Appaiya v. Andimuthu @ Thangapandi & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 835; [2023] 12 S.C.R. 525
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Being A Registration Copy-Secondary Evidence, Justice 1872 – S. 65(E), Justice 77 and 79 – Registration Act, Justice 1908 – S. 57(5) – Admissibility in Evidence of Certifi ED Copies
- Decided
- 20 Sept 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 14630/2015
- Sections
- 65, 57(5), 74(2), 100, 109, 110, 90, 79, 61, 63, 64, 74
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 12 S.C.R. 525 : 2023 INSC 835
CASE DETAILS
APPAIYA
v.
ANDIMUTHU @ THANGAPANDI & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 14630 of 2015)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2023
[B.R. GAVAI AND C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was correct in holding that owing to the non-production of any document by appellant evincing as to how the sons’ of the seller obtained the suit property in a partition Exhibit A1-registered sale deed whereby the property was sold to the appellant’s vendor, being a registration copy-secondary evidence, could not be admitted in evidence as proof of the contents of its original. Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 65(e), 74, 76, 77 and 79 – Registration Act, 1908 – s. 57(5) – Admissibility in evidence of certified copies in property matters – Certified copy of the sale deed executed in favour of appellant’s vendor-Exhibit A-1, produced by the appellant, if admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of its original document: Held: Certifi ed copy issued thereunder is not a copy of the original document, but is a copy of the registration entry which is itself a copy of the original and is a public document u/s. 74(2) of the Evidence Act and 75(5) thereof, makes it admissible in evidence for proving the contents of its original – Thus, the cumulative effect of the provisions of the Evidence Act and s. 57(5) of the Registration Act would make the certified copy of the sale deed produced as Ext.A1 admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of the said original document – Thus, the finding of the High Court that the certified copy of Ext.A1 owing to the failure in production of the original and proving through an independent witness is inadmissible in evidence, is legally unsustainable – Acceptance of the admissibility of Ext.A1 found in favour 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.
of the appellant by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court was in tune with the provisions – Once the title of appellant’s vendor acquired under Ext.A1 sale deed is established and purchase of the same property by the appellant, under Ext.A5 registered sale deed is upheld by the High Court there was no reason or justifi cation to interfere with the concurrent judgments of the courts below – Since sale deed legally establishes the contents of the original sale deed the same should confer the right over the entire property to the appellant – Thus, no ground to sustain the reversal of the concurrent judgments of the courts below by the High Court in exercise of the power u/s. 100 CPC, as no ground justifying such exercise exists – Judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s. 100. [Paras 21, 29, 33 and 34]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 573:[1999] 1 SCR 1168; Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (D) by LRS v. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (D) & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 404; Lankeshwar Malakar v. R. Deka (2006) 13 SCC 570: [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 895; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179:[2001] 1 SCR 948; SK. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee (2017) 5 SCC 127:[2017] 1 SCR 841; R. Nainar Pillai and Anr. v. Subbiah Pillai 2007 SCC OnLine Mad 457/ (2008) 3 Mad LJ 219 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.14630 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2012 of the High Court of Madras at Madurai in SAMD No.802 of 2004.
Appearances:
S. Mahendran, Adv. for the Appellant.
M. P. Parthiban, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. The captioned appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 17.10.2012 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal (MD) No. 802 of 2004 whereby and whereunder it reversed the concurrent judgments of the courts below decreeing the suit with regard to the title and possession of the entire suit property and confined the plaintiff’s (appellant herein), entitlement to title and possession to 96 cents purchased under Ext. A5 sale deed. To be precise, as per the judgment impugned, the judgment dated 03.07.2001 in A.S.No.65/97 of the Sub-Court, Periyankulam confirming the judgment and decree dated 30.09.1997 in O.S.No.104/96 of the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Andipatti, was set aside to the aforesaid extent. The appellant herein was the plaintiff and the respondent Nos. 1 and 6 were respectively defendant Nos. 3 and 2, in the stated suit. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are the legal representatives of the deceased first defendant. The subject suit was filed seeking declaration that the entire suit property belonged to the plaintiff and for a consequential prayer for permanent injunction against the defendants.
2. The case of the appellant – (plaintiff) in nut-shell, relevant for the purpose of disposal of the appeal, is as follows :- On 09.08.1918, Vellaiya Thevar executed a mortgage deed for the loan availed from Irulappan, the father of appellant’s vendor- Puliyankaladi, in respect of the suit property having an extent of 2 acres and 61 cents comprised in Survey No.845/1 of Thimmanayakanur village in Andipatti Taluk of Madurai District. Default in repayment of loan amount made Puliyankaladi to file O.S. No.519/1928 against sons of Vellaiya Thevar viz., Thavasi Thevar, Kuruppa Thevar, Subbaiah Thevar and Sangu Thevar and it was decreed in favour of Puliyankaladi. In order to satisfy the decree, they sold the property to Puliyankaladi as per Ext. A1 registered sale deed No.1209/1928 dated 27.08.1928. Puliyankaladi, thereafter executed a mortgage deed of the suit property in favour of Veluchamy and Vellamal. On 31.05.1961 he executed another mortgage deed in favour of APPAIYA v. ANDIMUTHU @ THANGAPANDI & ORS.
