Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1003; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1795
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 18 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 12411/2024
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1795 : 2024 INSC 1003 Allahabad University Etc.
v.
Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 12411-12414 of 2024)
18 December 2024 [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reading down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018. Headnotes† University Grants Commission Act, 1956 – University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 – Reg.10(f)(iii) – Exception was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in shortlisting candidates for interview for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations – The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to read down Reg.10 and held that the same would apply only where past services are required to be counted for direct recruitment and promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the posts of Associate Professor and Professor:
Held: First and foremost, the Division Bench of the High Court has not found Reg.10(f)(iii) to be ultra vires on any of the available grounds, i.e., either on the ground of legislative incompetence or that it offends any of the Constitutional rights and/or any provision of the UGC Act or that there is excessive delegation; rather, the Division Bench has read down Reg.10(f)(iii) on the specious * Author 1796 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports ground that the construction it has placed “would obviate the need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and the general instructions appended to the advertisement in that regard” – This course of action was impermissible – ‘Reading down’ can be resorted to whenever a provision, which is questioned, is found to be ultra vires by the court but there is scope for the court to read the same down in a manner so as to save it from being declared constitutionally invalid – The line of reasoning weighing with the Division Bench that the need to examine the challenge would stand obviated if Reg.10(f)(iii) were construed in the manner it did is, thus, plainly erroneous – Once Reg.10 specifically refers to counting of previous regular service, whether national or international, inter alia as Assistant Professor, the Division Bench in the exercise of its judicial review powers could not have held that Reg.10 has no application to one aspiring for appointment as an Assistant Professor – Law is well settled that courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which are not there; at the same time, it cannot also read a statute in a manner that results in deletion of words which are there – This is for the simple reason that the court has no power to legislate; hence, it cannot rewrite the legislation – Bearing this principle in mind, the Division Bench was wholly unjustified in its approach. [Paras 42, 43] Interpretation of Statutes – Intention of the Legislature: Held: A situation could arise where plain and literal reading of a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose for which the enactment was introduced and, the situation, necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction which would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature – The court would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while it irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material of which the legislation is woven. [Para 18] Interpretation of Statutes – On the Principle of reading down: Held: Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being declared ultra vires; however, there could be situations where the subordinate legislation (like a rule or a regulation) is challenged [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1797Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. on the ground of excessive delegation or is itself violative of the enabling/primary legislation under which it is framed or even breaches constitutional guarantees – ‘Reading down’ of a provision is a subsidiary rule of interpretation of statutes, which the courts tend to employ in situations to save the subordinate legislation like a rule or a regulation, wherever possible and practical, by reading it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather than declaring it as unconstitutional or invalid – However, it has been clarified that it is to be used sparingly, and in limited circumstances – Additionally, it is clear that the act of reading down a provision, must be undertaken only if doing so can keep the operation of the statute “within the purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid”. [Para 27] Service Law – Selection – Criterion – Whether a selection Board can fix a higher criterion for shortlisting candidates: Held: The principle discernible from the various decisions of this Court is that whenever selection is based solely on the performance of the aspirants in the interview, it is not open to the recruiting authorities to dilute in any manner the norms and standards prescribed by the statutory provisions or executive orders governing recruitment for screening aspirants to be called for interview; however, it is always open to them to prescribe enhanced norms to have the zone of consideration for interview restricted to those aspirants satisfying the enhanced norms or higher criteria – In such cases, however, care has to be taken such that the enhanced norms or higher criteria are not susceptible to a challenge on the ground of arbitrariness or being contrary to the statutory provisions or executive orders governing recruitment. [Para 30] Pleadings – Grant of relief – Whether, relief can be granted in the absence of requisite pleadings:
Held: While deciding a writ petition on the basis of affidavits, the writ court’s enquiry ought to be restricted to the case pleaded by the parties and the evidence that they have placed on record as part of the writ petition or the counter/reply affidavit, as the case may be – Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings and the evidence produced before it by the parties – It is well-nigh impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments advanced in course of hearing. [Para 37] 1798 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur [1986] 1 SCR 383 : (1986) 2 SCC 237; Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen [2010] 1 SCR 1127 : (2010) 2 SCC 513; Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 323; CST v. Radhakrishan [1979] 2 SCR 33 : (1979) 2 SCC 249; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 142 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1111 : (1999) 9 SCC 700; State of Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha [2011] 10 SCR 662: (2011) 13 SCC 262; Subramanian Swamy v. Raju [2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8 SCC 390; Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu [2024] 2 SCR 12 : (2024) 6 SCC 641 – relied on.
