CBI v. R.R. Kishore
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 817; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 5 Judges: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice In the Context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, Justice Was the Moot Question That Arose
- Decided
- 11 Sept 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 377/2007
- Sections
- 6A(1), 6A, 6, 6A(2), 26, 2, 5(4), 17, 7, 17A, 12, 53
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1 : 2023 INSC 817
CASE DETAILS
CBI
v.
R.R. KISHORE
(Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 2007)
SEPTEMBER 11, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, SANJIV KHANNA,
ABHAY S. OKA, VIKRAM NATH AND
J.K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act) required approval of the Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by senior Government officers under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and provided a kind of immunity to such officers. Whether there could be a deprivation of such immunity by a retrospective operation of a judgment of the Court, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, was the moot question that arose for determination in the present case.
The question was whether the declaration made by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another, that Section 6A of the DSPE Act being unconstitutional, can be applied retrospectively in context with Article 20 of the Constitution. The following three corollary questions also arose for consideration namely: Whether Section 6A of the DSPE Act was part of procedure or it introduced a conviction or sentence; Whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution had any bearing or relevance in the context of declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and Whether the declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.2 Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act) – s.6A – Nature of – A part of procedure or introduced a conviction or sentence. Held: Section 6A of the DSPE Act does not lay down or introduce any conviction for any offence – It is a procedural safeguard only which is enumerated in Section 6A of the DSPE Act with regard to making of an investigation or enquiry of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 6A of the DSPE Act also does not lay down any sentence nor does it alter any existing sentence for an offence – s.6A of the DSPE Act is a part of the procedure only in the form of a protection to senior government servants – It does not introduce any new offence nor it enhances the punishment or sentence. [Paras 23 and 24] Constitution of India – Art.20 – Applicability of, in context of s.6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Held: Article 20(1) of the Constitution has no applicability either to the validity or invalidity of Section 6A of the DSPE Act. [Para 36] Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – s.6A – Declaration of s.6A as unconstitutional – Whether would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional – Constitution of India – Art. 13(2) and Part III. Held: Once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements – Thus, the declaration made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy will have retrospective operation – Section 6A of the DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the date of its insertion i.e. 11.09.2003. [Para 43] Constitution of India – Art.20(1) – Protection from retrospective Ex post facto law – Explained.
Held: Sub-article (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution consists of two parts – The first part prohibits any law that prescribes judicial punishment for violation of law with retrospective effect. Sub-article (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution does not apply to civil liability, as distinguished from punishment for a criminal offence – Further, what is prohibited is conviction or sentence for any offence under an ex post facto law, albeit the trial itself is not prohibited – Trial under a procedure different from the one when at the time of commission of an offence, or by a court different from the time when the offence was committed is not unconstitutional on account of violation of sub-article (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution – It may be different, if the procedure or the trial is challengeable on account of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution or violation of any other fundamental right – The right under first part of sub-article (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution is a very valuable right, which must be safeguarded and protected by the courts as it is a constitutional mandate.[Paras 27 and 28] Constitution of India – Art.13 – Word “void” – Interpretation and meaning of – Words and Phrases.
Held: Under Article 13(1) all existing laws prior to the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part-III, would be void to the extent of inconsistency – Further, according to Article 13(2), the State is prohibited from making any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part-III and further that any law made in contravention of this clause would be void to the extent of contravention – Article 13(2) prohibits making of any law so it would be relating to laws made post commencement of the Constitution, like the case at hand – In the present case, as it has been held that Section 6A of DSPE Act is violative of Article 14 of Part III of the Constitution, as such, the same would be void – The word “void” has been interpreted in a number of Supreme Court judgments beginning 1951 till recently and it has been given different nomenclature such as ‘non est’, ‘void ab initio’ ‘still born’ and ‘unenforceable’. [Para 41]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another (2014) 8 SCC 682: [2014] 6 SCR 873 – clarified.
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1951] SCR 228; Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [1953] SCR 1188; The State of Manipur & Ors. v. Surjakumar Okram & Ors. 2022 CBI v. R.R. KISHORE SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.4 SCC Online SC 130; Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1963 SC 1019:[1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 912; Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [1959] 2 SCR Suppl. 8 and M.P.V. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Another [1958] SCR 1422 – relied on.
