Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 532; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 22 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5401/2025
- Sections
- 103, 100, 96
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417 : 2025 INSC 532 Angadi Chandranna v.
Shankar & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025)
22 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The main dispute in the lis is, whether the suit property was ancestral or self-acquired property of defendant no.1. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – ss.96, 100, 103 – Defendant no.1 and his two brothers CT and CE divided the joint family properties under a registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986 – Subsequently, defendant no.1 purchased the suit property from his brother CT by way of registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989 – Thereafter, defendant no.1 sold the suit property to defendant no.2 by way of registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993 – Plaintiffs (sons and daughters of defendant no.1) instituted suit seeking partition and separate possession of suit property – Trial decreed suit in favour of plaintiffs – Defendant no.2 moved a regular appeal – First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court – Aggrieved, plaintiffs filed second regular appeal – The High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court – Correctness:
Held: The High Court can go into findings of facts u/s.103 CPC only under certain circumstances – In the instant case, the so-called substantial question of law framed by the High Court does not qualify to be a substantial question of law, rather the exercise of the High Court is a venture into the findings of the First Appellant Court by re-appreciation of evidence – s.103 permits the High Court to go into the facts only when the courts below have not determined or rendered any finding on a crucial fact, despite evidence already available on record or after deciding the substantial question of law, * Author 1418 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the facts of a particular case demand re-determination – When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law – Therefore, the High Court erred in setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court – On facts, the plaintiffs did not question the partition deed effected among the brothers – After the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties – Hence, the suit property acquired by defendant no.1 became his self-acquired property, on being sold by his brother to him, vide sale deed dated 16.10.1989 – No evidence was let in by the plaintiffs to prove that the other properties allotted to defendant no.1 yielded income and that it was only from that entire income that the suit property was purchased – Taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles enunciated in the earlier decisions, in considered opinion of this Court, defendant no.1 acquired the suit property out of the loan obtained from DW3 and not from the income derived from the nucleus funds or joint family funds, and hence, the suit property should be considered as his self-acquired property – Besides, the High Court erroneously applied the doctrine of blending under the Hindu joint family law by relying upon judgments that are not applicable to the case on hand, re-appreciated evidence without framing any substantial question of law and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs – Thus, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is restored. [Paras 12, 12.1, 18, 19, 19.2, 20] Principles/Doctrines – Doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family – Discussed. [Para 20] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.103 – Discussed.
[Paras 12, 12.1] Case Law Cited Chandrabhan (Deceased) through L.Rs & Ors. v. Saraswati & Ors., 2022 INSC 997 : [2022] 7 SCR 295 : MANU/SC/1224/2022; Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1419Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors. [2019] 13 SCR 152 : (2020) 16 SCC 255; Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh & Ors. [2013] 7 SCR 897 : (2013) 9 SCC 419 – relied on. Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr. [2024] 12 SCR 719 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864; Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs [2019] 4 SCR 1084 : (2019) 7 SCC 641; Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. [2019] 4 SCR 357 : (2019) 20 SCC 633; Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa & Anr. [1961] 3 SCR 779; Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi & Ors. v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama [1964] 2 SCR 172; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar [1987] 1 SCR 516 : (1987) 1 SCC 204; K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganandhan & Ors. [1976] 3 SCR 637 : (1977) 1 SCC 244 – referred to.
R. Deivanai Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 2004 MADRAS 529 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Property; Ancestral Property; Self-acquired property; Joint family property; Sale deed; Partition deed; Partition; Possession; Substantial questions of law; Re-appreciation of evidence; Crucial fact; Income from nucleus fund; Joint family funds; Doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RSA No. 1417 of 2006 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, Sr. Adv., Raghunatha Sethupathy B, K. Paari Vendhan, Ms. Pariksha, Shreehare J.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Nishanth Patil, Ayush P Shah, Vignesh Adithiya S, Arijit Dey. 1420 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the purchaser of a property bearing Sy. No. 93 measuring 7 acres 20 guntas situated at Mahadevapura Village, Parashurampura Hobli, Challakere Taluk 1 . He has come up with the present appeal against the judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru2 in Regular Second Appeal No.1417 of 2006. By the impugned order, the High Court allowed the Regular Second Appeal thereby setting aside the judgment and decree dated 21.02.2006 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Challakere 3 in Regular Appeal No.291 of 2002 and affirming the judgment and decree dated 21.12.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Challakere 4 , in O.S.No.169 of 1994.
