Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 290; [2024] 4 S.C.R. 442
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Augustine George Masih
- Decided
- 9 Apr 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2319/2009
- Sections
- 41(2), 42(1), 42(2), 6, 67, 42, 29, 20, 25, 114, 52A, 41
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
* Author [2024] 4 S.C.R. 442 : 2024 INSC 290 Smt. Najmunisha v.
The State of Gujarat (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2319-2320 of 2009)
09 April 2024 [Aniruddha Bose and Augustine George Masih,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration As per the prosecution, secret information was received by PW-2 (Intelligence Officer/Inspector) as to Accused No. 4 (husband of Accused No.1) carrying contraband from a particular route in an auto rickshaw. Said secret information was recorded by her and reported to her superior-PW-3, (Zonal Officer, a Gazetted Officer). The raiding party chased the said auto rickshaw however, Accused No.4 allegedly abandoned it fleeing away from the scene. On conducting the search of the said auto rickshaw, the raiding party inter alia found 1.450 Kgs charas. It eventually searched the house of Accused No.4 and 1 and found 2.098 Kgs of charas. The said raid/search not based on the personal knowledge of PW-3 as regards there being contraband in the house of Accused No.4 thereby necessitating search for the same, if was bereft of mandatory statutory compliance of s.41(2) of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Conviction of Accused No.1 and 4, if justified.
Headnotes Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.41(2), 42 – “personal knowledge”, “and taken in writing” – Non-compliance:
Held: s.41(2) empowers a Magistrate to issue search warrant for the arrest of any person or for search, whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence under the NDPS Act – s.41(2) further enables a Gazetted Officer, so empowered to arrest or conduct a search – The empowered Gazetted Officer must have reason to believe that an offence has been committed under Chapter IV, which necessitated the arrest or search– As per s.41(2), such reason to believe must arise from either his personal knowledge or information given by any person to him – Additionally, such knowledge or information is to be reduced into writing by virtue [2024] 4 S.C.R. 443Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat of expression “and taken in writing” used therein – The secret information received by PW-2 was limited to the apprehension that Accused No.4 was to carry contraband via an auto rickshaw from a particular route – There was no reference to the apprehension of existence of contraband in the house of Accused No.4 in the said recorded information – There was no prior information to the raiding party, including PW-3 (Gazetted Officer) that there was contraband in his house, necessitating search for the same – PW-1 deposed that he was asked to accompany the raiding party to the house of Accused No.4, located nearby for carrying out a search thereof and admits of having no knowledge about any written information with the raiding party for conducting raid at the said house – PW-2 admitted that the raiding team proceeded to the house for the search of the contraband pursuant to the discussions carried by them and not particularly on the personal knowledge of PW-3 – She further admitted that it was obligatory for her to obtain a written authorization from her superior officer, PW-3 however, omitted seeking the said authorization on the premise that there was an emergent need to conduct search at the house – Such major inconsistency as to the ‘source’ of information of existence of contraband at the house of Accused No.4 weakens the case of prosecution – Plea that the expressions “personal knowledge” and “and taken in writing” contemplated by s.41(2) ought to be read disjunctively, eliminating the requirement of taking down information in writing when it arises out of the personal knowledge of the Gazetted Officer, rejected – Raid/search at the house of the Accused No.1 and 4 was not based on the personal knowledge of PW-3, rather it was an action on the part of raiding party bereft of mandatory statutory compliance of s.41(2) – Conviction of Accused No.1 premised on the recovery of 2.098 kgs of charas from the house was not in consonance with the mandatory statutory compliance of s.41(2)– Prosecution not able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt – Impugned judgment of the High Court and Trial Court, set aside – Appellants acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. [Paras 42-47, 54] Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.42(1), (2), s.41(2) – Amendment Act of 2001:
