Susela Padmavathy Amma v. M/S Bharti Airtel Limited
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 206; [2024] 3 S.C.R. 647
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 15 Mar 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1577/2024
- Sections
- 138, 142, 190, 482, 141, 34(1), 2(13)
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* Author [2024] 3 S.C.R. 647 : 2024 INSC 206 Susela Padmavathy Amma v.
M/S Bharti Airtel Limited (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1577-1578 of 2024)
15 March 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The High Court rejected the prayer for quashing of criminal complaints qua the appellant in connection with the offence punishable u/s. 138 r/w. s.142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Headnotes Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 r/w. s.142 – The grievance of the complainant-respondent is that in-spite of regular follow-ups and reminders, the company-accused no.1 failed and neglected to clear the respondent’s dues – On repeated demands, the company furnished respondent five cheques – When complainant deposited the cheques, they were returned unpaid with reason “payment stopped by drawer” – Accordingly, the respondent filed two complaints u/s. 190(i)(a) of the Cr.P.C. for offences punishable u/ss. 138 & 142 of the N.I. Act – Both the complaints were filed against three accused persons including appellant herein (accused no.3) – Appellant sought to quash criminal proceedings against her u/s. 482 Cr.P.C, however the same was dismissed by the High Court – Propriety:
Held: On perusal of the complaint, it is clear that the only allegation against the present appellant is that she and the accused No.2 had no intention to pay the dues that they owe to the complainant – It is stated that the 2nd accused and the 3rd accused (appellant herein) are the Directors, promoters of the 1st accused being the Company – It is further averred that the 2nd accused is the authorized signatory, who is in-charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company, i.e., the 1st accused – It can be clearly seen that there is no averment to the effect that the present appellant is in-charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs 648 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of the Company – It is also not the case of the respondent that the appellant is either the Managing Director or the Joint Managing Director of the Company – The averments made are not sufficient to invoke the provisions of s.141 of the N.I. Act qua the appellant – Thus, the criminal proceedings in connection with the offence punishable u/s. 138 r/w. s.142 of the N.I. Act are quashed and set aside qua the present appellant. [Paras 19-22] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138, s.141 – Vicarious liability of the director:
Held: Merely reproducing the words of the section without a clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a director of the company was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, would not ipso facto make the director vicariously liable. [Para 12] Case Law Cited State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal and others [1998] 3 SCR 104 : (1998) 5 SCC 343; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another [2005] Suppl. 3 SCR 371 : (2005) 8 SCC 89; Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra and another [2014] 14 SCR 1468 : (2014) 16 SCC 1; State of NCT of Delhi through Prosecuting Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v. Rajiv Khurana [2010] 9 SCR 387 : (2010)
11 SCC 469; Ashoke Mal Bafna v. Upper India Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Company Limited (2018)
14 SCC 202 – relied on.
N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh and others [2007] 3 SCR 883 : (2007) 9 SCC 481; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. and another [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 344 : (2004) 1 SCC 391; Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat and others [2012] 11 SCR 466 : (2012) 13 SCC 375; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora and another [2009] 9 SCR 1144 : (2009) 10 SCC 48;
Lalankumar Singh and others v. State of Maharashtra [2022] 14 SCR 573 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383 – referred to.
List of Acts Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [2024] 3 S.C.R. 649Susela Padmavathy Amma v. M/S Bharti Airtel Limited List of Keywords Failure to pay dues; Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account; In-charge of company; Authorized signatory; Responsible to company; Conduct of company; Criminal proceedings; Quashing.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.1577- 1578 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2022 in CRLOP Nos.3470 and 5767 of 2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras Appearances for Parties Manoj V George, Ms. Shilpa Liza George, Km Vignesh Ram, Nasib Masih, Ms. Akshita Agrawal, Ms. Chaahat Khanna, Advs. for the Appellant.
Lakshmeesh S. Kamath, Ms. Samriti Ahuja, Karan Singh Dalal, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals challenge the common judgment and order dated 26th April, 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”), in Crl. O.P. Nos. 3470 & 5767 of 2019 and Crl. M.P. Nos. 2224, 2225 & 3255 of 2019, whereby the High Court rejected the prayer for quashing of C.C. Nos. 3151 & 3150 of 2017, on the file of learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai (now transferred to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet, Chennai), in connection with the offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “the N.I. Act”).
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as follows: 650 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 3.1 M/s. Bharti Airtel Limited (hereinafter referred to as, “complainant” or “respondent”), is a company engaged in the business of providing telecommunication services, under a license issued by the Government of India, in various telecom circles in India. 3.2 One M/s. Fibtel Telecom Solutions (India) Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as, “Fibtel Telecom Solutions” or “Company”), a company registered with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) as a telemarketer, had approached the respondent intending to obtain telecom resources for the purpose of transactional communication and requested the complainant for allotment of telecom resources for the said purpose. One Manju Sukumaran Lalitha is the Director & Authorized Signatory of Fibtel Telecom Solutions and one Susela Padmavathy Amma, the appellant herein, is the Director of Fibtel Telecom Solutions. 3.3 Based on the representation made by Fibtel Telecom Solutions, the respondent had agreed to provide the required services, whereupon the parties entered into a Service Agreement, vide which Fibtel Telecom Solutions had to pay Rs. 14,00,000/- as fixed monthly recurring charges to the respondent. It is the thus the case of the respondent that Fibtel Telecom Solutions owes a sum of Rs. 2,55,08,309/-, in lieu of the service provided to it by the respondent.
