as to who should be brought on record as legal representative of the sole plaintiff Mrs. Urmila Devi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Urmila Devi’ for the sake of brevity). This is a classic case and a mirror to the fact that litigant public may become disillusioned with judicial processes due to inordinate delay in the legal proceedings, not reaching its logical end, and moving at a snail’s pace due to dilatory tactics adopted by one or the other party. The said suit, OS No.2 of 1982, was instituted for the relief to declare the sale deed, executed by Shri Mangal Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘first defendant’ for the sake of convenience) in favour of defendants No.4 to 32 in respect of the suit properties described in the plaints schedule as item No.1 to 8, to be null and void by claiming to be the owner of the said properties; and for a decree of possession of the suit properties with costs.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
2. When the aforesaid suit was still at infancy stage the sole-plaintiff expired on 18.05.2007. One Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an application to substitute him as her legal heir, by placing reliance on the Will dated 19.05.1999 and claiming to be a legatee under the said registered Will. He also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that Mr. Yashpal Jain (hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant’ for the sake of convenience) was a witness to the said registered Will. The defendants objected to the said application contending inter alia that the appellant herein was the adopted son of late Urmila Devi by relying upon the adoption deed dated 06.01.1973 duly registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar. In the said proceedings, the present appellant also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that he was a witness to the Will dated 19.05.1999 executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain. The application filed by Manoj Kumar Jain came to be allowed by order dated 24.02.2010.
2.1 Being aggrieved by the said Order the legal heirs of the first defendant namely, legal heirs of Mangal Singh, filed a Civil Revision No.2 of 2010 before the District Judge which came to be allowed by setting aside the Order of the Trial Court on the ground that applicant had stated during the course of the revisional proceedings that he would not press the said application and as such directed the Trial Court to consider the application filed by Yashpal Jain-appellant herein and permitted him to file an application seeking condonation of delay along with the application to bring on record the legal representatives of the sole plaintiff, since he had failed to do so earlier. Accordingly, revision application came to be allowed by order dated 02.12.2011 and Mr. Yashpal Jain filed an application before the Trial Court for condoning the delay in filing such application and also prayed YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
for abatement of suit to be set aside. The learned Trial Judge vide Order dated 09.05.2012 allowed the application by setting aside the abatement and permitted Yashpal Jain to be substituted as legal representative of late Urmila Devi.
3. At this juncture, we would like to point out that a careful perusal of the application and the orders passed by the courts below would indicate that the parties and the courts below seem to have proceeded on the footing that they were to adjudicate the rights of a legal heir which if seen in the light of expression used in the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) is impermissible, as it is not referable to ‘legal heir’ but ‘legal representative’ as defined under Section 2 (11) which reads: “Legal representative” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.
On the death of a party to the suit it is the legal representative who is/ are entitled to prosecute the proceedings and, in law, represent the estate of the deceased. The legal representative who is brought on record not only includes a legatee under a Will but also an intermeddler of the property who would be entitled to sue and to be sued and/or continue to prosecute the proceedings. This vital aspect seems to have been lost sight of by the courts below conveniently.
4. Be that as it may, the aforesaid Urmila Devi who claimed to be Bhumidar and owner in possession of land situated in village Sonargaon, Patti Katulsyun, District Garhwal, Uttarakhand has contended in her suit that the suit schedule properties were looked after by Mangal Singh- the first defendant and as he had fraudulently obtained a Bhumidar Sanad of the land comprising No.77, 3/16 Nalis, she had filed an application under Section 137-A of UP Act No.1 of 1951 before the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri Garhwal, challenging the said Bhumidari Sanad obtained by the first defendant, which was held in her favour by the Tehsildar, and confirmed by the appellate authority. Not being satisfied with the said order, the first defendant had filed a second appeal before the Revenue Board which came to be allowed in favour of Mangal Singh, against which a review petition was filed thereon by Urmila Devi which came to be allowed on 30.08.1982. The said order was challenged before the High Court of Uttarakhand in Writ Petition (M/S) No.342 of 2005 (old No.14655 of 1983) by Mangal Singh. In the said proceedings a substitution application came to be filed by the legal representative of Mangal Singh stating thereunder that Yashpal Jain (appellant herein) is the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and prayed for his name to be substituted. The said application came to be allowed vide order dated 24.02.2012 and appellant herein was substituted as the legal representative of Urmila Devi in writ proceedings. There is no further challenge to said order or in other words, it has attained finality.