Held: s.42(1) obligates an officer empowered by virtue of s.41(2) to record the information received from any person regarding an alleged offence under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985 or record the grounds of his belief as per the Proviso to s.42(1) in case an 444 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports empowered officer proceeds on his personal knowledge – While the same is to be conveyed to the immediate official superior prior to the said search or raid, in case of any inability to do so, the s.42(2) provides that a copy of the same shall be sent to the concerned immediate official superior along with grounds of his belief as per the proviso hereto – This relaxation contemplated by virtue of s.42(2) was brought about through the Amendment Act of 2001 to the NDPS Act wherein prior to this position s.42(2) mandated the copy of the said writing to be sent to the immediate official superior “forthwith”. [Para 31] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.6 – “acts forming part of same transaction” – Search conducted at the residence of the Accused No.4 if was in continuance of action of the raiding party towards the search of the auto rickshaw based on the secret information received by PW-2 (Intelligence Officer/ Inspector):
Held: No – The attempt towards raiding/searching the residence of Accused No.4 was not explicitly in pursuance of detaining the said accused – Testimonies of the members of the raiding party showcase the idea of search of the house to be an afterthought with an admitted time gap of 40-45 minutes between having raided the auto rickshaw which was alleged to be abandoned by the driver and Accused No.4 and subsequent search of the house of Accused No.4, wherein Accused No.1 was present – Moreover, it appears from the record that even the idea to search the house was for the purpose of recovery of more contraband and not to apprehend the said absconded accused at the first instance – Hence, the search conducted at the residence of the Accused No.4 was not a continuance of action of the raiding party towards the search of the auto rickshaw based on the secret information received by PW-2 – Accordingly, it does not appropriately fulfill the requirements of the test laid down in Gentela Vijyvardhan Rao and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh – Searches of the abandoned auto rickshaw, and at the house wherein Accused No.1 was present, were thus, different transactions. [Paras 28, 29] Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.67 – Statement of the appellants-accused recorded u/s.67 – Plea of the appellants that same was not admissible and ought not to have been the basis of conviction of the appellants- Accused No.1 and 4:
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 445Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat Held: In Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu it was held held that s.67 is at an antecedent stage to the investigation, which occurs after the empowered officer u/s.42 of the NDPS Act has the reason to believe upon information gathered in an enquiry made in that behalf that an offence under NDPS Act has been committed and is thus not even in the nature of a confessional statement – Hence, question of its being admissible in trial as a confessional statement against the accused does not arise - The same, therefore, cannot be considered to convict an accused person under the NDPS Act – By virtue of the decision in Tofan Singh, the benefit is to be granted to the appellants in regard to the inadmissibility of their statements u/s. 67. [Paras 51, 52] Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.41(2) – Power of search and seizure – Limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution and statutory limitations:
Held: s.41(2) begins from the power of search and seizure conferred by the State upon its executive or administrative arms – Such power is inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution as well as statutory limitations – At the same time, it is not legitimate to assume that Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India would be affected by the provisions of search and seizure – The statutory provisions conferring authorities with the power to search and seize are a mere temporary interference with the right of the accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions itself – Such a power cannot be considered as a violation of any fundamental rights of the person concerned. [Para 41] Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Constitution of India – Article 21 – Just and fair trial, a fundamental right – Actions of authorities within the NDPS Act must ensure upholding the rights of the accused to have a fair trial:
Held: Article 21 necessitates a just and fair trial to be a humane and fundamental right and actions of the prosecution as well as the authorities concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act 1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding of the rights of the accused in order to allow to have a fair trial – The harmonious 446 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports balance between the Latin maxims salus populi suprema lex (the safety of the people is the supreme law) and salus republicae suprema lex (safety of the State is the supreme law) is not only crucial and pertinent but lies at the core of the doctrine that welfare of an individual must yield to that of the community subject to the State being right, just, and fair. [Para 24] Case Law Cited Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu [2020] 12 SCR 583 : (2021) 4 SCC 1; Gentela Vijyvardhan Rao and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 273 : (1996) 6 SCC 241; State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh [1994] 2 SCR 208 : (1994) 3 SCC 299; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539 – relied on.
