Paranagouda and Another v. The State of Karnataka and Another
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 933; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 923
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice 1860 – Ss. 498a, Justice 304b Rw S. 34
- Decided
- 19 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3274/2023
- Sections
- 34, 304, 306, 3, 304B, 498A, 215, 323, 313, 4, 113, 101
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 923 : 2023 INSC 933
CASE DETAILS
PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 3274 of 2023)
OCTOBER 19, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the courts below were justified in convicting and sentencing the accused for the offences punishable u/ss. 498A, 304B read with s. 34 IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act; whether the conviction of the accused u/s. 304 B IPC would be sustainable; and whether accused can be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 IPC though not charged for said offence.
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 498A, 304B rw s. 34, 306 – Cruelty against married women – Abetment of suicide - Accused-husband and in-laws subjected the deceased-wife to such cruelty and harassment for dowry demand as to drive her to commit suicide by self-immolation – Recording of the dying declaration of the wife and thereafter she succumbed to her burn injuries – Conviction of the accused for the offences punishable u/ ss. 498A, 304B/34 and s. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced accordingly – Justification:
Held: Perusal of the dying declaration clearly suggests the same to be genuine, true and the maker has stated the true story – Dying declaration does not suggest that there was any proximate nexus to the act of committing suicide on account of preceding dowry demand or the demand of dowry on any particular date having triggered the deceased to commit the suicide or forced her to self immolate – Proximate link not being available, the conviction of the accused u/s 304B was improper and cannot be sustained and is set aside – In the light of dying declaration having been accepted to have been made by the deceased and the contents of the same disclosing that she was mentally traumatized, unable to withstand the torture meted 924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
out, which resulted in her committing suicide would suffice to convict the accused for the offence punishable u/s. 498A – It is this taunting or mental torture which she could not withstand and forced her to commit suicide by selfimmolation – Thus, the accused persons are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 though charge was not framed – As regards, aged accused-in laws, in view of the period of sentence already undergone, and not having any past history of criminal record, a lenient view is taken while imposing the sentence – Judgment and order of conviction passed by the courts below is modified - Appellants are acquitted for the offences punishable u/s. 304B and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted for the offence punishable u/ss. 306 and 498A read with s. 34 and sentenced to imprisonment for the period already undergone with fine – Dowry Prohibition Act – ss. 3 and 4. [Paras 13, 17, 19, 21, 29, 30] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 215 – Effect of errors – Conviction of an accused for an offence with which he may not have been specifically charged with – Permissibility – Accused having been tried for the offences punishable u/ss. 498A, 304B IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of DP Act, if can be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 IPC though not charged for said offence:
Held: Omission to frame charge does not disable the court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record – On facts, from the statement of charge framed u/s. 304B and in the alternative s. 306, it is clear that all the facts and ingredients for framing the charge for offence u/s. 306 existed – Mere omission on the part of the trial judge to mention s. 306 IPC with 498A would not preclude this Court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found proved – In the charge framed u/s. 304B, it is clearly mentioned that dying declaration of the deceased indicates that deceased was mentally traumatized and she was unable to tolerate the torture and harassment meted out by the accused person on account of which she committed suicide by self immolation and as such non-framing of the specific charge would not be fatal as no injustice is being caused to the accused – Thus, the accused persons liable to be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 though charge was not framed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 304B, 306 – Dowry Prohibition Act – ss. 3 and 4. [Paras 27, 29]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Salim Gulab Pathan v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 606; Atbir v. Government (2010) 9 SCC 1; Kamlavva and Anr v. State of Karnataka (2009) 13 SCC 614; Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359; Sher Singh Alias Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29; Dinesh Seth v. State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94; Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. (2004) 5 SCC 334; K. Prema S. Rao & Anr v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others (2003) 1 SCC 217 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3274 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in CRLA No.2847 of 2012.
Appearances:
Ganesh Kumar R., Manjunath Meled, Sandeep Sharma, Mrs.
Vijayalaxmi Udapudi, Advs. for the Appellants.