Sajjan Singh v. The State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 630; Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne [1966] 2 SCR 34; Municipal Committee, Amritsar and others v. State of Punjab and Others (1969) 1 SCC 475 : [1969] 3 SCR 447; I.C. Golaknath & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. [1967] 2 SCR 762; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others (1993) 4 SCC 727 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 576; M.A. Murthy v. State of Karnataka and Others (2003) 7 SCC 517 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 327; Transmission Corporation of A.P. v. C.H. Prabhakar and Others (2004) 5 SCC 551 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 759; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 : [2014] 2 SCR 1; H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi [1955] 1 SCR 1150; Fertico Marketing and Investment Private Limited and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (2021) 2 SCC 525 : [2020] 12 SCR 956; Rattiram and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 12 SCC 316 : [2013] 2 SCR 1003; State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder and Others AIR 1987 SC 1354 : [1987] 2 SCR 295; A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726 : [1973] 3 SCR 477; Ashok Kumar Gupta and Another v. State of U.P. and Others (1997) 5 SCC 201 : [1997] 3 SCR 269; Assistant Excise Commissioner, Kottayam and Others v. Esthappan Cherian and Another 2021 (10) SCALE 308; Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. District Magistrate (1994) 1 SCC 103; Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 : [2018] 9 SCR 1006; Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 321 : [2019] 2 SCR 707; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953) 2 SCC 111 : [1954] SCR 1098; T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177 : [1983] 1 SCR 905; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1 SCR 1019; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [1951] 1 SCR 682; Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India and Another (1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595; State of West Bengal v. S.K. Ghosh [1963] 2 SCR 111; Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab [1964] 7 SCR 676; G.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 593 : [1979] 2 SCR 816; Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Others (1991) 4 SCC 298 : [1991] 3 SCR 812; and Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ajay Agarwal (2010) 3 SCC 765 : [2010] 3 SCR 70 - referred to. Hopt v. People of the Territory of Utah 110 US 574 (1884); Duncan v. State 152 US 377 (1894); Gibson v. Mississippi 162 US 565 (1896); Thompson v. State of Missouri 171 US 380 (1898); John Mallett v. State of North Carolina 181 US 589 (1901); John Rooney v. State of North Dakota 196 US 319 (1905); Beazell v. State of Ohio Chatfield 269 US 167 (1925); Dobbert v. Florida 432 US 282 (1977); Smith et al v. Doe et al 538 US 84 (2003); Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation v. Bonjorno 494 US 827 (1990); Phillips v. Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 and Calder v. Bull 1 L Ed 648 : 3 US (3 Dall) 386 (1798) – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
377 of 2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.10.2006 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLR No.366 of 2006.
With Criminal Appeal No. 2763 of 2023.
Appearances:
Tushar Mehta, S.G., S.V. Raju, ASG, Arvind Datar, Amit Desai, Arunabh Chowdhary, Sr. Advs., Ankur Talwar, Rajat Nair, Ashutosh Ghade, Ms. Sairica S. Raju, Annam Venkatesh, Kanu Agrawal, Shreeyash U. Lalit, Nakul Chengappa K.K., Shantnu Sharma, Madhav Sinhal, Pratyush Srivastava, Bhuvan Kapoor, A.K. Sharma, Ankur Chawla, Bhanoo Sood, Aamir Khan, Shivam Tandon, Rahul Unni Krishnan, Pranav Deish, Arush Matlotia, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Ms. Kalyani Lal, Jayant Mohan, Mohit Gupta, Karan Kumar Gogna, Akshay Sahni, Ms. Pallavi Langar, Ms. Prerna Mahajan, Ashish Jha, Himanshu Tyagi, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Ms. Harsh Lata, Rahul Pratap, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Dr. R.R. Kishore, Respondent in Person.
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.6 JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
VIKRAM NATH, J.
Crl. Appeal No.377/2007.
1. This Constitution Bench has been constituted to consider whether the declaration made by a Constitution Bench of this Court, in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another1, that Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 19462 being unconstitutional, can be applied retrospectively in context with Article 20 of the Constitution.
2. Necessary facts relevant for the purposes of this case are stated hereunder:
2.1 The appellant-Central Bureau of Investigation3 after registering the First Information Report at 02:00 pm on 16.12.2004 for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19884 laid a trap in the evening on the same day wherein the respondent is said to have accepted bribe to set the things right for the radiologist conducting Pre-Natal test to determine the sex of the foetus in contravention of the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994. The respondent applied for discharge, inter alia, amongst others on the ground that the trap which was a part of the enquiry/investigation had been laid without the previous approval of the Central Government as provided under Section 6A of the DSPE Act.
2.2. The Special Judge, CBI, rejected the application for discharge vide order dated 30.04.2006 which was carried in revision before the High Court and was registered as Criminal Revision Petition No.366 of 2006. Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated 05.10.2006 framed three questions for consideration namely:
1 (2014) 8 SCC 682
2 In short ‘DSPE Act’ 3 In short, “CBI”
4 In short “PC Act, 1988”
1. What is the background with regard to Section 6A of the DSPE Act?
2. Did the CBI acted in contravention of Section 6A(1)?
3. If yes, does it mean that the entire trial, consequent upon an illegal investigation, is vitiated?
It answered question No.2 in favour of the respondent and further with respect to question No.3 left it open for the competent authority to take the decision and further proceed with reinvestigation and in case sanction is not granted, to notify the Special Judge, CBI, to close the case. The operative part of the order is in paragraph 29 of the judgment which is reproduced hereunder:
“29. It follows that if, at the initial stage of trial, the illegality of investigation is brought to the notice of the court and yet the Trial Court continues with the trial then, such proceedings would be liable to be set aside by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In this case, in view of the discussion above, it is clear that the provisions of Section 6 A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are mandatory and not merely directory. The investigation carried out in contravention of such provisions is, therefore, clearly illegal, in violation of a statutory requirement. The dismissal of the discharge application moved on behalf of the petitioner means that the trial would continue. This cannot be permitted in view of the discussion above. Because, then the court would be turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to the illegality in investigation which has been brought to its notice at the earliest stage. However, it also does not mean that the petitioner is entitled to a discharge and the closure of the case against him. As pointed out in Rishbud’s case and Mubarak Ali’s case, reinvestigation is to be ordered in the context of the provisions of section 6A of the said Act. While the file is to be kept pending before Special Judge, approval of the Central Government is to be sought for investigation. If approval is accorded then the matter shall be reinvestigated as per prescribed procedure and the material gathered in such re-investigation shall be placed before the Special Judge for further proceedings in accordance with law. If the approval is not given by the Central Government, then the same shall be notified to the Special Judge who shall then close the case.”
