Siby Thomas v. M/S. Somany Ceramics Ltd
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 890; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 821
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Sanjay Kumar Headnotes Issue for Consideration: in the Impugned Order, Justice That
- Decided
- 10 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3139/2023
- Sections
- 138, 141, 482, 1, 141(1)
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[2023] 13 S.C.R. 821 : 2023 INSC 890
CASE DETAILS
SIBY THOMAS
v.
M/S. SOMANY CERAMICS LTD.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3139 of 2023)
OCTOBER 10, 2023
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: In the impugned order, the High Court declined to quash the complaint u/s.138 r/w. s.141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 qua the appellant-accused no.4 in exercise of the power u/s. 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s. 138 r/w. s.141 – Respondent filed complaint u/s. 138 r/w. s.141 of the NI Act – Appellant set up twin grounds to seek quashment of the complaint against him; firstly, that he had resigned from the partnership firm on 28.05.2013 whereas the cheque in question was issued on 21.08.2015 and secondly, that the complaint is devoid of mandatory averments required to be made in terms of sub-Section 1 of s.141 of the NI Act, as relates him: Held: It is not averred anywhere in the complaint that the appellantaccused no.4 was in charge of the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed – What is stated in the complaint is only that the accused Nos. 2 to 6 being the partners are responsible for the day-to-day conduct and business of the company – It is also relevant to note that an overall reading of the complaint would not disclose any clear and specific role of the appellant-accused no.4 – In the complaint, it was alleged that accused No.1 through accused No.2 had purchased the goods from the complainant on credit basis through proper sales invoices and, in paragraph 6 it was alleged that for liquidation of legal liability outstanding accused Nos. 2 and 3 issued cheque in favour of the complainant from the account of accused No.1 – The averments in the complaint filed by the respondent are not sufficient to satisfy the mandatory SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.822 requirements u/s. 141(1) of the NI Act – Since the averments in the complaint are insufficient to attract the provisions u/s. 141(1) of the NI Act, to create vicarious liability upon the appellant, he is entitled to succeed in this appeal. [Paras 12, 13, 17] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Ingredients of s.141 – Vicarious liability:
Held: A vicarious liability would be attracted only when the ingredients of s.141(1) of the NI Act, are satisfied – It would also reveal that merely because somebody is managing the affairs of the company, per se, he would not become in charge of the conduct of the business of the company or the person responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company – A bare perusal of s.141(1) of the NI Act, would reveal that only that person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company alone shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished. [Para 16] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Specific averments in the complaint to make the accused vicariously liable:
Held: In the decision in S.P. Mani’s case in paragraph 47 (a) it was held that the primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. [Para 11]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1238; Gunmala Sales Private Limited v. Anu Mehta (2015) 1 SCC 103 : [2014] 10 SCR 1117; Ashok Shewakramani & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. 2023 INSC 692 – relied on.
Anita Malhotra v. Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 520 : 2011 [13] SCR 76 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3139 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2019 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 52299 of 2019.
Appearances:
Wills Mathews, Karthik S. D., Paul John Edison, Dhanesh M. Nair, Manu Prakash Upadhyay, Ms. Shweta Garg, Advs. for the Appellant. Vipin Kumar Jai, Adv. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This Appeal by accused No.4 in the complaint filed by the respondent herein under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the NI Act’) is directed against the order dated 06.12.2019 in CRM-M No.52299 of 2019 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. As per the impugned order the High Court declined to quash the complaint qua the appellant in exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr. PC’).
3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
4. Virtually, the appellant set up twin grounds to seek quashment of the complaint against him; firstly, that he had resigned from the partnership firm on 28.05.2013 whereas the cheque in question was issued on 21.08.2015 and secondly, that the complaint is devoid of mandatory averments required to be made in terms of sub-Section 1 of Section 141 of the NI Act, as relates him. The High Court found that the contention in regard to the maintainability of the complaint against the appellant, owing to his retirement from the partnership firm prior to the issuance of the cheque in question, is a matter of evidence and ultimately, the appellant would have to lead evidence and prove that fact. Consequently, it was held that the complaint could not be rejected qua the appellant at the initial stage in exercise of the powers under Section 482 Cr.PC.