Prateek K. Chadha, AAG, V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Sreekar A., Ms. Muskan Singla, Ms. Pragya Ganjoo, Shubhranshu Padhi, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The judgment dated 20.07.2022 passed by High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench dismissing the Criminal Appeal No.2847 of 2012 by affirming the judgment and order of sentence convicting the appellants passed by the Sessions Judge, Bagalkot in S.C. No.35 of 2011 dated 14.09.2012 for the offences punishable under Section 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (for short the ‘DPAct’) has been called in question. PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. The third daughter of the complainant (Shri Chandappa Gooli) named Akkamahadevi was married to second respondent/accused No.1 herein on 16.05.2010. A complaint came to be lodged by Sri Chandappa Gooli, father of the deceased on 20.12.2010 alleging thereunder that a dowry of Rs. 31,000 and 1.5 tolas of gold was given at the time of marriage and additional dowry of Rs. 50,000 and gold was demanded after two months of marriage. It was alleged that accused No.1 and his parents (appellants) gave physical and mental torture to his daughter and unable to bear the same she committed suicide by self-immolating namely by pouring kerosene and lighting fire. A dying declaration came to be recorded on 20.12.2010 and she died on 24.12.2010 due to burn injuries. Initially FIR came to be registered in Crime No.143 of 2010 for the offences punishable under Section 323, 498A read with Section 34 of IPC and 504 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act and on her death on 24.12.2010, Section 304B of IPC was added. On completion of investigation charge-sheet came to be filed and the jurisdictional sessions judge took cognizance of the offence alleged against the accused persons namely husband-accused No.1 (R-2 herein), appellant No’s 1 and 2 herein (accused No.2 and 3) and Smt. Ningamma accused No.4. On behalf of the prosecution, 32 witnesses were examined as PW-1 to PW-32 and they got marked 50 documents as Ex.P-1 to P-50 and three material objects as MO 1 to MO 3. On closure of prosecution side, the accused were examined and their statements also came to be recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Accused No.4 (mother of accused No.3) had expired on 28.02.2012 and as such the proceedings against her stood abated. After hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned advocates appearing for accused No. 1 to 3, they came to be convicted for the offences alleged against them. The learned Trial Judge had convicted the accused by relying upon the dying declaration (Ex.P.45) and sentenced them to undergo 7 years of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 304B, five years of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, one year of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 498A r/w Section 34 of IPC and one year of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act with fine of Rs. 1000 for each of the offences under Section 498A, 304B and Section 4 of DP Act for each of the accused and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months, and fine of Rs. 31,000 each for the offence under Section 3 of DP Act with default sentence of three months. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
4. Being aggrieved by said judgment, appeal came to be preferred on various grounds and primarily on the ground that deceased had suffered burn injuries to the extent of 70-80% and she was not in a position to speak. It was also contended that Doctor PW-32 who had certified that deceased was able to speak had not even recorded the blood pressure and pulse rate of the deceased in the case-sheet and the treated doctor PW-31 has also admitted that general condition of the deceased was poor at the time of admission to the hospital itself. It was also urged that evidence which was available before the trial court was not appreciated in proper perspective and mere dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of conviction unless it was corroborated. It was also contended that none of the prosecution witnesses supported the story of prosecution and they had turned hostile and as such learned Session Judge ought not to have convicted the accused persons.
5. The High Court by the impugned judgement having formulated points for its consideration vide paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, has answered the points formulated, in favour of the prosecution and against the accused by holding that dying declaration was recorded properly and same is proved by taking into consideration the contents of the same and the evidence of Tehsildar who recorded the same as well as the evidence of Doctor PW-31 who treated the deceased and had issued Ex.P-46 (case sheet of deceased Mahadevi). Hence, this appeal.
6. We have heard the arguments of the learned advocates appearing for the parties. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants contends that dying declaration is neither true nor voluntary statement of deceased as she was not physically or mentally fit to make any declaration and undisputedly the parents of the deceased had not supported the case of the prosecution. He would also contend that doctor who had examined the deceased and treated her has clearly deposed that deceased was suffering from breathlessness when brought to the hospital and he had also certified that she had suffered 70 to 80% burn injuries and thereby making her physically and mentally incapacitated to give any declaration or make any statement. PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
7. Per contra Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State by supporting the judgment of both the courts would submit that there is no cogent material to displace the findings recorded by the courts below. He would also contend that dying declaration cannot be brushed aside merely because deceased had suffered 70% to 80% burn injuries and this cannot be a ground to set aside the conviction. He would submit that Doctor PW-31 had deposed in clear terms that deceased was mentally fit to make statement and as such no doubt can be raised as regards the mental capacity of the deceased to make statement wherein she had assigned the reasons for her self-immolation. Hence, he prays for rejection of the appeal.
DISCUSSION, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
8. The facts narrated hereinabove would suffice for examining as to whether the orders of the courts below requires to be sustained or modified or set aside. Elaborate narration of factual aspects would only burden this judgment and as such we desist from doing so, except to the extent required.
9. The solemnisation of marriage between second respondent and Mrs. Akkamahadevi on 16.05.2010 is not in dispute. She having died on 24.12.2010 due to burn injuries sustained on 20.12.2010 is also not in dispute.