A.P.J. Abdul kalam Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of Mngt. & Engg. Technology [2020] 13 SCR 732 : (2021) 2 SCC 564; Visveswaraiah Technological University v. Krishnendu Halder [2011] 2 SCR 1007 : (2011) 4 SCC 606; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court [2024] 12 SCR 28 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 1 SCR 841 : (2004) 6 SCC 54; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1078 : (1999) 4 SCC 458; M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar [1994] Supp. 3 SCR 665 : (1994) 6 SCC 293; Pt. Shamboo Nath Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh [1995] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 266; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [2008] 14 SCR 621: (2008) 17 SCC 491; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 524 : (1998) 7 SCC 469; Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 1050 : (1988) 4 SCC 534 – referred to.
List of Acts University Grants Commission Act, 1956; University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Interpretation of Statutes; Principle of reading down; Assistant Professor; Interpretation of statutes; Ultra-vires; Shortlisting of [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1799Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. candidates; Service Law; Selection; Pleadings; Subordinate legislation; Statutory provisions; Executive orders; Benevolent interpretation; Power of Court; Rewriting legislation. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 12411- 12414 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WRIT-A No. 580 of 2023, SPLAD Nos. 187 and 257 of 2022 and CMRA Nos. 398 of 2023 With Civil Appeal No. 12415 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Nikhil Goel, P.K.S. Baghel, Sr. Advs., Manu Yadav, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Tanmaya Agarwal, Shwetank Silakwal, Wrick Chatterjee, Mrs. Aditi Agarwal, Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Vishal Agrawal, Mrigank Prabhakar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
The C hallenge
1. Assail in these civil appeals is to the common judgment and order dated 18 th January, 2024 1 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2 whereby the High Court disposed of a writ petition, two special appeals and one review petition. 3 All but one of the proceedings were at the instance of Gitanjali Pandey. 4 The 1 impugned order 2 High Court, hereafter 3 Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, Special Appeal Defective No. 187 of 2022, Special Appeal Defective No. 257 of 2022 and Civil Misc. Review Application No. 398 of 2023 4 Respondent 1 1800 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports remaining one was at the instance of one Brahma Deo (Respondent 1 in Civil Appeal No. 12413/2024).
R esume of faCTs
2. Relevant facts, pertinent for disposal of the present appeal, are summed up as under:
a. Respondent 1was an aspirant for the post of ‘Assistant Professor’ in Allahabad University and its affiliated colleges. As per her pleadings, between October 2004 and March 2010 (approximately 5 ½ years), she worked as a contractual faculty in Jawad Ali Shah Imambara Girls PG College (affiliated to Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay University, Gorakhpur) at a monthly cash honorarium of Rs. 5000/-. Thereafter, between 2016 and 2021, she claims to have worked as a guest faculty in different constituent colleges of Allahabad University at different honoraria ranging from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-.
b. Advertisements:
i. On 28th September 2021, Allahabad University published an advertisement for appointment on the posts of Assistant Professors in various disciplines. A total of 4 (four) posts were advertised for Sanskrit. Respondent 1 applied for appointment on the single advertised post in the unreserved category.
ii. On 30 th August 2022, a constituent college of Allahabad University, viz. Iswar Saran Degree College (ISDC), issued an advertisement which, inter alia, invited applications from eligible candidates for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit.
iii. On 28 th November 2022, another constituent college of Allahabad University, viz. Allahabad Degree College (ADC), issued a similar advertisement.