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.
Veluchamy and Velammal. The said mortgage deeds were redeemed by the appellant (plaintiff) on 24.06.1963. Ultimately, the appellant purchased the suit property from Puliyankaladi and his family members namely, Irulan, Balakrishnan and Balakrishnan’s minor children Senthilkumaran and Backialakshmi on 15.07.1963 as per sale deed No.1759/1963 of SRO, Andipatti. Since then, he has been in its possession and enjoyment. After mutating it in his name in the revenue records he obtained patta and has been paying kist to the government. The defendants are strangers having lands on the southern and northern sides of the suit property. They demanded him to sell the property to them and on being refused they turned inimical to him and started disturbing his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. On 05.06.1994, the defendants along with some others attempted to trespass into his property, but it was thwarted with the help of co-villagers.
3. The first and the third defendants filed written statement in the suit mainly refuting the averment that the entire suit property belonged to Puliyankaladi and contending that it is incorrect and false and therefore, the plaintiff may be put to strict proof. The further case of the defendants was that out of the total extent of the property in Survey No.845/1, 75 cents belonged to Thavasi Andi Thevar, Veluthai Ammal and the first defendant, and son of Thavasi Andi Thevar, Veluthai Ammal and the first defendant executed a registered mortgage deed on 14.09.1961 in favour of Pomminayakkanpatti Palaniammal for Rs. 1000/-. Further, as per sale deed No.2178/1974 of Andipatti Sub-Registry the third defendant purchased 30 cents in Survey No.845/1 and its well, 1/5th Kamalaivari channel and ½ of the Kamalaivari channel on the western side and since then she has been in possession and enjoyment of the said extent. In short, according to them suit was instituted with an ulterior intention to grab the entire property comprised the Survey No.845/1.
4. Based on the pleadings the trial court framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction?
2. Whether the sale of the plaintiff is a forged one?
3. Whether the mortgage deed dated 14.9.198 is genuine?
4. Whether the sale deed dated 13.9.1974 is genuine?
5. Whether the entire suit property is not under the possession of the plaintiff?
6. What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?”
5. Thereafter, an additional issue was framed as under:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration to the suit property?”
6. On the side of the appellant/plaintiff, he got himself examined as PW-1 and Exts.A1 to A8 were marked and on the side of the defendants three witnesses were examined and Exts.B1 to B14 were marked. Exts. C1 to C8 were marked as Court documents. After evaluating the oral and documentary evidence adduced, the trial Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to get declaration that the entire suit property belonged to him and as a consequence, the defendants and their men are to be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff over the suit property and decreed the suit accordingly. Evidently, the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.65 of 1997 filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S.No.104/1996 did not frame any specific point(s) as enjoined under Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter, ‘the CPC’), but observed that the issue to be considered is whether the appeal is to be allowed as prayed for by the appellants therein/defendants 1 and 3. Obviously, additional documents were filed by defendants 1 and 3 and received in evidence as Exts.B15, B16 and B17 by the Lower Appellate Court. Even after appreciating such additional evidence, it found no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial Court and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
7. The unsuccessful defendants filed second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC which culminated in the impugned judgment. The High Court framed three questions as substantial questions of law and after an elaborate consideration, the High Court held all the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellants therein viz., defendant Nos. 1 and 3. As a necessary sequel, the concurrent judgments of the courts below decreeing the suit with regard to the title and possession were set aside to the extent mentioned above and the appeal was accordingly allowed.
8. The appellant/plaintiff assails the judgment of the High Court allowing the Second Appeal as above, on various grounds. The core APPAIYA v. ANDIMUTHU @ THANGAPANDI & ORS.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.
contention of the appellant is that findings of facts concurrently recorded by the Court below are immune from challenge before the High Court in Second Appeal as the First Appellate Court is the final Court on facts. It is true that this position is well-settled. At the same time, this position is not devoid of exceptions. The very decisions relied on by the appellant viz., Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr.1 and Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (D) by LRS v. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (D) & Ors.2 themselves would go to show that it is not an inviolable position of law.
9. The relevant paragraphs relied on by the appellants in those decisions themselves would make it clear that being concurrent findings on facts is no guarantee for an imprimatur from the High Court as under certain situations interference under Section 100, CPC after formulating substantial question (s) of law is permissible.