9.1 The gist of the prosecution case is that there was consistent demand for dowry and deceased was tortured for additional dowry and unable to sustain the physical and mental torture meted out to her, she had committed suicide by self-immolation viz, by pouring kerosene and lighting herself. 9.2 The complainant, PW-24 who is the father of the deceased has not supported the case of the prosecution and he has deposed that accused had looked after the deceased well. Long and short of the deposition of PW-24 (father of deceased) is that he did not support the case of the prosecution. PW-1 witness to the inquest panchanama too has turned hostile. The neighbours of the house where the deceased was residing namely PW-3 and PW-4 have turned hostile. PW-5 and PW-21 whom the prosecution claimed of having known the fact of ill-treatment given by the accused to the deceased have turned hostile. The persons who are said to have advised the accused not to ill-treat the deceased have also turned hostile. The persons who were present during the marriage talks of the deceased and accused No.1 namely PW-7 to PW-9 have also not supported the case of the prosecution. Other witnesses namely PW-10, 11, 12, 19, 18, 30 as well as the mother of the deceased PW-22 have not supported the case of the prosecution. Dr. Suresh Basarkod (PW.26) who tendered the case sheet attested by casualty medical officer of Kumareshwar Hospital, Bagalkot, where deceased was admitted, has deposed that Dr. Pramod Mirji (PW-31) and Dr. Vishwanath are competent to speak about medical treatment extended to Mahadevi (deceased). However, Dr. Vishwanath was not examined.
9.3 Dr. Pramod Mirji has been examined as PW-31 and he has stated that deceased was conscious and she was complaining of pain. He has further deposed to the following effect:
“The patient was conscious and she was complaining of pain. There were burn injuries over entire body excepted face. The injured has burn injuries of 70% -80%. The patient was in a position to speak. She was under my treatment till she died on 24.12.2010 at about 5.15 a.m. Now I see Ex.P-46 and it is Xerox copy of case sheet of the said injured. In case sheet Ex.P-46 I have mentioned that the patient was under agony due to pain and pulse not filed and B.P. was not recordable and therefore I have opined that general condition of patient was poor.” Perusal of his cross-examination would indicate that he had treated the deceased for four days and the pulse rate and blood pressure was not recorded on the day of admission and it is kept blank in the case sheet Ex.P-
46. He also admits that entries in the case sheet would reflect that the general condition of the deceased was poor. He further admits that blood pressure of the deceased was not recordable and pulse was feeble. He further admits that deceased was suffering from breathlessness as per the entries found in Ex.P-46 (case sheet). He has also admitted that even though patient was conscious at times the patient had not been in a position to talk. 9.4 Dr. Mahalingappa Kori (PW32) who was CMO at Kumareshwar Hospital, Bagalkot during the relevant period when the dying declaration (Ex.P-45) was recorded has deposed that he was working as casualty medical officer at the hospital on 20.12.2010 from 2:00 PM to 8:00 PM. He has further deposed that Tahasildar (PW25) had expressed his intention to record the dying declaration of injured Mahadevi and he had requested PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
him to be present at the time of recording of the statement. He states that he examined Mahadevi at that time and she was conscious and in a condition to speak. He also states that the statement of Mahadevi was recorded between 4:20 PM to 5:15 PM. He has identified his endorsement and signature at Ex-P45(b) on the dying declaration.
10. Taluka executive Magistrate Basappa Laxmappa Gothe PW-25 is said to have recorded the dying declaration of the deceased as per Ex.P- 45, based on which the accused has been convicted by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. PW25 who was the Tahasildar at Bagalkot during the relevant period has deposed that he was working as Tahasildar in Bagalkot from 08/07/2009 to 27/04/2011. He has deposed that Dr. Mahalingappa Kori (PW32) was present when he recorded the statement of Mahadevi from 4:20 PM to 5:15 PM. He further deposes that Dr. MC Kori had talked to the deceased and found that she was in a fit condition to give statement. He further deposes that he was also convinced that Mahadevi was fit to give statement. He has identified the statement recorded by him as Ex-P45 and also the LTM of the deceased found in Ex-P45. He has deposed that doctor was present throughout the time of recording of statement and the signature & endorsement of the doctor marked as Ex- P45(b) has been identified. PW25 had also conducted inquest panchnama (Ex.P-1) & recorded the statement of Renavva Chandappa Guli (PW22) and he has identified his signature found on the statement of PW22 (Ex. P40) as Ex.P-40(a). He has denied the suggestion that deceased Mahadevi had not given any statement.
11. The learned Sessions judge has referred to the judgment of this Court in the case of Salim Gulab Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 606 whereunder it has been held that dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the court. Yet another judgment of this Court in the case of Atbir vs. Government (2010) 9 SCC 1 which is to the same effect has also been relied upon by the Sessions Judge to convict the accused, whereunder it has been held that dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction. “(a) If it satisfies the conscience of the court that deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not a case of prompting or imagination;
(b) It is true and voluntary and no further corroboration is required;
(c) It is not suspicious.”
