In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899 v. .
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1066; [2023] 15 S.C.R. 1081
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 7 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice The Indian Stamp Act, Justice 1899, Justice And the Indian Contract Act
- Decided
- 13 Dec 2023
- Case number
- CURATIVE PETITION (CIVIL) No. 44/2023
- Sections
- 35, 2, 5, 16, 440, 63, 11, 7(2), 8, 45, 3, 11(6)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 15 S.C.R. 1081 : 2023 INSC 1066
CASE DETAILS
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
UNDER THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996
AND THE INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899
(Curative Petition (C) No. 44 of 2023)
In (Review Petition (C) No. 704 of 2021 )
In (Civil Appeal No. 1599 of 2020)
DECEMBER 13, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, SANJIV KHANNA,
B R GAVAI, SURYA KANT, J B PARDIWALA AND
MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The issue at hand arose in the context of three statutes; the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Stamp Act imposes duty on “instruments”. Arbitration agreements are often embedded in underlying instruments or substantive contracts. The primary issue for consideration was whether such arbitration agreements would be non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid if the underlying contract is not stamped. The challenge before the Supreme Court was to harmonize the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Stamp Act, 1899.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – ss.8 and 11 – Arbitration agreements embedded in underlying instruments or substantive contracts – Whether such arbitration agreements would be non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid if the underlying contract is not stamped – Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Unstamped or insufficiently stamped instruments – If admissible in evidence – Nonstamping or inadequate stamping – If curable.
Ed. Note. Hon’ble Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI pronounced the judgment on behalf of himself, Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Hon’ble Mr Justice B R Gavai, Hon’ble Mr Justice Surya Kant, Hon’ble Mr Justice J B Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice Manoj Misra. Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna pronounced a separate but concurring judgment. 1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence u/s.35 of the Stamp Act – Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable – Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect – The Stamp Act itself provides for the manner in which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure for it – An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination u/ss.8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act – The concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists – Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal. [Paras 48 and 224] – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring): Unstamped or insufficiently stamped instruments inadmissible in evidence in terms of s.35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, are not rendered void and void ab initio – An objection as to the under-stamping or non-stamping of the underlying contract will not have any bearing when the prima facie test, “the existence of arbitration agreement”, is applied by the courts while deciding applications under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – An objection as to insufficient stamping of the underlying agreement can be examined and decided by the arbitral tribunal. [Para 1] Evidence – Admissibility of documents – Difference between inadmissibility and voidness – Contract Act, 1872 – s.2(g).
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The admissibility of an instrument in evidence is distinct from its validity or enforceability in law – An agreement can be void without its nature as a void agreement having an impact on whether it may be introduced in evidence – Similarly, an agreement can be valid but inadmissible in evidence – When an agreement is void, one is speaking of its enforceability in a court of law – When it is inadmissible, one is referring to whether the court may consider or rely upon it while adjudicating the case – This is the essence of the difference between voidness and admissibility. [Paras 44, 45 and 46] Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Purpose of.
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The Stamp Act is a fiscal legislation which is intended to raise revenue for the government – It is a mandatory statute. [Para 58] Arbitration – Principle of arbitral autonomy – Doctrines / Principles.
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The principle of arbitral autonomy is an integral element of the ever-evolving domain of arbitration law – Arbitral autonomy means that the parties to an arbitration agreement can exercise their contractual freedom to bestow the arbitral tribunal with the authority to decide disputes that may arise between them – The basis of arbitral autonomy is to give effect to the true intention of parties to distance themselves from the “risk of domestic judicial parochialism. [Para 66] Doctrines / Principles – Principle of judicial interference in arbitration proceedings – Scope of non-obstante clause contained in s.5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – Legislative intention. Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral proceedings serves to proscribe judicial interference in arbitral proceedings, which would undermine the objective of the parties in agreeing to arbitrate their disputes, their desire for less formal and more flexible procedures, and their desire for neutral and expert arbitral procedures – The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral procedures – This principle has also been incorporated in international instruments – s.5 of the Arbitration Act is of aid in interpreting the extent of judicial interference under ss.8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act – s.5 contains a general rule of judicial non-interference – Therefore, every provision of the Arbitration Act ought to be construed in view of s.5 to give true effect to the legislative intention of minimal judicial intervention. [Paras 69 and 82] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Is a self-contained code – Provisions of other statutes cannot interfere with the working of the
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Arbitration Act, unless specified otherwise. [Para 85 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Arbitration – Arbitration agreement – Is the foundation of arbitration as it records the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. [Para 88 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Arbitration – Arbitration agreement – Separability of the arbitration agreement from the underlying contract in which it is contained.
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): An arbitration agreement is juridically independent from the underlying contract in which it is contained – The concept of separability reflects the presumptive intention of the parties to distinguish the underlying contract, which captures the substantive rights and obligations of the parties, from an arbitration agreement which provides a procedural framework to resolve the disputes arising out of the underlying contract – This presumption has various consequences in theory and practice, the most important being that an arbitration agreement survives the invalidity or termination of the underlying contract – The separability presumption gives effect to the doctrine of competence-competence. [Paras 90 and 112] Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of competence-competence – Comparative analysis – Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – s.16. Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz (also known as competence competence), as originally developed in Germany, was traditionally understood to imply that arbitrators are empowered to make a final ruling on their own jurisdiction, with no subsequent judicial review of the decision by any court – However, many jurisdictions allow an arbitral tribunal to render a decision on its jurisdiction, subject to substantive judicial review – The UK position is that although the arbitral tribunal is empowered to consider whether it has jurisdiction, its determination is subject to the examination of the courts – The courts in the United States have considered the principle of competence-competence to be intertwined with the separability presumption – The Singapore High Court has given full effect to the doctrine of competence-competence since the arbitral tribunal gets the first priority to determine issues even with respect to the very existence of the arbitration agreement, while the jurisdiction of the courts is limited to a prima facie determination – s.16 of the Arbitration Act recognizes the doctrine of competence-competence in Indian arbitration law. [Paras 115, 117, 118, 119, 120] Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of competence-competence –Positive and negative aspects of the doctrine – Negative competencecompetence – Discussed.
Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.R Gavai, Surya Kant, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.): The international arbitration law as well as domestic law prioritize the arbitral tribunal by permitting them to initially decide challenges to their authority instead of the courts – The policy consideration behind this approach is twofold: first, to recognize the mutual intention of the parties of choosing the arbitrator to resolve all their disputes about the substantive rights and obligations arising out of contract; and second, to prevent parties from initiating parallel proceedings before courts and delaying the arbitral process – This is the positive aspect of the doctrine of competence-competence – The negative aspect, in contrast, speaks to the national courts – It instructs the courts to limit their interference at the referral stage by deferring to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement – Allowing arbitral tribunals to first rule on their own jurisdiction and later allowing the courts to determine if the tribunal exercised its powers properly safeguards both the power and authority of the arbitral tribunal as well as the courts – The negative aspect of the doctrine has been expressly recognized by Indian courts – Considering both the positive and negative facets, the principle can be defined as a rule whereby arbitrators must have the first opportunity to hear challenges relating to their jurisdiction, which is subject to subsequent review by courts. [Paras 129, 130]
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Arbitration Act is a legislation enacted to inter alia consolidate the law relating to arbitration in India – It will have primacy over the Stamp Act and the Contract Act in relation to arbitration agreements. [Para 166 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Interpretation of Statutes – Harmonious construction – Provisions contained in two statutes must be, if possible, interpreted in a harmonious manner to give full effect to both the statutes – In providing a harmonious interpretation, the Court has to be cognizant of the fact that it does not defeat the purpose of the statutes or render them ineffective. [Para 165 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Interpretation of Statutes – Non-obstante clause – Held: Although a non-obstante clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour, its effect is limited to the extent intended by the legislature. [Para 77 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Words and Phrases – “admissible”. [Para 44 in judgment of Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI] Words and Phrases – Word “shall” – In ss.33 and 35 of the Stamp Act – Meaning and effect of. [Para 189 in judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
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Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd. (2019) 9 SCC 209 : [2019] 5 SCR 579 – overruled to an extent. Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd v. Northern Coal Field (2020) 2 SCC 455 – relied on.
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1 : [2020] 11 SCR 1001 – clarified.
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IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
1092; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (2003) 7 SCC 418: [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 812; Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta,1959 SCC OnLine SC 6; Damodar Valley Corporation v. K K Kar (1974) 1 SCC 141: [1974] 2 SCR 240 ; Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja(2004) 3 SCC 155: [2004] 1 SCR 404; National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation India Ltd. v. Gains Trading Co. (2007) 5 SCC 692; P Manohar Reddy & Bros. v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corp. (2009) 2 SCC 494: [2008] 17 SCR 1217; Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd. v. Potluri Madhavilata, (2009) 10 SCC 103: [2009] 14 SCR 815; Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 712; A Ayyasamy v. A Paramsivam, (2016) 10 SCC 386: [2016] 11 SCR 521; SPB & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.(2005) 8 SCC 618: [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.(2009) 1 SCC 267: [2008] 13 SCR 638; Duro Felguera, S A v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. (2017) 9 SCC 729: [2017] 10 SCR 285; Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman (2019) 8 SCC 714: [2019] 12 SCR 123; Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 234: [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 699; CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57: [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373: [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707; Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation (2018) 14 SCC 715: [2018] 1 SCR 915; Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation 2021 SCC OnLine SC 439; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315: [1981] 1 SCR 1083; Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. T. Thankam (2015) 14 SCC 444: [2015] 2 SCR 228; CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. v. BPL Communications Ltd., (2003) 12 SCC 140; Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. Jute Corpn. of India Ltd., (2007) 14 SCC 680: [2007] 11 SCR 388; Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: [2014] 13 SCR 895; Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75: [2021] 1 SCR 1 ; Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam (2001) 7 SCC 573: [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 469; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016) 10 SCC 386: [2016] 11 SCR 52; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5; Emmar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh (2019) 12 SCC 751; Intercontinental Hotels Group (India) (P) Ltd v. Waterline Hotels (P) Ltd.(2022) 7 SCC 662; Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao (1971) 1 SCC 545; Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya (2007) 8 SCC 514; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 17 SCC 607; Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society 2023 SCC OnLine SC 586; Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited v. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534: [2018] 1 SCR 848; Official Trustee, West Bengal v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee [1969] 3 SCR 92; NTPC v. Siemens Atkeingesllchaft (2007) 4 SCC 451: [2007] 3 SCR 399; Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc.(2013) 1 SCC 641: [2012] 3 SCR 402 and Seka Dobric v. SA Eonsoftech Private Limited (Decision of Supreme Court of India in Arbitration Petition No. 25 of 2023) – referred to.
Sukh Lal Sheikh v. Tara Chand Ta, 1905 SCC OnLine Cal 164; Gulzari Lal Marwari v. Ram Gopal 1936 SCC OnLine Cal 275; Boottam Pitchiah v. Boyapati Koteswara Rao 1964 SCC OnLine AP 5; Mulheim Pipecoatings GmbH v. Welspun Fintrade Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1048 – referred to. Rio Algam v. Sammi Steel Co., Ontario Court of Justice, Canada, 1 March 1991 [1991] O.J. No. 268; Heyman v. Darwins [1942] AC 356; Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Kansa General International Insurance Co. Ltd. [1993] Q.B. 701; Premium Nafta Products Limited v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd.[2007] UKHL 40; Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,388 US 395 (1967); Buckeye Check Cashing Inc v. Cardegna 546 U.S. 440, 440 (2006); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson 2 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; Malini Ventura v. Knight Capital Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 225; Tobler v. Justizkommission des Kantons Schwyz, DFT 59 | 177 (1933) – referred to. Gary Born, The Principle of Judicial Non-Interference in International Arbitration Proceedings’ (2009) 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 999, 1002; Gary Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2021) 2361; Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2012) 21, 60; Richard Garnett, ‘Article 5 of the Model Law: Protector of the Arbitral Process?’ (2021) 38(2) Journal of International Arbitration 127-146; Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) 3; Stephen Schwebel, Luke Sobota, and Ryan Manton, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2020) 4; Henry Horwitz and James Oldham, ‘John Locke, John Mansfield, and Arbitration during the Eighteenth Century’ (1993) 36(1) The Historical Journal 137, 139; Earl Wolaver, ‘The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration’
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
(1934) 83 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, 142; Julian D M Lew, ‘Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration’ (2006) 22(2) Arbitration International 179, 183 and P Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon – referred to.
