State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 334; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 598
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 6 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2350/2025
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334 State of Assam & Ors.
v.
Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No.2350 of 2025)
07 March 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with the decision made by the Government to cancel the select list; Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list was either vulnerable on application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or suspect applying the doctrine of proportionality and, therefore, liable to invalidation; Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights of the respondents for which a writ petition u/Art.226 of the Constitution could be maintained.
Headnotes† Service Law – Selection – Cancellation of select list – An advertisement was issued in the year 2014 to fill up 104 posts of constables in Assam Forest Protection Force – Process of selection was conducted in the year 2016 – Thereafter, there was a change in political regime – The incumbent PCCF noted serious anomalies in the selection process – Based on such note, the Government cancelled the select list – Subsequent thereto, a fresh advertisement dated 14.04.2017 was issued – Two sets of writ petitions were filed – The first writ petition challenged the decision of cancellation of the select list and the other writ petition challenged the advertisement dated 14.04.2017 – The Single Judge of the High Court allowed first of the two writ petitions and held that the irregularities from which the select list allegedly suffered can be rectified – The said decision was upheld by the Division Bench of High Court – Correctness:
Held: It is true that the law does not postulate a fetter on the authority of the employer-State and it is within the domain of the * Author [2025] 3 S.C.R. 599State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors. Government when to initiate a process of recruitment for public employment, either according to recruitment rules or even in the absence thereof, it is for the Government of the day to decide in which manner it proposes to conduct selection, what would be the various stages the candidates aspiring for appointment have to pass through in order to be placed in the select list, who would be the selectors, and how weightage is to be given to each of the testing methods, a great deal of credence is lent to a process if it is fairly and transparently conducted in accordance with rules, whatever be its source, without the slightest hint of any bias or favouritism or nepotism – Normally, it is not for the courts to interfere unless the process smacks of mala fides – The facts presented evince that it is the successor Government that had taken an informed decision not to proceed with the earlier process and to start a new process – At that stage of decision making, possibly, three options were available to the Government, being –
(i) allow the process to be taken to its logical conclusion, without being unduly bothered by the illegalities/irregularities detected and referred to by the PCCF; (ii) cancel the entire process and start it anew; and (iii) separate the grain from the chaff and to proceed with the former and complete the process – Once the Government arrived at the decision considering the illegalities/ irregularities detected by the PCCF that the process ought to be started afresh and preferred the second option to the first and third options, thereby cancelling the previous process, the High Court ought to have applied the proportionality test to adjudge whether the perfect balance was struck by preferring that option out of the other available options – Such test was not applied by the High Court – The larger public interest that the successor Government had in mind was not kept in view by the single Judge of the High Court – The decision to cancel the select list has the marks etched to proceed towards such commitment and achieving the greater good – Such a noble initiative was, by no means, open to scrutiny by the judicial review court – This Court, thus, unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that based on the note of the PCCF dated 04.07.2016 and the recommendation made by him for cancellation of the select list, the decision of the Government to approve the said note and, thereby, cancel the select list did not stand vitiated to attract its invalidation either by application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or proportionality. [Paras 35, 37, 39, 45] 600 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Constitution of India – Art.226 – Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights of the respondents for which a writ petition u/Art.226 of the Constitution could be maintained:
Held: Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a policy decision – The law is clear that the policy decision not to carry the process forward must be taken bona fide, there has to be justifiable reason if the process is abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker – A writ court may, upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner and make such directions as the facts and circumstances warrant – This Court, therefore, do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting achievement of their goals to secure public employment – Whether, and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend on the facts of each case – On facts and in the circumstances, however, the respondents’ legal rights were not infringed because of absence of grant of legitimacy to the select list by way of an approval from the Government. [Paras 54, 55] Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness – Doctrine of proportionality – discussed. Case Law Cited Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [1991] 2 SCR 567 : (1991) 3 SCC 47; B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 SCR 682: AIR 1966 SC 1942 – followed.
Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 474 : (2000) 7 SCC 719; Anamica Mishra v. UPPSC [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 124 : (1990) Supp SCC 692; Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U., Puthuvalnikathu [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 883 : (2003) 7 SCC 285; Sachin Kumar v. Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board & Ors. [2021] 2 SCR 1073 : (2021) 4 SCC 631 – relied on.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commission [1978] 2 SCR 272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana [2007] 13 SCR 98 : (2008) 2 SCC 161; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha [1974] 1 SCR 165 : (1974) 3 SCC 220; Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 816 : [2025] 3 S.C.R. 601State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors. 1993 Supp. 2 SCC 600; All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar (2010) 6 SCC 614; Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India [1979] 2 SCR 953 : (1979) 3 SCC 165; R.S. Mittal v. Union of India [1995] 2 SCR 1127 : 1995 Supp. 2 SCC 230; Dinesh Kumar Kashyap v. South East Central Railway [2018] 14 SCR 947: (2019) 12 SCC 798 – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Service Law; Selection; Cancellation of select list; Doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness; Doctrine of proportionality; Assam Forest Protection Force; Article 226 of Constitution of India; Legal Rights; Policy decision; Recruitment for public employment. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2350 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2021 of the Gauhati High Court in WA No. 102 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Sr. A.A.G., Ms. Diksha Rai, Piyush Vyas, Ms. Purvat Wali, Vijay Deora, Irfan Hasieb, Krishnajyoti Deka. Adv. for the Respondents:
Manish Goswami, Sr. Adv., Priyank Adhyaru, Priyonkoo Gogoi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
Facts
1. A process of recruitment was set in motion by the office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest & Head of Forest Force, 602 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Assam,1 Government of Assam, by issuing an advertisement dated 23 rd July, 2014 to fill up of 104 posts of Constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force. 2
2. Process of selection was conducted in May, 2016. The respondents, who had applied pursuant to the advertisement, participated in the process. They qualified in the physical efficiency test,3 whereafter they were interviewed. It was claimed by the respondents that the select list prepared by the Central Selection Committee, headed by the then PCCF, contained names of candidates found, prima facie, fit for selection and appointment as Constables in the AFPF and that such list, wherein their names figured, had been submitted to the Government for approval.
3. In May, 2016 itself, there was a change in the political regime of Assam pursuant to the elections held to the Assam Legislative Assembly.
4. On 4 th July, 2016, the incumbent PCCF submitted a note to the Government highlighting serious anomalies that had crept in, in the selection process. Based on such note of the PCCF but without conducting any inquiry, as alleged by the respondents, the Government approved cancellation of the select list vide order of the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Environment and Forests Department dated 18 th July, 2016. The sole reason assigned for such cancellation was that the process had been conducted in violation of the reservation policy as well as judgments of this Court, as suggested by the PCCF.
5. On 17 th August, 2016, a notice was published from the office of the PCCF in a daily newspaper informing all concerned of cancellation of the select list. It was conveyed that further action to be taken in the matter of recruitment of constables in the AFPF would be notified in due course.
6. Subsequent thereto, a fresh advertisement dated 14th April, 2017 was issued.
1 PCCF
2 AFPF
3 PET
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 603State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
7. Two sets of writ petitions 4 were instituted in the Gauhati High Court. 5 The first writ petition challenged the decision of cancellation of the select list and the notice dated 17 th August, 2016. The other writ petition challenged the advertisement dated 14 th April, 2017. Notice was issued on the first writ petition on 28 th April, 2017. In course of hearing, a single Judge was informed that the advertisement dated 14 th April, 2017 pertains to appointment of 132 constables. Such advertisement was different from the 104 posts, which formed the subject matter of the first writ petition. Considering the same, interim stay of the advertisement dated 14 th April, 2017 was not granted. the judgments oF the high court
8. Vide judgment and order dated 7 th May, 2019, the single Judge allowed the first of the two writ petitions, referred to above, holding, inter alia, that the irregularities from which the select list allegedly suffered can be rectified without disturbing the selection process by refixing or reallocating the candidates in accordance with merit, category and status by giving due notice to those who are likely to be adversely affected. The single Judge was also of the view that the chaff could be separated from the grain without much difficulty and, therefore, the decision to view the entire selection process as vitiated, leading to cancellation of the select list, is untenable.
9. The appellants carried the judgment and order dated 7 th May, 2019 in an intra-court appeal.
10. An Hon’ble Division Bench 6 of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 8 th October, 2021, upheld the view taken by the single Judge and dismissed the writ appeal. The Division Bench was of the view that prior to cancellation of the select list, no finding of fact had been arrived at pursuant to an inquiry conducted by any duly constituted inquiry committee and consequently, the veracity of the irregularities or illegalities alleged had not been ascertained and that the note of the then PCCF dated 4 th July, 2016, which highlighted the anomalies, could not have been treated to be definitive finding of fact arrived at by the Government warranting cancellation of the selection 4 W.P. (C) 4532 of 2016 and W.P. (C) 2428 of 2017 5 High Court 6 Division Bench 604 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports list. A view was also expressed therein that the irregularities could have been rectified and the process taken to a logical conclusion. the challenge
11. The judgment and order of the Division Bench is the subject matter of assail in this civil appeal, by special leave, at the instance of the State of Assam and its officers.