c. Pursuant to all the above advertisements, Respondent 1 duly applied for appointment on the posts.
d. The requisite qualifications for appointment on the posts of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor are [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1801Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. prescribed by the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018. 5 Clause 4 thereof provides for the minimum qualifications required for the post of Assistant and Associate Professor. It is not in dispute that Respondent 1 does possess the requisite educational qualifications for appointment as Assistant Professor in Sanskrit.
e. The procedure for shortlisting candidates for interview is given in the note to Reg.4.1, which provides for shortlisting on the basis of an academic score prepared in accordance with Table 3A (for universities) and 3B (for colleges). Hence, for shortlisting candidates for the purposes of interview, Allahabad University would score candidates as per the criteria laid down in Table 3A and the affiliated colleges in Table 3B.
f. As per clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, 2 (two) marks are to be granted to a candidate for every year of his/her teaching experience or Post Doctoral experience. Since the contents of both the tables are similar, we propose to reproduce Table 3A later in this judgment.
g. Despite Respondent 1 fulfilling the eligibility criteria, she was not shortlisted for the interview as her score did not reach the cutoff marks. This happened because she was not awarded any marks under clause 7 in Table 3A for “Teaching/Post Doctoral experience”. Her past teaching experiences on contractual basis and as a guest faculty were not counted as ‘teaching experience’ by Allahabad University.
h. According to Allahabad University, past teaching experience as a guest lecturer and on contractual basis do not fulfill the conditions provided under Reg.10(e) and (f)(iii), respectively; hence, it could not be counted as ‘Teaching/Post Doctoral experience’.
i. As per clause 10(e), previous service as a ‘guest lecturer’ would not count as ‘teaching experience’. Furthermore, as per clause 5 2018 Regulations, hereafter 1802 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 10(f)(iii), previous service of a lecturer on contractual basis would count as ‘teaching experience’ only if the incumbent was drawing total gross emoluments not less than the monthly gross salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor, as the case may be. Reg.10, in its entirety, would also be reproduced at a latter part of this judgment for the sake of completeness of understanding.
j. As mentioned above, Respondent 1 had served as a guest lecturer and on contractual basis before. Furthermore, as per the records, she was also not drawing a salary/honorarium equivalent to the monthly gross salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor, which at the relevant time was Rs. 35,654/-. Therefore, Respondent 1 was not granted any marks for her past services as guest lecturer and on contractual basis. Falling short of marks, she was not shortlisted for interview.
k. Thereafter, litigation commenced with the following cases being presented by the Respondent 1:
i. Upon the advertisement dated 28 th September 2021 being issued and her experience not being marked, Respondent 1 invoked the writ jurisdiction by filing a petition 6 praying that Allahabad University be directed to grant her marks for her teaching experience as ‘contractual faculty’ while shortlisting candidates for interview. Her petition was rejected by the Single Judge on 20th May 2022. Challenging the same, she filed the Special Appeal (Defective).7 ii. In respect of advertisement dated 30 th August 2022, Respondent 1 filed another petition 8 wherein, inter alia, she prayed for a declaration that Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950. This petition was dismissed on 2nd August 2023 in light of the pendency of the Special Appeal (Defective) filed earlier. Against the order dated 2 nd 6 Writ-A no. 7114 of 2022 7 Special Appeal (D) No. 187 of 2022 8 W.P. 16585 of 2022 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1803Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. August 2023, Respondent 1 preferred Civil Misc Review Application. 9 iii. Insofar as the advertisement dated 28 th November 2022 is concerned, Respondent 1 filed another petition 10 challenging the vires of Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations.
iv. Relying upon the judgment dated 20th May 2022 (rendered in Writ-A No.7114 of 2022), the Single Judge dismissed the petition 11 of the said Brahma Deo. Aggrieved by such dismissal, Brahma Deo also filed a Special Appeal (Defective). 12 v. As noted above, vide the impugned order, all the abovementioned four proceedings were disposed of.