In the judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J.
N N Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. (2023) 7 SCC 1 – overruled.
Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1: [2020] 11 SCR 1001 – clarified.
Javer Chand and Others. v. Pukhraj Surana AIR 1961 SC 1655: [1962] 2 SCR 333; State of Bihar v. M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 110: [1962] 1 SCR 827; Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others (1971) 1 SCC 545: [1971] 3 SCR 590; Hameed Joharan (Dead) and Others v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs. and Others (2001) 7 SCC 573: [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 469; Dr. Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs. v. Hari Das (D) by LRs. (2005) 10 SCC 746: [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 359; Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya (2007) 8 SCC 514: [2007] 10 SCR 772; Shyamal Kumar Roy v. Sushil Kumar Agarwal (2006) 11 SCC 331: [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 47; Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra (2009) 2 SCC 532: [2008] 17 SCR 944; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad, AIR 1965 SC 1636: [1965] 2 SCR 908; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. A.P. Jaiswal and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 748; Total Environment Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 953; Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754: [1989] 3 SCR 316; Caravel Shipping Services (P) Ltd. v. Premier Sea Foods Exim (P) Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 461: [2018] 14 SCR 289; Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 13 SCC 477: [2014] 12 SCR 488; B.O.I. FinanceLtd. v. Custodian and Others (1997) 10 SCC 488: [1997] 3 SCR 51; Canara Bank and Others v. Standard Chartered Bank (2002) 10 SCC 697; Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee (2014) 6 SCC 677: [2014] 6 SCR 514; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 713: [2020] 10 SCR 791; Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society 2023 SCC OnLine SC 586 and Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd. (2019) 9 SCC 209: [2019] 5 SCR 579 – referred to.
Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand AIR 1946 PC 51– referred to.
BNA v. BNB and Another [2019] SGHC 142 and Insigma Technology Co Ltd v. Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] SGCA 24 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
INHERENT/CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Curative Petition (C) No. 44 of 2023 in Review Petition (C) No.704 of 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 1599 of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2021 in RP (C) No.704 of 2021 and dated 14.02.2020 in CA No.1599 of 2020 of the Supreme Court of India.
With Arbitration Petition No. 25 of 2023.
Appearances:
Arvind P Datar, Nikhil Sakhardande, Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advs., Debesh Panda, Ms. Amrita Panda, Naman Maheshwari, Ms. Snehal Maheshwari, Rameshwar Totala, Rahul Totala, Udbhav Gady, Ashish Venugopal, Ms. Sonali Mathur, Siddharth Sijoria, Garv Malhotra, Eshan A Chaturvedi, Arijit Sanyal, Ms. Arundhati Kale, Omar Ahmad, Pratyush Miglani, Pranav Mago, Kanishk Aggrawal, Sri Aditya Kumar, Sooraj Sharma, Ms. Payal Chawla, Ms. Hina Shaheen, Ms. Yamini Daga, Shubhra Swami Paranjpe, Raghav Bhatia, Soayib Qureshi, Advs. for the Petitioners.
Shyam Divan, Nikhil Nayyar, Sr. Advs., Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, Sulabh Rewari, Divyanshu Rai, Rongon Choudhary, Ms. Mansvini Jain, Atharv Gupta, Ravi Raghunath, Ms. Aakashi Lodha, Dhanaram Ramachandran, Advs. for the Respondents.
Gourab Banerji, Sr. Adv., T S Sundaram, Subhro Prokas Mukherjee, Venkata Supreeth, Mohit Pandey, Rakesh Talukdar, Shashank Garg, Shivank Dideli, (Amicus in NN Global)
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Darius J Khambata, Nakul Dewan, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, K Ramakanth Reddy, Arvind Verma, Prashanto Chandra Sen, Sr. Advs., Vijayendra Pratap Singh, Abhijnan Jha, Ms. Shreya Choudhary, Ankitesh Ojha, Tushar Hathiramani, Ms. Shreenandini Mukhopadhyay, Ms. Vidhi Shah, Pradhuman Gohil, Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Rushabh N Kapadia, Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Neil Chatterjee, Ms. Nooreen Sarna, Ms. Tansi Fotedar, Soumil Jhanwar, Satyender Saharan, Rohan Naik, Sathvik Chandrashekar, Rahul Arya, Premlal Krishnan, Vivek Singh, Ms. Bani Dixit, Madhav Bhatia, Shailendra Slaria, Yogesh Sharma, Mukesh Sharma, Ms. Sujal, Himanshu Kapoor, Alok Tripathi, Shivam Singh, Ms. Mugdha Pande, Jaideep Khanna, Sahil Bhatia, Suyash Vyas, Ms. Shaswati Parhi, Nishant Singh, Abir Phukan, Kuriakose Varghese, V Shyamohan, Ms. Eshita Baruah, Vedant Goel, Arjun Chopra for M/s Kmnp Law, Kartik Seth, Siddharth Seth, Mrs. Shriya Gilhotra, Prashanth Dixit, Arushi Singh Rathore, Saurav Chaturvedi, Ankit Gupta, Mahesh Bhati for M/s Chambers of Kartik Seth, Dr Vivek Sharma, Sameer Rohtagi, Ms. Simran Brar, Ms. Apoorva Neral, Ms. Sanya Dua, Swastik Dalai, M/s. Karanjawala & Co, Rahul G Tanwani, Anantha Narayana MG, Shubhendu Anand, Ayush Anand, Sudipto Sircar, Aditya Shekhar, VC Shukla, Mrs Sindoora Vnl, Ms. Aditi Tripathi, Ms. Vidhi Thakar, Aman Shukla, Prastut Dalvi, Alabhya Dhamija, Manan Shanghai, Siddharth Relan, Ms. Charu Ambwani, Ms. Komal Agarwal, Ms. Kavya Vijay, Ashutosh Srivastava, Umesh Chandra Srivastava, Ms. Manisha Ambwani, Rajul Srivastav, Ms. Roohe Hina Dua, Harshit Khanduja, Randeep Sachdeva, Arun Pandit, Ms. Dhanakshi Gandhi, Sahib Kochhar, Pratham Mehrotra, Ms. Shreya Arora, Tejas Karia, Ms. Shruti Sabharwal, Ms. Vrinda Pareek, Dr. Rishab Gupta, Sanyat Lodha for Shardul S Shroff, George Pothan Poothicote, Ms. Jyoti Singh, Ms. Somya Yadava, Ms. Khyati Jain, Gauhar Mirza, Ms. Hiral Gupta, Ms. Sukanya Singh, Ms. Nilakshi Srivastava, Abhinav Chahar, Rohit Rahar, Kunal Vajani, Shubhang Tandon, Guneet Sidhu, Ms. Manisha Singh, Ashu Pathak, Siddhant Buxy, Ms. Priyanka Vora, Debanshu Khettry, Varun K Chopra, Mehul Sharma, Abhishek Kandwal for M/s VKC Law Offices, PV Amarnadha Prasad, Ms. Vijayshree Pattnaik, Debesh Panda, Ms. Diya Kapur, Raghav Kumar, Aditya Ladha, Ms. Gahena Gambani, Ms. Liz Mathew, Ankur Kashyap, Ajith S Ranganathan, Rohit Rajershi, Abhay Singh, Aman Bajaj, Advs. for the Intervenors.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI
A. Reference .................................................................................. 5* B. Submissions ............................................................................ 12* C. Maintainability ....................................................................... 18* D. The Indian Stamp Act 1899 ................................................... 22* i. Overview .............................................................................. 22* ii. The consequences of the failure to stamp an instrument 27* a. The procedure under the Stamp Act .......................... 27* b. The difference between inadmissibility and voidness ...32* c. Section 35 of the Stamp Act renders a document inadmissible and not void ...........................................34* iii. The purpose of the Stamp Act .......................................... 38* E. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996........................... 40* i. Arbitral autonomy ............................................................. 42* ii. Principle of minimum judicial interference ................... 45* iii. The Arbitration Act is a self-contained code ................. 52* iv. Principles of modern arbitration .................................... 54* F. The law on the arbitration agreement ................................... 55* i. Separability of the arbitration agreement .......................... 56* d. United Kingdom ................................................................. 58* e. United States of America .................................................... 61* f. Singapore ............................................................................. 62*
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899
* Ed Note: Pagination is as per the original judgment.
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
g. International Conventions ................................................... 62* h. India .................................................................................... 64* G. The doctrine of competence-competence .............................. 70* i. Comparative analysis ........................................................ 71* ii. India ................................................................................... 73* iii. Negative competence-competence .................................. 79* H. Judicial interference under the Arbitration Act ................... 81* I. Harmonious construction of the Arbitration Act, the Stamp Act, and the Contract Act ...............................................................97* i. The Arbitration Act will have primacy with respect to arbitration agreements .....................................................101* a. The Arbitration Act is a special law and the Indian Contract Act and the Stamp Act are general laws ........................101* b. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act .................................... 104* c. Parliament was aware of the Stamp Act when it enacted the Arbitration Act ...............................................................106* ii. Harmonious construction of the three statutes under consideration ........................................................................106* a. The effect of the competence-competence doctrine ..... 106* b. The effect of the word “shall” in Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act....................................................................... 111* c. The object of the Stamp Act is preserved .....................113* d. The interpretation of the law must give effect to the purpose of the Arbitration Act in addition to the Stamp Act...... 114* J. SMS Tea Estates and Garware Wall Ropes were wrongly decided ................................................................................... 115* i. SMS Tea Estates ................................................................115* ii. Garware Wall Ropes........................................................119* K. The Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996 ........................................................................124* L. Vidya Drolia does not deal with the issue of stamping ....... 126* M. Conclusions .......................................................................... 129* A*. Reference
1. This Court has been called upon to resolve an issue which arose in the context of three statutes – the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 19961, the Indian Stamp Act 18992, and the Indian Contract Act 1872.3 The Stamp Act imposes duty on “instruments”. An instrument which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be acted upon in terms of its provisions. Arbitration agreements are often embedded in underlying instruments or substantive contracts. When an application is made for the appointment of an arbitrator, an objection is raised on the ground that the arbitration agreement is inadmissible because it is in an instrument which is unstamped or inadequately stamped. The primary issue that arises is whether such arbitration agreements would be non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid if the underlying contract is not stamped. A brief description of the context in which this question arises follows.
2. In N N Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.,4 (hereinafter referred to as “N N Global 1”) a Bench of three Judges of this Court was called upon in a Special Leave Petition to determine the enforceability of an arbitration agreement contained in an unstamped work order. The Bench, speaking through Justice Indu Malhotra, held that * Ed. Note: PART A 1 “Arbitration Act”
2 “Stamp Act”
3 “Contract Act”
4 (2021) 4 SCC 379
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
an arbitration agreement, being separate and distinct from the underlying commercial contract, would not be rendered invalid, unenforceable, or non-existent. The Court held that the non-payment of stamp-duty would not invalidate even the underlying contract because it is a curable defect. In the process, this Court adopted a view at variance with SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd5 and Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd.6 In SMS Tea Estates (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that an arbitration agreement in an unstamped contract could not be acted upon. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Garware Wall Ropes (supra) relied on SMS Tea Estates (supra) to hold that an arbitration agreement in an unstamped commercial contract would not “exist” as a matter of law and could not be acted upon until the underlying contract was duly stamped:
“22. When an arbitration clause is contained “in a contract”, it is significant that the agreement only becomes a contract if it is enforceable by law. We have seen how, under the Stamp Act, an agreement does not become a contract, namely, that it is not enforceable in law, unless it is duly stamped. Therefore, even a plain reading of Section 11(6-A), when read with Section 7(2) of the 1996 Act and Section 2(h) of the Contract Act, would make it clear that an arbitration clause in an agreement would not exist when it is not enforceable by law. This is also an indicator that SMS Tea Estates [SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd., (2011) 14 SCC 66 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 777] has, in no manner, been touched by the amendment of Section 11(6-A).