It has also been observed therein that rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. If the dying declaration discloses that deceased was unconscious or could never have made any statement, the conviction cannot be sustained. Even non-mentioning of minute details cannot be a ground to reject the said declaration and brief statement would suffice. If the evidence on record would suggest that the deceased was not in a fit condition to make statement or declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
12. In the instant case, we notice from the facts that the deceased had self-immolated. A plain reading of the dying declaration Ex.P-45 recorded by PW-25 would indicate that reason for self-immolation by the deceased was on account of her inability to tolerate the torture meted out by the accused persons and she was not able to withstand the same and as such she self-immolated in the agricultural land. The physical disability suffered by her on account of the burn injuries sustained would not disentitle her to make statement, if said statement had been made consciously knowing the consequences thereof and such statement or declaration cannot be brushed aside only on the ground of burn injuries (in the instant case 70% to 80%) having been sustained by her. As such, the contention raised by the learned advocates appearing for the appellants cannot be accepted or in other words the dying declaration cannot be brushed aside. The acceptance of the dying declaration by the court below is just a proper and under similar circumstances, this Court, in the case of Kamlavva And Anr Vs. State of Karnataka (2009) 13 SCC 614 has held that even in circumstances where the burn injuries was to the extent of 70% to 80% the dying declaration can be accepted and it has been further held to the following effect. “20. The next and the most vital issue which was raised is regarding the admissibility of the dying declaration stated to have been made by the deceased before her death. Before dealing with the factual aspect of the dying declaration, it would be necessary to know the exact legal position which has been laid down and reiterated by this Court time and again.
PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
21. The question as to admissibility of a dying declaration came up before this Court in several cases. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, wherein also a question regarding the admissibility of the dying declaration was raised, the Constitution Bench held that the Court must decide that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration, but where the eyewitnesses’ evidence including the evidence of a Magistrate who had recorded the dying declaration to that effect was available, mere absence of doctor’s certification as to the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind, would not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable. It was further held that the evidentiary value of such dying declaration would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
22. In para 3 of the said judgment in Laxman case, this Court discussed the juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration in the following manner: (SCC p. 713)
“3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement.”
23. The Constitution Bench in Laxman case also referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Koll Chunilal Savjl v. State of Gujarat wherein it was held that the ultimate test with regard to the admissibility of a dying declaration is whether the dying declaration can be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. In the said decision it was also held that before recording the declaration, the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement. The aforesaid ratio of Koli Chunilal Savji case was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Laxman case¹.
24. In Vikas v. State of Maharashtra this Court elaborately discussed the previous relevant decisions governing the legality of dying declaration and observed in para 45 as follows: (SCC pp. 529-30)
45. The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles governing dying declaration as under: (Paniben case, SCC pp. 480- 81, para 18)
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(vii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.
On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] 934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
25. After referring to the decision of this Court in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, this Court in Vikas reiterated the legal position that where a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it would stand on a much higher footing inasmuch as a competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim and in absence of circumstances showing anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court.”
13. In the light of above discussion, we are of the considered view that the dying declaration Ex.P-45 in the instant case which came to be accepted by the courts below cannot be found fault with, particularly, in the backdrop of the evidence tendered by the person who recorded the same as per Ex.P-45 and he having stood to his ground in the cross-examination and having spoken about her mental capability to make such statement and that too consciously. Dr. M.C. Kori PW-32 in whose presence the dying declaration Ex.P-45 came to be recorded by PW-25 has categorically stated that deceased Mahadevi was conscious and she was in a condition to speak. There is no prescribed format for recording the dying declaration. The perusal of the dying declaration in the instant case clearly suggests the same to be genuine and the maker has stated the true story. On going through the same, it appears to our mind as it appeared to the trial court and the High Court to be genuine, true and not tainted with doubt or shrouded with mystery. The contents of the dying declaration Ex.P-45 suggests the possible explanation of the occurrence of the incident and it also appears to be the truthful version of the maker.
14. The incidental question that would also arise for our consideration is: whether the conviction of the accused under Section 304B would be sustainable? The ingredients to be satisfied for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B are:
“(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.”
15. This Court in the case of Bansilal vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 has held that, to attract the provision of Section 304B of the IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death”, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand of dowry”. It has been further held: “20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death. (Vide T. Aruntperunjothi v. State ; Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan; State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram ; Anand Kumar v. State of M.P. and Undavalli Narayana Rao v. State of A.P.”
16. In Sher Singh Alias Partapa vs State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29 it has been held:
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