The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 412; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1254
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 28 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4480/2025
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1254 : 2025 INSC 412 The State of Jharkhand & Ors.
v.
Rukma Kesh Mishra (Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2025)
28 March 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the order by which the respondent-civil servant was dismissed from service, following disciplinary proceedings, should have been interdicted by the High Court on the ground that the charge-sheet had not been approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand.
Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.311 – Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State – Authority to issue chargesheet or initiate disciplinary proceedings against the government servant – Respondent-civil service officer, indulged in diverse activities constituting misconduct – Deputy Commissioner seeking approval of initiation of disciplinary proceedings along with draft charge-sheet, placed the proposals before the Chief Minister – Proposals approved by the Chief Minister and suspension of the respondent – Issuance of charge-sheet and conduct of the departmental inquiry, and thereafter, the respondent dismissed from service – Respondent then filed writ petition challenging the order of dismissal on the ground of absence of approval by the Chief Minister at or about the time of issuance of the charge-sheet, allowed by the High Court-Division Bench upheld the same – Sustainability:
Held: Unless the relevant rules applicable to an officer/employee of an authority so require, disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge-sheet cannot be faulted solely on the ground that Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority has not issued the same or approved it – On facts, no infirmity in initiation of disciplinary * Author [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1255The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra proceedings – Chief Minister himself having approved initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, question of absence of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister separately was a non-issue – Any officer holding a rank subordinate to the respondent’s appointing authority but superior in rank than the respondent could have issued the charge-sheet – Disciplinary proceedings was initiated against the respondent having the approval of the Chief Minister – Draft charge-sheet was part of the proposal – Once the draft charge-sheet was on record before the Chief Minister, approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings should have been read as including the Chief Minister’s assent not only to the draft charge-sheet, as drawn up, but also to the other proposals to suspend the respondent as well as appointment of an inquiry officer and presenting officer – Also, no procedure of placing the matter before the Chief Minister is shown to have been breached – According approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent did amount to approval of the draft charge-sheet – Single Judge committed grave miscarriage of justice in interfering with the order of dismissal and the Division Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed to same justice – Orders by the courts below fundamentally incorrect and patently illegal and are set aside – Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 – r.55 – Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 2016 – rr. 16, 17. [Paras 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 39, 40, 43] Service law – Disciplinary proceedings – ‘Draw up’ and ‘cause to draw up’ the charge sheet signifying initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer/employee found to be delinquent – Meaning:
Held: Disciplinary Authority is mandated by the law to ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to be drawn up’ the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior as a definite and distinct article of charge together with the statement of such imputations – Phrases ‘draw up’ and ‘cause to be drawn up’ do have different meanings in the context of disciplinary proceedings, though both relate to drawing up of a charge-sheet – By ‘draw up’, what is express is that the Disciplinary Authority itself is responsible for preparing the substance of imputation and the statement of allegations, whereas ‘cause to be drawn up’ would enable the Disciplinary Authority 1256 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to instruct or direct someone else to prepare the substance and statement – Effect is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may not prepare the document but rather delegate the task to someone else – If the delegation is proved to have been made in favour of an authority holding an office superior to that of the officer/employee proposed to be proceeded against, nothing much is required to be done and the courts ought to exercise restraint. [Para 36] Constitution of India – Art.141 – Precedents – Reliance by the courts:
Held: Whenever a precedent is cited laying down a principle of law having application to the facts of the case in hand and having binding effect, it is customary and expected of courts to be bound by the law declared by this Court u/Art.141 – However, the courts are free not to place blind reliance on whatever precedent is cited by the parties since facts of two cases are not seldom alike – It is the duty of the court, if it considers the precedent not to be applicable, to refer to factual dissimilarities that are found and thereafter to distinguish the precedent cited before it by assigning brief but cogent reasons. [Para 35] Constitution of India – Art.311 – Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State – Safeguards for civil servants from dismissal: Held: Member of the civil service of the State, can legitimately claim that the safeguards enshrined in Art.311 be scrupulously followed prior to ordering his dismissal including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner required by the relevant law – Sole safeguard provided by Art.311 to any member of a civil service/holder of a civil post is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed – Clause 1 of Art.311 does not require that the disciplinary proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing authority. [Paras 19, 33] Doctrines/principles – Stare decisis et non queta movere – Meaning:
Held: Means that to stand by what has been decided and do not disturb what has been settled – While courts are not restrained [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1257The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra by any principle of law from expressing a different view on a point of law or to distinguish precedents, stare decisis need not be disregarded to unsettle settled positions. [Para 26] Case Law Cited Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2006] Supp. 9 SCR 257 : (2006) 12 SCC 28; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh [1970] 3 SCR 302 : (1970) 1 SCC 108; P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 503 : (1993) 1 SCC 419 – relied on.
Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath [2013] 14 SCR 185 : (2014) 1 SCC 351; State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IAS (2018) 17 SCC 677 – distinguished.
Transport Commissioner v. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy (1995) 1 SCC 332; Inspector General of Police v. Thavasippan [1996] 1 SCR 977 : (1996) 2 SCC 145; Government of Tamil Nadu v. S. Vel Raj [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 452 : (1997) 2 SCC 708; Commissioner of Police v. Jayasurian (1997) 6 SCC 75; Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India v. Pawan Kumar Dubey [1976] 3 SCR 540 : (1976) 3 SCC 334 – referred to.
List of Acts Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930; Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 2016; Right to Information Act, 2005; Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Dismissal; Misconduct; Disciplinary proceedings; Stare decisis et non queta movere; Stare decisis; ‘Draw up’; ‘Cause to be drawn up’; Approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings; Failure of justice; Charge-sheet; Chief Minister of Jharkhand; Civil service officer; Misconduct; Writ jurisdiction; Precedents.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2023 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No. 572 of 2023 1258 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Anirudh Sharma, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Venkat Narayan.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Shiv Ram Pandey, Mrs. Sandhya Pandey, Dr. Kishor Shankar Dere, Mrs. Amita Agarwal, Madan Lal Daga, Man Singh Chouhan, Amarjeet Sahani, Dr. Sunil Kumar Agarwal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
The A ppeAl
2. Appellants - the State of Jharkhand and three of its officers – assail the judgment and order dated 24th November, 2023 1 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi 2 in this civil appeal. By the impugned order, the Division Bench dismissed an intra-court appeal 3 carried by the appellants from the judgment and order dated 20 th April, 2023 of a Single Judge, allowing a writ petition 4 instituted by the respondent - Rukma Kesh Mishra.
The QuesTion
3. We are tasked to decide a solitary legal question: whether the order by which the respondent was dismissed from service, following disciplinary proceedings, should have been interdicted by the High Court on the specious ground that the charge-sheet had not been approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand 5 ?
1 impugned order 2 High Court 3 LPA No. 572 of 2023 4 WP (S) No. 4781 of 2017 5 Chief Minister [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1259The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra B rief resume of fAcTs
4. Facts giving rise to this appeal are not too complicated. While the respondent had been functioning as a civil service officer, it came to light that he had indulged in diverse activities of dishonesty, financial irregularities, forgery of documents, etc. constituting misconduct. It was proposed to proceed against him departmentally. Along with the proposal dated 13 th January, 2014, which was initiated by the appellant no. 3 – the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma – seeking approval of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the draft chargesheet containing 9 (nine) charges proposed to be levelled against the respondent (contained in form ‘K’) was placed before the Chief Minister together with proposals that the respondent be suspended from service with immediate effect and that in the inquiry to be initiated against the respondent, the officers named therein be appointed as the inquiry officer and the presenting officer. The Chief Minister approved all the proposals on 21 st March, 2014. On 31 st March, 2014, the appellant no.2 – Deputy Secretary to the Government of Jharkhand (Personnel, Administrative and Rajbhasha Department) 6 – suspended the respondent from service. Appellant no.2 thereafter issued charge-sheet dated 4 th April, 2014 under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 7 for the purpose of an inquiry to be conducted into the respondent’s conduct vis-à-vis the 9 (nine) articles of charges drawn up against him. Respondent having denied and disputed the material allegations in the charge-sheet, an inquiry came to be conducted with the appellant no.4 – described in the array of appellants as the Departmental Enquiry-cum-Conducting Officer – as the inquiry officer. Respondent duly participated in such inquiry whereafter a report of inquiry was submitted by the appellant no.4 on 31st July, 2015. Appellant no.4 held the respondent guilty of all but 3 (three) of the charges. A second show cause notice was issued to the respondent on 11 th April, 2016, followed by a reminder. Respondent replied to the second show cause notice on 24 th September, 2016. Apropos a proposal containing detailed reasons why the report of the appellant no.4 called for acceptance and the respondent dismissed from service on proof of majority of the charges of misconduct levelled against him, the 6 relevant department 7 1930 Rules 1260 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports same was placed before the Cabinet of the State Government 8 in its meeting held on 13 th June, 2017. The Cabinet having approved such proposal, the respondent was dismissed from service vide an order of the Governor contained in memo dated 16th June, 2017 issued by the Joint Secretary of the relevant department. The order of dismissal recorded that the Government had taken the decision to dismiss the respondent based on proof of the charges against him in terms of Rule 14(xi) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 2016 9 and that under Rule 18(7) thereof, due consent of the Jharkhand Public Service Commission for imposing such punishment had been obtained.