Darshan Singh v. State of Haryana (2016) 14 SCC 358; Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat [2000] 1 SCR 542 : (2000) 2 SCC 513; Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 335 : (2001) 6 SCC 692; Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1975] 1 SCR 753 : (1975) 3 SCC 219; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar [2005] 3 SCR 417 : (2005)
4 SCC 350; Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 716 : (2003) 7 SCC 465; Dhal Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh [2016] 8 SCR 36 : (2016) SCC OnLine SC 983; Chhunna alias Mehtab v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 9 SCC 363; Dharamveer Parsad v. State of Bihar (2020) 12 SCC 492; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka [2022] 4 SCR 827 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [2021] 11 SCR 237 :
(2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra Sharma, District Magistrate, Delhi [1954] 1 SCR 1077 – referred to.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436 – referred to.
List of Acts Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Evidence Act, 1872; Constitution of India.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 447Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat List of Keywords Contraband; Raid/search of house; Raiding party; “Personal knowledge”; “and taken in writing”; Written authorization; Gazetted Officer; Benefit of doubt; Beyond reasonable doubt; Search and seizure; Confessional statements.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 2319- 2320 of 2009 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.03.2009 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in CRLA No. 1702 and 2097 of 2004 Appearances for Parties Sanjay Jain, Adv. for the Appellants.
K M Nataraj, A.S.G., Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Ms. Srujana Suman Mund, Shailesh Madiyal, T A Khan, Vatsal Joshi, Annirudh Sharma Ii, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Augustine George Masih, J.
1. The instant criminal appeals arise out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 7419- 7420 of 2009 assailing the Common Impugned Judgment dated 16.03.2009 of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1702 of 2004 and 2097 of 2004 moved by the Original Accused No. 01 (Smt. Najmunisha – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1702 of 2004 before the High Court) and Original Accused No. 04 (Abdul Hamid Chandmiya alias Ladoo Bapu – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 2097 of 2004 before the High Court).
2. Smt. Najmunisha (hereinafter referred to as “Accused No. 01”) was originally convicted under Sections 29 read with 20(b)(ii)(c) and 25 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS Act 1985”). The Trial Court had sentenced her to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of INR 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) for the charge under Section 29 read with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act 1985 and 448 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in default, she had to undergo one year of simple imprisonment. No separate sentence was imposed under Section 25 of the NDPS Act 1985. This sentence was subsequently modified by the High Court of Gujarat while partly allowing her appeal to the effect that her fine was enhanced to the minimum prescribed fine of INR 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) and reduced the sentence in default of paying the fine from simple imprisonment of one-year to simple imprisonment of three months.
2A. Abdul Hamid Chandmiya alias Ladoo Bapu (hereinafter referred to as “Accused No. 04”) is the husband of Accused No. 01 who was originally convicted under Section 29 read with 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act 1985 and sentenced to thirteen years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of INR 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). The same was affirmed by the High Court of Gujarat while also dismissing his appeal.
3. Accused No. 05 (Nazir Ahmed alias Nazir Bazara) was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(a) of the NDPS Act 1985 and was sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment along with fine of INR 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) which he completed during the trial and therefore did not prefer any appeal before the High Court of Gujarat.
4. The facts leading to the present set of appeals are that on 10.12.1999 at about 06:30 PM, the PW-02 Mrs Krishna Chaube (Intelligence Officer/Inspector) (hereinafter referred to as “Mrs Chaube”) had received a secret information that the Accused No. 04 would be carrying narcotic substances in an auto rickshaw bearing registration number GJ-9T-2355 at about 07:00 AM on 11.12.1999 and shall be passing through one Shahpur Darwaja. The said secret information was recorded by her and reported to her superior officer (PW- 03), namely Mr Pawan Singh Tomar – who was the Zonal Officer (hereinafter referred to as “Mr Tomar”).