Impugned oRdeR
3. The High Court noted the question arising for decision in paragraph 17 of its decision and commenced its discussion from paragraph 23. We consider it appropriate to reproduce verbatim the same hereunder: “17. The short question raised in this bunch of petitions is as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) would be applicable while awarding marks for the teaching/post-doctoral experience, in terms of clause 7 of table 3A for shortlisting of candidates, to be called for interview for the post of Assistant Professors in universities? As a sequel, it has to be seen as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
***
23. The counting of past services under regulation 10, however, would be relevant and directly co-related to the post on which direct appointment orpromotion under CAS itself is sought. Since, past services are required 9 Civil Misc. Application No. 398 of 2023 10 W.P. No. 580 of 2023 11 Writ-A No. 6927 of 2022 12 Special Appeal (D) no.257 of 2022 1804 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports for appointment to the post of Associate Professor and Professor only in the regulations, the relevance of regulation 10 would be restricted to these posts alone.
24. No previous teaching experience (including Assistant Professor) since is required as eligibility condition for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, as such regulation 10 would have no direct applicability/relevance for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor.
***
29. Regulation 10 specifically deals with a defined exigency i.e. counting of past services for direct recruitment and promotion under CAS. This exigency is not attracted in the present set of cases. Regulation 10 has a direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e. direct recruitment and promotion under CAS. Since past services are mandatorily required for appointment to the post of Associate Professor and Professor only, therefore, regulation 10 would have relevance only for appointment and promotion to such posts.
30. Reference of past services on the post of Assistant Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor appears to be a surplusage since the eligibility for the post of Assistant Professor does not require any teaching experience. Counting of past services as Assistant Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor serves no purpose in the scheme contained in the regulations. Regulation 10 of the regulations, therefore, has no applicability in the case of direct appointment to the post of Assistant Professor.
31. We are persuaded to take such a view as reference to teaching experience in table 3A has to be read in conjunction with post-doctoral experience as they constitute a composite class in itself. In the event regulation 10 conditions teaching experience, as is suggested by the respondents, the term post-doctoral experience would also have to be necessarily conditioned by regulation 10. This, however, does not appear to be the intent of the scheme contained in the regulations.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1805Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
32. Limiting teaching experience to the experience of teaching as an Assistant Professor, by drawing emoluments not less than the monthly gross salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor would clearly be reading something more than what is specified in the regulations itself. Counting of past services for direct recruitment or promotion under CAS to the post of Assistant Professor otherwise is not contemplated. Such a construction would also be unworkable once a condition of the kind is attached to the post-doctoral experiences also.
33. Post-doctoral experiences can be of different kinds, including research activity, teaching activity etc. If the provisions of regulation 10 are applied while awarding marks in clause 7 of table 3A then an anomalous situation may arise, inasmuch as teaching experience gathered by a post-doctoral candidate would entitle him to two marks if teaching by him is considered as post-doctoral experience but such marks would be denied if it is treated as teaching experience only. It is for this reason that table 3A of the regulations does not refer to or rely upon regulation 10. The interpretation drawn by the respondents to read regulation 10 in table 3A, which specifically lays down the criteria for short-listing of candidates for interview for the post of Assistant Professors, therefore, cannot be approved.
34. In our opinion, regulation 10 of the regulations would be attracted only where past services are required to be counted for direct recruitment and promotion under CAS. It cannot be transposed to be made applicable in criteria for short-listing of candidates to be called for interview, to the post of Assistant Professor, by any recognized process of interpretation. Such construction otherwise is not culled out from the scheme contained in the regulations nor it helps in short-listing of candidates to be called for interview.
35. Table 3A specifies the marks to be awarded to a candidate on different parameters specified therein. Apart from awarding marks for graduation; post-graduation;
M.Phil.; NET with JRF or NET; SLET/SET the table provides for teaching/post-doctoral experience of two marks for each 1806 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports year. Since the term teaching/post-doctoral experience is not defined in the regulations the ordinary/commonsensical meaning would have to be assigned to it.