10. In Vidhyadhar’s case (supra):- “23. The findings of fact concurrently recorded by the trial court as also by the lower appellate court could not have been legally upset by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC unless it was shown that the findings were perverse, being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion.”
In Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane’s case (supra):-
31. From the discussions in the judgment it is clear that the High Court has based its findings on the documentary evidence placed on record and statements made by some witnesses which can be construed as admissions or conclusions. The position is well settled that when the judgment of the final court of fact is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the judgment. The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by courts.
1 (1999) 3 SCC 573
2 (2002) 6 SCC 404
11. In the context of the contentions raised by the appellants relying on the decisions referred (supra) it is only apposite to look into the question, “what is substantial question of law”.
12. In the decision in Lankeshwar Malakar v. R. Deka3, it was held that in order to be substantial question of law, the test is whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly or substantially affects the right of the parties or whether the question is still open i.e., it is not finally settled by the Supreme Court, Federal Court or Privy Council.
13. In fact, in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari4 while exploring the meaning of the phrase “substantial question of law” this Court held: “12. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means — of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with — technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta [AIR 1928 PC 172 : 55 IA 235] , the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench
3 (2006) 13 SCC 570
4 (2001) 3 SCC 179
APPAIYA v. ANDIMUTHU @ THANGAPANDI & ORS.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.
of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad 969] :
“[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand, if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.”
and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:
“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.
13. In Dy. Commr., Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain [AIR 1953 SC 521] also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section 110 of the Code.
14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.”
14. In the decision in SK. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee5, this Court held that when court is called upon to interpret documents and examine their effect, depending upon the nature of controversy and the issues involved, it would constitute substantial question (s) of law.
15. Bearing in mind the aforesaid positions with respect to the exercise of power under Section 100, CPC, we will have to consider whether the reversal of the concurrent judgments of the Court below by the High Court as per the impugned judgment invites interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
16. Obviously, the High Court framed three questions of law, as under:- “1. Whether the courts below are right in law in construing Ex.A.1 sale deed dated 27.08.1928 in favour of Puliyankaladi, the predecessor - in - title of the suit property as alleged by the plaintiff/ respondent contrary to the extent and boundaries described in the said sale deed?
2. Whether the courts below erred in law in presuming that the appellant/ first defendant has admitted the title of the predecessor viz., Puliyankaladi in view of Exs.A.2, A.3, A.4 and other deeds.
3. Whether the courts below have erred in law in casting the burden
5 (2017) 5 SCC 127
APPAIYA v. ANDIMUTHU @ THANGAPANDI & ORS.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.
of proof on the appellants / defendants to prove that the plaintiff is not entitled to the entirety of the suit property in a suit for declaration of title by the plaintiff?”
17. As noted above, the High Court answered all of them in favour of the defendants and consequently reversed the concurrent judgments to the extent noted above. A scanning of the impugned judgment would reveal the main reasons for such reversal as under:-
(i) Exhibit A1, sale deed dated 27.08.1928 (produced as Annexure P1 in this appeal) was executed in favour of Puliyankaladi by the sons of Vellaiya Thevar. However, no document was produced by the plaintiff/the appellants herein, evincing as to how they obtained it under partition so as to have right to alienate it.
(ii) Exhibit A1 would not attract the presumption of genuineness provided under Sections 90 and the presumptive proof of ownership under 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872 for the reason that it is only a registration copy of the registered sale deed dated 27.08.1928 and its genuineness is disputed.Furthermore, in the light of the decision in R. Nainar Pillai and Anr. v. Subbiah Pillai6 to admit such a document in evidence and to presume it as genuine it requires corroboration by an independent witness.
(iii) Exhibits A2, A3 & A4 would not estop under Section 110 of the Evidence Act the appellants therein from disputing the title of the respondent therein - plaintiff as what was dealt with under Exhibit A1 is different from what were dealt with under Exhibits A2 to A4.
(iv) The Courts below did not place reliance on Exhibit B1, certified copy of the sale deed dated 02.07.1977 executed by the appellant’s father and Perumal Nayakkar (mother of the plaintiff) in favour of Pommi Nayakkar to an extent of 52 cents from the suit property which comprised in Survey No.845/1 in Thimmarasanaickanur village, Andipatti Taluk, Madurai District.
6 2007 SCC OnLine Mad 457/ (2008) 3 Mad LJ 219
(v) Vellaiya Thevar was entitled to only 96 cents and therefore in terms of Exhibit A5, the plaintiff (the appellant) is entitled only to 96 cents.
(vi) Both sides have produced kist rasid, chitta and patta.
18. In the light of the reasons that persuaded the High Court to reverse the concurrent judgments, as mentioned above, their sustainability is to be looked into with respect to the positions of law as noted hereinbefore, with respect to the scope of exercise of power under Section 100, CPC and with reference to the relevant provisions under the Evidence Act as also other relevant enactments.
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