5. Thereby, on 11.12.1999, it is submitted by the prosecution that on directions of Mr Tomar, they assembled at about 06:30 AM near the raiding point and arranged for the panchas and waited for the Accused No. 04 at different points of the raiding route. When the Accused No. 04 showed up in the said vehicle as per the information, they attempted to stop the auto rickshaw, instead it sped away at a high speed. Therefore, the members of the raiding party arranged for and chased the said auto rickshaw which was eventually, after covering a certain distance, found abandoned near a road and the Accused [2024] 4 S.C.R. 449Smt. Najmunisha v . T h e State o f G u j a r a t No. 04 was said to have escaped. On conducting the search of the said auto rickshaw, the raiding party found a driving license of one Shri Abdulgafar Gulamali Shaikh alias Rajubhai in addition to charas to the tune of 1.450 Kilograms.
6. As Accused No. 04 had run away, the raiding party eventually was led to the house of Accused No. 04 wherein the Accused No. 01 was already present. Thereinafter, the son of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 – namely Abdul Rajak (hereinafter referred to as “Accused No. 02”) – came inquiring. Eventually the raiding party conducted a search of the said house wherein in the open kitchen there was a cement bag which had yellow coloured wires beneath which they are said to have found one bundle wrapped in newspaper which was fastened with a linen thread inside which a transparent plastic bag contained 2.098 Kilograms of substance of which turned out to be charas. Thereafter, the necessary formalities were completed and Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 02 were arrested. Eventually, the panchnama was also recorded with two independent witnesses.
7. The statements of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 02 were recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 wherein it was stated that Accused No. 01 aids the business of drug trafficking as conducted by Accused No. 04 – who was absconding. Eventually, Accused No. 04 is also said to have been arrested on 26.06.2000 and per his statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 he had confessed to be transporting and selling the contraband which he sold regularly to Accused No. 05.
8. Eventually, the charges were framed and a total of five prosecution witnesses were examined with PW-01 being one of the panch witnesses, PW-02 to PW-04 being members of the raiding party, and PW-05 being the FSL expert. Per contra, the defence had examined a total of seven witnesses in their favour.
9. The trial of Accused No. 01 to Accused No. 05 was concluded by the Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 143 of 2000 and Sessions Case No. 295 of 2000 vide judgment dated 28.01.2004, whereby while the Accused No. 02 and Accused No. 03 were acquitted, Accused No. 01, Accused No. 04 and Accused No. 05 were convicted as aforementioned.
9A. Since both the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 had moved in respective appeals before the High Court of Gujarat their conviction 450 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports stood affirmed, while the fine imposed on Accused No. 01 was enhanced as aforementioned and the default sentence was reduced. As stated above, Accused No. 05 did not prefer any appeal.
10. The High Court of Gujarat had observed that the statements of the appellants herein under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 were prima facie voluntary and without inducement, threat or coercion and the statement of Accused No. 01 refers to dealing of narcotic substances by Accused No. 04 for a long period of time in which she aided as well. Therefore, there exists a presumption in favour of the prosecution under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “IEA 1872”). None of the accused had either retracted the said statements or they had moved any complaints alleging perversity. The defence, despite leading evidence, could not establish their version that the officers had come inquiring about house of Accused No. 04 and eventually arrested Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 02 as against all legalities. Furthermore, there was consistency in the statements of prosecution witnesses and that no specific unreliability was established in the panchnama by the defence. As to the necessary compliance laid down in the provisions of the NDPS Act 1985, the procedure established under Section 52A of the NDPS Act 1985 was not to be considered and that there was no requirement of any authorization under Section 41 of the NDPS Act 1985. Since Mr Tomar, being a Gazetted Officer, had accompanied the raiding party pursuant to the information communicated by Mrs Chaube on 10.12.1999, defence has also not raised any contention as to breach of Section 36 or Section 53 of the NDPS Act 1985.