36. Teaching experience as a full time teacher in a recognized university or its affiliated or constituent colleges with requisite qualification as per regulations for the post of Assistant Professor would sufficiently entitle a candidate to award of two marks for each year of teaching experience in clause 7 of table 3A. Nature of appointment i.e. substantive/adhoc/guest lecturer etc. or the amount of salary paid having not been specified in clause 7 of the table 3A are not relevant for the purposes of award of marks in clause 7 of table 3A for short-listing of candidates. Regulation 10 would otherwise not be applicable for the reasons recorded above. This construction would obviate the need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and the general instructions appended to the advertisement in that regard. It would also effectuate the cause of calling best candidates for interview, inasmuch as teaching experience of a candidate would be counted towards his merit for short-listing.
37. The interpretation assigned in this judgment to clause 7 of table 3A would subserve the object of short-listing the best candidates to be called for interview to the post of Assistant Professors. The selections already made, however, would not be reopened or challenged on the ground that short-listing of candidates was not done in the manner indicated in this judgment. This is so as the selected candidates are not a party to this bunch of petitions nor their selections otherwise have been assailed. The respondents would, henceforth, short-list the candidates to be called for interview for the post of Assistant Professor in the manner indicated in this judgment. On these terms the writ petition, special appeal and the review application are disposed of. No order is passed as to costs.”
submIssIons on behalf of The appellanTs
4. Learned senior counsel and counsel for Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College, respectively, submitted that the High [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1807Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. Court erred in substituting its opinion to the mandatory methodology followed by them. To persuade us to reverse the impugned order, they argued that:
a. For award of marks under clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, Reg.10 would apply, even for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor, as the post ‘Assistant Professor’ is expressly mentioned therein;
b. The process of shortlisting as adopted by the appellants is extremely important for them, considering that thousands of candidates apply for a few posts;
c. Even if Reg.10 is assumed to be not applicable, the appellants are entitled to adopt the methodology given therein as there is no specific bar in the 2018 Regulations. Hence, it is open for them to supplement such regulations so long as they are not illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to the 2018 Regulations;
d. The Division Bench while being seized of the writ petition ought to have noticed that respondent 1 had not averred anomaly in respect of clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B and in the absence thereof, and particularly when ‘post-doctoral experience’ had not been defined, could have sought clarification from the University Grants Commission 13 or the appellants as to what is meant by such expression but instead thereof, allowed itself to be guided by a perceived anomaly which was not even the pleaded case of respondent 1;
e. In practice, ‘post-doctoral experience’ refers to post-doctoral fellowship programmes awarded by various Government organizations like UGC, Indian Council of Social Science Research, Department of Science and Technology, etc., not including teaching activity, yet, it would appear from the impugned order that the Division Bench has proceeded to return findings which are based on mere assumptions;
f. There are decisions of this Court, viz. A.P.J. Abdul kalam Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of Mngt.
13 UGC
1808 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports & Engg. Technology14 and Visveswaraiah Technological University v. Krishnendu Halder15 where it has been laid down that while dilution of published norms is not permissible, prescribing enhanced norms is permissible without defeating any right of an aspirant for a post;
g. The decision of recent origin of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court16 also puts beyond any shadow of doubt that any procedure that is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved can be devised for taking a recruitment process towards its logical end by the recruiting bodies.