3.4 However, the grievance of the respondent is that in-spite of regular follow-ups and reminders, Fibtel Telecom Solutions failed and neglected to clear the respondent’s dues. Only thereafter, upon repeated demands made by the respondent, Fibtel Telecom Solutions furnished five post-dated cheques to the complainant, on 17 th June 2016, details of which are as given below:
Sr. No. Cheque No. Cheque Dated Cheque Amount 1 414199 25.06.2016 Rs. 25,00,000/- 2 414196 31.08.2016 Rs. 50,00,000/- 3 414204 31.08.2016 Rs. 80,00,000/- 4 414195 31.07.2016 Rs. 45,00,000/- 5 414205 30.09.2016 Rs. 80,00,000/- [2024] 3 S.C.R. 651Susela Padmavathy Amma v. M/S Bharti Airtel Limited 3.5 On deposit of the cheque mentioned at Sr. No. 1 in the table, bearing cheque no. 414199 and dated 25 th June 2016, by the respondent, the said cheque was returned to it unpaid with reason “payment stopped by drawer”. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent issued a legal notice to Fibtel Telecom Solutions, on receipt of which & following an oral agreement between them, a payment schedule was agreed to and a cheque for an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- drawn by Fibtel Telecom Solutions was honoured by it. However, when the complainant deposited the remaining four cheques as mentioned at Sr. No. 2 to 5 in the table, the same were returned to it unpaid with reason “payment stopped by drawer”. Details of deposit & return of cheques are as given below:
Cheque No.
Cheque Presented On Cheque Returned On Legal Notice Reply 414196 23.09.2016 26.09.2016 13.10.2016 12.11.2016 414204 23.09.2016 26.09.2016 13.10.2016 12.11.2016 414195 25.10.2016 26.10.2016 09.11.2016 No reply 414205 17.10.2016 18.10.2016 10.11.2016 29.11.2016 3.6 Accordingly, the respondent filed two complaints under Section 190(i)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC” for short) for offences punishable under Section 138 & 142 of the N.I. Act, being C.C. No. 3151 of 2017 dated 30th November, 2016 and C.C. No. 3150 of 2017 dated 23 rd December, 2016, before the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. 3.7 Both the complaints have been filed against three accused persons namely, Fibtel Telecom Solutions, arrayed as Accused No. 1; Manju Sukumaran Lalitha, arrayed as Accused No. 2 & Susela Padmavathy Amma, the appellant herein, arrayed as Accused No. 3.
3.8 Accused No. 3, who is a female senior citizen and the Director of Fibtel Telecom Solutions, filed Crl. O.P. No. 3470 of 2019 against C.C. No. 3151 of 2017 & Crl. O.P. No. 5767 of 2019 against C.C. No. 3150 of 2017, before the High Court under 652 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaints qua her.
3.9 Vide impugned judgment and order, dated 26 th April, 2022, the High Court dismissed Crl. O.P. Nos. 3470 & 5767 of 2019 and Crl. M.P. Nos. 2224, 2225 & 3255 of 2019, but directed the concerned trial court to dispose of the case within a period of three months.
3.10 Aggrieved by the rejection of the petition for quashing of criminal complaints, the appellant herein filed the present appeal. 3.11 Vide order dated 12 th December 2022, this Court had issued notice and stay of further proceedings qua the appellant was granted.
4. We have heard Shri Manoj V. George, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Lakshmeesh S. Kamath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
5. Shri Manoj V. George, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is an aged-lady and was not involved in the day-today affairs of the Company. It is submitted that even in the complaint there are no averments that the appellant was in-charge of day-today affairs of the Company. It is further submitted that the appellant was also not a signatory to the cheque in question. It was only the accused No.2 who was the signatory to the cheque. It is, therefore, submitted that the High Court has grossly erred in not allowing the petition for quashing of criminal complaints qua the appellant. Learned counsel relied on the judgments of this Court in the cases of N.K. Wahi vs. Shekhar Singh and others 1, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and another2 Ashoke Mal Bafna vs. Upper India Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Company Limited3, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others vs Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. and another 4 and Laxmi Dyechem vs. State of Gujarat and others 5 in support of his submissions.
1 [2007] 3 SCR 883 : (2007) 9 SCC 481 2 [2005] Suppl. 3 SCR 371 : (2005) 8 SCC 89
3 (2018) 14 SCC 202
4 [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 344 : (2004) 1 SCC 391 5 [2012] 11 SCR 466 : (2012) 13 SCC 375 [2024] 3 S.C.R. 653Susela Padmavathy Amma v. M/S Bharti Airtel Limited
6. Shri Lakshmeesh S. Kamath, learned counsel for the respondent, on the contrary, submitted that the learned judge of the High Court has rightly, after considering the material on record, dismissed the petition for quashing of criminal complaints qua the appellant. It is submitted that the grounds raised are the defense of the accused and it can only be raised at the stage of the trial. It is, therefore, submitted that no interference is warranted in the present appeal.
7. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Brij Lal Mittal and others6, this Court observed thus:
“8. Nonetheless, we find that the impugned judgment of the High Court has got to be upheld for an altogether different reason. Admittedly, the three respondents were being prosecuted as directors of the manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Act which reads as under: “34. Offences by companies.—(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.”
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