3. The appellant herein is Defendant No.2 and the Respondent Nos.1 to 4, who are the sons and daughters of Defendant No.1 (C. Jayaramappa), are the plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the aforesaid suit.
4. Defendant No.1 and his two brothers viz., C. Thippeswamy and C. Eshwarappa, after the death of their father and uncle, who was issueless, divided the joint family properties under a registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986. Subsequently, Defendant No.1 purchased the suit property from his elder brother C. Thippeswamy by way of a registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989. Thereafter, Defendant No.1 sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 by a registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993.
5. When the facts stood thus, the plaintiffs had instituted a suit bearing O.S.No.169 of 1994 before the trial Court seeking partition and 1 For short, “the suit property”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
3 Hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate Court” 4 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1421Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors. separate possession of the suit property. After due trial, the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.12.2001, decreed the suit as prayed for, by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession by metes and bounds through revenue authorities. Challenging the same, Defendant No.2 moved Regular Appeal bearing No.291 of 2002. The First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.02.2006, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed Regular Second Appeal No.1417 of 2006 which was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court was set aside by the High Court, by the judgment and order dated 12.08.2021. Therefore, Defendant No.2 is before us with the present appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant / Defendant No.2, at the outset, contended that the question of law framed by the High Court for adjudication, is a pure question of fact, which cannot be framed or decided while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.5 and Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs 6 .
6.1. According to the learned counsel, the joint family property was partitioned in the year 1986; subsequently, one of the brothers, Thippeswamy, sold his share i.e., the suit property to Defendant No.1 vide registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989; and thereafter, Defendant No.1 sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 vide registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993. The evidence adduced by Defendant No.2 would clearly show that the suit property was purchased by Defendant No.1 using his own funds and loan obtained from DW3 Narasimhamurthy and hence, the same should be considered as self-acquired property of Defendant No.1. As such, at the time of sale, the suit property was no longer a part of joint family property. Considering the said aspect, the First Appellate Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that the suit property was a self-acquired property of Defendant No.1. 5 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864
6 (2019) 7 SCC 641
1422 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
6.2. It is further submitted that after the execution of the sale deed dated 11.03.1993 by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No.2 in respect of the suit property, the plaintiffs, who are the sons and daughters of Defendant No.1, had filed the suit for partition and separate possession, without seeking the relief of cancellation of the said sale deed. Though the trial Court framed an issue, it decided that the said issue does not arise for consideration, as in a suit for partition, there is no necessity to seek a relief of declaration of sale deed executed in favour of third parties as null and void. In this connection, the learned counsel referred to a decision of this court in Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. 7, wherein, it was held that a specific prayer for setting aside the sale deed is mandatory in the suit for declaration and separate possession.
6.3. It is also submitted that the High Court erred in arriving at the finding that Defendant No.1 got the suit property under the will dated 18.12.1978 and the same blended into the joint family properties since then. Whereas, the property received by the Defendant No.1 under the partition deed was different from the suit property and that, the suit property was purchased by him out of his own funds and the loan obtained from DW3 Narasimhamurthy. Hence, the doctrine of blending would not apply to the present case. The legal position in this regard is that the doctrine of blending of self-acquired property into joint family pool would apply only when such self-acquired property is voluntarily thrown into the common stock with intention to abandon separate claim over the same [Refer: Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa & Anr.8 , and Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi & Ors. v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama 9].
6.4. Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.
7 (2019) 20 SCC 633
8 [1961] 3 SCR 779 9 [1964] 2 SCR 172 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1423Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs submitted that the suit property was acquired by Defendant No.1 through a sale deed dated 16.10.1989, for a total consideration of Rs.15,000/- from C. Thippeswamy, using nucleus funds or joint family funds viz., income derived from the land allotted to the share of Defendant No.1 through partition; income derived from doing coolie work; cash of Rs.10,000/- given during partition; and cash given by Mallamma (grandmother of the respondents) by selling her property at Rayadurga and hence, the same should be treated as ancestral property and not self-acquired property.