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.8
2.3. The CBI, feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Delhi High Court, has preferred the present appeal substantially on the ground that Section 6A(2) of DSPE Act would be applicable and not Section 6A(1) thereof. The High Court erred in holding that Section 6A(1) was applicable.
2.4. The said appeal is pending since 2007. During the pendency of the appeal Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act was held to be invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by a Constitution Bench vide judgment dated 06.05.2014 in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra). Paragraph 99 of the said report which makes the above declaration is reproduced hereunder:
“99. In view of our foregoing discussion, we hold that Section 6A(1), which requires approval of the Central Government to conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the PC Act, 1988 where such allegation relates to: (a) the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above, and (b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the Government, is invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As a necessary corollary, the provision contained in Section 26(c) of Act 45 of 2003 to that extent is also declared invalid.”
3. What the Constitution Bench did not decide was whether the declaration of Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have retrospective effect or it would apply prospectively.
4. The appeal was taken up on a number of occasions and argued from both sides. Relying upon the judgments regarding retrospective or prospective applicability of the said declaration, the appellant-CBI would submit that once Section 6A(1) has been declared to be violative of Article 14, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the prosecution should be allowed to continue with the proceedings from the stage of rejection of discharge application. On the other hand, the respondent would submit that the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) could not have any retrospective operation and therefore, no fault could be found with the judgment of the High Court and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
5. At a particular stage, this Court felt that the Union of India should be made a party and should be heard. It accordingly suo moto issued notices vide order dated 27.04.2012 and the Union of India was required to file an affidavit. The Union of India filed an affidavit dated 05.10.2012. However, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by order dated 29.01.2013. Thereafter, the Union of India filed another affidavit in February, 2013. The matter was thereafter taken up on 10.03.2016 when this Court, after recording the submissions advanced by the rival parties and considering the importance of the question and also the fact that the retrospectivity or prospectivity of the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) could only be dealt with by a Constitution Bench, directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side for constituting an appropriate Bench. Paragraph 7 of the order dated 10.03.2016 framed the question for determination and the same is reproduced hereunder: “7. The provisions of Section 6A(1), extracted above, do indicate that for officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above a kind of immunity has been provided for. Whether there can be a deprivation of such immunity by a retrospective operation of a judgment of the Court, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, is the moot question that arises for determination in the present case.”
6. As the order of reference also briefly deals with the necessary facts and also the reasons for referring the issue to the Constitution Bench, it would be appropriate to reproduce the complete order dated 10.03.2016. It reads as follows:
“1. A prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was sought to be questioned by the respondent accused on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 which was brought in by an amendment in the year 2003. Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is in the following terms:
“6A. Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation.-(1) The Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.10 Government where such allegation relates to- (a) the employees of the Central Government of the Level of Joint Secretary and above; and (b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government.”
2. The Delhi High Court before whom the challenge was brought answered the question by holding that the respondent accused was entitled to the benefit of the said provision. Accordingly, the High Court took the view that the matter required fresh consideration for grant of previous approval under Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Aggrieved, the C.B.I. is in appeal before us.
3. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties as also the respondent who appears in person.
4. The provisions of Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 has been held to be unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Subramanian Swamy versus Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another [(2014) 8 SCC 682]. The judgment of the Constitution Bench is however silent as to whether its decision would operate prospectively or would have retrospective effect. Though a large number of precedents have been cited at the Bar to persuade us to take either of the above views, as would support the case of the rival parties, we are of the considered view that this question should receive the consideration of a Constitution Bench in view of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India.
5. In fact, in Transmission Corporation of A.P. versus Ch. Prabhakar and others [(2004) 5 SCC 551], the precise question that has arisen before us had been referred to a Constitution Bench. Paragraphs 15 and 21 dealing with the said question read as follows:
“15. Whether constitutional guarantee enshrined in clause
(1) of Article 20 is confined only to prohibition against conviction for any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence and subjection to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission of offence or it also prohibits legislation which aggravates the degree of crime or makes it possible for him to receive the same punishment under the new law as could have been imposed under the prior law or deprives the accused of any substantial right or immunity possessed at the time of the commission of the offence charged is a moot point to be debated.
(underlining is ours)
***
21. However, as the interpretation of Article 20 as to its scope and ambit is involved in these proceedings, we refer the question formulated in para 15 of this order to a larger Bench for consideration.”
However, the Constitution Bench in Transmission Corporation of A.P. versus Ch. Prabhakar and others [(2010) 15 SCC 200] declined to answer the question as in the meantime there were certain amendments to the statute in question and, therefore, the issues referred were understood to have become academic. The very same issues have been cropped up before us in the present proceedings.