the notice issuing order
12. We have noted that the notice issuing order dated 1 st August, 2022 recorded that the co-ordinate bench was apprised of no written examination being conducted and that the selection was made on the basis of interview alone preceded by a physical test, which was a qualifying test for appearing in the interview. It was also noted that out of 104 selected candidates, 64 belonged to Kamrup (Metro) and Kamrup (Rural) districts and that not a single candidate had been selected from as many as 16 districts. Concerned thereby, the co-ordinate bench granted stay of operation of the judgment and order under assail till the next date of hearing.
appellants ’ contentions
13. Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned senior counsel and Additional Advocate General for the appellants, contended that the writ petition should not have been entertained in the first place by the single Judge. According to him, neither did the empanelled candidates have any indefeasible right of appointment against the existing vacancies nor was the Government under any obligation to fill up the vacancies. Inclusion of the names of the respondents in the select list was at best a condition of eligibility without creating any vested right of appointment; hence, such inclusion by itself did not confer upon them the right to invoke the writ jurisdiction and seek certiorari to set aside the decision to cancel the process as well as for mandamus to take the process forward. The Government was well within its right to cancel the process, for, serious irregularities had crept in tainting the process. In such circumstances, the Government being the sole judge of facts, its decision demanded deference rather than being quashed on the ground that the irregularities were curable. Heavy reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in [2025] 3 S.C.R. 605State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors. Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 7 in support of the contention that the High Court – both single Judge and the Division Bench – fell in error in making the directions it did.
14. It was also contended that apart from the fact that the respondents lacked any legal right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, bare perusal of the note of the PCCF would reveal that sufficient justification was provided in support of the proposed cancellation of the select list. The said note having been approved by the Government, led to issuance of the notice dated 17 th August, 2016. However, the single Judge without even considering as to whether the decision of the Government did suffer from any of the vices attracting judicial review, proceeded to make directions which normally would be within the province of an appellate authority but certainly not a judicial review court.
15. Insofar as the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench is concerned, Mr. Sharma contended that the note of the PCCF was based on meticulous examination of the records and without there being any material placed by the respondents before the High Court to suggest that the PCCF had ignored relevant and germane material or had considered extraneous material, the intra-court appeal ought not to have been dismissed on the ground that no inquiry was conducted to ascertain whether the claims made in the said note were correct.
16. Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Sharma prayed that the appeal be allowed and the appellants be permitted to start the process afresh.
respondents ’ contentions
17. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Manish Goswami, learned senior counsel contended as follows:
(i) The order dated 18 th July, 2016 and the notice published in the newspaper dated 17 th August, 2016 would make it evident that the only reason weighing with the Government for cancellation was violation of the reservation policy and violation of judgments of this Court. Therefore, the appellants cannot now be permitted
7 (1991) 3 SCC 47
606 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports to improve their case by pleadings etc., and urge new reasons justifying the cancellation. The appellants misled this Court while obtaining the notice issuing order dated 1 st August, 2022.
(ii) No rules were violated in preparation of the select list since no rules had been framed to govern the selection process and none was in operation at the relevant point of time, which is an admitted position.
(iii) Cancellation of the process was based solely on the note dated 4 th July, 2016 of the PCCF and no inquiry was ever conducted into the alleged anomalies. On this ground alone, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
(iv) No challenge was laid to the select list by any unsuccessful candidate alleging corrupt practice and/or fraudulent activity having been resorted to by the selected candidates including the respondents and the selection process was free from any taint.
(v) Assuming, but not admitting, that there was some violation of the reservation policy, even then the same was limited to only 34 selected candidates. This is evident from the averment of the appellants before the High Court; hence, there was absolutely no justification to cancel the entire select list containing names of 104 persons. The impugned decision to cancel the select list is hit by the doctrine of proportionality.
(vi) Both the single Judge as well as the Division Bench was correct in returning findings that the alleged violation of the reservation policy was a curable defect and could be rectified by the authorities without disturbing the selection process by re-fixing or reallocating the candidates in accordance to their merit, category and status by giving due notice to those who are likely to be adversely affected.
18. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was placed by Mr. Goswami on the following decisions of this Court:
(i) Anamica Mishra v. UPPSC ; 8
(ii) Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U., Puthuvalnikathu;9 8 (1990) Supp. SCC 692
9 (2003) 7 SCC 285
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 607State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
(iii) Sachin Kumar v. Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board & Ors.;10 and
(iv) Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commission.11
19. Mr. Goswami finally urged that in view of the foregoing contentions raised by him, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. He also prayed that this Court may be pleased, in addition, to order that the directions passed by the single Judge, as affirmed by the Division Bench, be implemented by the appellants without any further delay. Questions arising For decision
20. The broad question of law arising for decision in the light of the judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court is:
Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with the decision to cancel the select list and to require the process to be carried forward in the manner directed by it?