[…]
29. This judgment in Hyundai Engg. case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd., (2018) 17 SCC 607 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 530] is important in that what was specifically under consideration was an arbitration clause which would get activated only if an insurer admits or accepts liability. Since on facts it was found that the insurer repudiated the claim, though an arbitration
5 (2011) 14 SCC 66
6 (2019) 9 SCC 209
clause did “exist”, so to speak, in the policy, it would not exist in law, as was held in that judgment, when one important fact is introduced, namely, that the insurer has not admitted or accepted liability. Likewise, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the arbitration clause that is contained in the sub-contract would not “exist” as a matter of law until the sub-contract is duly stamped, as has been held by us above. The argument that Section 11(6-A) deals with “existence”, as opposed to Section 8, Section 16 and Section 45, which deal with “validity” of an arbitration agreement is answered by this Court’s understanding of the expression “existence” in Hyundai Engg. case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd., (2018) 17 SCC 607 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 530], as followed by us.”
Thereafter, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation,7 cited paragraph 29 of Garware Wall Ropes (supra) (extracted above) with approval for the proposition that an arbitration agreement exists only when it is valid and legal:
“146. We now proceed to examine the question, whether the word “existence” in Section 11 merely refers to contract formation (whether there is an arbitration agreement) and excludes the question of enforcement (validity) and therefore the latter falls outside the jurisdiction of the court at the referral stage. On jurisprudentially and textualism it is possible to differentiate between existence of an arbitration agreement and validity of an arbitration agreement. Such interpretation can draw support from the plain meaning of the word “existence”. However, it is equally possible, jurisprudentially and on contextualism, to hold that an agreement has no existence if it is not enforceable and not binding. Existence of an arbitration agreement presupposes a valid agreement which would be enforced by the court by relegating the parties to arbitration. Legalistic and plain meaning interpretation would be contrary to the contextual background including the definition clause and would result in unpalatable consequences. A reasonable and just interpretation of “existence” requires understanding the context, the purpose and the relevant legal
7 (2021) 2 SCC 1
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
norms applicable for a binding and enforceable arbitration agreement. An agreement evidenced in writing has no meaning unless the parties can be compelled to adhere and abide by the terms. A party cannot sue and claim rights based on an unenforceable document. Thus, there are good reasons to hold that an arbitration agreement exists only when it is valid and legal. A void and unenforceable understanding is no agreement to do anything. Existence of an arbitration agreement means an arbitration agreement that meets and satisfies the statutory requirements of both the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act and when it is enforceable in law.
147. We would proceed to elaborate and give further reasons:
147.1. (i) In Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. [Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 324] , this Court had examined the question of stamp duty in an underlying contract with an arbitration clause and in the context had drawn a distinction between the first and second part of Section 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, albeit the observations made and quoted above with reference to “existence” and “validity” of the arbitration agreement being apposite and extremely important, we would repeat the same by reproducing para 29 thereof : (SCC p. 238)
[…] Existence and validity are intertwined, and arbitration agreement does not exist if it is illegal or does not satisfy mandatory legal requirements. Invalid agreement is no agreement.”
3. N N Global 1 (supra) noted the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in Vidya Drolia (supra) and doubted the correctness of the view adopted in paragraphs 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes (supra) and in paragraphs 146 and 147 of Vidya Drolia (supra) (extracted above). It referred the following issue to a Bench of five Judges:
“58. […] Whether the statutory bar contained in Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 applicable to instruments chargeable to stamp duty under Section 3 read with the Schedule to the Act, would also render the arbitration agreement contained in such an instrument, which is not chargeable to payment of stamp duty, as being non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid, pending payment of stamp duty on the substantive contract/ instrument?”
4. The Constitution Bench in N N Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.8 (hereinafter referred as “N N Global 2”) answered the reference. By a majority of 3:2, it was held that NN Global 1 (supra) does not represent the correct position of law. The majority judgment (authored by Justice K. M. Joseph for himself and Justice Aniruddha Bose with a concurring judgment by Justice C. T. Ravikumar) upheld the view taken by this Court in SMS Tea Estates (supra) and Garware Wall Ropes (supra). Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Hrishikesh Roy delivered separate dissenting judgments. The conclusions of the majority can be summarized in the following terms:
a. An unstamped instrument containing an arbitration agreement is void under Section 2(g) of the Contract Act;
b. An unstamped instrument, not being a contract and not enforceable in law, cannot exist in law. The arbitration agreement in such an instrument can be acted upon only after it is duly stamped;
c. The “existence” of an arbitration agreement contemplated under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act is not merely a facial existence or existence in fact, but also “existence in law”;
d. The Court acting under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act cannot disregard the mandate of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act requiring it to examine and impound an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument; and e. The certified copy of an arbitration agreement must clearly indicate the stamp duty paid.
5. The minority judgment adopted a different legal approach. Justice Ajay Rastogi noted that the scope of the referral court under Section 11 is limited to the examination of the “existence” of an arbitration agreement. He held that all the other debatable issues, including the issue of stamping,
8 (2023) 7 SCC 1
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
must be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide in view of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.
6. Justice Hrishikesh Roy relied on the scheme of the Stamp Act to hold that an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document is not rendered invalid or void ab initio because the failure to stamp an instrument is a curable defect. Further, Justice Roy traced the evolution of the Arbitration Act to observe that it promotes minimum judicial interference in the arbitral process. He held that Section 11 of the Arbitration Act should be harmonized with Section 35 of the Stamp Act by deferring the issue of stamping to the arbitrator. In conclusion, Justice Roy held that SMS Tea Estates (supra) and Garware Wall Ropes (supra) do not set out the correct position of law.
7. On 14 February 2020, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dharmaratnakara Rai Bahadur Arcot Narainswamy Mudaliar Chattram v. Bhaskar Raju and Brothers9 cited SMS Tea Estates (supra) with approval. In Bhaskar Raju (supra), this Court reversed the decision of the High Court which had relied on an insufficiently stamped lease deed to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Bhaskar Raju (supra) was decided before N N Global 1 (supra). However, while the reference made by the three-Judge Bench in N N Global 1 (supra) was pending, review petitions were filed in Bhaskar Raju (supra). On 20 July 2021, the review petition was dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.10 On 7 December 2022, a curative petition was filed seeking a reconsideration of Bhaskar Raju (supra). The Constitution Bench in N N Global 2 (supra) answered the reference and delivered its verdict on 25 April 2023.
8. On 8 May 2023, a three-Judge Bench of this Court issued notice in a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator in Seka Dobric v. SA Eonsoftech Private Limited.11 In the meantime, on 18 July 2023, a five- Judge Bench of this Court issued notice in the curative petition in Bhaskar Raju (supra) and listed the matter for hearing in open court on 24 August
9 (2020) 4 SCC 612
10 Review Petition (Civil) No. 704/2021 in CA No. 1599/2020.
11 Arbitration Petition No. 25 of 2023 2023.12 On 14 August 2023, the Bench in Seka Dobric (supra) observed that one of the objections in that matter pertained to non-stamping of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the arbitration petition was directed to be listed along with the curative petition in Bhaskar Raju (supra). The relevant part of the order is extracted below:
“1. One of the objections which has been raised on behalf of the respondent in response to the petition under Section 11(6) and 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is that the arbitration agreement is not stamped.
2. Notice has already been issued by this Court on Curative Petition (Civil) No 44 of 2023 which has been directed to be listed in the open Court on 24 August 2023.
3. These proceedings shall be accordingly listed on 24 August 2023 together with the Curative Petition.
4. Counter affidavit, if any, be filed in the meantime.”
9. On 26 September 2023, a Bench of five Judges took up the arbitration petition along with the curative petition. Considering the larger ramifications and consequences of the decision in N N Global 2 (supra), the Court referred the proceedings to a seven-Judge Bench. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below:
“2. Having regard to the larger ramifications and consequences of the view of the majority in N N Global Mercantile Private Limited vs Indo Unique Flame Limited and Others, we are of the considered view that the proceedings should be placed before a seven-Judge Bench to reconsider the correctness of the view of the five-Judge Bench.”
10. It is in this context that the proceedings were listed before this Bench of seven Judges on 11 October 2023, when this Court directed the cause title to be changed to: “In Re: Interplay between the arbitration agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899.” We are not reproducing the factual matrix of the case(s) 12 Curative Petition (Civil) No. 44 of 2023 in Review Petition (Civil) No. 704 of 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 1599 of 2020.
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
in question as we have been called upon to determine the question of law. In the process, we will consider the correctness of the view adopted in N N Global 2 (supra) as well as other ancillary issues.
B*. Submissions
11. The petitioners broadly contend that N N Global 2 (supra) does not lay down the correct position of law. The submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the intervenors are summarized below.
12. Mr Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act expressly confines the referral court’s power to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Such examination does not extend to the adequacy of the stamping under Section 33 of the Stamp Act;
b. The majority in N N Global 2 (supra) has effectively nullified Section 11(6A) which confined the jurisdiction of this Court and High Court to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement;
c. Mandating the courts at the referral stage to follow the prescriptions contained under Section 33 of the Stamp Act would amount to exceeding the remit of examination. The Arbitration Act confines the authority of referral court to the examination of an arbitration agreement and not the instrument;
d. The arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, including on issues pertaining to stamping;
e. The inclusion of the non-obstante clause in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act limits the judicial intervention of courts in the arbitral process and must be read harmoniously with the provisions of the Stamp Act; and f. The requirement of stamping does not render an instrument void. It only makes the instrument inadmissible in evidence until the defect is cured in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Act.
* Ed. Note: PART B
13. Mr Nikhil Sakhardande, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The deficiency in stamping is a curable defect, the effect of which ceases to operate as soon as the revenue interest of the state is secured;
b. The non-payment of stamp duty, being a temporary affliction, cannot affect the validity of an arbitration agreement; and c. Mandating the courts at the Section 8 or Section 11 stage of the Arbitration Act to examine the issue of stamping will defeat the legislative purpose of minimal judicial interference enshrined in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act.
14. Mr Darius J Khambata, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The doctrine of separability recognizes that an arbitration agreement is a self-contained agreement, distinct from the underlying contract;
b. An arbitration agreement contained within an underlying contract would be a “distinct matter” in terms of Section 5 of the Stamp Act, and would therefore continue to remain valid and enforceable notwithstanding the non-stamping or inadequate stamping of the contract;
c. The majority in N N Global 2 (supra) failed to give full effect to the doctrine of separability by incorrectly holding that nonstamping of the underlying contract would ipso facto invalidate the arbitration agreement contained in such contract;
d. The inadmissibility of a document on account of non-stamping or insufficient stamping does not result in the document being void, invalid, or non-existent in law;
e. The majority in N N Global 2 (supra) disregarded the principle of competence-competence by mandating the referral court under Section 11 to examine an instrument for stamping;
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
f. At the pre-arbitral stage, the referral courts should leave all issues pertaining to the stamping for the decision of the arbitral tribunal; and g. Section 33 of the Stamp Act provides that a person can have authority by “consent of parties” to determine issues of stamping. Such authority necessarily includes an arbitral tribunal which is constituted by the consent of parties through an arbitration agreement.
15. Mr Gourab Banerjee, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The object of the legislature in enacting the Stamp Act is to protect public revenue and not to interfere with commercial life by invalidating instruments vital to the smooth flow of trade and commerce;
b. Non-stamping does not render an instrument null and void. Such instrument, even if unstamped, exists in fact and law;
c. Investigation into the aspects of stamping at the referral stage under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act is contrary to the plain language and legislative intent of the said provision; and d. The adjudication of stamp duty is a time-consuming process. Mandating the court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act to adjudicate on the issue of stamp duty would be against the goal of expeditious appointment of arbitrators contained under Section 11(13) of the Arbitration Act.
16. Mr Jayant Mehta, learner senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Although compliance with the provisions of the Stamp Act is imperative, its non-compliance is curable and does not render an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument void or invalid; b. The majority view in N N Global 2 (supra) does not deal with Section 9 of the Arbitration Act creating a serious difficulty in seeking interim measures of protection in both domestic as well as international arbitrations seated in India; and c. A fiscal statute does not bar the entertainability of a lis, except where the statute specifically so prescribes. The Stamp Act does not prescribe a bar on the entertainability of a lis.