6. We have considered it necessary to make the present reference for the reason that in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. versus Ch. Prabhakar and others [(2004) 5 SCC 551] one of the questions referred is whether the scope and ambit of Article 20 of the Constitution of India is to be understood to be protecting the substantial rights or the immunity enjoyed by an accused at the time of commission of the offence for which he has been charged.
7. The provisions of Section 6A(1), extracted above, do indicate that for officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above a kind of immunity has been provided for. Whether there can be a deprivation of such immunity by a retrospective operation of a judgment of the Court, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, is the moot question that arises for determination in the present case.
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.12
8. For the aforesaid reasons and having regard to the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, we refer the aforesaid question to a larger bench for which purpose the papers may now be laid before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side.”
7. In the above backdrop, the matter has been placed before this Bench and has been heard at length on the question referred.
SLP(Crl.) No.4364 of 2011
8. Leave granted.
9. This appeal has been filed by the appellant assailing the correctness of the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court passed in Criminal Application No.1913 of 2010, titled Manjit Singh Bali vs. Central Bureau of Investigation dated 29.11.2010. By the above order, the Bombay High Court dismissed the petition praying for quashing of the FIR registered by CBI against the petitioner therein under Sections 7 and 8 of the PC Act, 1988. In this case, an FIR was registered on 18.02.2010 based on a complaint dated 16.02.2010. A raid was conducted on 24.02.2010, during which the petitioner therein was arrested and cash was recovered from his car. In this case also the issue is as to whether in the facts of the said case, Section 6A(1) of DSPE Act would be applicable or Section 6A(2) thereof would be applicable.
ARGUMENTS:
A. For CBI:
10. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the appellant-CBI in Criminal Appeal No.377 of 2007 made detailed submissions which are briefly summarized hereunder:
10.1. Section 6A of the DSPE Act is a mere procedural provision and not a penal provision as such would not attract Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Article 20 of the Constitution applies only to those provisions of law in force, violation of which results in conviction and resultantly awarding sentence. Procedural issues like statutory protection during trial, a provision providing for a particular Court to try the offence would not have any bearing while invoking Article 20 of the Constitution.
10.2. Article 20 of the Constitution would have no applicability in determining whether the declaration made in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) would be prospective or retrospective. The protection provided under Article 20 of the Constitution against ex post facto law extends and confines only to conviction and sentence and would have no relevance for procedural aspects and also would not have any applicability to the powers exercised during the course of the investigation. He enlisted the following aspects in this respect:
(a) Article 20 is limited in application wherein distinct offences are created subsequently;
(b) The other aspect of Article 20 is debarring infliction of greater penalty, post commission of the offence;
(c) Section 6A did not decriminalise PC Act offences and removal of the said provision, therefore, does not create a new offence;
(d) Section 6A did not provide any blanket immunity against anti-corruption laws and therefore, removal of the same does not create a new offence;
(e) Section 6A did not create any vested right which can be said to be covered by Article 20;
(f) Declaration of Section 6A as invalid and unconstitutional is through a judicial order and not a legislative measure.;
10.3. Reliance is placed upon the following judgments in support of the above propositions:
(1) Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh5;
(2) State of West Bengal Vs. S.K. Ghosh6;
(3) Sajjan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab7;
(4) Rattan Lal Vs. State of Punjab8;
(5) Union of India Vs. Sukumar Pyne9;
5 (1953) SCR 1188
6 (1963) 2 SCR 111
7 (1964) 4 SCR 630
8 (1964) 7 SCR 676
9 (1966) 2 SCR 34
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.14
(6) G.P. Nayyar Vs. State (Delhi Administration)10;
(7) Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat and Others11;
(8) Securities and Exchange Board of India Vs. Ajay Agarwal12;
10.4. Referring to Section 6A of the DSPE Act, it was submitted that the same is not a penal provision and it does not create a new offence nor does it increase the punishment for an existing offence, which existed on the date of the commission of offence.
10.5. Prior to insertion of Section 6A in the DSPE Act, similar provision was existing in Single Directive No.4.7(3) requiring prior sanction to investigation. This Court in the case of Vineet Narain and Others Vs. Union of India and Another13, amongst other larger issues was also testing the validity of the Single Directive No.4.7(3). This Court held in the said case that by administrative instructions the statutory powers could not be intermeddled or impeded. It accordingly declared Single Directive No.4.7(3)(i) as invalid.
10.6. As a result of such declaration Section 6A was introduced in the DSPE Act in the year 2003 vide Section 26(c) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 w.e.f. 11.09.2003.
10.7. Section 6A of the DSPE Act, undeniably does not create a new offence nor does it obliterate the offence. The Constitution Bench in Subramanian Swamy’s case (supra) noted that the classification made in Section 6A neither eliminates public mischief nor achieves some positive public good and, therefore, the classification was held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it side-tracks the fundamental objects of the PC Act, 1988 to deal with corruption.
