Pavana Dibbur v. The Directorate of Enforcement
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1029; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1049
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Pankaj Mithal Headnotes Issue for Consideration: Whether the Off Ence U/S.120b, Justice 2002, Justice 2002 – Paragraph 1 of the Schedule – Penal Code
- Decided
- 29 Nov 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2779/2023
- Sections
- 120B, 3, 482, 2, 120, 45(1), 406, 5, 420, 2(1), 263A, 379
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1049 : 2023 INSC 1029
CASE DETAILS
PAVANA DIBBUR
v.
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
(Criminal Appeal No. 2779 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 29, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND PANKAJ MITHAL, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the offence u/s.120B, IPC included in Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, can be treated as a scheduled offence even if the criminal conspiracy alleged is to commit an offence which is not a part of the Schedule. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Paragraph 1 of the Schedule – Penal Code, 1860 – s.120B – Appellant purchased the first property from Alliance Business School and the second property from accused no.1 against whom an FIR was registered alleging that he collected Rs.107 crores from the students by claiming himself as the Chancellor of the Alliance University – Four FIRs, ECIR registered – Complaint filed against the appellant-accused alleging that she entered into a conspiracy with accused no.1 by getting executed nominal sale deeds in respect of the first and second properties in her name for the benefit of accused no.1 and facilitated him to use her bank accounts to siphon the university funds, assisting him in the activity connected with the proceeds of crime – Petition for quashing the complaint filed by the appellant, dismissed by High Court – Appellant pleaded that out of the four scheduled/predicate offences, chargesheets were filed in the case of three offences wherein only one offence covered by the Schedule to the PMLA was mentioned– It was thus contended that s.120B of IPC alone, in the absence of any other scheduled offence cannot sustain a charge under the PMLA and unless there is an allegation regarding a conspiracy to commit any scheduled offence, the prosecution under the PMLA cannot lie:
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Held: The offence punishable u/s.120B of the IPC will become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is specifically included in the Schedule – In the present case, in the chargesheets filed in the alleged scheduled offences, there is no allegation of the commission of criminal conspiracy to commit any of the offences included in the Schedule – Except for s.120B, IPC, no other offence in the schedule was applied – Therefore, in this case, the scheduled offence does not exist at all – Hence, the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the offences punishable u/s.3, PMLA – Impugned order quashed and set aside – Complaint pending before the Special Court for PMLA cases, Bengaluru quashed as regards the present appellant – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482. [Paras 26, 27] Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.3 – Plea of the appellant that as she was not arraigned as an accused in the chargesheets filed pertaining to the alleged scheduled offences, she cannot be roped in as an accused for the offences punishable u/s.3:
Held: In a given case, if the prosecution for the scheduled offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or discharge of all the accused or the proceedings of the scheduled offence are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled offence will not exist, and therefore, no one can be prosecuted for the offence punishable u/s.3 of the PMLA as there will not be any proceeds of crime – Thus, in such a case, the accused against whom the complaint u/s.3 of the PMLA is filed will benefit from the scheduled offence ending by acquittal or discharge of all the accused – Similarly, he will get the benefit of quashing the proceedings of the scheduled offence – However, an accused in the PMLA case who comes into the picture after the scheduled offence is committed by assisting in the concealment or use of proceeds of crime need not be an accused in the scheduled offence – Such an accused can still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as the scheduled offence exists – An offence u/s.3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed – It is not necessary that a person against whom the offence u/s.3 is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence – Plea of the appellant rejected. [Paras 15, 16] Interpretation of Statutes – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Paragraph 1 of the Schedule – Penal Code, 1860 – s.120B: Held: The penal statutes are required to be strictly construed – The penal laws must be construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment – While giving effect to the legislature’s intention, if two reasonable interpretations can be given to a particular provision of a penal statute, the Court should generally adopt the interpretation that avoids the imposition of penal consequences – A more lenient interpretation of the two needs to be adopted – The legislative intent which can be gathered from the definition of the scheduled offence under clause (y) of sub Section (1) of s.2 of the PMLA is that every crime which may generate proceeds of crime need not be a scheduled offence – Therefore, only certain specific offences have been included in the Schedule – Thus, if the submission of the ED that as s.120B, IPC is included in Part A to the Schedule even if the allegation is of making a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence which is not a part of the Schedule, the offence becomes a scheduled offence, is accepted, the Schedule will become meaningless or redundant – Reason explained – Interpretation suggested by the ED will defeat the legislative object of making only a few selected offences as scheduled offences – If such an interpretation is accepted, the statute may attract the vice of unconstitutionality for being manifestly arbitrary – It cannot be the legislature’s intention to make every offence not included in the Schedule a scheduled offence by applying s.120B – Therefore, the offence u/s.120-B included in Part A of the Schedule will become a scheduled offence only if the criminal conspiracy is to commit any offence already included in Parts A, B or C of the Schedule. [Paras 23-25]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2022) SCC Online SC 929 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.2779 Of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No.3542 of 2022.