17. The respondents largely contend that N N Global 2 (supra) is correct and is in line with the consistent position adopted by this Court in SMS Tea Estates (supra) and Garware Wall Ropes (supra), which ought not to be disturbed. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents and intervenors are summarized below.
18. Mr Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The curative petition is not maintainable because none of the pleaded grounds meet the requirements set out in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra.13 Since the curative petition is not maintainable, the reference to a seven-Judge Bench is without jurisdiction;
b. The examination by the court under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act is not confined to mere facial existence of an arbitration agreement. The referral court has to prima facie examine both the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement;
c. Section 33 of the Stamp Act casts a mandatory legal requirement on courts under Section 11 proceedings to impound an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument. Such an instrument cannot be admitted in evidence or otherwise acted upon until the stamp duty and requisite penalty is paid; and d. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act does not limit the operation of the mandatory provisions of the Stamp Act.
19. Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The expression “examination” used in Section 11(6A)
contemplates the examination of the validity of an arbitration
13 (2002) 4 SCC 388
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
agreement, including the examination of sufficiency of stamping; and b. The inclusion of Section 11(6A) in the Arbitration Act was not intended to overcome the effect of SMS Tea Estates (supra).
20. Mr Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The principle of separability contained in Section 16 of the Arbitration Act implies that an arbitration agreement can be treated as a distinct agreement only for the purpose of determining its validity or enforceability;
b. The court exercising powers under Section 11 is not designated by the parties to receive evidence for the purpose of substantive adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties; and c. Even if an instrument containing an arbitration agreement is unstamped or insufficiently stamped, such inadequacy or insufficiency should not derail the appointment of an arbitrator at the referral stage under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act.
21. Ms Madhavi Divan, Mr Prashanto Chandra Sen, Mr Arvind Varma, Mr Ramesh Singh, Mr K Ramakant Reddy, Mr Rahul G. Tanwani, Mr Abir Phukan, Mr Tejas Karia, Mr Pallav Mongia, Mr Kunal Vajani, Ms Apporva Neral, Mr Varun K Chopra, Dr. P. V. Amamadha Prasad, Mr Gauhar Mirza, Ms Hiral Gupta, Mr George Poothan Poothicote, Ms Manisha Singh, Mr Shadan Farasat, Mr Saurav Agarwal, Mr Siddhant Buxy, Ms Priyanka Vora, Mr Debanshu Khettry, Mr Shivam Singh, Ms Diya Kapur and Mr Jatinder Kumar Sethi supplemented these submissions.
C*. Maintainability
22. We address the preliminary issue of the maintainability of the present proceedings in this segment. The record of proceedings indicates that notice was issued in the curative petition on 18 July 2023. Subsequently, in Seka Dobric (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court while hearing a Section 11 application for the appointment of arbitrators, directed the proceedings to be listed along with the curative petition. On 26 September 2023, the five-Judge Bench differed with the view taken in N N Global 2 * Ed. Note: PART C (supra) and referred the issue to a seven-Judge Bench. Thus, it is important to note that along with the curative petition, a Section 11 petition is also listed before this Court in the present proceedings.
23. The maintenance of judicial discipline is important for ensuring consistency and certainty in the development of law. The rule of judicial discipline demands that a Bench of lower strength is bound by the decision of a larger Bench.14 Judicial discipline also dictates that generally, a Bench of the same strength can question the correctness of a decision rendered by a co-ordinate Bench. In such a situation, the matter is placed before a Bench of larger strength.15
24. However, there have been situations where a Bench of lower strength has differed with the decision rendered by a Bench of larger strength. In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi,16 a Bench of two Judges of this Court differed with a three-Judge Bench in matter pertaining to the interpretation of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and referred the matter to a Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench observed that the reference made by the two-Judge Bench was “improper”. Nevertheless, the Constitution Bench decided to answer the reference “since the questions involved are pending in many cases in different High Courts and certain doubts have arisen with regard to the interpretation to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act.” In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra,17 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the judicial course adopted in Hansoli Devi (supra) was by way of exception rather than a rule. Therefore, the rule of judicial discipline also has certain well-defined exceptions.
25. The respondent has relied on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan,18 to submit that there is no live cause or matter to justify the invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction. The issue before the three-Judge Bench in Seka Dobric (supra) pertains to the appointment of an arbitrator at Section 11 stage when the underlying contract is unstamped or insufficiently stamped. The Bench directed the 14 Bharat Petroleum Corporation v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha, (2001) 4 SCC 448 15 Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1
16 (2002) 7 SCC 273
17 (2005) 2 SCC 673
18 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Section 11 application to be listed along with the curative petition in view of the wider legal ramifications flowing from N N Global 2 (supra). Therefore, the respondent’s argument is misplaced because Seka Dobric (supra), which is a live cause or matter, is also listed along with the curative petition.
26. The respondent has also argued that it was improper for the Constitution Bench to exercise its curative jurisdiction to refer the matter to this Bench of seven Judges. Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013 provide that if a Bench in the course of hearing any cause, appeal or “other proceedings” considers that the matter be dealt with by a larger bench, it shall refer the matter to the Chief Justice, who shall thereupon constitute such a Bench for the hearing of the matter. In Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association,19 a nine-Judge Bench of this Court held that the term “other proceeding” used in Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is a comprehensive term giving widest freedom to a court of law to do justice to the parties in the case. Accordingly, it was held that review petitions also fall within the purview of the expression “other proceeding.” In view of the decision in Kantaru Rajeevaru (supra), the term “other proceeding” under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 will also include curative petitions. Therefore, we find no impropriety in the reference made to this Bench.
27. Moreover, the reference raises important issues on points of law, which require immediate consideration. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra), this Court laid down two exceptions to the rules mentioned above:
“12. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by
19 (2020) 9 SCC 121
it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 754] and Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC 273].”
28. The two exceptional situations laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra community (supra) have to be invoked cautiously, and in situations involving wide ramifications for the law. In Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,20 Justice V R Krishna Iyer speaking for the Constitution Bench observed that the “legislative policy in the country must accept as final the pronouncements of this Court by a Constitution Bench unless the subject be of such fundamental importance to national life or the reasoning is so plainly erroneous in light of the later thought that it is wiser to be ultimately right than to be consistently wrong.” We are of the opinion that the reference by the five-Judge Bench raises question of seminal importance with regard to the interpretation and application of the arbitration law in India, which in turn has implications for business and commerce in the country. Accordingly, we will answer the reference without delving into the facts of the individual cases. The issue of maintainability of the curative petition is left open and could be raised by the respondent before an appropriate Bench.
D*. The Indian Stamp Act 1899 i. Overview
29. As the title suggests, the Stamp Act is a legislation which consolidates the laws relating to the payment of stamp-duty on the execution of certain instruments in the manner specified in the statute. Section 2(14) defines “instrument” as follows:
“(14) “instrument” includes—
(a) every document, by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded; * Ed. Note: PART D
20 (1980) 1 SCC 223
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
(b) a document, electronic or otherwise, created for a transaction in a stock exchange or depository by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded; and
(c) any other document mentioned in Schedule I, but does not include such instruments as may be specified by the Government, by notification in the Official Gazette”
30. The term “instrument” is defined broadly, in an inclusive sense. It includes electronic documents. Schedule I to the Stamp Act contains descriptions of various instruments along with the stamp duty payable on each of them. Stamp-duty is liable to be paid under Section 3, which provides as follows:
“3. Instrument chargeable with duty.—Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the proper duty therefore, respectively, that is to say—
(a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed in India on or after the first day of July, 1899;
(b) every bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand, or promissory note drawn or made out of India on or after that day and accepted or paid, or presented for acceptance or payment, or endorsed, transferred or otherwise negotiated, in India; and
(c) every instrument (other than a bill of exchange or promissory note) mentioned in that Schedule, which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed out of India on or after that day, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in India and is received in India:
Provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect of—
(1) any instrument executed by, or on behalf of, or in favour of, the Government in cases where, but for this exemption, the Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument;
(2) any instrument for the sale, transfer or other disposition, either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise, of any ship or vessel, or any part, interest, share or property of or in any ship or vessel registered under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, or under Act, 19 of 1838, or the India Registration of Ships Act, 1841, as amended by subsequent Acts.
(3) any instrument executed, by, or, on behalf of, or, in favour of, the Developer, or Unit or in connection with the carrying out of purposes of the Special Economic Zone.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the expressions “Developer”, “Special Economic Zone” and “Unit” shall have meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (g), (za) and (zc) of Section 2 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005.”
31. Section 3 provides that the three categories of instruments in clauses (a), (b) and (c) shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I. The proviso to Section 3 indicates three other categories in respect of which no duty shall be chargeable. In terms of Section 5 of the Stamp Act, the duty chargeable on any instrument which comprises or relates to several distinct matters is the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments (each comprising or relating to one of the many matters) would be chargeable under the same statute. Section 6 governs situations where the same instrument falls within two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I. In such a situation, if the duties chargeable under the different descriptions are different, the instrument shall be chargeable with the highest of them. The rule in Section 6 is subject to the provisions of Section 5. As a consequence, Section 6 cannot be relied on to avoid the payment of stamp-duty if an instrument relates to several distinct matters with each such matter covered by a distinct entry in Schedule I. Section 6 is applicable only when an instrument relates to a single matter which is covered by two or more descriptions in Schedule I, or when a single matter in an instrument relating to several distinct matters is covered by two or more descriptions in that schedule.
32. Sections 13 and 14 indicate the mode of stamping. In terms of Section 13, every instrument written upon paper stamped with an impressed
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
stamp shall be written in such manner that the stamp may appear on the face of the instrument and cannot be used for or applied to any other instrument. Section 14 stipulates that no second instrument chargeable with duty shall be written upon a piece of stamped paper upon which an instrument chargeable with duty has already been written.21 Section 15 is significant because it indicates the effect of non-compliance with Sections 13 and 14: instruments written in contravention of Section 13 or Section 14 shall be deemed to be unstamped.22
33. Chapter II of the Stamp Act provides for various other contingencies or situations, including inter alia policies of sea-insurance,23 bonds, debentures, and securities,24 transactions in stock exchanges and depositories,25 and instruments executed outside India.26 Chapter II also provides for the valuation of stamp-duty, including for the conversion of amounts expressed in foreign currencies,27 how to value stock and marketable securities,28 the effect of statement of rate of exchange or average price,29 instruments reserving interest,30 instruments connected with mortgages of marketable securities,31 how the transfer and consideration of debt etc. is to be charged,32 valuation in case of annuity,33 stamp where value of subjectmatter is indeterminate.34 21 The proviso to Section 14 provides as follows “Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent any endorsement which is duly stamped or is not chargeable with duty being made upon any instrument for the purpose of transferring any right created or evidenced thereby, or of acknowledging the receipt of any money or goods the payment or delivery of which is secured thereby.”
22 Section 15, Stamp Act 23 Section 7, Stamp Act 24 Sections 8 to 8F, Stamp Act 25 Section 9A, Stamp Act 26 Sections 18, 19, Stamp Act 27 Section 20, Stamp Act 28 Section 21, Stamp Act 29 Section 22, Stamp Act 30 Section 23, Stamp Act 31 Section 23A, Stamp Act 32 Section 24, Stamp Act 33 Section 25, Stamp Act 34 Section 26, Stamp Act
34. Section 29 indicates who the stamp duty is to be borne by (in the absence of an agreement to the contrary) and Section 30 stipulates that a receipt must be given in certain cases.
35. A person may also apply to the Collector for his opinion as to the duty (if any) which is payable on a particular instrument, under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. The instrument given to the Collector for his opinion may be executed or previously stamped, but there is no requirement that it must be either executed or previously stamped.35 If an instrument brought to the Collector under Section 31 is in their opinion chargeable with duty, and they determine that it is already fully stamped, or that the duty determined by them under Section 31 has already been paid, then they shall certify by endorsement on such instrument that the full duty with which it is chargeable has been paid.36 If the Collector is of the opinion that the instrument is not chargeable with duty, they shall certify that it is not so chargeable.37 Any instrument upon which an endorsement has been made under Section 32 shall be deemed to be duly stamped or not chargeable with duty, as the case may be.38 The proviso to Section 32 lists three categories of instruments which the Collector is not authorised to endorse under the same section.