10.8. Shri Mehta commenting upon Section 6A of the DSPE Act enlisted the following short conclusions:
(a) It is not a provision creating an offence or providing immunity from an offence under which anyone can be punished;
10 (1979) 2 SCC 593
11 (1991) 4 SCC 298
12 (2010) 3 SCC 765
13 (1998) 1 SCC 226
(b) The said provision did not exempt applicability of anti-corruption laws to officers above the rank of Joint Secretary;
(c) It was a mere executive safety mechanism; It was a mere initial protective net of a particular kind which this Hon’ble Court declared as unconstitutional;
(d) The said provision did not seek to create individual rights or immunities rather was, as was the submission of the Union of India in Subramanian Swamy (supra), a provision which was aimed at protecting bona fide actions for ensuring honest decisions/advice in governmental functioning.
(e) It was not aimed as an immunity or substantive exclusion from application of laws, rather was a preliminary check provided in order to ensure honest officials are not unnecessarily harassed.
(f) It cannot be termed as a substantive procedural provision nor is it a substantive penal provision.
(g) At best, Section 6A of the DSPE Act was purely technical, procedural precondition, which was preliminary in nature and was to be exercised prior to the stage of investigation.
10.9. It is settled proposition that declaration of unconstitutionality renders a law to be non est, void ab initio or unenforceable, as the case may be, subject to the legislature to cure the basis of the said unconstitutionality. Reliance was placed upon the following judgments of this Court in his context:
(1) Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay14;
(2) Behram Khurshed Pesikaka Vs. The State of Bombay15;
(3) M.P.V. Sundararamier and Co. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Another16;
(4) Deep Chand Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others17;
14 1951 SCR 228
15 (1955) 1 SCR 613
16 1958 SCR 1422
17 1959 SCR Suppl. (2) 8 CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.16
(5) Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others18;
(6) Municipal Committee, Amritsar and others Vs. State of Punjab and Others19;
(7) The State of Manipur & Ors. Vs. Surjakumar Okram & Ors.20;
10.10. The common opinion culled out from the various opinions rendered in the above judgments is that such declaration makes the law unenforceable and such unenforceability relates back. It was, thus, submitted that judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) relates back to the point when Section 6A was inserted in the DSPE Act.
10.11. Further submission is that a decision of this Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of its stage of pendency as it is assumed that what is enunciated by this Court is in fact the law from inception. There can be no prospective overruling unless expressly indicated in clear and positive terms. If the Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) had any intentions of declaring that the same would be prospective in application, then the same should have been specifically and discretely stated therein. In absence of such declaration, the natural assumption is that the same is retrospective applying the Blackstonian theory of precedence.
10.12. Reference was made by Shri Mehta to the cases of I.C. Golaknath & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab21 and Anr. and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others Vs. B. Karunakar and Others22 for the proposition that prospective overruling is to be exercised as an exception in rare circumstances and such power should be seldom exercised. He has further placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of M.A. Murthy Vs. State of Karnataka and others23 for the proposition that if prospective overruling is not specifically provided in the decision, it would not be open for Courts in future to declare such a decision to be prospective in nature. If
18 AIR 1963 SC 1019
19 (1969) 1 SCC 475
20 2022 SCC Online SC 130
21 (1967) 2 SCR 762
22 (1993) 4 SCC 727
23 (2003) 7 SCC 517
prospective applicability of a decision is not provided in the said decision, then it is presumed that it will have retrospective effect and declaration of any law as invalid would be unenforceable and non-existent from the statute book from the time of its inception. The judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) would, therefore, operate retrospectively and at least would be unenforceable ab initio.
10.13. The next submission is that the judgment in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Vs. C.H. Prabhakar and Others24 would also not be of any help to the respondent as under the American position of protection against ‘ex post facto’ laws, removal of a provision similar to Section 6A of the DSPE Act would not be hit. Reference is made to the following judgments:
(1) Hopt Vs. People of the Territory of Utah25;
(2) Duncan Vs. State26;
(3) Gibson Vs. Mississippi27;
(4) Thompson Vs. State of Missouri28; 171 US 380 (1898)
(5) John Mallett Vs. State of North Carolina29;
(6) John Rooney Vs. State of North Dakota30;
(7) Beazell Vs. State of Ohio Chatfield31;
(8) Dobbert Vs. Florida32;
(9) Smith et al Vs. Doe et al33;
B: For Union of India:
24 (2004) 5 SCC 551
25 110 US 574 (1884 26 152 US 377 (1894)
27 162 US 565 (1896)
28 171 US 380 (1898)
29 181 US 589 (1901)
30 196 US 319 (1905)
31 269 US 167 (1925)
32 432 US 282 (1977)
33 538 US 84 (2003)
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.18
11. Shri S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India made submissions on behalf of the Union of India. His submissions are briefly summarized as follows:
11.1. Merely because the Court takes time to decide the matter or merely because the challenge to statutory provisions is made subsequently, it would not make an unconstitutional statutory provision legal or constitutional even if such provision has operated for some time till it is struck down by the Court. Such a violation is void ab initio, as settled by a large number of decisions of this Court. It is only rarely that in some cases in order to obviate the hardships and on equitable grounds, this Court had protected an action taken under an unconstitutional statute. However, that does not mean that the statute was not unconstitutional or bad during the period it was on the statute book.
11.2. Prohibition under Section 6A of the DSPE Act is against conducting any enquiry or investigation. Referring to the definition of “enquiry” in Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 197334, it was submitted that the enquiry commences after charge-sheet is filed and is a forerunner to the trial. Reliance was placed upon the case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab35, in particular, reference has been made to paragraphs 27, 29 and 39 of the report.