7.1. It is further submitted that when the partition among the Defendant No.1 and his brothers, came into effect i.e., on 09.05.1986, the plaintiffs were minors and were co-parceners with respect to the properties or amounts that were divided and allotted to Defendant No.1’s share, as the family continued to reside jointly. As such, the plaintiffs have a right over the suit property.
7.2. Referring to Hindu Law by Mulla, the learned counsel submitted that the character of the ancestral property does not change with respect to the sons, even after partition, as it is a settled principle of law that the share that a co-sharer obtains upon the partition of ancestral property, continues to be ancestral for his male issues, who acquire an interest in it by birth, whether they exist at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Therefore, the suit property, which was acquired/purchased by Defendant No.1, remains ancestral property and the plaintiffs have a right over the same. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar10.
7.3. It is also submitted that even assuming but not admitting that joint family property once divided through partition, no longer remains as such and is considered self-acquired, the court must examine the facts and evidence to determine how Defendant No.1 acquired the suit property for Rs.15,000/- in 1989, either using nucleus funds/joint family funds or with a loan obtained from DW.3. According to the learned counsel, there was no
10 (1987) 1 SCC 204
1424 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports reasonable possibility that within a period of just three years, the Defendant No.1 could have accumulated a sum of Rs.15,000/solely by doing coolie work or by cultivating the land allotted to him by way of partition, and acquired the suit property. Further, no convincing and reliable material was produced that Defendant No.1 obtained loan from DW.3. That apart, there were contradictions and inconsistencies in the defendants’ side’s deposition only to suggest that the suit property was acquired using joint family funds. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have successfully discharged their burden by producing sufficient material to establish that the suit property was acquired using joint family funds, and the character of the suit property must still be regarded as ancestral.
7.4. Ultimately, the learned counsel submitted that there is no evidence to show that the suit property was sold for the benefit of the estate. Rather, it shows that Defendant No.1 was in dire need of money to continue his bad habits and not to look after the estate. That apart, the amount received by Defendant No.1 after selling the suit property was never handed over to the plaintiffs for their betterment. Therefore, it is submitted that the suit property was sold without the consent of the plaintiffs and without any legal necessity, making the sale deed void.
7.5. Pointing out the above, the learned counsel submitted that considering all these aspects, both the trial Court and High Court rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and the same do not call for any interference by this court.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record.
9. As evident from the facts, there was a partition deed dated 09.05.1986, among Defendant No.1 and his two brothers in respect of the ancestral properties, after the death of their father, Channappa, who had two wives and three sons through them. ‘A’ schedule property was allotted to C. Thippeswamy (son through the first wife, Mallamma); ‘B’ schedule property was allotted to C. Eshwarappa, (son through the second wife, Parvathamma); ‘C’ schedule property was allotted to Defendant No. 1, (another son through the second wife, Parvathamma); and ‘D’ schedule property was divided into equal shares among Defendant No.1 and his brothers. Subsequently, Defendant No.1 purchased the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1425Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors. suit property, which was allotted to the share of C. Thippeswamy through partition deed dated 09.05.1986 (A-schedule property), by a sale deed dated 16.10.1989 for Rs.15,000/-. Thereafter, he sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 on 11.03.1993 for a sale consideration of Rs.20,000/. It is pertinent to mention here that the suit property is the property allotted to C. Thippeswamy, later purchased by Defendant No.1 and not the property which was received by Defendant No.1 through will.
10. Contending that the suit property was acquired by Defendant No.1 using joint family funds and should therefore be treated as ancestral; he cannot sell it without the consent of the plaintiffs; and plaintiffs 1 and 3, being coparceners of the joint family, have a share in the suit property, while plaintiffs 2 and 4 have a right to maintenance from it, the plaintiffs instituted the suit bearing O.S.No.169 of 1994 for partition and separate possession. The defence raised was that the suit property was self-acquired property of Defendant No.1 and hence, Defendant No.1 has the right to sell it to Defendant No.2. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, PW1 to PW3 were examined and Exs.P1 to P3 were marked; and on the side of the defendants, DW1 to DW4 were examined and Exs.D1 to D10 documents were marked. Upon analysing the same, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, which was reversed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court set aside the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment of the trial Court. Therefore, this appeal came to be filed by the appellant / Defendant No.2.