SIBY THOMAS v. M/S. SOMANY CERAMICS LTD.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.824
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that even if it is taken that the factum of his retirement from the partnership firm on 28.5.2013 was prior to the cheque in question on 21.8.2015 is a matter of evidence, the complaint as against the appellant is liable to be quashed owing to the absence of mandatory averments required to be made in terms of Section 141 (1) of the NI Act, in the complaint. In other words, it is submitted that though the respondent had specified or elaborated the role of some of the accused in the complaint as relates the appellant averments elaborating/specifying his role in the day-to-day affairs of the partnership firm much-less mandatorily required averments for his prosecution are conspicuously absent in the complaint. To drive home the contentions that the learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to paragraphs 3 to 6 of the complaint. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions of this Court in Anita Malhotra v. Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr.1 and a decision of Two-Judge Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 879 of 2023 titled Ashok Shewakramani & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.2 and connected cases dated 03.08.2023 to buttress the said contentions.
6. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the complaint would reveal that the averments thereunder are sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirement in terms of Section 141 of the NI Act, qua the appellant as well. In order to support his contention the learned counsel relied on the decision of a two- Judge Bench of this Court in S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan3.
7. In view of the rival contentions as above it is apposite to refer to the averments in paragraph 3 and 4 of the complaint, which is annexed to the SLP. They read thus:
“3. That the accused No.1 is a partnership-firm with the name and style of M/s Tile Store, having its office at 5-654/B, Jyothis Complex, By-pass Road, Eranhipalam, Calicut-673006 (Kerala), while accused
1 (2012) 1 SCC 520
2 2023 INSC 692
3 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1238 No.2 to 6 are the partners of the accused No.1. The accused No.2 to 6 being the partners are responsible for the day to day conduct and business of the accused No. 1.
4.That the accused No.1 through its partners i.e. accused No.2 to 6, on the basis of the authority vested in them approached to the complainant for purchasing the ceramic tiles, sanitary wares and bath fitting from the complainant on credit basis. The request of the accused No.1 was accepted by the complainant and the accused agreed to pay the amount of the goods purchased by them to the complainant within one month and it was also agreed that if the accused failed to make the payment within one month in that case they shall also be liable to pay interest @ 24% per annum on the balance sale consideration till its full realization.”
(Underline supplied)
8. As noticed hereinbefore, the parties are at issue over the question as to whether the averments in the complaint satisfy the requirements under Section 141 (1) of the N.I. Act. True that in paragraph 3 it is stated that accused No.1 is a partnership firm and accused Nos.2 to 6 are the partners of accused No.1 and they, being the partners, are responsible for the day-to-day contact and business of accused No.1. In paragraph 4 what is stated is that accused No.1 through its partners i.e., accused Nos. 2 to 6, on the basis of the authority vested in them approached the complainant for purchasing the ceramic tiles, sanitary-wares and bath fittings from the complainant on credit basis. Indubitably, besides the aforesaid averments no other averments are made in the complaint in regard to the appellant’s role. Therefore, the question is whether the averments referred to hereinbefore are sufficient to prosecute the appellant under Section 138 of the NI Act, on the afore-extracted averments. We are not oblivious of the fact that the appellant has also got a contention that he retired from the partnership firm much prior to the issuance of the cheque in question. It is only proper and profitable to refer to sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the N.I. Act in view of the rival contentions. It reads thus:- “(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct SIBY THOMAS v. M/S. SOMANY CERAMICS LTD.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.] SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.826 of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: 22 [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]”
9. Bearing in mind the averments made in the complaint in relation to the role of the appellant and sub-section (1) of Section 141, we will have to appreciate the rival contentions. Going by the decision relied on by the respondent in S.P. Mani’s case (supra) it is the primary responsibility of the complainant to make specific averments in the complaint, so as to make the accused vicariously liable. Relying on paragraph 47(b) of the said decision learned counsel appearing for the respondent would also submit that the complainant is supposed to know only generally as to who were in charge of the affairs of the company or firm, as the case maybe and he relied on mainly the following recitals thereunder:
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