5. As already noticed hereinabove, appellant herein filed an application for substitution as legal representative of the original plaintiff-Urmila Devi along with an application for condoning the delay in filing said application and to set aside the abatement. The said application came to be allowed vide Order dated 09.05.2012. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Legal Representatives of Mangal Singh filed Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 before the District Judge who affirmed the Order of the Trial Court and dismissed the Revision Petition by Order dated 13.12.2012. The legal representatives of Mangal Singh filed WP No.144 of 2013 before the High Court challenging the Orders dated 09.05.2012 and 13.12.2012 passed by the Trial Court and the Revisional Court, respectively. The High Court allowed the writ petition by quashing the impugned orders and rejecting the application of the appellant herein, thereby restoring the original order dated 17.05.2008 wherein Manoj Jain had been ordered for being substituted as legal representative of late Urmila Devi on the strength of the registered Will dated 19.05.1999 propounded by him with a direction to conclude the proceedings within a period of 9 months. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
6. We have heard the arguments of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant and Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents.
7. It is the contention of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, that the High Court committed a serious error in upsetting the findings of the Trial Court and the YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Revisional Court whereunder the discretionary power was exercised by condoning the delay while setting aside the abatement and allowing the application of the appellant herein to be brought on record as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi; the High Court erred in not considering the fact that courts below had recorded a clear finding that appellant herein was the sole surviving legal representative of the deceased plaintiff and as such it ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned order passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the Revisional Court; She would also contend that defendants in this suit who were the writ petitioners in WP(M/S) 342 of 2005 (old number 14655 of 1983) had substituted the appellant herein as legal representative of Urmila Devi in dispute related to the suit schedule property (involved in OS No.2 of 1982) and as such defendants cannot be permitted to take stand contrary to same. Hence, it is contended that impugned order is liable to be set aside.
8. Per contra, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, supports the impugned order and contends that in the Writ Petition No.144 of 2013, appellant herein who was a party therein had not filed a counter-affidavit and as such High Court had recorded that non-traversing of petition averments would amount to admission and had also taken note of the fact that appellant herein had filed an affidavit before the Trial Court on 25.10.2008 whereunder he has accepted the Will dated 19.05.1999 executed by deceased Urmila Devi and thereby supported the stand of Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal heir of Urmila Devi. He would also draw the attention of this Court to yet another affidavit dated 21.08.2009 filed by the appellant himself in OS No.2 of 1982 whereunder he has again supported the Will dated 19.05.1999 or in other words, supported the substitution of Shri Manoj Kumar Jain as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. Hence, he contends there is no illegality committed by the High Court. It is further contended that appellant was having knowledge of OS No.2 of 1982 and as such he cannot plead ignorance for the delay. Lastly, challenging the adoption on the ground that same cannot be the basis for the appellant herein to be brought on record, he has sought for rejection of this appeal.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
9. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar, we are of the considered view that following points would arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2019 passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 quashing the orders dated 13.12.2012 rendered in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 by the High Court whereby the order dated 09.05.2012 passed by trial court allowing the impleadment application filed by the appellant herein had been rejected, is to be sustained or set aside?
(ii) Whether any further direction or directions requires to be issued for concluding the proceedings in a time bound manner on account of Suit No.2 of 1985 pending for trial for past 41 years?
(iii) What order?