PAVANA DIBBUR v. THE DIRECTORATE OF
ENFORCEMENT
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Appearances:
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Ms. Ashima Mandla, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Surya Pratap Singh, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Advs. for the Appellant. S. V. Raju, ASG, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Alka Agarwal, Annam Venktesh, Ms. Sairica Raju, Zoheb Hussain, Advs. for the Respondent. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
OVERVIEW
1. The respondent–the Directorate of Enforcement (for short, ‘ED’), filed a complaint under the second proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the PMLA’) before the Special Court for PMLA Cases at Bengaluru. The appellant–Pavana Dibbur was shown as accused no.6 in the said complaint. By the order dated 17th March 2022, the Special Court took cognisance of the said complaint. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr. PC’) seeking the relief of quashing of the said complaint. By the impugned judgment and order dated 27th September 2022, the petition for quashing the complaint has been dismissed.
2. In the year 2011, Alliance Business School (for short, ‘ABS’) purchased a property bearing Khata no.37/22 at Gollahalli Village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru for the consideration of Rs.13.05 crores. The area of the said property is approximately five acres. For the sake of convenience, we are describing the said property as ‘the First Property’. On 1st July 2013, the appellant purchased the first property from ABS by a registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs.13.5 crores. The accused no.1–Madhukar Angur, purchased a property measuring 4 acres and 0.4 Guntas bearing survey nos.61, 62 and 63 at Karpur Village, Kasaba Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru. For the sake of convenience, we are describing this property as ‘the Second Property’. The appellant purchased the second property by a registered sale deed on 29th June 2019 for a consideration of Rs.2.47 crores from accused no.1–Madhukar Angur.
3. For a period of five years, i.e. from 2010 to 2015, the appellant’s husband–Dr Ayyappa Dore, was the Vice-Chancellor of the Alliance University. The appellant also acted as the Vice-Chancellor of the Alliance University for a brief period. On 11th November 2017, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered on the complaint of the Registrar of the Alliance University against accused no.1–Madhukar Angur, alleging that he collected a sum of Rs.107 crores from the students by claiming himself as the Chancellor of the Alliance University. The allegation was that he collected the said amount between January 2017 and November 2017, which was deposited in the account of Srivari Education Services. Subsequently, crores of rupees were transferred to the account of the accused no.1.
4. An Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) was registered on 16th October 2020 by the ED against accused nos.1, 2 and 3, namely Madhukar Angur, his wife Priyanka Angur and Mr Ravikumar, Partner, Srivari Education Services and other unknown accused alleging the commission of the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA. The ECIR was based on four FIRs, the details of which are as under: Sl.
No.
FIR No. Sections in
FIR
Chargesheet Sections under which the Chargesheet was filed
1. 119 of 2016 (PS Jayaprakash Nagar)
376, 420 and 506 of IPC B-Report filed/ Closure Report filed on 2nd February 2017 Closure Report accepted
2. 730 of 2016 (PS Madiwala)
143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 506 and 120-B of IPC Chargesheet filed on 4th July 2017 in which the appellant is not named as the accused Chargesheet is filed under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 506, 120-B of IPC
3. 52 of 2017 (PS Shankarpura)
506, 504, 143, 149 and 420 of IPC Chargesheet filed on 25th March 2018 in which the appellant is not named as the accused Chargesheet filed under Sections 504, 506, 120-B read with 34 of
IPC
PAVANA DIBBUR v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
4. 188 of 2017 (PS Anekal)
143, 406, 407, 408, 409 and 149 of
IPC
Chargesheet filed on 18th June 2019 in which the appellant is not named as the accused Chargesheet filed under Section 406, 408, 408, 447, 204, 120-B read with 34 of
IPC
5. On 27th September 2021, the ED passed an order under Section 5 of the PMLA attaching first and second properties. A complaint was filed before the adjudicating authority on 13th October 2021, in which the appellant is shown as the fifth defendant.
6. The allegation against the appellant in the complaint filed under the second proviso of Section 45(1) of the PMLA is that she has entered into a conspiracy with accused no.1–Madhukar Angur by getting executed nominal sale deeds in respect of the first and second properties in her name for the benefit of accused no.1. The allegation of the ED is that the appellant facilitated the accused no.1 to use her bank accounts to siphon the university funds, thereby, assisting the accused no.1 in the activity connected with the proceeds of crime. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge relied upon the decision of a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.1.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
7. Ms Meenakshi Arora, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, firstly submitted that the first and second properties are not tainted properties and, therefore, the same are not covered by the definition of “proceeds of crime” under clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the PMLA. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the first property was acquired on 1st July 2013, much prior to the commission of the first scheduled offence. The allegation in the FIR dated 11th November 2017 against accused no.1 is that he collected a sum of about Rs.107 crores from the students between January and November 2017 and transferred 1 (2022) SCC Online SC 929 the said amount to his account. Therefore, the appellant’s acquisition of the first property can never be linked with the proceeds of the crime regarding the scheduled offence. She submitted that regarding the acquisition of the second property, the appellant had her own resources available to acquire the same. The learned senior counsel relied upon an Income Tax Return filed by the appellant under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016, by which she declared a total undisclosed income of Rs.26,42,54,193/-. The appellant paid Rs.11,89,08,385/- towards income tax and penalty on 8th September 2016. The return was filed on 12th September 2016. Therefore, the appellant had a source of money for acquiring the second property for the consideration of Rs.2.47 crores. Both the properties acquired by the appellant had no nexus at all with the proceeds of crime of the scheduled offences. The learned senior counsel pointed out that consideration of Rs.2.47 crores was agreed upon, as it is mentioned in the sale deed that it was a distress sale made by the accused no.1–Madhukar Angur.