Answering the aforesaid question would also require us to notice the grounds based whereon the appellants cancelled the select list. Thus, we have to necessarily answer two other questions:
(a) whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list was either vulnerable on application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or suspect applying the doctrine of proportionality and, therefore, liable to invalidation?
(b) Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights of the respondents for which a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be maintained?
One incidental question arising for decision is, whether the appellants have urged new grounds to support the cancellation in addition to those assigned earlier in any affidavit/pleading?
The final question is, what would be the just relief that can be granted to the parties to this civil appeal?
10 (2021) 4 SCC 631
11 (1978) 1 SCC 405
608 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports analysis and reasons
21. We have perused the judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court and given due consideration to the contentions advanced by the parties.
22. It would be profitable to note the precedents in the field having a bearing on the questions arising for decision in the appeal, before we venture to answer the questions formulated above. In our view, these could provide valuable guidance to steer us towards the right direction.
23. In State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha,12 this Court held that the mere fact of certain candidates being selected for appointment to vacancies pursuant to an advertisement did not confer any right to be appointed on the post in question and thereby, entitle the selectees to a writ of mandamus or any other writ compelling the authority to make the appointment.
24. The Constitution Bench in Shankarsan Dash (supra) considered the aforesaid decision and, taking cue from it, held that: “7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. …”
25. Close on the heels of the above decision, a three-Judge Bench in Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana13 had the occasion to observe:
12 (1974) 3 SCC 220
13 (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 600 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 609State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors. “7. It will thus be seen that at the time when the writ petition which has given rise to the present proceedings was filed, the State Government had withdrawn the aforesaid two notifications by the notification dated December 30, 1991. The stage at which the last-mentioned notification came to be issued was the stage when the HPSC was still in the process of selecting candidates for appointment by special recruitment. During the pendency of the present proceedings the State Government finalised the criteria for special recruitment by the notification of March 9, 1992. Thus, the HPSC was still in the process of selecting candidates and had yet not completed and finalised the select list nor had it forwarded the same to the State Government for implementation. The candidates, therefore, did not have any right to appointment. There was, therefore, no question of the High Court granting a mandamus or any other writ of the type sought by the appellants. The law in this behalf appears to be well settled. ….”
26. Having noticed the decisions on the point as to the rights that aspiring candidates have, we move on to notice a decision which is not only on the point of right of a selected candidate to seek appointment through writ remedy but also dwells with decisions of subsequent Governments upsetting the decisions of earlier Governments.
27. One finds an extensive discussion on the tests required to be satisfied to invalidate a decision of a subsequent Government, nullifying a previous Government decision, in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana.14 The case involved suspension of the process of selection by the Government because, inter alia, the cadre strength was found to be unjustly inflated by the previous Government. The appellants before this Court indisputably were the selected candidates and the principal question arising for decision, in the given facts and circumstances, was whether they had a legal right to be appointed. This Court held, “the legal principle obtaining herein is not in dispute that the selectees do not have any legal right of appointment subject, inter alia, to bona fide action on the part of the State”. Noticing the decisions in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra), Shankarsan Dash
14 (2008) 2 SCC 161
610 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports (supra) as well as other decisions on the point, this Court further held that whereas the selectee as such has no legal right, the superior court in exercise of its judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance of any writ in the absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide or arbitrariness on the part of the authority, and each case has to be considered on its own merit. Examining the point as to whether the impugned action of the respondent-State lacked bona fide, this Court answered in the negative. Finally, this is what was observed: “55. We are not oblivious of the constitutional scheme that the decisions taken by one Government in public interest itself cannot be a ground for review thereof at the hands of the successor Government. It is not the Government which is in the seat of the power, matters in this behalf, but what matters is the public interest.