11. On the basis of the pleadings and submissions made by the parties, the main dispute in the lis is, whether the suit property was ancestral or self-acquired property of Defendant No.1.
12. Before delving into the facts of the case, this court in Jaichand (supra) expressed its anguish at the High Court for not understanding the scope of Section 100 CPC, which limits intervention only to cases where a substantial question of law exists, and clarified that the High Court can go into the findings of facts under Section 103 CPC only under certain circumstances, as stated in the following passages: “23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in which the High Court framed the so-called substantial question of law. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be 1426 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports termed even a question of law far from being a substantial question of law. How many times the Apex Court should keep explaining the scope of a second appeal Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and how a substantial question of law should be framed? We may once again explain the well-settled principles governing the scope of a second appeal Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in MANU/ SC/2077/1996 : 1998: INSC: 349 : AIR 1996 S.C. 3521, it was held by this Court that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach another possible view in order to set aside the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court.
25. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait reported in MANU/SC/0647/1997 : 1997:INSC:487 : (1997) 5 S.C.C. 438), this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not mere question of law.
26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor reported in MANU/SC/0058/1999 : 1999 (2) S.C.C. 471, this Court held:
Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction Under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. A judgment rendered by the High Court Under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained.
27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar reported in MANU/SC/0278/1999 : 1999:INSC:192 : AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 held:
The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1427Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors. erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.
28. It is thus clear that Under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.
29. The High Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with the findings of the trial Court on the ground of failure on the part of the trial as well as the first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such findings are either recorded without proper construction of the documents or failure to follow the decisions of this Court and acted on assumption not supported by evidence. Under Section 103, Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court has got power to determine the issue of fact. The Section lays down:
Power of High Court to determine issue of fact: In any Second Appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient to determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,-
(a) Which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or
(b) Which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.
30. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh reported in MANU/ SC/0094/1993 : AIR 1993 S.C. 398, this Court held:
The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court which was the final court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration 1428 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of admissible evidence of vital nature. But, after setting aside the findings of fact on that ground the Court had either to remand the matter to the first appellate Court for a rehearing of the first appeal and decision in accordance with law after taking into consideration the entire relevant evidence on the records, or in the alternative to decide the case finally in accordance with the provisions of Section 103(b). ...... If in an appropriate case the High Court decides to follow the second course, it must hear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on the records relevant to the issue in question and this is possible if only a proper paper book is prepared for hearing of facts and notice is given to the parties. The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the court below is vitiated in law does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged.
31. In the case of Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal reported in MANU/SC/2774/2006 : 2006:INSC:305 : (2006) 5 SCC 545 this Court explained the concept in the following words: It must be tested whether the question is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties.
Or whether it is not finally decided, or not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.
If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.
32. It is not that the High Courts are not well-versed with the principles governing Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only the casual and callous approach on the part of the courts to apply the correct principles of law to the facts of the case that leads to passing of vulnerable orders like the one on hand.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1429Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
12.1. In the present case, in our view, the so-called substantial question of law framed by the High Court does not qualify to be a substantial question of law, rather the exercise of the High Court is a venture into the findings of the First Appellant Court by re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that the High Court can go into the findings of facts only if the First Appellate Court has failed to look into the law or evidence or considered inadmissible evidence or without evidence. Section 103 permits the High Court to go into the facts only when the courts below have not determined or rendered any finding on a crucial fact, despite evidence already available on record or after deciding the substantial question of law, the facts of a particular case demand re-determination. For the second limb of Section 103 to apply, there must first be a decision on the substantial question of law, to which the facts must be applied, to determine the issue in dispute. When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law. When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one. It will be useful to refer to another judgment of this Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through L.Rs & Ors. v. Saraswati & Ors.11, wherein it was held as follows:
“33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant for this case may be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question 11 2022 INSC 997 : MANU/SC/1224/2022 1430 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.
(iii) The general Rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or
(iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.
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