11.3. Further referring to the definition of the word “investigation” in Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C., it was submitted that the prohibition contained in Section 6A of the DSPE Act relates to the prohibition from collecting evidence in an enquiry or during the investigation.
11.4. Referring to the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) it is submitted that there could be two situations prior to the judgment in the aforesaid case i.e. prior to May, 2014; (i) where evidence is already gathered as part of investigation or (ii) where evidence is not gathered because of the prohibition contained in Section 6A of the DSPE Act. Placing reliance upon a judgment of this Court in H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh Vs. The State of Delhi36, wherein, while answering the first question, this Court held that the prohibition contained in Section 5(4) of the Prevention of Corruption 34 In short ‘Cr.P.C.’
35 (2014) 3 SCC 92
36 (1955) 1 SCR 1150
Act, 194737 was mandatory in nature whereas while answering the second question, this Court held that trial following an investigation conducted in violation of Section 5(4) of the PC Act, 1947 would not be illegal. It was submitted that where a Magistrate has already taken cognizance upon an investigation, conducted without the approval under Section 6A of the DSPE Act, the Court can act on evidence collected during such investigation and the proceedings would not be vitiated in the absence of any prejudice both actual and pleaded with respect to such evidence. Reference has been made to the following judgments:
(i) Fertico Marketing and Investment Private Limited and Others Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another38;
(ii) Rattiram and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh39;
(iii) State of Karnataka Vs. Kuppuswamy Gownder and Others40;
11.5. It is further submitted that where investigation was not conducted and where the Magistrate has not taken cognizance, the Investigating Agency can conduct further investigation and collect evidence which earlier it was not able to do due to the bar of Section 6A of the DSPE Act. However, such further investigation would be subject to Section 17(A) of the PC Act, 1988. It was, thus, submitted that after judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra), the prohibition contained in Section 6A of the DSPE Act having seized the CBI could investigate the matter subject to Section 17(A) of the PC Act, 1988 wherever applicable. There would be no requirement to obtain approval under Section 6A of the DSPE Act.
11.6. The provisions under Section 6A of the DSPE Act do not confer any immunity from prosecution. Assuming that Section 6A of the DSPE Act was in operation prior to the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra), it could not bar investigation by an Agency other than those covered by the DSPE Act. Reference was made to the judgment of this Court in the case of A.C. Sharma Vs. Delhi Administration41. Further submission is that 37 In short, “PC Act, 1947”
38 (2021) 2 SCC 525
39 (2013) 12 SCC 316
40 AIR 1987 SC 1354
41 (1973) 1 SCC 726
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.20 a trial on the basis of a private complaint relating to corruption cases would be maintainable and there would be no immunity in such cases by virtue of Section 6A of the DSPE Act.
11.7. It was next submitted that Article 20(1) of the Constitution would have no application in this case as investigation is only part of the procedure for collecting evidence and it neither amounts to conviction nor to sentence. Reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh (supra).
C: Dr. R.R. Kishore – respondent in person in Crl.A.No.377 of 2007:
12. The respondent, Dr. R.R. Kishore has throughout represented himself in person and has argued the matter at length before us. His submissions are summarized hereunder:
12.1. At the outset, it was submitted that CBI is contesting this case against the stand of the Union of India. Initially Union of India was not a party to the proceedings, however, pursuant to an order dated 27.04.2012 passed in this appeal, the Union of India was made a party by the Court suo moto. The affidavit filed by Union of India, served upon the respondent on 25.02.2013 and which is part of the record, categorically stated that CBI does not have jurisdiction to initiate investigation against the respondent without prior approval of the Central Government. It further stated that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the impugned order dated 05.10.2006 is correct and effectively captures the purpose of enactment of a provision. It further took stand in paragraph 23 that purport of Section 6A of the DSPE Act is to accord meaningful protection to the persons imbued with decision making powers from frivolous or motivated investigation by providing a screening mechanism. Reference was also made to the directions issued by this Court in the case of Vineet Narain (supra) to the effect that Central Government shall remain answerable for the CBI’s functioning and shall further take all measures necessary to ensure that CBI functions effectively, efficiently and is viewed as a non-partisan agency. On such submissions, it is the case of the respondent that nothing survives in this appeal filed by the CBI and the same deserves to be dismissed.
12.2. It was next submitted that CBI had not only violated Section 6A of the DSPE Act but had also violated Section 6 of the said Act and also Sections 17 and 18 of the PC Act, 1988. Even though the FIR was registered only under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988 against the respondent alone, but still the CBI conducted investigation regarding possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income not only against the respondent but also his wife, who was working as an employee of the State of U.P.
12.3. Referring to the facts of the case, it was stated that the case was registered under Section 7 of the PC Act on 16.12.2004, the High Court delivered the judgment impugned in the appeal on 05.10.2006, the petition was preferred by the CBI in January, 2007, leave was granted thereafter and notice was issued to the Union of India on 27.04.2012. The affidavit was filed by the Union of India in February, 2013. The provisions of Section 6A of the DSPE Act was continuing on the statute book till 06.05.2014 when the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) was delivered. On the basis of above facts, it was submitted that the appeal was liable to be dismissed as being meritless.