RE: POINT No.(i)
10. It is not in dispute that Smt. Urmila Devi had instituted a suit O.S. No.2 of 1982 against Mangal Singh and others in respect of suit schedule properties as described in the plaint schedule for declaring the sale deeds executed by Mangal Singh in favour of defendant Nos.4 to 32, as mentioned in Plaint Schedule 1 to 18, as null and void; and during the pendency of the said suit the plaintiff- Smt. Urmila Devi expired on 18.05.2007. On her demise Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an application on 17.05.2008 for substitution as her legal heir and claiming right legatee under the Will dated 19.05.1999. This application was followed by an affidavit of the appellant (Yashpal Jain) dated 25.10.2008 stating thereunder that his mother Urmila Devi had executed a Will dated 19.05.1999 in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain and also stating thereunder that Will was duly registered. The legal heirs of the defendant objected the said substitution contending, inter alia, that the present appellant is the adopted son of Urmila Devi and said adoption deed was duly registered on 06.01.1973 in the office of the Sub-Registrar. It was also contended that Shri Rajendra Prasad Jain was the holder of power of attorney of Urmila Devi and on his (Rajendra Prasad) death on 18.02.2001, she had executed another power of attorney YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
on 21.04.2001 appointing Virender Kumar Jain and on the basis of the same the name of his wife came to be mutated in respect of the lands indicated thereunder. Hence, it was contended that Will propounded by Manoj Kumar Jain was fabricated and forged. Hence, it was prayed that claim of Manoj Kumar Jain for being substituted as legal representative of Urmila Devi is liable to be rejected. Yet another affidavit was also filed by the appellant on 21.08.2009 reiterating the contents of the earlier affidavit dated 25.10.2008. In other words, it was contended that Manoj Kumar Jain was not the legal representative of Urmila Devi.
11. The learned trial judge allowed the application by order dated 24.02.2010 for substitution by condoning the delay with costs and directed substitution of Manoj Kumar to be the legal representative of deceased plaintiff Urmila Devi.
12. The aforestated order dated 24.02.2010 came to be challenged by legal representatives of Mangal Singh in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010 which resulted in same being allowed vide order dated 02.12.2011 and the order of the trial court dated 24.02.2010 was set aside by taking note of the fact that Manoj Kumar Jain had stated in his application 27/C along with affidavit that he would not press the substitution application. The appellant was granted liberty to file an application for impleadment as a party before the lower court. In this background appellant herein filed an application for substitution as legal representative of Urmila Devi and this application came to be filed on 05.12.2011 along with application for condonation of delay and to set aside abatement, which was opposed by the legal representatives of the first defendants by filing objections and contending that application filed by Yashpal Jain is not maintainable. After hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties learned trial judge by a detailed order dated 09.05.2012 condoned the delay and allowed the application of the appellant to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased-plaintiff Urmila Devi. This order came to be affirmed by order dated 13.12.2012 in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 filed by the legal representatives of Mangal Singh.
13. It is pertinent to mention at this juncture that during the life time of Urmila Devi an application came to be filed under Section 137-A of U.P. Act No.1 of 1951 before Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri Garhwal contending that the Bhumidari Sanad had been obtained by Mangal Singh, with reference to land comprising Nos.77, 3/16 Nalis, by adopting forgery, which came to be accepted. The appeal filed by Mangal Singh before the Assistant Collector against the order of Tehsildar did not yield any result, which gave rise to filing of a Second Appeal before the Revenue Board culminating in said appeal being allowed in favour of Mangal Singh. The Review Petition filed against the order of the Second Appellate Authority came to be allowed and this was challenged by Mangal Singh in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005 (Old No.14655 of 1983). During the pendency of the said writ petition, as noticed earlier, Urmila Devi expired and an application for substitution came to be filed by the very same legal representatives of Mangal Singh (who are Respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein) vide Annexure P-10, specially pleading thereunder to delete the name of Respondent No.4 (therein) Smt. Urmila Devi and substitute Yashpal Jain (appellant herein) in her place. This application came to be allowed by order dated 24.02.2012 as reflected in Annexure RA/2 annexed to the rejoinder affidavit of the appellant. In this view of the matter, it cannot be gain said by the respondents herein that the appellant is not to be substituted as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. It is for this cogent reason, the learned trial judge vide order dated 09.05.2012 allowed the substitution and permitted the appellant herein to be substituted as legal representative of deceased plaintiff-Urmila Devi. Rightly so, this order of the trial court came to be affirmed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 13.12.2012. It would be apt and appropriate to note at this juncture and at the cost of repetition that Manoj Kumar Jain, who had initially filed an application for substitution which came to be allowed by the trial court by order dated 24.02.2010, which order was carried in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010 and in the said proceedings an application came to be filed by said Manoj Kumar Jain stating thereunder that he does not intend to press the application filed by him for being substituted as legal representative of Urmila Devi. This fact also persuaded the Revisional Court to remand the matter back to the trial court vide order dated 02.12.2011.