36. Chapter IV of the Stamp Act details with the procedure to be followed by various authorities if instruments which are liable to be stamped are not duly stamped. The provisions of this Chapter are examined in detail in the subsequent segment. Chapter V provides for allowances for stamps (such as spoiled or misused stamps) in certain cases and Chapter VI provides for reference of cases arising under the enactment to authorities including the High Courts as well as for the revision of certain decisions of courts regarding the sufficiency of stamps. Chapter VII of the Stamp Act indicates the penalties for non-compliance with its provisions and finally, Chapter VIII contains certain supplementary provisions in relation to the statute.
35 Section 31(1), Stamp Act 36 Section 32(1), Stamp Act 37 Section 32(2), Stamp Act 38 Section 32(3), Stamp Act
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
ii. The consequences of the failure to stamp an instrument a. The procedure under the Stamp Act
37. Section 17 of the Stamp Act provides that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in India shall be stamped before or at the time of execution. Section 62 inter alia penalises a failure to comply with Section 17. However, despite the mandate that all instruments chargeable with duty must be stamped, many instruments are not stamped or are insufficiently stamped. The parties executing an instrument may, contrary to the mandate of law, attempt to avoid the payment of stamp duty and may therefore refrain from stamping it. Besides this situation, there are other ways in which an instrument may not be properly stamped, including the following:
a. The duty may have been paid under an incorrect description under Schedule I;
b. The duty paid may be of a sufficient amount but of improper description;
c. The provisions of Section 5 which govern instruments relating to several distinct matters may not have been complied with; or d. The instrument may be written in contravention of Sections 13 and 14, and thereby deemed to be unstamped in terms of Section 15.
38. The legislature recognized that the mandate of the Stamp Act may not be complied with because of the reasons listed in the preceding paragraph or otherwise. It was in recognition of this fact that the provisions in Chapter IV were enacted. Section 33 provides that every person who has authority to receive evidence (either by law or by consent of parties) shall impound an instrument which is, in their opinion, chargeable with duty but which appears to be not duly stamped. The power under Section 33 may be exercised when an instrument is produced before the authority or when they come across it in the performance of their functions. Persons in charge of public office except police officers are similarly empowered under Section 33, which is reproduced below:
“33. Examination and impounding of instruments.—(1) Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.
(2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in India when such instrument was executed or first executed:
Provided that—
(a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any Magistrate or Judge of a Criminal Court to examine or impound, if he does not think fit so to do, any instrument coming before him in the course of any proceeding other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898);
(b) in the case of a Judge of a High Court, the duty of examining and impounding any instrument under this section may be delegated to such officer as the Court appoints in this behalf.
(3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt,—
(a) the State Government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and
(b) the State Government may determine who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public offices.”
39. Section 35 is of particular significance to the issue before this Court – it renders instruments which are not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence. Section 35 reads as follows:
“35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.— No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped:
Provided that—
(a) any such instrument [shall] be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion;
(b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it;
(c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped;
(d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898);
(e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by Section 32 or any other provision of this Act.” (emphasis supplied)
In terms of Section 35, an instrument which is not duly stamped is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and it shall not be acted upon, registered, or authenticated.39 Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 35 39 Subject to the proviso to Section 35.
stipulates that the bar contained in the provision is removed upon the payment of duty and the penalty (if any). The party or parties may pay the duty chargeable to the person who has the authority to receive evidence by law or by consent of parties. Section 35 is significant because it gives teeth to the Stamp Act by ensuring that stamp-duty is paid before rights and obligations arising from an agreement are enforced.
40. Section 38(1) indicates how an instrument which is impounded is to be dealt with:
“38. Instruments impounded how dealt with.—
(1) Where the person impounding an instrument under Section 33 has by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence and admits such instrument in evidence upon payment of a penalty as provided by Section 35 or of duty as provided by Section 37, he shall send to the Collector an authenticated copy of such instrument, together with a certificate in writing, stating the amount of duty and penalty levied in respect thereof, and shall send such amount to the Collector, or to such person as he may appoint in this behalf.
(2) In every other case, the person so impounding an instrument shall send it in original to the Collector.”
41. The Collector is conferred with the power to impound an instrument under Section 33. If any other person or authority impounds an instrument, it must be forwarded to the Collector under clause (2) of Section 38. Once the Collector receives an instrument, he has the power to stamp it under Section 40, if it is not a bill of exchange, a promissory note, or an instrument that is chargeable with a duty that exceeds ten naye paise. The Collector may: a. Certify by endorsement that the instrument is duly stamped, if they are of such an opinion;40 b. Certify by endorsement that the instrument is not chargeable with duty, if they are of such an opinion;41 and 40 Section 40(1)(a), Stamp Act 41 ibid
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
c. Require the payment of the proper duty or the amount required to make up the proper duty, if they are of the opinion that the instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped.42 The Collector may also levy a penalty, as provided by Section 40. If the instrument has been sent to the Collector under Section 38, it must be returned to the impounding officer after it is dealt with as described above.43
42. In terms of Section 42 of the Stamp Act, an instrument is admissible in evidence once the payment of duty and a penalty (if any) is complete. It stipulates that either the person admitting the instrument in evidence or the Collector, as the case may be, shall certify by endorsement that the proper duty has been paid.
43. The procedure contemplated by the Stamp Act facilitates the collection of revenue. It permits instruments to be impounded not only by persons in charge of a public office or those who are empowered by law to receive evidence but also by any person who is empowered to receive evidence by consent of parties. The statute then sets out the procedure to be followed upon impounding a document. This procedure ensures that stamp-duty is paid. After the payment of the appropriate amount under the appropriate description in Schedule I and the penalty (if any), the Stamp Act provides for the certification of such payment by an endorsement by the appropriate authority. Once an instrument has been endorsed, it may be admitted into evidence, registered, acted upon or authenticated as if it had been duly stamped.
b. The difference between inadmissibility and voidness
44. The admissibility of an instrument in evidence is distinct from its validity or enforceability in law. Section 2(g) of the Contract Act provides that an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. The admissibility of a particular document or oral testimony, on the other hand, refers to whether or not it can be introduced into evidence. P Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon defines ‘admissible’ thus:
42 Section 40(1)(b), Stamp Act 43 Section 40(3), Stamp Act “Admissible Proper to be received, capable and worthy of being admitted. As applied to evidence, the term means that it is of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced in evidence”44 Many statutes have rules on the admissibility of documents, with the Indian Evidence Act 187245 being one of them.
45. An agreement can be void without its nature as a void agreement having an impact on whether it may be introduced in evidence. Similarly, an agreement can be valid but inadmissible in evidence. For instance, A and B may enter into an agreement by which B is restrained from undertaking a particular trade. This agreement would be void under Section 27 of the Contract Act46 but this does not impact its admissibility in evidence should A attempt to enforce it against B. The court will not enforce the agreement between the parties because it is void but the agreement is nonetheless admissible in evidence.
46. When an agreement is void, we are speaking of its enforceability in a court of law. When it is inadmissible, we are referring to whether the court may consider or rely upon it while adjudicating the case. This is the essence of the difference between voidness and admissibility.
c. Section 35 of the Stamp Act renders a document inadmissible and not void
47. The majority judgment in N N Global 2 (supra) summed up its holding in the following terms:
44 P Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (Second edition, 1997)
45 “Evidence Act”
46 “27. Agreement in restraint of trade void.— Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void.
Exception 1.—Saving of agreement not to carry on business of which goodwill is sold.—One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein: Provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business.”
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
“109. … An agreement which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped is not enforceable, as long as it remains in the said condition. Such an instrument would be void as being not enforceable [see Section 2(g) of the Contract Act].”
The above observation conflates the distinction between enforceability and admissibility.
48. Section 35 of the Stamp Act is unambiguous. It stipulates, “No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence…” The term “admitted in evidence” refers to the admissibility of the instrument. Subsection (2) of Section 42, too, states that an instrument in respect of which stamp-duty is paid and which is endorsed as such will be “admissible in evidence.” The effect of not paying duty or paying an inadequate amount renders an instrument inadmissible and not void. Non-stamping or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming invalid. The Stamp Act does not render such an instrument void. The non-payment of stamp duty is accurately characterised as a curable defect. The Stamp Act itself provides for the manner in which the defect may be cured and sets out a detailed procedure for it. It bears mentioning that there is no procedure by which a void agreement can be “cured.”
49. In Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal,47 this Court noted that the trial court and the High Court had doubted the authenticity of an agreement for the sale of certain immoveable property because it was written on two stamp papers purchased on different dates. This Court held that this by itself would not invalidate the agreement. It noticed the distinction between the legal validity of the agreement and its admissibility:
“13. The Stamp Act is a fiscal enactment intended to secure revenue for the State. In the absence of any rule requiring consecutively numbered stamp papers purchased on the same day, being used for an instrument which is not intended to be registered, a document cannot be termed as invalid merely because it is written on two stamp papers purchased by the same person on different dates.
Even assuming that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity,
47 (2008) 4 SCC 530
the court can only deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that ground, hold the document to be invalid. Even if an agreement is not executed on requisite stamp paper, it is admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty under Sections 35 or 37 of the Stamp Act, 1899. If an agreement executed on a plain paper could be admitted in evidence by paying duty and penalty, there is no reason why an agreement executed on two stamp papers, even assuming that they were defective, cannot be accepted on payment of duty and penalty. But admissibility of a document into evidence and proof of genuineness of such document are different issues.”
(emphasis supplied)
50. This has long been the position of law in India with respect to the Stamp Act. In Gulzari Lal Marwari v. Ram Gopal,48 one of the parties contended that the agreement was invalid because it was not properly stamped. The portion of Section 35 which bars the admissibility of unstamped instruments was the same then as it is now. The Calcutta High Court held:
“…The effect of the section is to make such an unstamped document inadmissible in evidence, and unable to be acted upon by persons having authority to receive evidence or by any public officer. It does not affect the validity of the document.
There is a clear distinction to be drawn between invalidity and inadmissibility of documents. Certain statutes and sections render documents invalid if they are not stamped. No section of the Indian Stamp Act has this effect…”
The position of law has also been noticed by the High Courts in other cases including the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Boottam Pitchiah v. Boyapati Koteswara Rao49.
51. In N N Global 2 (supra), this Court held that the failure to stamp an arbitration agreement is not a “curable defect.” Relying on the provisions 48 1936 SCC OnLine Cal 275 49 1964 SCC OnLine AP 5
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
of the Contract Act as well as Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration Act, it held that an unstamped arbitration agreement is void. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the majority are extracted below:
“103. … It may not be apposite to merely describe an unstamped arbitration agreement as a “curable defect”. As long it remains an unstamped instrument, it cannot be taken notice of for any purpose, as contemplated in Section 35 of the Stamp Act. It remains unenforceable. … It is “not enforceable in law”. In the said sense, it also cannot exist in law. It would be void. Our view in this regard that voidness is conflated to unenforceability receives fortification from Section 2(j) of the Contract Act which renders a contract which ceases to be enforceable void.”
(emphasis in original)
52. The above observation of this Court is incorrect. Section 2(j) of the Contract Act provides as follows:
“(j) A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable.”
53. Section 2(j) is not attracted when an instrument is rendered inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. The effect of the latter is not to render an unstamped agreement unenforceable. If it was unenforceable, it would imply that it was void. We have already discussed why an unstamped or inadequately stamped agreement is not void in the preceding paragraphs. Indeed, the approach of the majority in N N Global 2 (supra) to the Contract Act would render unstamped agreements void ab initio and not void.
54. In N N Global 2 (supra), this Court also relied on Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act to reach its conclusion:
“104. What Section 11(6-A) contemplates is a contract and it is not an agreement which cannot be treated as a contract. This is despite the use of the words “arbitration agreement” in Section 11(6-A). In other words, contract must conform to Section 7 of the Act. It must also, needless to say, fulfil the requirements of the Contract Act.” (emphasis supplied)
55. Section 11(6-A)50 of the Arbitration Act is extracted below: “(6-A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section
(5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.”