8. The second limb of the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that as the appellant has not been arraigned as an accused in the chargesheets filed pertaining to the alleged scheduled offences, she cannot be roped in as an accused for the offences punishable under Section 3 of the PMLA. She relied upon what is held in paragraphs 251 to 253 of the decision of this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary1. She submitted that in the decision, this Court held that if an accused in the scheduled/predicate offence is acquitted/discharged, he cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under the PMLA. She submitted that the appellant’s case stands on a better footing as she was not even shown as an accused in any scheduled/predicate offences. She would, therefore, submit that the cognizance of the crime under the PMLA could not have been taken against the appellant.
9. The third submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that out of the four scheduled/predicate offences, chargesheets have been filed in the case of three offences, and in these chargesheets, only one offence covered by the Schedule to the PMLA has been mentioned, which is Section 120-B of IPC. She pointed out that in FIR no.119 of 2016 and FIR no.52 of 2017, Section 420 of IPC was included. However, in FIR no.119 of 2016, the closure report was filed, and in FIR no.52 of 2017, while filing the chargesheet, Section 420 of IPC was excluded. She contended that PAVANA DIBBUR v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Section 120-B of IPC alone, in the absence of any other scheduled offence, cannot sustain a charge under the PMLA. Unless there is an allegation regarding a conspiracy to commit any scheduled offence, the prosecution under the PMLA cannot lie. Relying upon the proviso to Section 120-A of IPC, the learned senior counsel submitted that an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means, in furtherance of an agreement, committed by any person is a sine qua non for attracting the offence of conspiracy under Section 120-B of IPC. If Section 120-B of IPC can be treated as a standalone offence to attract prosecution under the PMLA, by that logic, a complaint under the PMLA can be filed where the allegation is of criminal conspiracy to commit an offence which is not a scheduled offence. Therefore, she submits that the complaint against the appellant deserves to be quashed.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
10. Shri S.V. Raju, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the ED, submitted that even assuming that the appellant had monetary capacity to acquire the second property, one cannot conclude that the funds siphoned by the accused no.1, which constitute proceeds of crime, were not used by the appellant for acquiring the second property. He submits that this issue can be gone into only at the time of trial. Regarding the second submission, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that a person can be held guilty of the commission of a money laundering offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, even if he is not shown as an accused in the predicate offence. He submitted that it is apparent from the provision of Section 3 of the PMLA that in a given case, a person who is not an accused in the predicate offence can commit the offence of money laundering. Regarding the third submission, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that wherever the legislature intended, it has made a particular offence read with another offence as a scheduled offence. He invited our attention to Paragraphs 4 and 6 of Part A of the Schedule to the PMLA. Referring to Paragraph 11 of the Schedule to the PMLA, he urged that the first four offences in Paragraph 4 and all the offences in Paragraph 6 clearly show the legislature’s intention. He submitted that the schedule must be read as it is, and nothing can be added or subtracted from the Schedule considering the objects of the PMLA. He submitted that the validity of the Schedule has been upheld in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary1. He would, therefore, submit that no interference is called for with the impugned order.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
THE EFFECT OF THE APPELLANT NOT BEING SHOWN AS
AN ACCUSED IN PREDICATE OFFENCE
11. Section 3 of the PMLA reads thus:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.—Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,—
(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:—
(a) concealment; or
(b) possession; or
(c) acquisition; or
(d) use; or
(e) projecting as untainted property; or
(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever;
(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.” On a plain reading of Section 3, unless proceeds of crime exist, there cannot be any money laundering offence. Clause (u) of sub-section PAVANA DIBBUR v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
(1) of Section 2 of the PMLA defines “proceeds of crime”, which reads thus:
“2.Definition – (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad; Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.”
12. Clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the PMLA defines “property” to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained from scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Clause
(u) also clarifies that even the value of any such property will also be the proceeds of crime. Thus, the existence of “proceeds of crime” is sine qua non for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA.
13. Clause (x) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the PMLA defines “schedule”. Clause (y) thereof defines “scheduled offence”, which reads thus: “2. Definition – (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
(y) “scheduled offence” means—
(i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or
(ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is one crore rupees or more; or
(iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.”
14. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary1. In paragraph 253 of the said decision, this Court held thus:
“253. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.”
(underline supplied)
In paragraphs 269 and 270, this Court held thus:
PAVANA DIBBUR v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.