14. In this factual scenario, the defendants cannot be heard to contend that appellant herein had filed two affidavits (Annexure P-5 and Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted Manoj Kumar Jain as the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and as such he cannot turn around to assert himself to be the legal representative of Urmila Devi, for the simple YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
reason that affidavits filed by the appellant Yashpal Jain does not even remotely suggest or indicate that he have admitted Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal representative of Urmila Devi. On the other hand, said affidavits which has been perused by us, would clearly indicate that he has only affirmed and reiterated the fact that he is a signatory to the said Will and nothing more or nothing less.
15. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents herein, have also contended that on account of non-traversing of the writ petition averments the contents thereof are to be presumed true and correct, though seems to be an attractive proposition at first brush, it cannot be accepted for the simple reason that consent does not confer jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the records would clearly indicate that Manoj Kumar Jain himself had filed an application, accompanied by affidavit before the Revisional Court in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010, stating thereunder that he would not press the application filed by him for substitution and this was sufficient for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant or in other words, it should have sustained the order of trial court and ordered for appellant being brought on record as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi.
16. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that respondents herein themselves having filed an application in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005 for bringing the present appellant (Yashpal Jain) as her legal representative in the writ petition (M/S) 342/2005 and prosecuted the same, would reflect that they were in the acquaintance of the fact that present appellant being the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi but yet are attempting to contend that Manoj Kumar Jain is to be brought on record as legal representative of Urmila Devi. In this background the impugned order which has resulted in rejection of the application filed by the appellant to be brought on record as legal representative of Urmila Devi if sustained would result in the estate of deceased plaintiff not being represented, as a consequence of which suit would abate or would be put to a silent death by the defendants without claim made in the suit being adjudicated on merits. Hence, point No.(i) is answered in favour of the appellant and against respondents and therefore, the impugned order is set aside.
17. As far as the question of right of the appellant over the suit schedule properties, we are of the view, by virtue of adoption propounded, it is an issue which would be at large before the learned trial court and the veracity of the Will dated 19.05.1999 alleged to have been executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain, is to be decided in appropriate proceedings and as such we desist from expressing any opinion in that regard and contentions of both parties are kept open.
RE: POINT No.(ii)
18. Case papers on hand would disclose that dispute between the parties relates back to 02.02.1982 the date of institution of the suit No.2/1982 by the original plaintiff Smt. Urmila Devi. As to the stage of the suit namely, as to whether trial has commenced or otherwise, the material available before this court are silent but the fact remains that proceedings have got protracted from 1982 till demise of Urmila Devi on 18.05.2007 and thereafter it has moved at a snail’s pace or in other words, the litigation seems to have not been taken to its logical end for reasons best known. The death of the original plaintiff opened up a flood of litigation and as a result of it, several orders came to be passed by the courts below, both in original jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction, which also reached the High Cout and ultimately before this Court by the present proceedings. The cause for delay has been myriad. It is for this reason we have expressed our anguish at the beginning of this judgment as to likelihood of litigant public getting disillusioned of justice delivery system due to delays. It would be apt to note that certain litigations initiated more than 50 years back are still pending. As per the data extracted from National Judicial Data Grid (NJGD), we have noted hereinbelow the three oldest civil and criminal cases:
TOP 3 PENDING CIVIL CASES
1. West Bengal
(a) Civil Judge Senior Division, Malda – Partition Suit No.30 of 1952 – registered on 04.04.1952
(b) Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Medinipur – Other Suit No.39 of 2017 -registered on 15.09.1953.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
2. Uttar Pradesh Civil Judge, Junior Division, Varanasi – Original Suit No.319 of 1953 – registered on 02.07.1953
TOP 3 PENDING CTRIMINAL CASES
(1) Maharashtra
(a) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.2319 of 1959 – registered on 11.04.1959
(b) CJJD & JMFC Mehkar – R.C.C. No.61 of 1960 – registered on 06.10.1959