(emphasis supplied)
56. A plain reading of Section 11(6A) makes it evident that it is referring to an arbitration agreement. Section 11(6A) provides that courts must confine themselves to an examination of the existence of the arbitration agreement. The word “confine” indicates the intention of the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of the courts at the stage of the appointment of an arbitrator.
57. In Vidya Drolia (supra), this Court held:
“21. The term “agreement” is not defined in the Arbitration Act, albeit it is defined in Section 10 of the Contract Act, 1872 (for short “the Contract Act”), … as contracts made by free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not thereby expressly declared to be void. Section 10 of the Contract Act also stipulates that aforesaid requirements shall not affect any law in force in India (and not expressly repealed) by which a contract is required to be made in writing, in presence of witnesses or any law relating to registration of documents. Thus, an arbitration agreement should satisfy the mandate of Section 10 of the Contract Act, in addition to satisfying other requirements stipulated in Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.”
58. The above observations are correct insofar as the arbitration agreement must satisfy the requirements of the Contract Act. However, the authority empowered to adjudicate whether the requirements of the Contract Act are satisfied is the arbitral tribunal, under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. This is addressed in greater detail in the following segments. 50 Omitted by Act 33 of 2019. The omission is yet to be notified / take effect.
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
iii. The purpose of the Stamp Act
59. The Stamp Act is a fiscal legislation which is intended to raise revenue for the government. It is a mandatory statute. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Co.,51 this Court dealt with the import of Sections 35, 36 and 42 of the Stamp Act. One of the parties relied on the difference in the phraseology between Sections 35 and 36 to argue that an instrument which was insufficiently stamped or not stamped could be admitted in evidence upon the payment of duty and a penalty (if any) but that it could not be acted upon, once admitted. It was argued that Section 35 operates as a bar in two respects, namely, the admission of an instrument into evidence as well as acting upon that instrument. It was argued that Section 36, in contrast to Section 35, removed the bar in one respect alone – the admissibility of the instrument into evidence. This Court rejected this argument and held that the provisions of the Stamp Act clearly provide that an instrument could be admitted into evidence as well as acted upon once the appropriate duty has been paid and the instrument is endorsed:
“6. … The argument ignores the true import of Section 36. By that section an instrument once admitted in evidence shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that it has not been duly stamped. Section 36 does not prohibit a challenge against an instrument that it shall not be acted upon because it is not duly stamped, but on that account there is no bar against an instrument not duly stamped being acted upon after payment of the stamp duty and penalty according to the procedure prescribed by the Act. The doubt, if any, is removed by the terms of Section 42(2) which enact, in terms unmistakable, that every instrument endorsed by the Collector under Section 42(1) shall be admissible in evidence and may be acted upon as if it has been duly stamped.”
(emphasis in original)
60. In so holding, this Court made a significant observation about the purpose of the Stamp Act and the manner in which it is to be interpreted by courts:
51 (1969) 1 SCC 597
“7. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments: It is not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue once that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument. Viewed in that light the scheme is clear.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Stamp Act is a legislation which is enacted in the interest of the revenue. The statute must be interpreted with due regard to its purpose. E*. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
61. Arbitration is a method of alternative dispute resolution where parties agree to refer their disputes to a neutral third party known as an arbitrator. The aim of arbitration is to provide speedy, efficient, and binding resolution of disputes that have arisen between the parties in regard to their substantive obligations. The thrust of arbitration law is succinctly encapsulated in Redfern and Hunter: “It is to be expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where the law is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.”52
62. Before the enactment of the Arbitration Act, the law on arbitration was contained in the Arbitration Act 1940,53 the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937, and Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961. In 1978, the Law Commission of India suggested substantial amendments to the 1940 Act to make it more responsive to the contemporary legal and economic requirements. In the meanwhile, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law54 adopted the Model Law in 1985 to foster the development of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial arbitration. * Ed. Note: PART E 52 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) 3.
53 “1940 Act”
54 “UNCITRAL”
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The General Assembly of the United Nations recommended to all states to give due consideration to the Model Law in view of the desirability of achieving uniformity of the law of arbitral procedure and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice.55
63. The Arbitration Act was enacted to “consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as also to define the law relating to the conciliation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” In the process, the Arbitration Act repealed the 1940 Act, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937, and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961. It also brought domestic as well as international commercial arbitration in consonance with the Model Law, the New York Convention, and the Geneva Convention. The Arbitration Act is divided into four parts: (i) Part I deals with domestic and international arbitration that takes place in India; (ii) Part II deals with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention;
(iii) Part III deals with conciliation; and (iv) Part IV contains supplementary provisions. In the present reference, we are largely concerned with Part I of the Arbitration Act. The important principles which animate the law on arbitration as indeed the Arbitration Act are discussed in the following segment. These principles act as important aids to interpret the Arbitration Act.
i. Arbitral autonomy
64. In medieval England, recourse to arbitration was commonplace among merchants and traders. During the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration was encouraged by both Chancery and the courts.56 In light of the widespread use of arbitration, coupled with a rapid decline in court litigation, the English courts began to actively discourage arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.57 Judicial 55 General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ 40/72 112th Plenary Session, 11 December 1985.
56 Henry Horwitz and James Oldham, ‘John Locke, John Mansfield, and Arbitration during the Eighteenth Century’ (1993) 36(1) The Historical Journal 137, 139. 57 Earl Wolaver, ‘The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration’ (1934) 83 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, 142.
scepticism towards arbitration proceedings mainly stemmed from the attitude of judges that “every activity that occurred within a jurisdiction should be within the purview of state law and court.”58
65. As cross-border commerce and transactions proliferated, companies and businesses sought different ways to resolve their commercial disputes. The formality, customs, and legal traditions of national courts were at variance with the intention of the parties to achieve a speedy and efficient resolution of their disputes. The internationalization of trade and commerce in the middle of the nineteenth century necessitated the regulation and institutionalization of arbitration. In the process, arbitration was also detached from the national legal systems, with the growth of arbitral institutions such as the London Chamber of Arbitration and International Chamber of Commerce. This new regime of arbitration law paved the way for greater recognition of the mutual intention of parties and the authority of arbitral tribunals to resolve disputes without being bogged down by the intricacies of national legal systems. This was commended and reflected in various international instruments such as the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Accordingly, national laws were changed to reflect the principle of judicial non-interference in arbitration proceedings. The demands of commerce and business efficiency meant that control by national courts became subordinate to the intention of the parties and the authority of the arbitral tribunal.59
66. The principle of arbitral autonomy is an integral element of the ever-evolving domain of arbitration law. Arbitral autonomy means that the parties to an arbitration agreement can exercise their contractual freedom to bestow the arbitral tribunal with the authority to decide disputes that may arise between them. The basis of arbitral autonomy is to give effect to the true intention of parties to distance themselves from the “risk of domestic judicial parochialism.”60 58 Julian D M Lew, ‘Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration’ (2006) 22(2) Arbitration International 179, 183.
59 Ibid, at 185 60 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) 388
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67. The principle of judicial non-interference reflects the autonomy of arbitral tribunals. Arbitral tribunals are autonomous in the sense that they are constituted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes through a neutral and expert authority of their choice. Moreover, the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, also indicates that the arbitral tribunal enjoys sufficient autonomy from the national courts.
68. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides that the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Section 28 of the Contract Act states that agreements that restrict a party to a contract absolutely from enforcing their rights under or in respect of any contract by way of usual legal proceedings are void. However, the provision expressly saves contracts by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects. By choosing to settle their disputes through arbitration, parties surrender their right to litigate before the national courts in favour of the arbitral tribunal. By surrendering their right to litigate in national courts, parties also surrender their right to be bound by national procedural laws in favour of expedition, informality, and efficiency of the arbitral process. The arbitral tribunal is not subject to the procedural laws of a country. For instance, Section 19 of the Arbitration Act expressly provides that the arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act 1872. Moreover, it stipulates that an arbitral tribunal may conduct the proceedings in any manner it deems appropriate if the parties fail to agree on the procedure to be followed by the tribunal. Although arbitral tribunals have autonomy in the procedural and substantive sense, they are not completely independent of the law of the country in which the arbitral tribunal has its juridical seat, as discussed in the following segments. ii. Principle of minimum judicial interference
69. The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral proceedings is fundamental to both domestic as well as international commercial arbitration. The principle entails that the arbitral proceedings are carried out pursuant to the agreement of the parties or under the direction of the tribunal without unnecessary interference by the national courts.61 This principle serves to proscribe judicial interference in arbitral proceedings, which would undermine the objective of the parties in agreeing to arbitrate their disputes, their desire for less formal and more flexible procedures, and their desire for neutral and expert arbitral procedures.62 The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral procedures. This principle has also been incorporated in international instruments, including the New York Convention63 and the Model Law.
70. Article 5 of the Model Law deals with the extent of court intervention. It states that “[i]n matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law.” The drafters of the Model Law deemed it important to incorporate this article to provide “certainty to the parties and the arbitrators about the instances in which court supervision or assistance was to be expected.”64 By including the introductory words “in matters governed by this law”, the scope of the provision was limited only to matters which were governed by or regulated in the Model Law. The purpose was to ensure that no judicial authority assigns to itself the power that has been expressly and exclusively bestowed upon the arbitral tribunal. For instance, Article 16 of the Model Law confers upon the arbitral tribunal an exclusive power to rule on its jurisdiction including dealing with objections pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement.
71. The Model Law does not regulate or govern all matters related to international commercial arbitration as well as the arbitral process.65 Similarly, Article 5 does not bar the national courts from intervening in 61 Gary Born, The Principle of Judicial Non-Interference in International Arbitration Proceedings’ (2009) 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 999, 1002.
62 Gary Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2021) 2361 63 Article II(3), New York Convention 64 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its seventh session, A/CN.9/246 (New York, 23 January-3 February 1984) 45. 65 Manuel A Gomez, ‘Article 5: Extent of Court Intervention’ in Ilias Bantekas (eds) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: A Commentary 89 (2020)
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matters not governed by the Model Law.66 The UNCITRAL Working Group itself identified certain situations not dealt with under the Model Law where the national courts could intervene:
“Article 5 would, for example, not exclude court control or assistance in those matters which the Working Group had decided not to deal with in the law (e.g., capacity of parties to conclude arbitration agreement; impact of state immunity; competence of arbitral tribunal to adapt contracts; enforcement by courts of interim measures of protection ordered by arbitral tribunal; fixing of fees or request for deposit, including security for fees or costs; time-limit for enforcement of awards).”
72. This indicates that Article 5 of the Model Law emphasizes on arbitral tribunal being the first instance to determine all issues relating to matters of law or construction as well as issues of jurisdiction and scope of authority.67 It exclusively determines the manner and form of judicial intervention in the arbitration process. National courts can intervene with respect to matters not expressly governed by the Model Law.68
73. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act is based on Article 5 of the Model Law. However, Section 5 also incorporates a non-obstante clause setting out the scope of judicial intervention. It reads as follows:
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”
Two aspects become clear from a comparison of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act with Article 5 of the Model Law: first, Section 5 begins with a non-obstante clause unlike Article 5; and second, it limits the scope of judicial intervention to the extent “so provided” in Part I. 66 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2012) 67 Rio Algam v. Sammi Steel Co., Ontario Court of Justice, Canada, 1 March 1991, [1991] O.J. No. 268 68 Richard Garnett, ‘Article 5 of the Model Law: Protector of the Arbitral Process?’ (2021) 38(2) Journal of International Arbitration 127-146.
74. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law. Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick, efficient, and effective manner by minimizing judicial interference in the arbitral proceedings.69 Parliament enacted Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process to the bare minimum, and only to the extent “so provided” under the Part I of Arbitration Act. In doing so, the legislature did not altogether exclude the role of courts or judicial authorities in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to circumstances where the support of judicial authorities is required for the successful implementation and enforcement of the arbitral process.70 The Arbitration Act envisages the role of courts to “support arbitration process”71 by providing necessary aid and assistance when required by law in certain situations.