11. The High Court of Gujarat had also observed in paragraph number 36 of its judgment that there is compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act 1985 as established from the reports (Ex. 87 and Ex. 112) submitted to the Zonal Officer. Furthermore, it rejected the defence that the prosecution failed to prove documentary evidence as the defence did not raise any objection to the exhibiting of said documents, including arrest reports recorded in compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act, arrest memo of Accused No. 04 and Accused No. 01 and intimation given to the next kin of the accused persons.
12. The High Court of Gujarat was of the opinion that except two minor inconsistencies, namely, apropos who called the panchas and the [2024] 4 S.C.R. 451Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat recording of statement of Accused No. 02, there was no reason to question the veracity of the depositions of the members of the raiding party. Those minor fallacies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses do not go to the root of the matter. Thereafter, while acquitting Accused No. 02, the High Court believed that there was no evidence implicating him to the criminality involved. In the same breath, the Court observed that such finding of acquittal does not throw prosecution’s case as against other accused persons, inter alia, Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04, which is established beyond any reasonable doubts.
13. With respect to the objection that no independent witnesses were examined to prove joint possession of house by Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04, the High Court of Gujarat placed reliance on the depositions of Defence Witness (brother of Accused No. 04), who testified that the said accommodation was occupied by the accused persons to entertain their guests. The fact of possession of the house by Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 is bolstered by their own confessional statements and corroborated by the testimony of an independent witness PW-01. Thereupon, perusing the statements of Mrs Chaube and PW-05, the High Court held that there was no infirmity regarding the receipt of muddamal with seals intact on the goods being sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination.
14. Delving into the question of compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, the High Court was inclined to accept the argument of the prosecution that the statement of Mrs Chaube with respect to recording of secret information and conveying it to her superior officer stood established by consistent testimonies of Mrs Chaube and Mr Tomar and clarified that the testimony of the former cannot be thrown on the premise that there was variation on the point that who called the panch witness. Considering the aforementioned, the High Court of Gujarat affirmed the case of conviction of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04.
15. The learned Counsel for the appellants herein contends that the statement of the appellants/accused in the instant case recorded under the provision of Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 was not admissible and ought not to have been the basis of conviction of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04. It has been brought to our attention that the High Court has critically scrutinized the said 452 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports statements of Accused No. 01 to Accused No. 04 and has observed that the same being voluntary in nature and having been corroborated by other evidence can form the basis of their conviction. For this purpose, reliance has been placed on the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1 whereby it has been categorically held that a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 is inadmissible in evidence. The majority opinion herein had held that power of recording of statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is limited in nature and conferred upon subject to the safeguards as set out in Sections 41 to 44 of the NDPS Act 1985 for the purpose of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrants and for conducting of only an enquiry and not in the course of investigation. It is for the initiation of an investigation or enquiry under the NDPS Act 1985 and it does not meet the threshold of a confessional statement.
16. It is submitted that the secret information received by Mrs Chaube was only related to the auto rickshaw wherein the Accused No. 04 was to be carrying the contraband – which was eventually seized. However, there existed no secret information apropos the house wherein the subsequent search/raid was conducted by the raiding party. The latter was totally out of the scope of the information received and recorded and thereby the search therein was absolutely illegal and in violation of the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. The learned Counsel has further drawn our attention to the fallacies and inconsistencies in the panchnama recorded by the raiding party in addition to the depositions of the prosecution witnesses.