(c) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.778 of 1961 – registered on 30.08.1961 The Underlying factors behind Judicial Delays
19. The causes of delay are numerous loopholes in the law itself, redundant and voluminous paper work, absence of the witnesses, adjournments sought and granted for no justifiable reason as also delay in service of summons, lack of implementation of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’), as the case may be. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. It is not that there has been any lack of effort to speed up the Justice Delivery System. However, the attempts made hitherto have yielded limited results. Time and again various provisions of C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. have been amended to cater the ever-increasing demands for speedy disposal of cases and the results are not inspiring. There is an urgent need to take pro-active steps to not only clear the huge backlog of cases at all levels but there should be introspection by all the stakeholders to gear up to meet the aspirations of the litigant public who would only seek for speedy justice and to curtail the methods adopted to delay the proceedings which may suit certain section or class of the litigant public. When millions of consumers of justice file their cases by knocking at the doors of the courts of first instance, they expect speedy justice. Thus, an onerous responsibility vests on all stakeholders to ensure that the people’s faith in this system is not eroded on account of delayed justice. It is imperative to note that about 6 per cent of the population in India is affected by litigation, in such a scenario the courts would play an important role in the life of a nation governed by Rule of Law. Peace and Tranquility in the society and harmonious relationship between the citizens are achieved on account of effective administration of justice and its delivery system, even the economic growth of a country is dependent on the robust Justice Delivery System which we have in our country.
20. When the efficiency has become the hallmark of modern civilization and in all spheres of life there is an urgent need to hasten the pace of delivery of justice by reducing the time period occupied by the trial of suits and criminal proceedings as also the offshoots of such litigation which results in revisions, appeals etc. arising out of them.
A historical outlook of steps taken to curb the Judicial delay
21. The issue of delay has been bothering all the stakeholders for ages. Way back in the year 1924, a committee was constituted known as the Civil Justice Committee to enquire into the issues relating to changes and improvements necessary to bring in “more speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of the business transacted in the courts” under the chairmanship of Justice Rankin. Delay in disposal of cases beyond a period of two and a half years was a crucial concern and it was emphasized by the said Committee that “where the arrears are unmanageable, improvement in the methods can only palliate. It cannot cure”.1 The Central Government under the chairmanship of Justice S.R. Das set up a committee known as High Court Arrears Committee in the year 1949. In 1979, the Law Commission of India in its 77th Report on ‘delay and arrear in trial courts’ observed that the delay in civil or criminal matters have decreased the confidence among the general public about the judicial system. It was emphasized that civil cases should be treated as lapsed if the matter was not disposed of within one year from the date of registration, whereas a criminal matter should be disposed within six months and in case of sessions trial it should not go beyond one year. It was also suggested to timely fill up the vacancies, appoint additional and ad-hoc judges and increase overall judicial strength. Some of the key recommendations of the Committee were:
1 Civil Justice Committee, 1924 YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
“(i) Improvement of judicial system to meet modern requirement of society.
(ii) Time for scrutiny of the cases should not take more than one week.
(iii) Summons and notices should be attached with the plaint at the stage of filing, without stating the filing date.
(iv) Procedural reforms in civil and criminal case proceedings.”
22. The 79th reports of the Law Commission of India pertains to “Delay and Arrears in High Courts and Appellate Court” which when read along with the 77th report as aforementioned, has provided a stepby-step manual for managerial judging, prescribing upper time limits for trial procedure to ensure speedy disposal of cases to be followed by Trial Courts, High Courts, and other appellate courts. Its recommendations range from ways in which judges should expedite the service of summons to the drafting of the decree and includes the suggestions that they should become more active in conciliation efforts. Other notable recommendations include:
“(i) Appointment of administrative justices who supervise the work of process servers;
(ii) Fixing of dates should be done by presiding officer and not readers, cases should deliberately not be fixed when the prospects of them being taken up for low and a standard of number of cases pending before courts should be decided and whenever there are indications that the number of cases will go beyond the standard, additional courts should be set up.”