75. Section 5 begins with the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.” The non-obstante clause is Parliament’s addition to the Article 5 of the Model Law. It is of a wide amplitude and sets forth the legislative intent of limiting judicial intervention during the arbitral process. In the context of Section 5, this means that the provisions contained in Part I of the Arbitration Act ought to be given full effect and operation irrespective of any other law for the time being in force. It is now an established proposition of law that the legislature uses non-obstante clauses to remove all obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of any other law, which stand in the way of the operation of the legislation which incorporates the non-obstante clause.72
76. A non-obstante clause is appended in a provision to give such provision overriding effect over other provisions of the law.73 In 69 Food Corporation of India v. Indian Council of Arbitration, (2003) 6 SCC 564 70 Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470; P Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 71 Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee, (2014)
6 SCC 677
72 State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh, (2005) 9 SCC 129 73 Owners and Parties Interested in the Vessel M.V. Polaris Galaxy v. Banque Cantonale De Geneva, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1293
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Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram,74 Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji explained the purport of non-obstante clause in the following terms:
“67. A clause beginning with the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force, or in any contract” is more often than not appended to a section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision of the act or the contract mentioned in the non obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment.”
77. Although a non-obstante clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour, its effect is limited to the extent intended by the legislature. In ICICI Bank Ltd v. SIDCO Leathers Ltd,75 a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that a non-obstante clause must be interpreted by confining it to the legislative policy. Thus, even if a non-obstante clause has wide amplitude, the extent of its impact has to be measured in view of the legislative intention and legislative policy.76 In view of this settled legal position, the issue that arises for our consideration is the scope of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act.
78. In Morgan Securities & Credit (P) Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd.,77 the issue before the two-Judge Bench was whether the provisions of the Arbitration Act would prevail over the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.78 While noting the non-obstante clause contained in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, this Court held that the non-obstante clause has “limited application aiming at the extent of judicial
74 (1986) 4 SCC 447
75 (2006) 10 SCC 452
76 JIK Industries Ltd. v. Amarlal V. Jumani, (2012) 3 SCC 255
77 (2006) 12 SCC 642
78 “SICA”
intervention.” It was held that the Arbitration Act would not prevail over SICA since the latter enactment seeks to “achieve a higher goal.” In other words, the scope of the non-obstante clause is limited to prohibiting the intervention of judicial authorities, unless it has been expressly provided for under Part I of the Arbitration Act.
79. Similar to Article 5 of the Model Law, Section 5 uses the expression “in matters governed by this Part.” The use of this expression circumscribes the scope of judicial intervention to matters expressly governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act. The matters governed by Part I inter alia include (i) Section 8 which mandates judicial authorities to refer parties to arbitration when prima facie there is a valid arbitration agreement; (ii) Section 9 which allows courts to issue interim measures on an application made by a party to an arbitration agreement; (iii) Section 11 which empowers the Supreme Court or the High Courts to appoint arbitrators on an application made by parties to an arbitration agreement; (iv) Section 27 which allows the arbitral tribunal to request the court for assistance in taking evidence; and (v) Section 34 which empowers the court to set aside an arbitral award on the basis of the limited grounds mentioned therein.
80. Section 5 has two facets – positive and negative. The positive facet vests judicial authorities with jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings in matters expressly allowed in or dealt with under Part I of the Arbitration Act. The flip side to this approach is that judicial authorities are prohibited from intervening in arbitral proceedings in situations where the arbitral tribunal has been bestowed with exclusive jurisdiction. This is the negative facet of Section 5. The non-obstante clause limits the extent of judicial intervention in respect of matters expressly provided under the Arbitration Act.79 In Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd,80 a Bench of three Judges of this Court observed that the “nonobstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act.”
79 Secur Industries Ltd v. Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd, (2004) 3 SCC 447
80 (2022) 1 SCC 75
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81. One of the main objectives behind the enactment of the Arbitration Act was to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process by confining it only to the circumstances stipulated by the legislature. For instance, Section 16 of the Arbitration Act provides that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction “including ruling on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.” The effect of Section 16, bearing in view the principle of minimum judicial interference, is that judicial authorities cannot intervene in matters dealing with the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Although Sections 8 and 11 allow courts to refer parties to arbitration or appoint arbitrators, Section 5 limits the courts from dealing with substantive objections pertaining to the existence and validity of arbitration agreements at the referral or appointment stage. A referral court at Section 8 or Section 11 stage can only enter into a prima facie determination. The legislative mandate of prima facie determination ensures that the referral courts do not trammel the arbitral tribunal’s authority to rule on its own jurisdiction.
82. Section 5 is of aid in interpreting the extent of judicial interference under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act. Section 5 contains a general rule of judicial non-interference. Therefore, every provision of the Arbitration Act ought to be construed in view of Section 5 to give true effect to the legislative intention of minimal judicial intervention. iii. The Arbitration Act is a self-contained code
83. In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra,81 a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that a self-contained code is a complete legislation with regard to the purpose for which it is enacted. Such a selfcontained code provides for a complete machinery to deal with the purpose sought to be achieved by that law and its dependence on other legislations is either absent or minimal.
84. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd,82 explained the nature of the Arbitration Act in the following terms:
81 (2011) 3 SCC 1
82 (2011) 8 SCC 333
“89. It is, thus, to be seen that Arbitration Act, 1940, from its inception and right through to 2004 (in P.S. Sathappan [(2004) 11 SCC 672]) was held to be a self-contained code. Now, if the Arbitration Act, 1940 was held to be a self-contained code, on matters pertaining to arbitration, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which consolidates, amends and designs the law relating to arbitration to bring it, as much as possible, in harmony with the Uncitral Model must be held only to be more so. Once it is held that the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code and exhaustive, then it must also be held, using the lucid expression of Tulzapurkar, J., that it carries with it “a negative import that only such acts as are mentioned in the Act are permissible to be done and acts or things not mentioned therein are not permissible to be done”. In other words, a letters patent appeal would be excluded by the application of one of the general principles that where the special Act sets out a selfcontained code the applicability of the general law procedure would be impliedly excluded.”
85. The Arbitration Act is a self-contained code inter alia with respect to matters dealing with appointment of arbitrators, commencement of arbitration, making of an award and challenges to the arbitral award, as well as execution of such awards.83 When a self-contained code sets out a procedure, the applicability of a general legal procedure would be impliedly excluded.84 Being a self-contained and exhaustive code on arbitration law, the Arbitration Act carries the imperative that what is permissible under the law ought to be performed only in the manner indicated, and not otherwise. Accordingly, matters governed by the Arbitration Act such as the arbitration agreement, appointment of arbitrators and competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction have to be assessed in the manner specified under the law. The corollary is that it is not permissible to do what is not mentioned under the Arbitration Act. Therefore, provisions of other statutes cannot interfere with the working of the Arbitration Act, unless specified otherwise.
83 Pasl Wind Solutions (P) Ltd v. GE Power Conversion (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 1; Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation, (2018) 14 SCC 715 84 Subal Paul v. Malina Paul, (2003) 10 SCC 361
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iv. Principles of modern arbitration
86. The Stamp Act and the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 came into force on the same day, that is, 1 July 1899. The Arbitration Act, 1899, which was enacted more than a century ago, did not have minimum judicial interference as its avowed object. However, the law on arbitration has undergone a sea change over the course of a century.
87. The Arbitration Act represents the principles of modern arbitration, which seeks to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties to resolve their disputes by a neutral third-party arbitral tribunal, whose decision is final and binding on all the parties. Arbitration law allows the parties to design arbitral procedures, which ensures efficiency and expediency of the arbitration process. One of the reasons that business and commercial entities prefer arbitration is because it obviates cumbersome judicial processes, which can often prove expensive, complex, and interminable. Most legal jurisdictions have also recognized and adopted legal approaches that favor arbitration at both the domestic and international level. In the process, national courts have given effect to principles such as the separability presumption and jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal. Modern arbitration law does not completely restrict the role of national courts in the arbitration process, but gives priority to the arbitral tribunal to decide on disputes and issues pertaining to arbitration agreements as well as the substantive rights of the parties. The Arbitration Act reflects these aspects of modern arbitration law. It is the duty of this Court to interpret the Arbitration Act in a manner which gives life to the principles of modern arbitration in India. F*. The law on the arbitration agreement
88. An arbitration agreement is the foundation of arbitration as it records the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.85 In Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders,86 this Court enlisted the essential elements of an arbitration agreement as follows:
* Ed. Note: PART F 85 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) 49
86 (2003) 7 SCC 418
a. There must be a present or future difference in connection with some contemplated affair;
b. There must be the intention of the parties to settle such disputes by a private tribunal;
c. The parties must agree in writing to be bound by the decision of such tribunal; and d. The parties must be ad idem.
89. Section 2(b) of the Arbitration Act defines an “arbitration agreement” to mean an agreement referred to in Section 7. Section 7 defines an “arbitration agreement” to mean an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. It provides that an arbitration agreement could be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. Further, Section 7 mandates that an arbitration agreement shall be in writing. According to Section 7(4), an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in: (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. Section 7(5) provides that a reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.
i. Separability of the arbitration agreement
90. The concept of separability or severability of an arbitration agreement from the underlying contract is a legal fiction which acknowledges the separate nature of an arbitration agreement. The separate nature of the arbitration agreement from the underlying contract is one of the cornerstones of arbitration law. As Redfern and Hunter explain, an arbitration agreement is juridically independent from the underlying contract in which it is contained.87 87 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) 81
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The concept of separability reflects the presumptive intention of the parties to distinguish the underlying contract, which captures the substantive rights and obligations of the parties, from an arbitration agreement which provides a procedural framework to resolve the disputes arising out of the underlying contract. This presumption has various consequences in theory and practice, the most important being that an arbitration agreement survives the invalidity or termination of the underlying contract.
91. Schwebel, Sobota and Manton explain in a book on International Arbitration that the separability presumption88 is based on four factors: first, the intention of the parties to require arbitration of any dispute arising between them, including disputes over the validity of the contract; second, preventing an unwilling party from avoiding its earlier commitment by alleging the invalidity of the underlying contract; third, since the arbitration agreement and the underlying contract are considered as two separate agreements, the insufficiency in fulfilling formalities in the underlying contract would not result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement; and fourth, if the separability presumption is discarded, courts will have to rule on the merits of the disputes instead of the arbitral tribunals.
92. The rationale for the separability presumption lies in the contractual freedom of the parties to an arbitration agreement to settle their disputes by proceedings before an arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of courts. According to the common grain of business understanding and expectation, the parties intend all their disputes over substantive rights and obligations under the underlying contract to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal.89 Therefore, the separability presumption ensures that an arbitration agreement survives a termination, repudiation, or frustration of a contract to give effect to the true intention of the parties and ensure sanctity of the arbitral proceedings.
93. Switzerland was one of the first jurisdictions to recognize the separability presumption. In a decision rendered by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1933, it was observed that “[e]ven where the arbitration clause is contained in the same document as the substantive contract to which it relates 88 Stephen Schwebel, Luke Sobota, and Ryan Manton, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2020) 4. 89 Mulheim Pipecoatings GmbH v. Welspun Fintrade Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom and therefore from the outside appears as a part of the main agreement, it still does not constitute a single provision of the main agreement but an independent agreement of a special nature.”90 However, Gary Born points out that although an arbitration agreement could be separated from the underlying contract, it can never be independent or autonomous from such contract.91 This is largely due to the fact that in certain situations, the defects in the underlying contract could also invalidate the arbitration agreement.