17. The learned Counsel further relies on Darshan Singh v. State of Haryana (2016) 14 SCC 358 which deals with scope of Sections 41(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 and the need of their independent compliance against each other. This Court herein went on to hold that mere registration of FIR at the instance of the SHO and its subsequent communication to the Superintendent of Police would not amount to sufficient compliance with Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985. For this purpose, reference is made to paragraph number 13 of the said judgment at Page 364 as follows:
“13. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondent, we are of the view that the mandate [2024] 4 S.C.R. 453Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat contained in Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act, requiring the recording in writing, the details pertaining to the receipt of secret information, as also, the communication of the same to the superior officer are separate and distinct from the procedure stipulated under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the NDPS Act provides that a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate of Second Class specially empowered by the State Government may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under Chapter IV. Sub-section (2) of Section 41 refers to issuance of authorisation for similar purposes by the officers of the Departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence, etc. Sub-section (1) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act lays down that the empowered officer if he has a prior information given by any person, should necessarily take it down in writing, and where he has reason to believe from his personal knowledge, that offences under Chapter IV have been committed or that materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any building, etc. he may carry out the arrest or search, without warrant between sunrise and sunset and he may do so without recording his reasons of belie. The two separate procedures noticed above are exclusive of one another. Compliance with one, would not infer compliance with the other. In the circumstances contemplated under Section 42 of the NDPS Act the mandate of the procedure contemplated therein will have to be followed separately, in the manner interpreted by this Court in Karnail Singh case [Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 887] and the same will not be assumed, merely because the Station House Officer concerned had registered a first information report, which was also dispatched to the Superintendent of Police, in compliance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.”
18. The aforesaid reference places its reliance on a judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, i.e., Karnail Singh v. State of 454 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Haryana (2009) 8 SCC 539 which is also relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It is a well celebrated judgment on the statutory requirement of writing down and conveying information to the superior officer prior to entry, search and seizure as per Section 42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985, requiring a literal or substantial compliance. The learned Counsel has brought our attention to paragraph number 35 of the judgment at page 554 which dealt with effect of the decisions in Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2000) 2 SCC 513 and that in Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 692. By virtue of this, it was observed that while a total non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 would be impermissible, a delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the said delay could be an acceptable compliance of statutory requirements under Sections 42(1) and (2). For a better clarity of the judgment, paragraph number 35 is reproduced as follows: “35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul Rashid [(2000) 2 SCC 513 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham [(2001) 6 SCC 692 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows:
(a) The officer on receiving the information [of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 42] from any person had to record it in writing in the register concerned and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d)
of Section 42(1).
(b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not [2024] 4 S.C.R. 455Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior.
(c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2)
in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer.
But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency.
(d) W h i l e t o t a l n o n - c o m p l i a n c e w i t h requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2)
of Section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending of a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of Section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, 456 [2024] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.”
19. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 herein contents that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. There has been well recorded compliance of the statutory requirements and the evidences have been sufficiently appraised by the Courts below. Moreover, there has been no material contradiction in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the same aspires confidence. It is a settled law that the concurrent findings of the facts must not ordinarily be interfered with unless there exists a prima facie perversity or absurdity in light of the observation in paragraph number 26 in the decision delivered in Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 219.
20. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02 that there has been substantial compliance of the statutory requirements under Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 as Mrs Chaube recorded the secret information in writing and conveyed the same to her superior officer namely, Mr Tomar prior to the raid conducted as against Accused No. 04 and Accused No. 01. It is contended that the search undertaken at the residence of Accused No. 04 whereby Accused No. 01 was also present, was in continuation of the action taken on the basis of the said secret information. For this, the learned Counsel has brought to our attention the testimonies of Mrs Chaube (PW-02) and Mr Tomar (PW-03). Alternatively, even assuming that the said latter part of the raid/search at the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not in continuation of the action taken towards Accused No. 04 as per the secret information, there has still been appropriate compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 for the reason that the same was based on the personal [2024] 4 S.C.R. 457Smt. Najmunisha v. The State of Gujarat knowledge of Mr Tomar, who is a Gazetted Officer. It is further contended that the provision of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act is to be read disjunctively and henceforth there is no requirement to take down the information in writing where it emanates from the personal knowledge of the superior officer. To further this argument, the learned Counsel has distinguished the facts of the present case from the ratio in decisions in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC 299 and Karnail Singh (supra) as they refer only to the process to be followed upon receipt of information from any person and not to “personal knowledge” of the officer.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.