Rajaram S/O Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through L.Rs. v. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through L.Rs
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 51; [2023] 1 S.C.R. 809
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Appellant and His Wife Sought Amount – However
- Decided
- 18 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1978/2013
- Sections
- 138, 139, 482, 118
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 809[2023] 1 S.C.R. 809 RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU (SINCE DECEASED)
THROUGH L.RS.
v.
MARUTHACHALAM (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1978 of 2013)
JANUARY 18, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.] Money Lending – The appellant’s wife subscribed to chit funds (1992 and 1995) with the respondent for which two signed blank cheques were submitted as security – After maturity of the chit funds, appellant and his wife sought release of the subscription amount – However, respondent presented those cheques for encashment without any intimation to appellant – Said cheques were dishonoured as the appellant had closed the account – Respondent filed two complaint cases u/s 138 of NI Act – Both cases were dismissed by the trial Court – Thereafter, respondent filed suits for recovery of money on the basis of the Promissory Notes –Both the suits were dismissed – Appeals against the judgments in the criminal matters were allowed by the High Court and order of conviction and sentence was passed – Also, the suits were decreed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Considering the criminal appeals first, the trial court found that Income Tax Returns of the complainant did not disclose that he lent amount to the accused, and that the declared income was not sufficient to give loan of Rs. 3 lakhs –The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities – Applying this principle, the trial Court had found that the accused had rebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and attending circumstances – In the instant case, the defence raised by the appellant satisfies the standard of ‘preponderance of probability’ – High Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal of the appellant – Insofar as civil appeals are concerned, High Court A B C D E F G H 810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
on basis of the evidence on record, relying on the preponderance of probability, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had the financial ability to lend sum of Rs.3 lakhs – As the appellant’s wife was not examined as witness, the High Court found that the best available evidence was withheld by the defendants/appellants and as such principle of adverse inference applicable – Therefore, no reason to interfere with the judgments and the orders passed by the High Court in civil appeals.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Consider the criminal appeals first, after analyzing all these pieces of evidence, the Trial Court found that the Income Tax Returns of the complainant did not disclose that he lent amount to the accused, and that the declared income was not sufficient to give loan of Rs.3 lakh. Therefore, the case of the complainant that he had given a loan to the accused from his agricultural income was found to be unbelievable by the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that it was highly doubtful as to whether the complainant had lent an amount of Rs.3 lakh to the accused. The Trial Court also found that thecomplaint had failed to produce the promissory note alleged to have been executed by the accused on 25th October 1998. After taking into consideration the defence w itnesses and the attending circumstances, the learned Trial Court found that the defence was a possible defence and as such, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. Applying this principle, the Trial Court had found that the accused had rebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and attending circumstances. In the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the defence raised by the appellant satisfies the standard of “preponderance of probability”.The High Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal of the appellant. [Paras 20, 25 and 27][819-E- H; 820-G-H; 821-C] A B C D E F G H
2. A distinguishing fact between the criminal proceedings and the civil proceedings in the present case is that, while in the criminal proceedings the complainant had failed to produce the promissory notes, in the civil proceedings, the complainant had proved the promissory notes. The High Court found that the Civil Appeals were required to be decided on the basis of the preponderance of probabilities. The High Court found that the complainant had established that he was working as a LIC Agent, that his father was owning extensive agricultural properties and that he was deriving agricultural income. The High Court, on the basis of the evidence placed on record, relying on the preponderance of probability, came to a conclusion that the plaintiff had the financial ability to lend the sum of Rs.3 lakh as on 20th October 1998. The High Court also found that the appellant’s wife was not examined as a witness in the said case so as to probabilize the defence plea. The High Court found that the best available evidence was withheld by the defendants/appellants herein and as such, the principle of adverse inference was also applicable. [Para 29][821-E-G]
3. The High Court rightly observed that the adjudication in civil matters is based on preponderance of probabilities whereas adjudication in criminal cases is based on the principle that the accused is presumed to be innocent and the guilt of the accused should be proved to the hilt and the proof should be beyond all reasonable doubt. [Para 30][822-A-B]
4. In the result, this Court pass the following order:
(i) Criminal Appeal Nos. 1978 of 2013 and 1990 of 2013 are allowed and the common judgment of conviction dated 28th October 2008 and order of sentence dated 30th October 2008 respectively are quashed and set aside. The judgments and orders dated 10th July 2011 passed by the Trial Court is confirmed. RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU THROUGH L.RS.v.