56. Mr Dwivedi has drawn our attention to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organisation [(2006) 4 SCC 683] wherein it was held:
(SCC pp. 708-09, para 66)
‘66. Taking an overall view of the matter, it appears that there could hardly be a dispute that the Project is a mega project which is in the larger public interest of the State of Karnataka and merely because there was a change in the Government, there was no necessity for reviewing all decisions taken by the previous Government, which is what appears to have happened. That such an action cannot be taken every time there is a change of Government has been clearly laid down in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [(2004) 4 SCC 714] and in State of Haryana v. State of Punjab [(2002) 2 SCC 507] where this Court observed thus:
‘[I]n the matter of governance of a State or in the matter of execution of a decision taken by a previous Government, on the basis of a consensus arrived at, which does not involve any political philosophy, the succeeding Government must be held duty-bound to continue and carry on the unfinished job rather than putting a stop to the same.’ [2025] 3 S.C.R. 611State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
57. There cannot be any doubt in regard to the aforementioned proposition of law but the question herein is whether public interest would be subserved by asking the State to proceed to make appointments. Whereas, on the one hand, an action on the part of the State to interfere with the good work done by the previous Government solely on the basis of change in the regime must be deprecated, there cannot however be any doubt whatsoever that the successor Government cannot blink over the illegalities committed by the previous Government. If illegalities have been committed, the same should be rectified. When there exists a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the State, having regard to the overall situation including the post-haste manner in which actions had been taken, to cause an inquiry to be made and suspend the process of making appointments till the result of such inquiry is obtained, such a decision on its part per se cannot be said to be an act of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.”
28. It has not escaped our notice that the decision in Jitendra Kumar (supra) has been doubted in All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar15 on the point as to whether Wednesbury unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. The facts in K. Shyam Kumar (supra) bear close resemblance to the facts of the present appeal and, thus, may be noticed. Therein, the Railway Recruitment Board (RRB) had called for applications for appointments on Group D posts in the South-Central Railway Zone, Secunderabad. Consequently, in excess of three lakh candidates appeared for the written examination. Of them, ten short of two thousand seven hundred candidates having achieved the minimum qualifying marks in the written examination, were called for a PET. Candidates who qualified in the PET were called for verification, during which certain malpractices were detected in the written examination. Additionally, there was a deluge of allegations of mass copying, question paper leakage, and impersonation committed during the written examination. A vigilance enquiry was conducted and the report prima facie revealed these abovementioned illegalities. Relying on the vigilance report, the RRB decided to conduct a re-test
15 (2010) 6 SCC 614
612 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of the candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks in the written examination. This decision was challenged by some candidates before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad. The tribunal did not find any irregularity or illegality with the decision of the RRB, due to which the candidates were constrained to move the High Court. Before the High Court, the candidates termed the decision of the RRB as arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court agreed with the candidates and set aside the order directing the retest as, in the High Court’s opinion, the decision was unreasonable and violative of the Wednesbury principles. The RRB approached this Court in appeal. In the resultant decision, this Court while reversing the decision of the High Court discussed the scope of both the unreasonableness test as well as the proportionality test. It was held that the unreasonableness test looks, not necessarily at the merits of the decision, but the way the decision was made; the available courses of action of the deciding authority are scrutinised to ascertain what a reasonable man would do. On the other hand, the proportionality test is more wide reaching in its approach, closely analysing the course of action vis-à-vis the situation requiring a remedy. Hon’ble K.S.P. Radhakrishnan, J. explained the interplay between these two tests as follows:
“36. Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral or ethical standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to ‘assess the balance or equation’ struck by the decision-maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is also described as the ‘least injurious means’ or ‘minimal impairment’ test so as to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual rights and public interest. Suffice it to say that there has been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and structure, it is difficult to compartmentalise or lay down a straitjacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met with its death knell is too tall a statement...”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 613State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors. Keeping in mind these two tests, this Court noticed that the RRB had three courses of action once the irregularities had been brought to light. The first option was to conduct the written examination again for all the eligible candidates, which would be expensive and time consuming. The second option was to conduct re-test for the candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks. The third option would have been to exclude the sixty-two candidates who were identified as having indulged in impersonation. The RRB, relying on the vigilance report, held that there were allegations and prima facie evidence of mass copying as well as leakage of question papers and these irregularities could not be tackled by just excluding the sixty-two candidates accused of impersonation. This Court held that the actions of the RRB to conduct the re-test for candidates who obtained the minimum qualifying marks struck the right balance, as the first option would have been too expensive and time consuming and the third option would have been too restrictive in combatting the irregularities in the examination.
29. The decision in K. Shyam Kumar (supra) further sheds light on another aspect, that is, whether the authority can rely on subsequent information to justify its decision. In the process, the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) was distinguished in the following manner:
“45. …The principle laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill case is not applicable where larger public interest is involved and in such situations, additional grounds can be looked into to examine the validity of an order. The finding recorded by the High Court that the report of CBI cannot be looked into to examine the validity of the order dated 4-6-2004, cannot be sustained.”
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