submIssIons on behalf of R espondenT 1
5. Learned senior counsel for respondent 1 submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly read down Reg. 10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations to save it from being struck down as arbitrary and hence there is no need for interference. He argued that: a. Emoluments-based distinction under Reg.10(f)(iii) violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution as the distinction between Assistant Professors, who are serving on contractual basis, and those who are appointed on regular basis, has no direct nexus with the objective of ensuring quality education;
b. Exclusion of candidates, who otherwise are qualified and have ample teaching experience (even though on contractual basis), undermines the objective of ensuring quality education; c. The Division Bench has rightly held that since ‘Assistant Professor’ is an entry level post, there is no need for any previous experience;
d. Although respondent 1 has since lost the right to participate in the process initiated by Allahabad University due to passage of time, the impugned order still holds good for the colleges where the process is yet to be concluded and it was urged that
14 (2021) 2 SCC 564
15 (2011) 4 SCC 606
16 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1809Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. a well-qualified candidate like respondent 1 should not lose the opportunity to compete with the whole lot of candidates aspiring for appointment in the manner directed by the Division Bench. pleadIng of RespondenT 1 In suppoRT of heR ClaIm ThaT R eg. 10(f)(iii) Is ultra vires aRTICle 14 of The C onsTITuTIon
6. In Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, respondent 1 prayed that Reg.10(f)(iii) be declared ultra vires since the same was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. She submitted that the said regulation is discriminatory as it creates a hierarchy among teachers (in other words, creates class amongst class) on the basis of salary drawn by them. This adversely impacts other equally qualified and experienced candidates, as they do not get any marks for their past teaching experience just because they were not drawing salary equivalent to gross monthly salary of a regular Assistant Professor. She further submitted that the salary a teacher receives does not have any visible correlation with the teaching experience. Reg.10(f)(iii) is, thus, liable to be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
7. Significantly, apart from the emoluments aspect, neither have we been able to trace any other point that respondent 1 sought to urge to invalidate Reg.10(f)(iii), nor was any other part of the 2018 Regulations subjected to challenge.
The Issue
8. Exception was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in shortlisting candidates for interview for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations. Since the High Court did not declare Reg.10(f)(iii) as ultra vires the Constitution or the parent enactment, i.e., the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 17 (in terms whereof the 2018 Regulations were framed) but read Reg.10 down, we are primarily tasked to decide whether the High Court was correct in reading it down in the manner it did. Should the answer be in the negative, allowing the appeal of Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College is the logical conclusion; and since the appeals would thus succeed, as 17 UGC Act, hereafter 1810 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports a corollary, there would be no impediment for the appellants to be guided, inter alia, by Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations for the purpose of shortlisting. On the contrary, if these appeals fail, all the universities and colleges across the country would be precluded from shortlisting candidates seeking appointment on the posts of Assistant Professor for interview in terms of Regs.4 and 10 read with Tables 3A and 3B of the 2018 Regulations. This is a conclusion that would logically follow from the view expressed in paragraph 22 of the decision of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India18 and the ramifications, to say the least, could be significant. obseRvaTIons /fIndIngs of The hIgh C ouRT whIle ReadIng down R eg . 10(f)(iii)
9. To recapitulate, the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to read down Reg.10 and held that the same would apply only where past services are required to be counted for direct recruitment and promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the posts of Associate Professor and Professor. The Division Bench took the view that marking candidates for their past teaching experiences in order to shortlist them for interview for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor was a surplusage, since the eligibility for the post of Assistant Professor does not require any teaching experience. Therefore, counting of past services on such posts serves no tangible purpose. In the absence of such a requirement, the applicability of Reg.10 to direct recruitment on the posts of Assistant Professor would not arise, thus, restricting the operation of Reg.10 only to posts which demanded prior experience i.e. Associate Professor and Professor.
10. The Division Bench further opined that ‘Teaching experience’ as provided under clause 7 of table 3A has to be read in conjunction with ‘Post-doctoral experience’. They form a composite class. Resultantly, if ‘teaching experience’ is allowed to be conditioned by Reg.10, then ‘post-doctoral experience’ mentioned in the same clause will also necessarily have to be conditioned by the said regulation. This will result into an anomalous situation. According to the Division Bench, ‘post-doctoral experiences’ can be of many kinds including research activity, teaching activity, etcetera and that if teaching experience of a post-doctoral candidate (who is not drawing gross monthly equivalent
18 (2004) 6 SCC 54
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1811Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. to that of a regular Assistant Professor) is counted as ‘post-doctoral experience’, then such candidate would be entitled to two marks per year of his/her experience; however, if it is counted as ‘teaching experience’, then the candidate would not be entitled to the marks as he/she as a teacher was not drawing salary as aforesaid. Hence, for the same candidate, two different markings are possible based on the interpretation chosen. This perceived anomaly guided the High Court to ultimately read down Reg.10.