23. The 120th Law Commission Report on ‘Manpower planning in judiciary: a blueprint’ recommended that the most effective way to overcome the heavy pendency of cases clogging on the judicial system is by reducing judicial delay. It further states that the judiciary is overburdened by large number of cases filed each year, which clog an already stressed system. The report states that in 2002, when the ratio of the judges to population was 13 judges to 10,00,000 people, the Supreme Court recommended, in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247, to increase the ratio to at least 50 judges per 10,00,000 people.
24. The Malimath Committee, constituted on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, suggested multiple recommendations in its report, for Criminal Justice System, however some of them can be applied even in the civil litigation:
1. Time limit for filing written statements, amendments of pleadings, service of summons etc., must be prescribed.
2. So far as possible, parties must endeavor to decide or to settle the cases outside the court and to carry out the same objective, Section 89 in CPC, was introduced.
3. To record the evidences by issuing the Commission instead of by presence before the court of law. For the purpose of the same under Section 75 of the CPC, commission can be issued for collecting evidence.
4. Time frame need to be provided for oral argument before the court of law.
5. Restriction on Right of appeal.
25. Similarly, the Delhi High Court undertook a pilot project titled ‘‘Zero Pendency Court Project Report’2 whereunder 22 specific pilot and reference courts were referred to collect data to examine meticulously the life cycles of the legal cases. At its core, the project sought to understand how the cases progressed through the legal system in the absence of any backlog. The Data collected from the pilot project led to suggestions of some major recommendations which included, primarily, the assessment of Judicial strength, which as per the report, is regarded as a vital attribute to the cause of delay. The report in this regard suggested to arrive at an optimal judge strength to handle cases pending in different court and went on to provide the Ideal number of judges for different court. The report also highlighted that in criminal cases, prosecution evidence hearings accounts for the Highest percentage of court hearings however when it comes to allocation of time, the courts tend to dedicate more minutes to final arguments and the issuance 2 The Inspiration for the project was a remark by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaih (former CJI) in a conversation with Justice Ravindra Bhat, one of the members of the State Court Management System Committee (SCMS) of the Delhi HC.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
of final orders. In civil cases, miscellaneous hearings are common, but final order proceedings receive more time nevertheless, judges allocate a greater amount of time to the final order or judgment hearings.
26. Melvin M Belli, a member of the California Bar, in his article titled “The Law’s Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil Litigation”, which was prepared as a project for the Belli society, has noted “Trial delays or the period of the American Legal System”. The backlog of the system has become so typical that a plaintiff has to wait 5 years for trial of a simple personal injury claimed. In case, if there is an appeal, a final disposition of the case may occur 10 years after plaintiff has been injured and the following factors were outlined as the major contributors to the delay:
(i) The inefficient management of the court system by the judiciary.
(ii) A Tremendous increase in litigation.
(iii) The philosophy of procrastination of many judges and lawyers, and
(iv) The priority of criminal or civil cases on the court calendar. To tackle the aforesaid problems, the following remedial measures were suggested as possible solutions:
1) Appointment of surrogate judges (auditors, referees, judges pro tempore) to handle certain cases. The idea of using surrogate judges is to avoid unnecessary adjudication under formal trials. This is followed in Massachusetts, where court appointed auditors or referees, who were practicing attorneys, used to adjudge motor vehicle tort cases. They report their findings of facts and conclusions to the court and the parties may accept the auditor’s report as final or request a trial. If the case goes to trial, the auditor’s findings are prima facie evidence and may be read to the jury.
2) The imposition of interest accruing retroactively from the time of incident, rather than from time of judgment, to remove defendant’s incentives to delay.
3) The elevation of civil cases to parity with criminal cases so that civil cases will not be usurped.
4) A requirement that judges set definite trial dates and honor them, so that litigation cannot be delayed by one of the attorneys.
DELAY ON ACCOUNT OF PROCEDURAL LAWS
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