MARUTHACHALAM THROUGH L.RS.
A B C D E F G H 812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
(ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 10500 of 2013 and 10501 of 2013 are dismissed. However, the decrees of the High Court are modified, thereby restricting them to the amount already deposited by the appellants in this Court in the civil and criminal proceedings, along with interest accrued thereon. [Para 32][822-E-G] RohitbhaiJivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr.
(2019) 18 SCC 106 - held inapplicable.
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 :
[2019] 6 SCR 555; Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019)
4 SCC 197 : [2019] 2 SCR 24 ; Kalamani Tex and Anr v. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283 - referred to.
Case Law Reference [2019] 6 SCR 555 referred to Para 8 [2019] 2 SCR 24 referred to Para 10 (2019) 18 SCC 106 held inapplicable Para 10 (2021) 5 SCC 283 referred to Para 10 CRIMINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1978 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2008 and 30.10.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.A. Nos.1031 &1032 of 2001.
With Criminal Appeal No.1990 Of 2013, Civil Appeal Nos.10500 And 10501 of 2013.
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Neha Sharma, Anil Agarwalla, Advs. for the Appellants.
V. Prabhakar, Pramit Saxena, R. Chandrachud, Advs. for the Respondents.
A B C D E F G H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. The Criminal Appeals challenge the common judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28th October 2008 and 30th October 2008 passed by the Madras High Court whereby the Appellant has been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “the N.I. Act”) and has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 7 Lakhs in each case in respect of two cheques for an amount of Rs. 3.5 Lakhs.
2. The Civil Appeals challenge the judgments dated 08th August 2011 and 03rd February 2012 passed by the Madras High Court whereby the Original Suits filed by the plaintiff- respondents for recovery of money on the basis of promissory notes were decreed.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as their status before this Court.
4. Since both the Criminal Appeals arise out of a common judgment, we consider it apposite to refer to the facts in Criminal Appeal No.1978 of 2013. Insofar as the Civil Appeals are concerned, while they arise out of different judgments, for the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the facts arising from Civil Appeal No.10501 of 2013.
5. The present appeals arise from the following factual matrix: 5.1 In 1992, the Appellant-Rajaram’s wife subscribed to a 5year chit-fund with one Maruthachalam, the Respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 1978/2013 and Civil Appeal No.10500/ 2013. Upon the Respondent-Maruthachalam’s persuasion that, in order to be a successful bidder, a security by way of a blank cheque must be submitted, the Appellant submitted two signed blank cheques bearing nos. 237954 and 237956 on behalf of his wife, since she did not have a bank account. It is to be noted that the cheques were drawn on the account of M/s Brinda Engineering, the sole proprietorship concern of the Appellant, maintained with the Laxmi Vilas Bank Ltd.
5.2 It is further the case of the Appellant that in 1995, his wife subscribed to yet another 5-year chit-fund with the Respondent-Maruthachalam.
RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU THROUGH L.RS.v.
MARUTHACHALAM THROUGH L.RS.
A B C D E F G H 814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
5.3. In 1997, the bank account on which the said cheques were drawn was closed due to non-operation.
5.4 The first chit matured in 1997 and, since the wife of the Appellant was never a successful bidder, thus, the Appellant and his wife repeatedly requested the Respondent to release the amount of the chits, but the Respondent never did so. On the contrary, the Respondent promised to keep the amount as a deposit and pay interest. Similarly, the second chit matured in 1999, whereafter also the wife of the Appellant was never a successful bidder. Thereafter, repeated requests for releasing the subscription amount to the tune of Rs. 6 lakhs for both the chits were made on their behalf, but to no avail. Finally, the Appellant and his wife threatened the Respondent with legal action, whereupon the Respondent immediately presented the cheques for encashment without any information or intimation to the Appellant.