J udICIal pReCedenTs and The pRInCIples flowIng TheRefRom
11. It would be of profit to read precedents and to deduce the principles of law laid down therein, having a bearing on the issue which we are tasked to decide.
On InterpretatIOn Of StatuteS
12. Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Girdhari Lal & sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur,19 in His Lordship’s inimitable style, had the occasion to emphasize:
“6. It may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this stage certain well-known principles of interpretation of statutes: Words are but mere vehicles of thought. They are meant to express or convey one’s thoughts. Generally, a person’s words and thoughts are coincidental. No problem arises then, but, not infrequently, they are not. It is common experience with most men, that occasionally there are no adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but not words which will express precisely. There is then a great fumbling for words. Long-winded explanations and, in conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous words and words which unwittingly convey more that one meaning are used. Where different interpretations are likely to be put on words and a question arises what an individual meant when he used certain words, he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws
19 (1986) 2 SCC 237
1812 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has said, a legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve those difficulties. The legislatures, unlike individuals, cannot come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties of interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws by finding out what the legislature meant is allotted to the courts. Now, if one person puts into words the thoughts of another (as the draftsman puts into words the thoughts of the legislature) and a third person (the court) is to find out what they meant, more difficulties are bound to crop up. The draftsman may not have caught the spirit of the legislation at all; the words used by him may not adequately convey what is meant to be conveyed; the words may be ambiguous: they may be words capable of being differently understood by different persons. How are the courts to set about the task of resolving difficulties of interpretation of the laws? The foremost task of a court, as we conceive it, in the interpretation of statutes, is to find out the intention of the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of the so-called golden rule of construction that where the words of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. A court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others as well as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may sometimes be possible that the plain meaning of the words does not convey and may even defeat the intention of the legislature; in such cases there, is no reason why the true intention of the legislature, if it can be determined, clearly by other means, should not be given effect. Words are meant to serve and not to govern and we are not to add the tyranny of words to the other tyrannies of the world.” [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1813Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
13. Another crisp and enlightening passage is found in Reserve Bank of India (supra), where His Lordship observed as follows: “33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. … ”
14. Reiteration of the principles of interpretation of statutes and elucidation of the approach to be adopted, as suggested by the Hon’ble Judge, are so lucid that we feel hesitant to say anything more. However, while proceeding with the task entrusted to us, certainly these principles will have a strong bearing.
Whether , WOrdS can be added tO Or deleted frOm a Statute?
15. Though Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations expressly refers to “Assistant Professor” as one of the three posts to which the same would apply, the effect and import of the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court is that henceforth, Reg.10 has to be read as if it does not apply to the post of Assistant Professor. The following decisions would throw light on whether the approach of the High Court was right or not.
1814 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
16. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen,20 this Court held:
“11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be.” (emphasis supplied)
17. This Court, in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal,21 had the occasion to lament by observing that:
“14. We are at a loss to understand the reasoning of the learned Judges in reading down the provisions in paragraph 2 in force prior to November 1, 1986 as ‘more than five years’ and as ‘more than four years’ in the same paragraph for the period subsequent to November 1, 1986. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when
20 (2010) 2 SCC 513
21 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1815Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc. the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities……….”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The legal position is, thus, clear. A situation could arise where plain and literal reading of a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose for which the enactment was introduced and, the situation, necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction which would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. The court would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while it irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material of which the legislation is woven.
On the prIncIple Of readIng dOWn
19. Examining the reasons assigned by the High Court for reading down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations would necessitate an understanding of what the principle of ‘reading down’ is all about. Precedents on ‘reading down’ of a provision are legion and only a few of them are referred to here.
20. In CST v. Radhakrishan, 22 this Court held:
“15. … In considering the validity of a statute the presumption is in favour of its constitutionality and the
22 (1979) 2 SCC 249
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.