5. After obtaining information through the machinery provided by the Right to Information Act, 2005 that approval of the Chief Minister being the competent authority has not been “accorded at the time of issuing/signing of the memo of charge”, the respondent challenged the order of dismissal from service before the High Court by invoking its writ jurisdiction primarily on the ground of absence of approval by the Chief Minister at or about the time of issuance of the charge-sheet. He also challenged the disciplinary proceedings on the grounds that there was no application of mind and the appellants had failed to take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case; also, that the punishment imposed was excessive and disproportionate to the allegations levelled and gravity of the misconduct found proved. Accordingly, the respondent prayed that by issuing a writ of certiorari, the order of dismissal dated 16 th June, 2017 be quashed and a mandamus be issued directing the appellants to reinstate him in service.
The J udgmenTs of The high courT
6. Perusal of the writ petition (Annexure P22 of the paper book) does not reveal reference to any provision of law premised whereon the respondent contended that the charge-sheet could not have been issued without the approval of the Chief Minister, being the competent authority in case of the respondent.
7. Be that as it may, it is only on this ground that the writ petition of the respondent succeeded. The Single Judge, who heard the 8 Cabinet 9 2016 Rules [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1261The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra writ petition, unequivocally recorded that initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent was duly approved by the competent authority but “nowhere from the counter affidavit it appears that Chargesheet was ever approved by the competent authority”. Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath10 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IAS11 , the Single Judge held that it is the “requirement of law that charge has to be approved by the competent authority and the same was not done here, which is dehorse (sic, dehors) the Rule”. Based on such findings, while quashing the order of dismissal the Single Judge directed reinstatement of the respondent in service with all consequential benefits. The writ petition, thus, stood allowed.
8. The Division Bench, while dismissing the intra-court appeal of the appellants, proceeded to record the following findings:
“12. *** However, on scrutiny of the materials on record, we find that before a decision was taken to start a departmental proceeding against the respondent and Resolution dated 4th April 2014 was issued thereof, charge memo was already prepared on 13th January 2014. Not only that, the competent authority had accorded his approval to the charge memo on 21 st March 2014. That is, before a decision was taken to start the departmental proceeding against the respondent and approval thereon of the competent authority was taken. Apparently, the charge memo was incompetent and therefore the subsequent proceedings taken in the departmental inquiry against the respondent were also rendered illegal.
13. In view of this procedural error which is not a curable irregularity, the writ Court rightly interfered with the termination order dated 16 th June 2017”.
After extracting paragraph 41 of the decision in B. V. Gopinath (supra) and paragraph 21 of the decision in Promod Kumar (supra), the Division Bench held the writ court’s interference with the order dated 6 th June, 2017 to be perfectly valid and, accordingly, dismissed the intra-court appeal.
10 2014 (1) SCC 351
11 2018 (17) SCC 677
1262 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports A nAlysis And reAsons
9. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dvivedi, learned counsel for the appellants and Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the respondent, at some length.
10. Respondent, without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal/ revision challenging the order of dismissal from service, had invoked the writ jurisdiction before the High Court. For reasons assigned hereafter, we find that the writ petition could have been entertained by the High Court having regard to the jurisdictional issue raised by the respondent.
11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana12 has held that ordinarily no writ lies against a show cause notice or charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so (emphasis supplied). Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a show cause notice or charge-sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason it is wholly illegal (emphasis supplied). However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.