12.4. It was next submitted that at the time when the appeal is being heard, there is already in existence a similar provision protecting the interest of the respondent by way of Section 17(A) of the PC Act, 1988.
12.5. An argument relating to discrimination has also been raised by the respondent to the effect that in case if the contention of the appellant is accepted, the respondent would be discriminated from those set of government servants who have availed the protection of Section 6A of the DSPE Act and the proceedings against them have come to a closure in cases where the competent authority declined to grant sanction and also to another set of cases where the Courts have quashed the proceedings in the absence of sanction under Section 6A of the DSPE Act.
12.6. The next argument relates to Section 6 of the General Causes Act, 189742 dealing with effect of Repeal in view of its applicability under Article 367 of the Constitution.
12.7. It is also submitted that where a law has been in force for a long time and is subsequently repealed, the same would not affect the rights which had accrued during the existence of such law.
42 In short ‘the Act, 1897’ CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.22
12.8. It is also his submission that if, while declaring the statute to be invalid, the Court does not expressly incorporate for its retrospective application, it shall be deemed to apply prospectively. Reliance was placed upon the following judgments:
(1) Keshavan Madhava Menon (supra);
(2) Ashok Kumar Gupta and Another Vs. State of U.P. and others43;
(3) Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation Vs. Bonjorno44;
(4) Assistant Excise Commissioner, Kottayam and Others Vs.
Esthappan Cherian and another45
12.9. It was next submitted that appeal of the CBI has been filed primarily on two grounds; that Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act is not mandatory; and that Section 6A(2) would apply. He also submitted that no ground has been taken that Section 6A(1) is unconstitutional or invalid, as such, CBI cannot argue this point.
12.10. Lastly, it is submitted that not only Article 20, but also Article 21 of the Constitution, should be read in favour of the respondent and also in favour of the law existing at the time when the offence is said to have taken place, benefit should be extended of any protection available at that time. D: Shri Arvind Datar, Senior Advocate for appellant-Manjit Singh Bali in Crl.Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 4364 of 2011:
13. Shri Arvind Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant- Manjit Singh Bali in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4364 of 2011 made the following submissions:
13.1. After referring to the question referred to the Constitution Bench, Shri Datar, learned Senior Advocate submitted that following three corollary questions also arise for consideration namely:
(i) Whether declaration of a law being violative of Article 14 or any other Article contained in Part-III is void ab initio under Article 13(2)?
43 (1997) 5 SCC 201
44 494 US 827 (1990)
45 Civil Appeal No.5815 of 2009 by Supreme Court of India vide order dated 06.09.2021
(ii) What is the effect of such a judgment on actions taken or omitted to be taken during the period when the law remained operational? and
(iii) Whether there is a difference between: (I) a law held as unconstitutional for lack of legislative competence; and (II) a law held to be unconstitutional for violation of Part-III or other constitutional limitations?
13.2. Referring to Article 20(1) of the Constitution vis-a-vis deprivation of immunity retrospectively and analysing the said constitutional provision, it is submitted that a conviction of an accused can take place by following the prescribed procedure starting from enquiry, investigation, trial etc. According to him, if the first stages of enquiry, investigation are not permitted unless there is a specified prior approval as there is immunity from prosecution, no conviction can take place. According to him, this immunity referring to Section 6A of the DSPE Act, is entitled to protection under Article 20(1) of the Constitution. According to him, the marginal note refers to protection in respect of conviction and the phrase ‘in respect of’ must be interpreted to grant protection to all the existing procedural safeguards at the time when the offence was alleged to be committed. Reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal Deorah Vs. District Magistrate46.
13.3. Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act creates an immunity and grants a protection. It cannot be taken away retrospectively, either by retrospective amendment or by a judgment declaring such immunity invalid.
13.4. Section 6A was declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, under Article 13(2) of the Constitution it is void to the extent of the contravention. The argument further proceeds to elaborate the meaning and scope of the word “void” which came up for consideration in a number of cases right from 1951 to 1963. Dr. Datar has very fairly submitted that this Court has held that a provision which is held to be ‘void’ would be a “nullity”, “still born” or “dead” as if it was never in existence at all.
13.5 It was next submitted that a law which has been declared to be unconstitutional could only mean that such law becomes inoperative or
46 (1994) 1 SCC 103
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.24 ineffective, once declared and not before that. The submission is that a law declared unconstitutional cannot be treated as void ab initio for the following reasons:
(a) As there is a presumption of constitutionality till a law is declared to contravene the provisions of Part-III or other constitutional limitations, it remains valid;
(b) The expression “to the extent of contravention” implies that there has to be a judicial declaration of contravention and the extent thereof. Till such declaration is made, no law can be treated as void;
(c) If there is no interim stay, the law has to be implemented and all actions taken pending final hearing will not become unlawful;
(d) The word “void” is used 14 times in the Constitution. The use of the word “void” in the context of the Constitution, unlike the Contract Act, only means that a judicial declaration renders a law inoperative or unenforceable;
(e) The Oxford Dictionary defines the word “void” in two ways:
(i) As an adjective, it means that ‘something is not valid or legally binding’; and
(ii) As a verb, it means ‘to declare that (something) is not valid or legally binding’.