94. To properly understand the contours of the separability presumption, it is necessary to understand its origin and development in the international context. Such an analysis is important because any ruling by this Court on the separability presumption ought to be with the aid of international best practices.
d. United Kingdom
95. The separability presumption developed gradually in English law starting with the decision of the House of Lords in Heyman v. Darwins.92 The issue before the House of Lords was whether an arbitration agreement contained in an underlying contract could survive the termination of such contract for a repudiatory breach. It was held that an arbitration agreement is collateral to the substantive contract and could survive its termination. Lord Macmillan observed that an arbitration agreement is materially different from other ordinary contracts, the reason being that breach of obligations under ordinary contracts cannot (in general) be specifically enforced and breach of them results only in damages, but an arbitration agreement can be specifically enforced by the machinery of the arbitration Acts. Lord Macmillan concluded that repudiation or breach of a contract does not extinguish the arbitration agreement, because it survives for the purpose of resolving the outstanding claims arising out of the breach:
“I am, accordingly, of the opinion that what is commonly called repudiation or total breach of a contract, whether acquiesced in by the other party or not, does not abrogate the contract, though it may 90 Judgment of 7 October 1933, Tobler v. Justizkommission des Kantons Schwyz, DFT 59 | 177 (1933)
91 Gary Born (n 62) 377 92 [1942] AC 356
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
relieve the injured party of the duty of further fulfilling the obligations which he has by the contract undertaken to the repudiating party. The contract is not put out of existence, though all further performance of the obligations undertaken by each party in favour of the other may cease. It survives for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach, and the arbitration clause survives for determining the mode of their settlement. The purposes of the contract have failed, but the arbitration clause is not one of the purposes of the contract.”
96. In subsequent decisions, the English courts reiterated the separability presumption. In Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Kansa General International Insurance Co. Ltd.93, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement is “a self-contained contract collateral to the containing contract.” The separability presumption is also enshrined in Section 7 of the UK Arbitration Act 199694 in the following terms: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.”
97. Chitty on Contracts states that Section 7 of the UK Arbitration Act maintains the established common law principle which treats an arbitration agreement as distinct from the contract of which it forms part.95 According to Chitty, treating an arbitration agreement distinct and separate from the underlying contract has two consequences: first, an arbitration agreement can be void or voidable only on the grounds which directly relate to it; and second, if the arbitration agreement is valid and binding and is sufficiently wide in its terms, issues relating to the validity, existence, or effectiveness of the underlying contract are within the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.96 93 [1993] Q.B. 701 94 “UKG Arbitration Act”
95 Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed), (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 32- 96 ibid
98. In Premium Nafta Products Limited v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd.,97 the House of Lords further explained the separability presumption in Section 7 of the UK Arbitration Act. In that case, the issue was whether a party was bound by an arbitration agreement contained in an underlying contract which was allegedly procured by fraud and bribery. Lord Hoffman, writing for the House of Lords, held that it could be enforced in view of the separability presumption. The Law Lord held that an arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the UK Arbitration Act is a “distinct agreement” from the underlying contract and, therefore, can be void or voidable only on grounds which relate directly to the arbitration agreement. Lord Hoffman, built on his past decision in Harbour Assurance (supra), by holding that Section 7 protects an arbitration agreement from any indirect challenge. e. United States of America
99. The US Federal Arbitration Act presupposes that an arbitration agreement can be separate and distinct from the underlying contract.98 The separability presumption was subsequently reiterated by US courts with respect to both international and domestic arbitration. In Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,99 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the separability presumption by observing that “arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are ‘separable’ from the contracts in which they are embedded.” In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized upon the presumptive desire of the parties to insulate the arbitration agreement from challenges directed at the underlying contract. The position of law which was laid down in Prima Paint (supra) was reiterated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckeye Check Cashing Inc v. Cardegna100 and Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.101 In Rent-A-Center (supra), it was held that application of the severability rule does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.
97 [2007] UKHL 40 98 Gary Born (n 62) 382 99 388 US 395 (1967)
100 546 U.S. 440, 440 (2006)
101 2 561 U.S. 63 (2010)
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
f. Singapore
100. The doctrine of separability has been statutorily recognized under the domestic arbitration regime in Singapore through Section 21 of the Singaporean Arbitration Act, 2001.102 The provision is that “an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.” The separability presumption has been further explained by the Singapore High Court in BNA v. BNB. The High Court observed that the “parties intend their arbitration agreement to remain effective if a provision of the substantive contract into which it is integrated could, in certain circumstances of fact or law, operate to render their arbitration agreement invalid.”103 Thus, the Singapore High Court held that the purpose of the separability presumption is to insulate an arbitration agreement from invalidity that may arise from a challenge to the substantive contract.
g. International Conventions
101. The New York Convention does not expressly provide for the separability presumption. Article II of the Convention defines an arbitration agreement as including “an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.” Moreover, Article V(1)(a) provides that the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused where the arbitration agreement “is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made.” The provision rests on the premise that international arbitration agreements could be subjected to different national laws and legal rules than the underlying contract, and, therefore, an arbitration agreement is presumptively separate from the underlying contract. According to Gary Born, Article II and Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention indicate that the Convention treats an arbitration agreement as being different from the underlying contract.104 102 Arbitration Act 2001 (No. 37 of 2001)
103 [2019] SGHC 142 104 Gary Born (n 62) 378
102. Article 16 of the Model Law deals with the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. Article 16(1) provides: “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.”
(emphasis supplied)
103. Rule 23 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2021 also provides that “an arbitration clause that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.” In contrast to the New York Convention, the Model Law expressly recognizes the separability presumption.
104. According to the UNCITRAL Working Group, the separability presumption is incorporated under Article 16(1) to complement the principle of competence-competence. The separability presumption further ensures that the invalidity of the underlying contract does not affect the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to decide on the nullity of the contract or any other issues submitted to its jurisdiction by the parties “unless it finds that the defect which causes the nullity of the contract affects also the arbitration clause itself.”105 The last sentence of Article 16(1) (extracted above) states the general principle of contractual validity of arbitration clauses.106 It connotes that the invalidity of the underlying contract will not necessarily entail the invalidity of an arbitration agreement contained in the contract. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction will be affected only when the defect causing invalidity is directed at the arbitration agreement.107 105 Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985) 38.
106 Gary Born (n 62) 403 107 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2012) 76.
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
h. India
105. The Arbitration Act also incorporates the separability presumption in Section 16(1) along the lines of the Model Law. Section 16(1) reads as follows:
“16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction – (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose, -
(a) an arbitration agreement which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and
(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.”
106. The separability presumption, as incorporated under Article 16(1) of the Model Law, as well as Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, is qualified by the expression “for that purpose.” A plain reading may suggest that Section 16 has incorporated the separability presumption only for the particular purpose of allocation of competence over jurisdictional disputes. However, the Digest of Case Laws on UNCITRAL Model Law states that “the language used in the second sentence does not prevent the application of the separability presumption when a jurisdictional question is raised before a court.”108 Gary Born suggests that the better view is that the separability presumption contained in Article 16(1) states a general rule of contractual validity “which is applicable for all purposes.”109 The judicial view that emerges from the Indian courts also seems to suggest that an arbitration agreement is treated as distinct and separate from the underlying contract as a general rule of substantive validity.
107. The separability presumption has undergone a significant evolution in India. Initially, the Indian courts viewed an arbitration agreement as an integral part of the underlying contract without any existence beyond 108 Ibid.
109 Gary Born (n 62) 403 such contract. For instance, in Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta,110 the issue before this Court was whether an arbitration clause in the original contract survived after the enactment of a subsequent contract. Justice K Subba Rao (as the learned Chief Justice then was) considered Heyman (supra) but distinguished it on the ground that it only dealt with repudiation, where rights and obligations of parties survive the termination of contract. It was held that in situations where the original contract is superseded by a subsequent contract, the arbitration clause in the original contract will also cease to exist. Justice K Subba Rao, speaking for the majority, held that first, an arbitration clause is a collateral term of a contract as distinguished from its substantive terms, but nonetheless it is an integral part of it; second, the existence of the underlying contract is a necessary condition for the operation of an arbitration clause; third, if the underlying contract was non-est in the sense that it never came legally into existence or was void-ab-initio, the arbitration clause also cannot operate; fourth, if the parties put an end to a validly executed contract and substitute it with a new contract, the arbitration clause of the original contract also perishes with it; and fifth, in situations such as repudiation, frustration, or breach of contract, only the performance of the contract comes to an end, the arbitration clause persists because the contract continues to exist for the purposes of disputes arising under it.
108. In Damodar Valley Corporation v. K K Kar,111 a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the plea that a contract is void, illegal, or fraudulent affects the entire contract along with the arbitration clause. However, the enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1996 enabled the Indian courts to give effect to the separability presumption with greater impetus. Section 16(1)(b), which provides that a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause, renders the decisions in Kishorilal Gupta (supra) and Damodar Valley Corporation (supra) redundant. Consequently, even if the underlying contract is declared null and void, it will not ipso jure result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.
110 1959 SCC OnLine SC 6
111 (1974) 1 SCC 141
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
109. In Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja,112 the issue before this Court was whether an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act moved by a partner of a non-registered firm or by a person not shown as a partner in the Register of Firms was maintainable in view of Section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Section 69(3) creates a bar against the institution of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as partner. This Court considered the overall scheme of the Arbitration Act to hold that an “arbitration clause is separable from the other clauses of the partnership deed” and “constitutes an agreement by itself.”
110. In National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation India Ltd. v. Gains Trading Co.,113 the issue before this Court in an application under Section 11 was whether an arbitration clause comes to an end if the contract containing such clause is repudiated. While answering this in negative, this Court observed that even if the underlying contract comes to an end, the arbitration agreement contained in such contract survives for the purpose of the resolution of disputes between the parties. Similarly, in P Manohar Reddy & Bros. v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corp.,114 this Court referred to Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. (supra) to observe that an arbitration agreement contained in an underlying contract is a collateral term which may survive the termination of the contract.
111. In Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd. v. Potluri Madhavilata,115 this Court cited Heyman (supra) with approval to hold that the termination of the underlying contract does not render an arbitration agreement inoperative. It was further observed that the arbitration agreement survives for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising “in respect of”, “with regard to”, or “under” the underlying contract. The emphasis on the expressions “in respect of”, “with regard to” or “under” in Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd. (supra) indicates that the purpose of an arbitration agreement is to embody the mutual intention of the parties to settle any disputes that may arise “in
112 (2004) 3 SCC 155
113 (2007) 5 SCC 692
114 (2009) 2 SCC 494
115 (2009) 10 SCC 103
respect of” the substantive obligations under the underlying contract. It is, therefore, a logical conclusion that the parties mutually intend to make an arbitration agreement distinct and separate from the underlying contract, so that even if the underlying contract comes to an end, the arbitration agreement survives to resolve any outstanding disputes that may arise out the substantive obligations under the contract.
112. In view of the above discussion, we formulate our conclusions on this aspect. First, the separability presumption contained in Section 16 is applicable not only for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. It encapsulates the general rule on the substantive independence of an arbitration agreement. Second, parties to an arbitration agreement mutually intend to confer jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal to determine questions as to jurisdiction as well as substantive contractual disputes between them. The separability presumption gives effect to this by ensuring the validity of an arbitration agreement contained in an underlying contract, notwithstanding the invalidity, illegality, or termination of such contract. Third, when the parties append their signatures to a contract containing an arbitration agreement, they are regarded in effect as independently appending their signatures to the arbitration agreement. The reason is that the parties intend to treat an arbitration agreement contained in an underlying contract as distinct from the other terms of the contract; and Fourth, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in the face of the invalidity of the underlying contract, allows the arbitral tribunal to assume jurisdiction and decide on its own jurisdiction by determining the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. In the process, the separability presumption gives effect to the doctrine of competence-competence.
113. In view of the legal position, we now proceed to analyze the correctness of the decision in N N Global 2 (supra). The Constitution Bench acknowledged the separability presumption, but refused to apply it in the context of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act. The relevant observation of the Court is as follows:
“157. […] The evolution of the principle that an arbitration is a separate and distinct agreement from the contract, would indicate that it would have no play in the context of the duty of a Court, within the meaning of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act, to act in consonance therewith.”
IN RE: INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AND THE INDIAN
STAMP ACT 1899 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI ] 1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
114. The above position of law is contrary to the separability presumption which treats an arbitration agreement as separate from the underlying contract.
G*. The doctrine of competence-competence
115. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz (also known as competence-competence), as originally developed in Germany, was traditionally understood to imply that arbitrators are empowered to make a final ruling on their own jurisdiction, with no subsequent judicial review of the decision by any court.116 However, many jurisdictions allow an arbitral tribunal to render a decision on its jurisdiction, subject to substantive judicial review.117
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