12. Having read the decision in Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), we are of the view that it was open to the High Court to examine the question of jurisdiction to issue the charge-sheet to the respondent since he had invoked the writ jurisdiction after suffering the order of dismissal from service and not at an initial stage of the inquiry. The writ petition, therefore, could not have been thrown out at the threshold.
13. Now, while addressing the question arising for decision, it would be worthwhile to notice paragraphs ‘41’ and ‘21’ of the decisions in B. V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), respectively.
12 (2006) 12 SCC 28
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1263The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra
14. In B.V. Gopinath (supra), this Court intervened and quashed the charge-sheet on the ground of want of the Finance Minister’s approval. Paragraph ‘41’ reads as follows:
“41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge-sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested by the Additional Solicitor General, that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge-sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. Such a charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister”. (italics in original)
15. B.V. Gopinath (supra) was followed in Promod Kumar (supra). Paragraph ‘21’ of the latter decision being relevant, is quoted below: “21. It is clear that the approval of the disciplinary authority was taken for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is also clear from the affidavit that no approval was sought from the disciplinary authority at the time when the charge memo was issued to the delinquent officer. The submission made on behalf of the appellant is that approval of the disciplinary authority for initiation of disciplinary proceedings was sufficient and there was no need for another approval for issuance of charge memo. The basis for such submission is that initiation of disciplinary proceedings 1264 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and issuance of charge memo are at the same stage. We are unable to agree with the submission in view of the judgment of this Court in B.V. Gopinath. In that case the charge memo issued to Mr Gopinath under Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Finance Minister did not approve it. The judgment of the Tribunal was affirmed by the High Court. The Union of India, the appellant therein submitted before this Court that the approval for initiation of the departmental proceedings includes the approval of the charge memo. Such submission was not accepted by this Court on an interpretation of Rule 14(3) which provides that the disciplinary authority shall “draw up or cause to be drawn up” the charge memo. It was held that if any authority other than the disciplinary authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India”.
16. Having read excerpts from the decisions in B. V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), heavily relied on by the High Court for allowing the writ petition of the respondent, we propose to first examine whether the law laid down therein had any application to the facts pleaded in the writ petition and how far the same is relevant for deciding this appeal. Next, we propose to consider whether, on facts, initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent suffered from any infirmity warranting interference. Finally, we propose to consider the contours of Article 311 of the Constitution and the legal requirements of who should ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to draw up’ the charge-sheet signifying initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer/employee prima facie found to be delinquent. ApplicAbility of B. V. Gopinath (supra) And Promod Kumar (supra)
17. It is not in dispute that at the time the appellants resolved to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, the 1930 Rules were in force. The Single Judge noticed this fact, although the Division Bench has not adverted to it. Under the 1930 Rules, disciplinary proceedings could be initiated in terms of Rule 55 13 thereof. The 13 55. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement Vide Notification no.13213-A, dated the 17 th October, 1957 (or reduction) shall be passed on a member of a Service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1265The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra effect that Rule 55 would have on the merits of the plea raised by the respondent, in the ultimate analysis, is what appears to be clinching.
18. Bare perusal of Rule 55 reveals that it does not expressly specify the authority, who is competent to issue the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the decisions of this Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra) dealt with different rules which expressly specified who could issue the charge-sheet. We have noted with some measure of disappointment that long-standing precedents of this Court, which did lend sustenance to the impugned chargesheet, were neither placed before the Division Bench nor the Single Judge for consideration. This is one reason why we are persuaded to interfere.
19. Respondent was a member of the civil service of the State. Thus, he could legitimately claim that the safeguards enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution be scrupulously followed prior to ordering his dismissal including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner required by the relevant law.
20. It would, therefore, be profitable to note what is the law declared by this Court on the point as to who can issue the charge-sheet.
21. As far back as in 1970, this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh14 held that Article 311(1) does not in terms require that the authority empowered by that provision to dismiss or remove an officer should initiate or conduct the inquiry. This decision could count as the parent decision on the topic, declaring the law in paragraphs ‘6’ and ‘10’. The said paragraphs are quoted below for ease of understanding as to how Article 311(1) was construed: conviction in a criminal court or by a Court-Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and on any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so direct an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to crossexamine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer, conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.
***
14 (1970) 1 SCC 108
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