(f) A combined reading of Articles 249-251 read with Article 254 of the Constitution shows that the word “void” basically means ‘invalid’ or ‘inoperative’;
(g) The word “void” does not mean “repeal”; a judgment does not amend or alter the statue. It remains in the statute-book but cannot be given effect to.
(h) Part-III includes not only express fundamental rights but several derivative rights. Therefore, it will be incorrect to treat an unconstitutional law as void ab initio.
13.6. The next submission is that an administrative act, unless declared invalid, will continue to have legal effect and actions taken before the law was declared invalid would still remain protected.
13.7. A large number of judgments have been referred for the proposition that declaration of invalidity and consequences that follow are two different aspects and this Court has repeatedly granted relief by protecting the actions taken during pendency of the litigation.
13.8. It is also submitted that a law declared as invalid either on the ground of lack of legislative competence or for violating Part-III of the Constitution or other constitutional limitations would have the same effect. No distinction can be drawn in either of the cases.
13.9. It was next submitted that protection from prosecution has continued from 1969 as it was deemed necessary to ensure proper administrative function by Government officials except for brief periods when this Court had struck down the validity of the relevant clause of the Single Directive in the case of Vineet Narain (supra) and, thereafter, Section 6A of the DSPE Act in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra). Continuously, the legislature has been incorporating provisions in different statutes to continue to extend such protection to Government officials from unnecessary and frivolous criminal prosecutions.
13.10. It was lastly submitted that the doctrines of prospective overruling and the Blackstonian theory do not apply in the present case as no previous decision has been overruled. This is a case of declaring a law as unconstitutional being violative of Part-III of the Constitution.
13.11. In the facts and circumstances, it was submitted that the appeal of Manjit Singh Bali deserves to be allowed.
13.12. Shri Amit Desai, learned Senior Counsel also appearing for the same party made a few submissions. He placed reliance upon two judgments of this Court, namely (i) Mohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab47 and, (ii) Varinder Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh48.
14. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the following questions require consideration:
(i) Whether Section 6A of the DSPE Act is part of procedure or it introduces a conviction or sentence?
47 (2018) 17 SCC 627
48 (2020) 3 SCC 321
CBI v. R.R. KISHORE [VIKRAM NATH, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.26
(ii) Whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution will have any bearing or relevance in the context of declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional?
(iii) The declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional?
15. At the outset, it may be noted that during the course of arguments, it was made clear to the counsels that this Bench would be answering the specific question referred to it and would not be enlarging the scope of the reference made. Although learned counsels and the party in person were allowed to make their submissions and were not checked during the course of the arguments from raising points beyond the scope of the reference in order to enlarge its scope, that would not mean that the Court would deal with all such submissions. It was also made clear that the Bench would not be dealing with the merits of the individual cases and post answering the questions, the matters would be reverted to the regular Bench assigned of such jurisdictions for hearing and disposal.
16. Before commencing to analyse the respective arguments and legal position on the questions so framed, a brief narration of the history of obtaining sanction before launching prosecution may be referred to.
16.1. In 1969, the Central Government issued Single Directive which is a consolidated set of instructions issued to the CBI by various Ministries/ Departments and has been amended from time to time. Directive No.4.7(3) contained instructions regarding modalities of initiating an enquiry or registering a case against certain categories of civil servants and provided for a prior sanction of the Designated Authority to initiate investigation against officers of the Government and public sector undertakings & Nationalized Banks above a certain level. The same reads as follows:
“4.7(3)(i) In regard to any person who is or has been a decision making level officer (Joint Secretary or equivalent of above in the Central government or such officers as are or have been on deputation to a Public Sector Undertaking; officers of the Reserve Bank of India of the level equivalent to Joint Secretary of above in the Central Government, Executive Directors and above of the SEBI and Chairman & Managing Director and Executive Directors and such of the Bank officers who are one level below the Board of Nationalised Banks), there should be prior sanction of the Secretary of the Ministry/Department concerned before SPE takes up any enquiry (PE or RC), including ordering search in respect of them. Without such sanction, no enquiry shall be initiated by the SPE.
(ii) All cases referred to the Administrative Ministries/Departments by CBI for obtaining necessary prior sanction as aforesaid, except those pertaining to any officer of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary, should be disposed of by them preferably within a period of two months of the receipt of such a reference. In respect of the officers of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary to Government, such references should be made by the Director, CBI to the Cabinet Secretary for consideration of a Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary as its Chairman and the Law Secretary and the Secretary (Personnel) as its members. The Committee should dispose of all such references preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by the Cabinet Secretary.
(iii) When there is any difference of opinion between the Director, CBI and the Secretary of the Administrative Ministry/Department in respect of an officer up to the rank of Additional Secretary or equivalent, the matters shall be referred by CBI to Secretary (Personnel) for placement before the Committee referred to in Clause (ii) above. Such a matter should be considered and disposed of by the Committee preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by Secretary (Personnel).
(iv) In regard to any person who is or has been Cabinet Secretary, before SPE takes any step of the kind mentioned in (i) above the case should be submitted to the Prime Minister for orders.”
The validity of the above Single Directive No.4.7(3) was considered in the case of Vineet Narain (supra).
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