5.5 The Cheque No. 237954 was dated 20th October 1999 in favour of Respondent-Nachimuthu (who happens to be the brother-in-law of Maruthachalam) for an amount of Rs.
3,50,000/, and was presented for encashment on 04th November 1999 by the Respondent through his banker Indian Overseas Bank. The said cheque returned unpaid on 14th November 1999 with an endorsement stating “account closed”.
5.6 The other Cheque No. 237956 was dated 25th October 1999 in favour of the Respondent-Maruthachalam for an amount of Rs. 3,50,000/-, and was presented for encashment on 04th November 1999 by the Respondent through his banker Indian Overseas Bank. The said cheque too returned unpaid on 14th November 1999 with an endorsement stating “account closed”.
5.7 Statutory Notices dated 15th November 1999 were sent in respect of the aforesaid dishonoured cheques, which were duly replied by the accused/Appellant denying the existence of any legally enforceable debt and stating therein that the Respondent is liable to pay the chit amount along with A B C D E F G H subsequent interest. Since the amount was not paid, the Respondents instituted Complaint Cases under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, being CC No. 26 of 2000 in respect of Cheque No. 237954 and CC No. 32 of 2000 in respect of Cheque No. 237956. Both the cases were dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 10th July 2001 vide separate judgments.
5.8 Pursuant to the dismissal of the aforesaid cases, both the Respondents instituted civil/original suits for recovery of money on the basis of Promissory Notes.
5.9 Original Suit No. 112/2003 (earlier OS No. 602/2002) was instituted by the Respondent-Nachimuthu, alleging that the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs on 20th October 1998 from him and had executed a promissory note on the same day thereby promising to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. It was further alleged that the Appellant had issued a cheque on 20th October 1999 for Rs. 3,50,000/- towards the discharge of his liability and when the same was presented for encashment, it was dishonoured as the Appellant had closed the account.
Criminal Case No. 32/2000 was pursued under Section 138 of the N.I. Act which was dismissed against which an appeal was pending before the High Court.
5.10 Another Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 (earlier OS 746 of 2002) was instituted by the Respondent-Maruthachalam, alleging that the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs on 25th October 1998 from him and had executed a promissory note on 25th October 1998, thereby promising to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. It was further alleged that the Appellant issued a cheque on 20th October 1999 for Rs. 3,50,000/- towards the discharge of his liability and when the same was presented for encashment, it was dishonoured as the Appellant had closed the account. Criminal Case No. 26/2000 was pursued under Section 138 of the N.I. Act which was dismissed against which an appeal was pending before the High Court.
5.11 Original Suit No. 112 of 2003 and Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 06th January RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU THROUGH L.RS.v.
MARUTHACHALAM THROUGH L.RS. [B. R. GAVAI, J.] A B C D E F G H 816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
2004 and 29th July 2005 respectively. As against both the judgments, appeals were preferred before the High Court. 5.12 The Appeals against the judgments in criminal matters were allowed by the High Court vide common judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.10.2008 and 30th October 2008.
5.13 In Appeal, Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 and Original Suit No. 112 of 2003 were decreed by the High Court vide judgments dated 08th August 2011 and 03rd February 2012 respectively.
5.14 The Appeals against all the 3 judgments of the High Court are before us and are being disposed of vide this common judgment.
6. We have heard Ms. Neha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in all the appeals, and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for both the Respondents in all the appeals.
7. Ms. Neha Sharma submits that the High Court has erroneously reversed the well-reasoned judgements of the learned Trial Court. She submitted that blank cheques issued in the year 1992 by way of security for chit-funds were misused by the Respondents in the year 1999. She further submitted that in the year 1999, when the cheques were sent for encashment, the Appellant was no longer the proprietor of M/s Brinda Engineering and the bank account on which the said cheques were drawn was not operated after 1992, and had already closed in 1997 due to non-operation. She further submitted that even before the account was closed down, the wife of the Appellant became the sole proprietor of the enterprise, and thus, the appellant could not have signed the said cheques in the capacity of the proprietor of M/s Brinda Engineering.
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